567
1 INTRODUCTION
Azimuth thrusters are widely used in the maritime
industry,specificallyontugs,offshoreandpassenger
vessels.Theyarerenownedforprovidingvesselswith
exceptionalmaneuverability.
Azimuth propulsion performs best in automated
low and zerospeed tracking applications such as
autotrackinganddynamicpositioning,assystemcan
apply
necessary steering forces at any speed in any
directions.
However, it also has some drawbacks. Higher
complexityleadstotwoapparentproblems:
Vessel with azimuth thrusters is much more
complicatedinmanualhandling.
Higher propulsion system complexity leads to a
largerpossibilityfortechnicalproblems.
Many technical problems related to seals and
bearings cannotbe solvedin a day and, apparently,
do not appear in a day. They require correct
assessment of
visible symptoms, possible defects
locationandtimelycorrectivemaintenance.
Whenitcomeseithertosteeringsystemorpower
supplysystemfaults,itismoresituationalandoften
requires immediate actions from both bridge and
engineroomteams.
Therefore,simulatortrainingcanhelptobuildup
ahabitforspecificactionsand
acommunicationflow
betweenteamsincaseofsuchemergencies.
2 STEERINGMODESHIERARCHY
A typical azimuth thrusters system has a specific
proceduralflowgiveninfig.1.
Recommendations for Training of Crews Working on
Diesel-Electric Vessels Equipped with Azimuth
Thrusters
O.Pipchenko,M.Tsymbal&V.Shevchenko
NationalUniversity“OdessaMaritimeAcademy”,Odessa,Ukraine
ABSTRACT: This study addresses the problem of training the officers, which are assigned to an electrical
drivenvesselsequippedwithazimuththrusters.Apairofomnidirectionalthrustersincombinationwithpower
plant system containing several diesel generators imply a potential for a variety of
different emergency
scenarios,whichalsoincludespartialorfulllossofcontrolorblackout.Thesefaultscenarioswereclassifiedin
thearticlewithpredefinedrisklevelsdependingonthearea,timelimitation,modeofoperationandfaultitself.
Mutualresponsibilitiesandactionalgorithmsforbridgeandengineteamsina
stepbystepmannerhavebeen
developedforeachscenario.Personnelbehavioraldifferencesinbothexpectedandunexpectedemergencies
havealsobeenstudied.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 3
September 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.03.17
568
(1) DP / Track control: Synchronized steering
(2) Autopilot: Synchronized steering
(4) Follow-up (Tiller): Synchronized steering
(5) Follow-up: Independent steering
(6) Non follow-up (BRG): Independent steering
(3) Follow-up: Synchronized steering
(7) Non follow-up (ECR / SGR): Independent
steering
(8) Direct (SGR): Solenoid steering
Figure1.Steeringmodeshierarchy.
Modes (1) and (2) usually require routine
monitoring and minimum intervention from an
operator, except parameters adjustment, based on
shipbehavior.
However, simple things like steering angle
limitation along with reduced speed may lead to
temporarylossofsteeringinpoorweatherconditions.
Also in synchronous (both thrusters engaged in
steering)
auto tracking mode vessel speed might be
unstable.Thisproblemcanbetreatedwithsettingthe
system into asynchronous mode, where one of the
thrusters is pushing only straight ahead. From the
other hand,on theminimum speed of 1.52.5knots,
increase of rudder limit above conventional 35
can
dramaticallyimprovetheship’sstabilityontrack.
Modes(3)and(4)arecommonlyusedathighand
moderatespeedstochangeheadingmanually.Inthis
case, rudder limits have to be checked prior to
maneuver to avoid abrupt turning, as all produced
thrustwillbedirectedtoagiven
angle.
Mode(5)isamaneuveringmode,whichrequires
specificskillsfromanoperator.Manualmaneuvering
technics and precautions on thrusters’ allocation is
discussed in several publications including
Kobylinski(2013),Ververk(2002)andNowicki(2014).
Thisstipulatesthefirststageofofficerstraining,dedicated
togainingamanualhandlingskillfor
thebridgestaff.
Nonfollow up (6) is the closest to emergency
mode, when a thruster does not respond to
manipulator. Generally, there are might be three
optionsavailablefortheoperator:
NFUSteeringangle;
NFURPM;
NFUPitchangle.
Simply wrong sequence of actions during a
transferfromonecontrolsystemtoanother(i.e.from
DP to a conventional autopilot) may lead to a
situation when one of the thrusters is stuck on a
certainazimuthangle.
Thissituationhastobeassessedimmediatelyand
resolved
withuseofNFUcontrolbuttons.
Modes(6)(8)areemergencymodes,whichrequire
constant communication with an engine team. Non
followupanddirectsolenoidsteeringcanonlysavea
vessel from imminent danger, after that a better
solutionhastobefoundinordertoregaincontrolof
the
vessel.
3 RISKBASEDAPPROACH
There is no danger in the loss of steering alone.
However,depending onthesituation,lossofsteering
may lead to a navigational incident such as
grounding, collision or various heavy weather
damage (i.e. loss of cargo due to heavy rolling
resultedfromvesselsinability
tokeepasafeheading).
Inrelationtogroundings andcollisions,intuitional
approachcanbeused.
AstheRISKisaproductofaLIKELIHOOD(LH)
and a SEVERITY (SV), we should define these two
componentsfirst.
Apparently, being closer to a hazard with no
steering means bigger likelihood of running
across
thathazard.Thereareseveralfactorsinfluencingthe
LIKELIHOOD.
Let’sname the firstfactorHAZARDS DENCITY
(HD).Evenifthe initialCPA (secondfactor) isnon
zerothereisstillarisktohitanobjectindensetraffic
ornarrowwaters.Although,ifitisaship,it
willmost
likelytrytodeviatefromourwaytogiveussearoom
asnecessary,whichsomewhatreducestheRISK.
However, the most critical is the time factor or
TCPA to the closest hazard, which almost
straightforwardly specifies how much time we have
tosolvetheproblemtoavoid
groundingorcollision.
In the most general cases, the SEVERITY of
collisionorgroundingcanberelatedstraittoaship’s
velocity. The higher the velocity the more damage
maybecaused.
InordertoobtaincorrectLHvalueHD,CPAand
TCPAshallbeinverselyproportional:
11 1
L
HST
H
DCPATCPA

, (1)
whereSThazardmovabilityindex.
Basingonthekinematicenergyequation
2
0,5
E
mU
,
where m ship’s mass; U ship’s speed, although
mass can be assumed as constant and thus will not
affecttheRISKforthepa rticularvessel,severitycan
begivenas
2
SV U
, (2)
In table 1 RISK level is given in each line for a
possiblecollisionwithastationaryobject.
569
Table1.Riskassessmentfactors
_______________________________________________
LikelihoodSeverity Risk
_______________________________________________
HD CPA TCPA Stationary Speed
nm nm hours
_______________________________________________
10  1 210.05
5 0.510.5‐NO 52
2 0.25 0.51040 
0.50.10.25 1.0‐YES 201600
_______________________________________________
These factors form multidimensional RISK.
However, to get better visual representation lets
define HD = 1, CPA = 1 for a stationary target and
calculatetheRISKmatrix.
RISKlevelscanbedescribedasfollows:
BLACK(risk>400)immediateactionsrequired
toavoidanaccidentortominimize
itsconsequences.
Speed has to be reduced in any possible way.
Assessment of possible catastrophic consequences to
bedone.
BLUE(risk>200)immediateactionsrequiredto
avoid an accident or to minimize its consequences.
Speedhastobereducedinanypossibleway.
RED (risk > 100)
Speed has to be reduced to a
levelwhereadditionalmeansofsteering(retractable
or side thrusters) can be utilized. As soon as safe
heading is achieved, assess options for emergency
anchorage. Try to regain the steering with main
meansofpropulsion.
YELLOW (risk < 100) additional means of
steering
canbeutilized.Assessoptionsforemergency
anchorage. Try to regain the steering with main
meansofpropulsion.
Table2.Riskmatrix:lossofsteering
_______________________________________________
RiskTCPA,hours
1 0.75 0.50.25
_______________________________________________
Speed 1 1 1.33  2 4
knots 5 25  33  50  100
10 100 133 200 400
20 400 533 800 1600
_______________________________________________
4 POWERMANAGEMENTANDBLACKOUT
PREVENTION
Thereisavarietyofpossiblefaultsthatmayhappen
tothesteerablethrusters(IMCA2011&2012),which
goesallthewayfrompowergenerationtoadirected
thrustdelivery.
Thisstipulatesthesecondstageofofficerstraining,
dedicated to gaining a power
management skill for
the engine staff. This also includes changeover and
synchronization procedures between generators and
systemrestartafterblackout.
Generallyspeaking,ablackoutcanbeavoidedby
utilizingtwo different approaches(IMCA2000).The
first one is used on conventional DP II/III class
vessels, which usually have from four
to six
generators. During DP operations, a vessel usually
hasan open busbartie breaker,which splits power
delivery in two equal groups, feeding two separate
groupsofthrusters.
Suchapproachadvantagesareeliminationoftotal
blackoutincaseofanysingleelectricalormechanical
fault,greaterreliabilityandlessdieselgenerator(DG)
restarting time in case of partial blackout.
Disadvantages are high fuel consumption at low
loads, low power plant flexibility, in addition
blackout on one side leads to inability to operate a
certaingroupofthrustersandapparentlyreducesthe
steeringability.
The second way of providing electrical
power
continuitywithoutsplittingbusbarsistheapplication
ofpowerplantadvancedprotectionsystem.
The primary function of protection schemesis to
isolatefaultycircuitsandlimitdamagetoequipment.
Thegreatestthreatto any systemisthe shortcircuit
fault, which can alter system operation in a sudden
and
possibly violent manner. Electromagnetic forces
generated by large fault currents can cause
mechanical damage to transformer and machine
windingsandtheintenseheatassociatedwitharcing
has caused fire at fault locations. In DP and other
operations,evengreateremphasismustbeplacedon
the need to maintain supplies for
propulsion. The
arguments for and against operating with bus
sections connected have been discussed earlier and
arestillthesubjectofmuchdebate.Operationofthe
power system with bus sections connected offers
manyoperationaladvantageswithonlyslightriskof
complete blackout. The risk cannot be considered
negligible, however, and
operators choosing to take
advantage of this mode of operation may wish to
considerinstallingoneofthehigherspecificationbus
bar protection methods. There are four types of
protectionthatperformthistask:
zoneprotection;
directionalprotection;
protectionbytimediscrimination;
opticalarcdetection.
Suchapproachallowsthepowerplanttobemore
flexibleinmostofknownships’operationmodesbut
requires more sophisticated and expensive power
management and protection equipment comparing
thesplitbusbarsoperation.
Engine team actions in case of full or partial
blackoutaregivenon
figure2.
5 EMERGENCYSTEERING
Inawiderscopeoftheproblemitisnotonlysolenoid
steering from the thrusters’ gear compartment, but
alsoallpossibleemergencyactionstakenbydeckand
engine departments, and communication between
them.Whichisthethirdstageoftraining.Thisincludes:
control transfer from autopilot to feedback and
nonfollowupmodesonthebridge;
fullorpartialcontroltransferfromBridgetoECR
(onegroupofthrustersiscontrolledontheBridge,
anotherinECR);
troubleshootingandequipmentrestartontheECR
side;
ensuring steerage andmaneuverability or
emergencyanchoringontheBridgeside;
transferringthecontrolbacktoEngine room.
570
Introducing realistic scenarios and time limits
related to existing navigational hazards helps to
improve deck and engine officers’ trouble shooting
andcrisismanagementskills.
Ontheworkingvessel,thesescenariosusuallyare
onlylimitedtoatabletalk.Whichisunderstandable,
as the vessel schedule, mode or area of operation
mightnotallowtocarryoutapropertraining.
However, handson experience is extremely
importantwhenitcomestoemergencies.Crewshall
notonlyknowwhattodo,butbeabletoactinaquick
andefficientmanner.Thiscanonlybeachievedwith
dedicatedsimulatortraining.
For
the purpose of simulator training vessel
specific action algorithms can be really useful as a
stepbystep todo list and communication protocol,
whichhastobediscussedandagreedwithinBridge
andEngineteams.
There are several events related to steering that
maysubstantiallyaffectvessel’scontrollability,which
also
havepreviouslyoccurredintheindustry:
thrusterstartstorotatefreely;
thrustergoestofullpowerloadunintentionally;
thrusterfreezeoncertainazimuth;
thrusterstopsduetofailure.
Apparently,ifathruster’spitchorRPMisatzero
or evenbelow some criticalvalue any steering with
suchthrusterwillbeineffective.
Blackoutdetected
(busbarsvoltage<20%
rated)
StarttwoDGswiththe
higheststandbypriority
DoesanyDG
work?
NO
YES
CloserunningDGbreaker,
disableallotherDGbreakers
closing
Isthere oneDG
connectedto
busbars?
NO
Closenextrunn ingD G
breaker,disable allotherDG
breakersclosing
Sta rtnextst andby DG
IsnextDG
connected?
NO
YES
Sta rtnextst andby DG
DoesnextDG
work?
NO
YES
Closerunning DGbreaker,
disableallotherDGbreakers
closing
Isthere oneDG
connectedto
busbars?
NO
SynchronizesecondDGto
busbars
IssecondDG
connected?
YES
YES
END
DoesnextDG
work?
Sta rtnextst andby
DG
YES
Figure2.Flowchartonpowerrestoreafterfullblackout.
Get ready available
secondary means of control
Single thruster
steering fault
Consider choosing
comfortable heading
Follow emergency steering
procedure for a faulty
thruster, if necessary
End
Riskofcomplete
steeringlossexists?
Switch to: Follow-up
independent
Compensate with another
thruster
YES
NO
YES
NO
Reduce the speed to
minimum
Use NFU controls to bring
azimuth to zero
Reduce speed on a faulty
thruster
Isazimuthatzero
setting?
Isazimuthatzero
setting?
Bring RPM /
Pitch to Zero
YES
NO
Figure3.Actionsflowchartforasinglethrusterfailure
Thelatterhastwodifferentperspectives.Whenthe
steering mechanism works normally and thrust is
lost,headingcontrolwillbealsolost.
However, when thruster’s azimuth cannot be
controlled, the very first action required is to set
thrusttozero.
Actions flowchart for a single thruster fault is
shownonfigure
3.
Requiredactionsshallalsobechosenwithregard
to existing risk level. For instance, if a vessel is
steaming at 20 knots the very first action in case of
any serious steering fault is to slow down
appropriatelyinordertoreducepossibleharmandto
giveanengine
teammoretimefortroubleshooting.
Another consideration is that the vessel cannot
effectively use additional means of control such as
sidethrusters,retractablethrustersoranchorsathigh
speed.Ifthesteeringabilityisseriouslydegraded,the
deckofficerhastoensurethatthevesselisgoingslow
enoughinorder
todeployanadditionalthrusterorto
useanchorsasnecessary.
571
6 BEHAVIORALASPECTS
Team reaction on faults and communication in the
processoftrainingchangesdramatically.
There are several factors, which were observed
duringpracticalexercise.
Bridge and engine control room familiarization
obviously has the greatest effect on response time.
Thisalso includesknowledge of warningand alarm
sounds and
indicators, and same important
knowledgeofhowtosilencethealarmbuzzers.This
recalls another importantsubject of alarms
standardization an ergonomics, but usually a team
hastodealwithwhateverisalreadyinstalled.
Secondly, communication in between bridge and
engine team has to be clear and precise in order
to
providethebestresponsetime.
Notonlylanguagebarriermaybeaproblem,but
isalsoawarenessonbothendsofthephoneline.
It is a good practice to have a toolbox meeting
(briefing) between deck and engine teams prior to
critical operations and practice emergency scenarios
asa
team,includingVHFandphonecommunication.
Also, it is recommended to five a training to the
sameteams thatwill actually worktogether. It does
helpthecrewtofeelmorecomfortableinthefuture,if
difficultiesoccur.
Finally, practicing all the stages of emergency
gives both teams (bridge and
engine) clear
understandingofwhatmayhappenandhowtodeal
with it. This builds up the operator’s ability to
recognizehowacriticalsituationdevelopsandwhat
arethebestwaystokeepitfromescalatingoratleast
tominimizetheharm.
7 CONCLUSIONS
A dieselelectric vessel equipped
with azimuth
thrusters have complicated steering and power
supply systems architecture, which stipulates many
possible faults, but also many troubleshooting
alternatives.Knowledgeofthesealternativescanhelp
toavoidincidentsrelatedtolossofsteeringorpower.
Asofferedinthearticle,thebestwaytogethands
onexperience
ondealingwitha steering andpower
systemsfaultsistheMaritimeResourceManagement
training, which includes both bridge and engine
teams.
Suggested MRM training should consist of three
stages:
azimuth thrusters manual handling training for
deckofficers;
power management and troubleshooting for
engineers;
emergency steering training for both teams
involvedinsamescenario.
Generic steering system failure risk assessment
method and emergency actions flowcharts are
providedinthisarticle.
REFERENCES
Freek Verkerk. 2002. Manoeuvring aspects of vessels
equipped with pods. Maritime & nautical permanent
education.
IMCA, 2000. Power Management System Study. IMCA M
154.
IMCA, 2011. Dynamic Positioning Station Keeping
Incidents:Incidentsreportedfor 2009(DPSI 20). IMCA
M211.
IMCA, 2012. Dynamic Positioning Station Keeping
Incidents:Incidentsreportedfor
2010(DPSI 21). IMCA
M218.
Kobylinski, L. 2013. Problems of handling ships equipped
with AZIPOD propulsion systems. Prace naukowe
politechnikiwarszawskiej,z.95.
Nowicki,J.2014.StoppingofShipsEquippedwithAzipods.
TransNavVol.8N3.
Swift. A.J.&BaileyT.J..2004.BridgeTeamManagement
Tom van Terwisga, Frans Quadvlieg, Henk
Valkhof. 2001.
Steerable propulsion units: hydrodynamic issues and
designconsequences.MARIN.