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ISSN 2083-6473
ISSN 2083-6481 (electronic version)
 

 

 

Editor-in-Chief

Associate Editor
Prof. Tomasz Neumann
 

Published by
TransNav, Faculty of Navigation
Gdynia Maritime University
3, John Paul II Avenue
81-345 Gdynia, POLAND
www http://www.transnav.eu
e-mail transnav@am.gdynia.pl
Journal Vol. 6 No. 1 - March 2012
A. Coutroubis, G. Kiourktsoglou
ABSTRACT: This paper constitutes an effort to substantiate whether there are certain nationalities of crews which are for ethnic and / or cultural reasons more (or less) vulnerable to fall victims of PIRATEs off Somalia. Such groups (if there are any) in effect indirectly ?support? Somali piracy and for this reason they are being re-ferred to throughout the paper as ?Passively Supportive Crews?. The method (and the rational) in use within this paper is straightforward. Over a three and a half year period (2007 ? June/2010) an analysis is being conducted of all the reported (to the I.M.O. and I.M.B.) attacks in the region off Somalia. The analysis focuses on the crew composition of the attacked vessels with special interest cast upon those Ships (meaning the crews) which eventually succumbed to the PIRATEs and were in the end seajacked.
Journal Vol. 6 No. 2 - June 2012
D. Duda, K. Wardin
ABSTRACT: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden region became a real threat at the beginning of the 21st century for the safety of transport in the region. For these reasons, the international community have taken preventive actions and developed measures to be applied to fight piracy and increase safety in the region. These multilateral activities are based both on international efforts to improve the political situation in Somalia, where PIRATEs have their bases, as well as the introduction of certain practices and procedures to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden region.
Journal Vol. 8 No. 3 - September 2014
A. Dimitrevich, V. Torskiy
ABSTRACT: In recent years nearly 5000 seafarers have been hijacked and detained for months often in appalling conditions, while thousands of others have been the victims of a PIRATE attack. Given these numerous concerns, a pan-industry alliance of ship owners, unions, managers, manning agents, insurers and shipping- and welfare associations (maritime, labour, faith or secular) has come together to establish the "Maritime Piracy: a Humanitarian Response Programme" (MPHRP). The objectives of this Programme address the three phases of "pre-, during and post-incident", with the aim of implementing a model of assisting seafarers and their families with the humanitarian aspects of a traumatic incident caused by a piracy attack, armed robbery or being taken hostage.
Journal Vol. 6 No. 1 - March 2012
D. Duda, K. Wardin
ABSTRACT: Modern piracy is one of the items appearing on the seas, which has a great impact on maritime transport in many regions of the world. Changes that happened at the end of XX and beginning of XXI century became significant in the renaissance of piracy. The problem is present in many parts of the world but it become a real threat in year 2008 around a small country of Somalia and in the area called the Horn of Africa especially in the region of Gulf of Aden. Because international waters are very important for maritime transport so PIRATEs? attacks have great influence over this transport and on international community.
Journal Vol. 11 No. 4 - December 2017
K. Watanabe, K. Takashima, K. Mitsumura, K. Utsunomiya, S. Takasaki
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we present a concept of an application of UAV drones as a possible low-cost device to avoid PIRATE attacks. Recent UAV drone can be operated in the range of more than 2km and transmit very clear images. PIRATEs will be approaching using a small boat and they will be climbing up along the sidewall of the ship. We tried several experiments in our laboratory to check how the drone can be applied to interfere the PIRATE approaching and climbing. We present a conceptual structure of an anti-piracy drone system and fabricated a part of device including a thermo camera sensor and a net launcher to stall the boat. The results showed this method seems effective considering the cost, although the operator must be trained to control the drone properly.
Journal Vol. 14 No. 2 - June 2020
A. Goudosis, S.K. Katsikas
ABSTRACT: The Automatic Identification System (AIS) offers automatic traffic control and collision avoidance services to the maritime transportation sector worldwide. Because AIS lacks security mechanisms, it is vulnerable to misuse and exploitation by unlawful adversaries (e.g. sea-PIRATEs, terrorists, smugglers). To address the security issues of the AIS, in an earlier paper [1], we proposed the deployment of a Maritime Certificate-less Identity-Based (mIBC) public-key cryptography infrastructure that enhances AIS with on-demand anonymity, authentication, and encryption capabilities. In this paper we address implementation aspects of that infrastructure. In particular, we propose to use the Sakai-Kasahara Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) approach to implement the mIBC infrastructure, following the IEEE 1363.3-2013 standard for Identity-Based Cryptography.
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