143
1 INTRODUCTION
Researchers around the world are increasingly
pointingtheneedforabroaderviewofriskanalysis
in transport systems. Focused research, primarily
aimed at assessing the safety of transport, are not
sufficient anymore. Decision‐making processes
involvingtransportmanagers,requireaholisticview
oftherisksassociatedwithoperations.Therefore,itis
necessary to redefine a risk analysis frameworks,
focusing on issues such as how to understand and
describerisk,andhowtouseriskanalysisindecision
ma
king(Aven&Zio2014).
Inland navigation is seen as one of the safest
transportsystemsforfreight.Thenumberofrecorded
accidentsandbrea
kdownsinthisbranchoftransport
is considerably lower than the others, which
positively influences the safety assessment of
transport operations. However, this does not mean
thattherequiredreliabilityoftheprocessisensured.
This transport system is sensitive to other
distortions that must be taken into account when
organizing the carriage of goods. The specificit
y of
inlandwaterwaytransportmakesthemodelsofrisk
assessment dedicated to maritime transport,
unsuitable for the decision makers of inland
navigation.Forthisreasonitisnecessarytopreparea
holisticrangeofriskassessments,takingintoaccount
thespecificityofthistra
nsportsector.
Theaimofthisarticleistoproposeascopeofrisk
analysis for inland navigation and carry out a risk
assessment for cargo transportation on the Oder.
Therefore, in the first place, the most important
definitions regarding the discussed research issues
were presented. On the basis of lit
erature review
authors made a proposal for a procedure for risk
assessment, taking into account the specificity of
The Use of Linguistic Variables and the FMEA Analysis
in Risk Assessment in Inland Navigation
E.Skupień&A.Tubis
WroclawUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Wrocław,Poland
ABSTRACT:Thepapercontinuesthestudyofthesameauthors,whopreviouslyproposedamethodofrisk
assessmentininlandnavigation.
Intheliteraturethereisagapintheresearchareaofariskmanagementoftransportationsystems,especially:
inlandnavigation.Theaut
horscarriedoutinterdisciplinaryresearchandpresentedtheresultsrelatedtothe
identificationofriskfactorspresentinthesystemsofinlandnavigation.
The paper presents inland navigation risk analysis, conducted using the linguistic variables and the FMEA
method, taking into account technical, economic and social aspects. The aim of the art
icle is to present a
procedurefortheassessmentofriskininlandwaterwaystransport,andcarryoutriskanalysisfortransport
companies. In paper the proposal of behavior scenarios, methods of preventing and minimizing effects of
pointedrisksareshown.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 1
March 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.01.16
144
inland waterways transport. At the end it was
presentedtheanalysisoftherisksforthehandlingof
afreightontheOderRiver.
2 LITERATUREREVIEW
There are many different views on what risk is and
how to define it (Aven 2012; Hampel 2006), how to
measure and describe
it (Aven 2010, Kaplan 1997),
and how to use risk analysis in decision making
(Apostolakis2004,Aven2009).Overviewofthebasic
definitionoftheconceptofriskcanbefound,among
others,in(Aven2016).Accordingtothisreview,the
proposed definitions generally refer level of
uncertaintytothe
probabilityofanadverseeventand
its consequences. Therefore, in the research on risk
assessment in inland waterways transport described
in this paper the authors also adopted this point of
view.
The way one understands and describes risk
strongly influences the way risk is analysed and
hence it may have serious
implications for risk
management and decision‐making (Aven 2016). The
authorsintheirstudyreliedontheguidelinesofISO
31000. According to it (PN‐ISO 2010) the risk
assessment is defined as a holistic process that
involves three stages of the procedure: (1) risk
identification,(2)riskanalysis,and
(3)evaluation of
risk.Thesestagesareincludedintheproposedmodel
of risk assessment for the transport process. Risk
analysismayusevariousquantitativeandqualitative
techniques, which are also described in the above
standard. In the proposed model of risk assessment
the FMEA technique was used. It is one
of the risk
analysis techniques recommended by international
standards (Wang et al. 2012). Linguistic variables
were used to estimate the value of each parameter
usedfortheriskassessment(Burduk2012).
In the spotlight of the research conducted by the
authorsisprimarilyoperationalrisk.Itdecidesifthe
internal
organizational processes are sufficiently
effective, including immune to interference, that the
organization is able to pursue their economic goals
(Zawiła‐Niedźwiecki2012).Thereforesince the early
2000s,therehasbeenanincreasedfocusonwhathas
been defined as operational risk (Smallman 2000,
King2001,Ward2001). Such risks
relatetonegative
deviationsofperformanceduetohowthecompanyis
operated,ratherthanthewayitfinancesitsbusiness
(King2001,Jorion2006).Ithasbeenarguedthatthere
is a great need for improvement in the quality (as
regards tools and formal processes to manage
operationalrisk)
andscope(suchasidentification of
what risks to focus on) of Operational Risk
Management. Companies frequently deal with
operational risk issues as they occur, and often
following a crisis or catastrophic event (King 2001).
ORM is particularly important also for the
organizationinvolvedininlandwaterwaystransport
processes.
Conductedby
theauthorsanalysisofpublications
in the EBSCO database from the years 2006‐2016
dedicatedtotheriskmanagement,indicatesthatfora
water transportation, an extensive research are
exclusively carried out in the field of maritime
transport[including:(Bubbicoetal.2009,Brownetal.
2016,Yuebo&Xuefen
2014,Langardetal.2015).Itis
mostly a result of risk management has become a
majorpartofoperatingdecisionsforcompaniesinthe
maritimetransportationsectorandthusanimportant
researchdomain(NationalResearchCouncil2000).
Special mention in this case deserves an article
(Goerlandt& Montewka2015),in
whichtheauthors
presentedadetailedreviewoftheliteraturedevoted
to the analysis of risk for maritime transport.
Overview publications of the period 2011‐2014
allowed the authors to define current problems
undertakeninresearchonriskinmaritimetransport.
Theseamongtheothersare:
Determine the ship
collision probability and
frequencyinaseaarea(Goerlandt&Kujala2011,
Jeongetal.2012,Rasmussenetal.2012,Sumanet
al.2012,Wengetal.2012).
Determine the risk of oil spill and hazardous
substances in a sea area (Montewka et al. 2011,
Goerlandtetal.2011).
Quantify effect of risk reduction measures on
accident risk in a waterway area (van Dorp &
Merrick2011).
Literature analysis indicates that the main
consideration of researchers in risk assessment in
inland navigation is focused on the assessment of
transportsafety.Examinedaspectsoftheexperiments
aremainlyconcernedwith
suchthreats as: accident,
collision,contact(strikinganyfixedorfloatingobjects
other than those included under collision or
grounding), grounding (being aground or
hitting/touching shore or sea bottom or underwater
objects),fire,explosion(Lietal.2012).Thefrequency
of these threats in inland navigation is limited. It
should be
a subject of risk analysis, but the main
aspects of risk assessment should focus on the
reliabilityofthewholeprocess.Tomakethispossible,
thescopeoftheassessmentshouldbesubordinatedto
the decision‐making process of participants in the
freight transport process. For this reason it is
necessary to define the area of analysis for risk
assessmentininlandwaterwaystransport,takinginto
accounttheholisticapproachproposedinISO31000.
Thismeansthattheidentificationofpotentialhazards
is done by the way of a process analysis, which
includes the analysis of used resources (elements at
the
inputtotheprocess),thecourseoftheprocessand
theexpectedfinalresult.
3 INLANDNAVIGATIONONODRA
WATERWAY
Odra Waterway links significant economic areas of
the country with Szczecin‐Swinoujście seaports.
Althoughtheinlandnavigation inPoland,formany
decades, focused on the Oder, these connection not
fullyusesitspotential.
The Odra has a dominant role of the inland
navigation in Poland. One of factors of that
domination is the fact that the Oder is connected to
theWesternEuropewaterways.Inthestructureofthe
countryʹstransport,inlandwaterwaytransporthasa
negligible share. This
share in recent years does not
exceed0.2%.
145
ThetransportationontheOdraRiverisdominated
by bulk cargo such as coal, ore, aggregates and
oversizedconstructions.OnthePolishwaterwaysthe
transportofcontainersisnotconducted.Thiskindof
loads are starting to dominate the waterways of
Europe. All branches of transportation reduce the
supplyofbulkcargo.Increasestheimport
anceofthe
containers transport. The transportation role of the
Odra Waterway in recent years is further
marginalized. Currently, transport on the Odra
focuses on the Lower Odra, relations Szczecin‐
Western Europe. The regular transport in relation
Gliwice‐Szczecin disappeared, as well as on the
canalized Odra. This is the result of degradat
ion of
waterwaysinPoland.
InrecentyearspoliticalenvironmentinPolandhas
changed. The Ministry Of Maritime Economy And
Inland Navigation has been initiated. Since that,
Poland has joined the ANG agreement, many legal
plans has been created and the inland navigation
societyhasgrownalot
.Thusitmaybeexpected,that
inanextfewyearssomestrategicinvestmentswillbe
made,andthe potentialofPolishwaterways will be
filled.
The future development of inland navigation in
Polandshouldfocusontheroleoftheauthoritiesin
modeling hydrotechnical conditions but the risk
connectedtoshipownersisalsoimport
ant.
4 PROCESSOFRISKASSESSMENTININLAND
WATERWAYSTRANSPORT
Requirements of the waterways of the int
ernational
importance (class IV and V) meets only 5,9 % of
length of waterways in Poland (214km). Other
waterwayscanbeclassifiedasregional(classI,IIand
II) (GUS 2015). The greater part of the inland
waterway fleet is decapit
alized and requires
restoration.Itsagefarexceedsthestandardperiodof
useandfurtherexploitationispossibleonlythanksto
the constant modernization. According to data from
the Central Statistical Office (GUS 2015) majority of
used pusher tugs (73%), almost half of the pushed
barges (48.7%) and all self‐propelled ba
rge were
produced in the period 1949‐1979. The products
carried in inland waterways transport on Oder
Waterwayaremostlycoal,aggregatesandoversized
goods.
Duetothefact,tocollisionsininlandnavigation
rarelyendswithseriousdamagesofashiporhealth
ofpeople,theyarealm
ostneverreported(toavoida
fine).Forthisreasonauthorsdecidednottotakeinto
account statistics devoted to reported inland
navigation collisions. Authors defined the risks
associated with transportation of cargo by inland
waterways based on research on risk assessment in
maritime transport and on the ba
sis of cooperation
with the Office of Inland Navigation in Wroclaw.
Authors analyzed both external and internal factors
that could disrupt the correct implementation of the
process. Based on the conducted analysis, authors
defined7basicriskgroups:
Shipcollisions;
Poornavigationconditions;
Poor condition of infrastructure and loading
equipment;
Poorcondit
ionofthefleet;
Insufficientfinancialofboth:theshipownersand
authorities;
ShortageofqualifiedHR;
Lackofinterestinthisbranchoftransport.
It should be noted that only 3 identified groups
remainunderthecontrolofshipowners.Otherrisks
stemfromtheenvironmentinwhichtra
nsportationis
implemented.
The occurrence of the event belong to the one of
thegroupsmentionedabovemaycausedisturbances
ofvaryingstrengthofimpactontherealizationofthe
objective.Theobjectivedefinedforinlandwaterways
transportprocess istounproblematically accomplish
carriage by planned cost, qualit
y and logistics
parameters. The aim of Risk Management is to
prevent the possibilities of accruing undesirable
eventsorlimitthe consequences oftheiroccurrence.
Due to the lack of the performed control by ship
ownersoverthemajorityofthefactorsgeneratingthe
risk, the main action ta
ken by them will, however,
reduce potential effects of the event. Therefore, the
proper identification of possible adverse events and
assessment of accompanying risks is particularly
important. The results of the proceedings constitute
maythenthebasisfortheplanningscenario,allowing
aflexibleresponsetothedisruption.
Theriskassessmentiscarriedoutinthreestages:
(1) hazard i
dentification; (2) an estimate of the
likelihood and impact of hazards; (3) the
identification of hazards, the level of risk is
unacceptablebypolicymakers.Detailedcourseofthe
proceduresisshowninFig.1.
Analysis of transport process
Event analysis
Identification of the causes/sources of the event occurrence
Determination of the
consequences of an
adverse event
occurrence
Estimating the RPN rate
Does
company have control
over risk factor?
Is RPN
rate at an acceptable
level?
Determination of the
possibility of an
adverse event
occurrence
Comparison of risk indicator with the acceptable level
Acceptance of
occurred risk factor
The implementation of
improvement actions aimed
at reducing the likelihood of
an adverse event occurrence
The implementation of
procedures for limiting the
consequences of the
adverse event occurrence.
NO
NO
YES
YES
Identification of adverse events
Determination of
ease of detection for
an adverse event
occurrence
Figure1.Riskassessmentprocedure
146
Duetothelargediversityofthestateofwaterways
in Poland, the presented risk assessment is
illustrative.
5 ADVERSEEVENTS
On the basis of the 6 groups of risk, adverse events
weredefined.Table1showsthoseevents.
Table1.Adverseeventsininlandwaterwaystransport
_______________________________________________
Shipcollisions
_______________________________________________
SC1 shipdamagedduetothecollisionwithothershipor
touristsbout;
SC2 shipdamagedandpeoplewoundedorkilleddueto
thecollisionwithothershiportouristsbout;
SC3 shipdamagedduetothecollisionwithinfrastructure
(bridge,riverbank,lockgates,riverbed);
SC4 shipdamagedandpeoplewoundedork
illeddueto
thecollisionwithinfrastructure(bridge,riverbank,
lockgates,riverbed);
SC5 shipsinkingduetothecollision;
SC6 infrastructuredamagedduetothecollision;
SC7 oilspillsduetothecollision;
_______________________________________________
Poornavigationconditions
_______________________________________________
NC1 closingofanavigationrouteduetotoohighdepthof
awaterway;
NC2 closingofanavigationrouteduetotoolowdepthofa
waterway;
NC3 closingofanavigationrouteduetoicecoverona
waterway;
NC4 nopossibilityoffullutilizationofshipscapacitydu
e
totoolowdepthofawaterway;
NC5 needofso‐calledwavesupportduetotoolowdepth
ofawaterway;
_______________________________________________
Poorconditionofinfrastructureandloadingequipment
_______________________________________________
IC1 longertimeoflockage;
IC2 closingofalock;
IC3 longertimeofloading;
IC4 nopossibilityofloadinginagivenplaceduetoalack
ofloadingequipment;
IC5 nopossibilityofloadinginagivenplaceduetoa
conditionofaloadingequipment.
_______________________________________________
Poorconditionofthefleet
_______________________________________________
FC1 longertimeofshipping;
FC2 nopossibilityofexploitation;
FC3 highcostsneededservice.
_______________________________________________
Insufficientfinancialofboth:shipownersandauthorities
_______________________________________________
IF1 nopossibilityofshipexploitation;
IF2 nopossibilityofshipequippinginmodern
technology;
IF3 nopossibilityofinfrastructureexploitation.
_______________________________________________
ShortageofqualifiedHR
_______________________________________________
HR1 nopossibilityofsailingduetoalackofacrew;
HR2 greaterprobabilityofadverseeventsduetolackof
experienceofacrewmembers;
HR3 highercostsofcrew.
_______________________________________________
Lackofinterestinthisbranchoftransport
_______________________________________________
LI1 lackofshippingorders;
LI2 moreinconvenienceofinlandwaterway
transportationdevelopment.
_______________________________________________
Theriskindexhas been defined for all identified
adv
erseeventsandexpressedinaccordancewiththe
FMEAprocess,asaproductof3parameters.
RPN
n=Pn∙En∙Dn (1)
where:
RPN
n=riskindexofappearanceofnadverseevent,
P
n=possibilityofoccurrenceofnadverseevent,
E
n=Effectsofexposureonnadverseevent,
D
n=Easeofdetectionofnadverseevent.
Table2.Possibilityofoccurrenceleveldefinition.
_______________________________________________
Possibility Estimated Descriptionofthe
levelprobability probabilitylevel
_______________________________________________
1 HighThethreatoccurredinthelast
quarter
2‐3MediumThethreatoccurredinthelast
year
4‐5LowThethreatoccurredinthelast
twoyearsormore
_______________________________________________
Table3.Effectsofexposureleveldefinition.
_______________________________________________
Exposure Recovery Descriptionoftheeffects
leveltimeofexposure
_______________________________________________
1 High Highfinanciallosses
2‐3MediumFinanciallosses,lossof
reputation
4‐5LowNofinancialloss,lossof
confidenceofclients
_______________________________________________
Table4.Easeofdetectionleveldefinition.
_______________________________________________
Detection Easeof Descriptionoftheease
leveldetection ofdetection
_______________________________________________
1 LowIdentificationofaweekor
more
2‐3MediumIdentificationwithin2‐5days
4‐5HighIdentificationimmediatelyafter
theoccurrence
_______________________________________________
Table5.Riskindexevaluation.
_________________________
Event Pn En Dn RPNn
_________________________
SC1 4 2 4 32
SC2 4 1 4 16
SC3 4 2 4 32
SC4 4 1 4 16
SC5 4 1 4 16
SC6 4 1 4 16
SC7 4 1 4 16
NC1 2 4 2 16
NC2 2 4 2 16
NC3 2 4 2 16
NC4 2 4 4 16
NC5 2 4 2 16
IC1 2 4 2 16
IC2 4 2 2 16
IC3 2 4 4 32
IC4 2 4 4 32
IC5 4 2 2 16
FC1 4 4 2 32
FC2 4 2 2 16
FC3 4 2 2 16
IF14 2 2 16
IF22 2 2 8
IF34 2 2 16
HR1 4 1 1 4
HR2 2 2 1 4
HR3 2 2 1 4
LI1 2 2 1 4
LI2 2 4 1 8
_________________________
147
Basedonawidediscussionofexpertsconnectedto
inland navigation, present on gathering of
Commission on Oder in Lower Silesian (functionary
of administration of waterways, shipowners and
other of interests group) the value of needed
parameters were estimated with the use of the
linguisticassessment.
The possibility of occurrence
of the event was
evaluatedonascale1‐5.Thisassessmentwasbased
onexpertsopinion.Effectsofexposureforacompany
(ashipowner)wereevaluatedona1‐5scale,andease
ofdetectionina1‐5scale.Detailedevaluationsystem
isshowninTables2,
3and4.
Analysis of the results indicates that the ship
owners particular attention should be focused on
theseevents,whichhavethelowestRPNindex.They
areinfacteventsdifficulttoidentify,whichincidence
is high, and at the same time are associated with
significant financial consequences for the
company.
Theacceptablelevelofriskdeterminedonthebasisof
interviewswithexpertswassetatRPN>16.Thisisa
product of the quarter of the scale adopted for the
estimated three‐pointers (4 x 4 x 4). With such a
specific scale, only 5 of the
28 identified adverse
eventsisindicatorofriskatanacceptablelevel.The
remaining 23 events requires further analysis.
However,theyallcannotbetreatedinthesameway.
One can certainly distinguish among these two
groups of threats that the proceedings should be
varied. A first group of events, the
events resulting
from the environment to which the owners have no
effect.In these cases, one can only take measures to
reduce the consequences of this adverse events. The
secondgrouparetheeventsonwhichtheshipowner
has a direct impact. In these cases it is necessary to
take immediate preventive action. These events
should also be subject to constant monitoring by
management.
The adverse events, with unacceptable RPN,
resulting from factors not associated with ship
owners,from groups connected tonavigation
conditions (NC) and infrastructure conditions (IC)
shouldbelookedafterbytheauthoritiesresponsible
forthemaintenance
ofwaterways.Groupsofhuman
resource (HR) and lack of interest (LI) could be
influencedbythegovernment,startingwithaffecting
theeducationofchildren.
The other group of adverse events, with
unacceptable RPN is connected with ship owners.
Shipcollisions(SC)canbepreventedbytrainingofa
crew
and mitigated by hull construction and also
training.Problemswith moderntechnologyonboard
mentionedininsufficientfinancial(IF)andcondition
ofthefleet(FC)canbypartlysolvedbylooking for
foundsinEuropeanProjects.
All of the mentioned adverse events can be also
divided into two groups, depending on the
kind of
actionsthatcouldbetaken:i)adverseeventsthatcan
be prevented, ii) adverse events that cannot be
prevented, but the effects could be limited. The
adverseeventscanalsobedividedinto:j)preventing
requires organizational changes, jj) preventing
requiresinvestments.
6 BEHAVIORSCENARIOS
To describe above
examples, one can use the
behavioral scenario method. A few examples are
presentedfurtherinthetext.
TopreventtheadverseeventSC1 (ship damaged
duetothecollisionwithothershiportouristsbout),
the captain or the shipowner can introduce safety
procedures. This could be double checking the
parameters
of navigation, limiting the speed during
maneuverings, the present of two crew members
duringhigh‐riskmaneuveringandsoon.
TheeffectsoftheadverseeventSC7(oilspillsdue
to the collision) can be limited by special onboard
equipment, quick procedure to report an
environmentalaccidentorthecrew
training.
TheadverseeventNC2 (closing of a navigation
route due to too low depth of a waterway) can be
prevented by both organizational changes and
investments.Thelowdepthofawaterwayismostly
causedbyadroughtand/oralackofprecipitation.It
canbesolvedbyariver
cascadingandconstructionof
retention tanks. Both of this solution require legal
actions–organizationalchangesandinvestments.
Topreventthe adverseeventHR1(nopossibility
of sailing due to a lack of a crew), organizational
changes are needed. A trained crew requires legal
actionsandtime,soitis
highlyimportanttoinitiate
properactionsinadvance(propertrainingofstudents
inhigh schoollasts4 years).Itislackof interestsin
inland navigation among young people, so
specialized high schools are closing. Training more
crew members would require advertising of sailors
profession. The training can be conducted also
on a
ship.Itdoesnottakesomuchtime,butthatkindof
training it does not give a solid background and
professionalknowledge,onlypracticalskills.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Increasing competition in the freight market, the
increase in congestion on the roads, make inland
waterways transport companies increasingly
interested
in the techniques of risk analysis and
management.Duetothelackofexperienceandgood
practices in this sector, the ship owners are looking
for solutions model, which will be defined not only
the risk assessment techniques, but also areas that
shouldbeanalyzed.
In this paper, the authors presented
inland
navigation risk analysis, conducted using the
linguistic variables and the FMEA method, taking
into account technical, economic and social aspects.
Theproposedsolutioninclude the specific nature of
inland navigation. Identification of the conditions of
the process, existing limitations and analysis of
actions taken in the next stages of
the process, a
sourceofinformationaboutpotentialadverseevents
andbehaviorscenarioswerepresented.
Next step in research on this topic will be to
proposeprocedurestopreventtheriskandminimize
thescaleofconsequencesforspecifictransportation.
148
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