251
1 INTRODUCTION
Transportsecuritysystemsarehighlyequippedwith
different kinds of appliances, that are subject of
continuous miniaturization, caused by rapid
evolutiontakingplaceinthefieldofelectronics.The
appliancesareusedinstationaryandmobileobjects,
i.e. fire detection systems (microprocessor detectors,
control panels, power modules). Electronic
componentsandsystemsoperateunderlowervoltage
supplyandreducedpowerconsumption.
Therefore, electromagnetic fields of lower
intensity, can interfere with electronic devices,
causing disruptions in transport security systems
functionality, or even resulting with their failure
Fig.1.
Figure1.Electromagneticinterferencesinarailwayarea
Following safety states of transport security
systemscanbedistinguished,takingintoaccountthe
impact of interferences [Dyduch & Paś & Rosiński
2011,Paś2015b,Rosiński2015a]:
1 transport security system not affected by inside
and outside interferences the intensity of
interferences too low, their permitted level not
Low Frequency Electromagnetic Interferences Impact
on Transport Security Systems Used in Wide Transport
Areas
P.Dziula
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
J
.Pas
M
ilitaryUniversityofTechnology,Warsaw,Poland
ABSTRACT: The article presents the impact of electromagnetic interferences of low frequency range, on
transport security systems used in wide transport areas. Intended and unintended (stationary and mobile),
electromagneticinterferences,impactingonitemsandcomponentsconstitutingtransportsystematwidearea
(seaport,railway,etc.),cause
changesofitsvulnerability,resistanceanddurability.Diagnosticsofinterferences
sources(amplitude,frequencyrange,radiationcharacteristics,etc.),appearingwithintransportenvironment,
andusage of appropriate technical solutions of systems (i.e.shielding, reliabilitystructures), allows forsafe
implementationofsafetysurveillanceofhumanbeings,propertiesandcommunicationmea ns.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 2
June 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.02.04
252
exceeded, the system stay in its actual operation
state;
2 theappliances,operatingwithintransportsecurity
systems, automatically compensate interferences
by means of passive or active filters, or other
devicessecuringtheirfunctionality;
3 theappearanceofinterferencescausestransitionof
transport security system, from the state of full
operational
ability, into the state of restricted
operationalabilityreturntothefullabilitystate
demands intervention of service [Rosiński 2015b,
Siergiejczyk&Paś&Rosiński2016,Siergiejczyk&
Paś&Rosiński2015];
4 the appearance of electromagnetic interferences
within transport security system results with its
partial
orcompletedamagestateofunreliability
ofsafety.
Toanalyseelectromagneticinterferencesinfluence
on transport security systems, following criteria
shouldbetakenintoaccount:
system’s resistance to interferences, defined as
ability to continue proper functionality of its
appliances,underinterferencesappearance;
system’s susceptibilityto interferences meaning
response
of functioning system to inside and
outsideinterferences;
system’s durability to interferences understood
as its ability to maintain initial conditions until
interferencesdiscontinue.
According to European Directive 89/336/EEC,
concerning electromagnetic compatibility, all
components of transport security systems should
ensureappropriatelevelofresistancetointerferences,
allowing them to
maintain proper functionality in
particular electromagnetic environment [Ott 2009].
This applies not only to electronic security systems,
but also to others, that are built of electronic
components[Krzykowska&Siergiejczyk&Rosiński
2015, Siergiejczyk & Krzykowska & Rosiński 2015a,
Siergiejczyk & Krzykowska & Rosiński 2015b,
Siergiejczyk&Rosi
ński&Dziula&Krzykowska2015,
Weintrit&Dziula&Siergiejczyk&Rosiński2015].
Transportsecuritysystems,usedonthevastareas,
usually operate in hard conditions, caused by
fluctuations of air temperature and humidity,
precipitation, climate changes, water intrusion,
vibrations [Burdzik & Konieczny & Figlus 2013],
serviceabilities
[Laskowski&Łubkowski&Pawlak&
Stańczyk2015].Sourcesofintentionalelectromagnetic
fieldsappearinginportsandaboardships(radarand
radionavigational stations, stationary and mobile
radiocommunication stations, etc. [Kaniewski &
Lesnik&Susek&Serafin2015,Paszek & Kaniewski
2016]) and of nonintentional ones (industry power
supplies, generators and electric engines, power
cablesandlines,etc.),arecontributingtoformationof
an“electromagneticsmog”,abletodecreaseworking
conditions of components of security systems, and
also other ICT systems [Kasprzyk & Rychlicki 2014,
Lewiński & Perzyński & Toruń 2012, Sumiła &
Miszkiewicz 2015].
The quality of information does
also mean, in case of mentioned exploitation
conditions[Stawowy2015,Stawowy&Dziula2015].
Transport security systems, operating in hard
environmental conditions, should meet the
requirements, specified in respective regulations
concerningtheirexploitation.
The exploitation phase of the transport security
systemsincludescoexistingofminimum
threebelow
mentionedprocesses:
1 theexploitationprocess,whichaimistoperform
required utility task, meaning to result with
expectedexploitationeffect;
2 thedestructionprocess,resultingwithreducingof
utilitypropertiesofelectronicsecuritysystems,i.e.
disruptionsofinformationflowprocessatwireless
sensors, caused by electromagnetic
disruptions,
existing in the environment. Following kinds of
thedestructionprocessescanbedistinguished:
overtdestructionprocess,
hiddendestructionprocess
3 theantidestructionprocess,coveringinformation
collecting, and all other activities delaying or
stopping the destruction process, and recovering
its effects within subsequent phases of the
destruction
processevolution(the“therapy”).
Electronic security systems are impacted by
external‐
Z(t), and internal interferences‐W(t),
generated within wide area, described by random
processS(t).WhenlevelofinterferencesS(t)exceeds
allowed value S
d(t) (allowed level specified for the
securitysystem),failureofthesystemtakesplace.
Timeoftheelectronicsecuritysystemfunctioning,
until the failure takes place, can be assumed as one
havingexponentialdistribution,if:
external‐
Z(t),andinternal‐W(t)interferencesare
asymptotically independent, meaning
Z(t2) does
notdependon
Z(t1),andW(t2)doesnotdependon
W(t1);
relations between
Z(t1) and Z(t2), and W(t1) and
W(t2),decreasewithsimultaneousincreaseof:
,'''
12
tt
forZ(t);
,''''''
12
tt
forW(t)Fig.2;
external‐
Z(t),andinternal‐W(t)interferencesdo
not show certain tendencies, meaning their peak
values appearances are random, and can not be
predicted, thus, interferences
Z(t) and W(t) are
stationary.
Figure. 2. The progress of impact of external‐z(t), and
internal‐
w(t) interferences generated within wide
transportarea,allowedlevelvalueofinterferences S
d(t)=Sd
doesnotdependontime;thesystemdefectappearsnotas
cumulatingofitsinternaltechnicalparameters,butratheras
aresultofimpactofexternalandinternalinterferences,that
exceed allowed level, defect of the system is caused by
interferenceslevelonly
When projecting transport security systems, it is
necessary to consider environmental conditions of
transport system’s area, and select appropriate
appliances, that are going to be included in the
systems (i.e. power supplies [Rosiński 2015c]). To