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2024 Journal Impact Factor - 0.6
2024 CiteScore - 1.9
ISSN 2083-6473
ISSN 2083-6481 (electronic version)
Editor-in-Chief
Associate Editor
Prof. Tomasz Neumann
Published by
TransNav, Faculty of Navigation
Gdynia Maritime University
3, John Paul II Avenue
81-345 Gdynia, POLAND
e-mail transnav@umg.edu.pl
GPS Jamming and Spoofing – Countermeasures for Safety and Security
1 Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology, Tokyo, Japan
2 City University of New York, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, USA
2 City University of New York, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, USA
ABSTRACT: This paper aims to clarify the legal status of Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming and spoofing, which have a dichotomous nature of countermeasures and cyber-attacks. GPS is an indispensable tool to enable ships, aircraft, and weapons to navigate to a predetermined destination. The jamming and spoofing of these signals apparently hinder safe navigation through Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). At the same time, jamming has been positively employed to prevent the triggering of explosives and to conceal communications between terrorists during critical operations. In light of these positive uses of jamming, international legal structures have not been established to prohibit jamming and spoofing. In order to find essential factors to help legalise or criminalise jamming, this research analyses cases of GPS jamming. Both Ben Gurion International Airport in Israel and the Black Sea have often been disrupted by intentional interference with GPS, such as jamming and spoofing.
KEYWORDS: Freedom of Navigation, GPS Jamming and Spoofing, International Law Frameworks, Law of War (LOAC), Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Self-Defence and Targeted Killing, Cyber Interference with PNT Signals, Legal Regulation of Maritime Security
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Citation note:
Okochi M., Haberfeld M.: GPS Jamming and Spoofing – Countermeasures for Safety and Security. TransNav, the International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, Vol. 19, No. 3, doi:10.12716/1001.19.03.26, pp. 917-929, 2025
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