289
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the introduction of automation onboard
merchantships,navigationremainsprimarilyateam‐
dependenttask.Thisisevidentinthepilotagelegof
navigationwheretheshipisjointlynavigatedbythe
bridge team along with the pilot. The successful
outcome of pilotage operations depends upon
effective performance of bridge members as a tea
m.
Bolstadetal.(2002)have definedteamasanumberof
individuals with combined endeavor working
towards a common goal. The bridge of a merchant
shipcanbeviewedasacomplexcollaborativesystem
as it is operated by a team of highly specialized
individuals using va
rious navigationalequipment at
theirdisposalandrequiresinteractivecommunication
(Sandhålandetal.2015).Eventhough,theresearchon
safety and training simulators have escalated in
recentyears(Klugeetal.2014),accidentscontinueto
happen and operators at sharp end have been
attributed (the so called human error element) for
those accidents(Grech et al.2008). According to the
reportpublishedbyEuropeanma
ritimesafetyagency
(EMSA) for the period 2011‐14, a total of 9180
maritimeincidentsofvaryingseveritywerereported.
Inresponse,about600safetyrecommendationswere
issued,outofwhichsafetyofnavigationconstituteda
substantial share (13%) only to be preceded by
operational pra
ctice (43%) and human factors (17%)
astheareaoffocus(EMSA,2015).However,giventhe
potential of casualties and damage to environment
thatcanoccur duetonavigation –relatedaccidents,
the analysis of factors affecting bridge operations
meritparamountconsiderat
ion.Thecollisionbetween
passenger ship MV St. Thomas Aquinas 1 and cargo
ship MV Sulpicio Express 7 in the Philippines which
resultedinheavycasualties andsubsequentdamage
totheenvironmentastheresultofaccompanyingoil
spillservesasastarkreminder(NDRRMC,2013).
As suggested by Kim & Nazir (2016) and
Schröder‐Hinrichs et al. (2012) in their separate
analysis of Sewol and Costa Concord
ia disasters
respectivelythatacombinationofseveralhumanand
organizational factors lead to the accidents.
Consentient to above, the authors believe that
attributing the whole culpability to the bridge team
would be unwarranted. However, it is to be noted
Distributed Situation Awareness in pilotage operations:
Implications and Challenges
A.Sharma&S.Nazir
UniversityCollegeofSoutheast‐Norway,Borre,Norway
ABSTRACT:Pilotageisconsideredasthemostcriticallegofnavigationandacomplexoperationinmaritime
domain. In this paper, we argue that Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) is an important construct in
pilotageastheinformationrequired tocarryout operationsisdistributed betweenagent
sand artefacts.We
identifythecentralthemesfromthetheoryofDSAwhichareusefulindescribingmoderndaycomplexsocio‐
technical systems.Further, based on the central themes, wepropose guidelines for evaluating bridge teams
involvedinpilotageoperations.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 11
Number 2
June 2017
DOI:10.12716/1001.11.02.11
290
that the erroneous actions carried out by the bridge
teamcansetoffachainofeventsthatcanpotentiate
thevulnerabilitiestothesystem.Theintroductionof
modern technologies in the bridge (most notably
ECDIS) has added another dimension in the
complexity of pilotage operations. Technological
changes,whileincreasing
informationprocessingcan
have a detrimental effect on Situation Awareness
(Grech & Horberry (2002), as cited in Grech et al.
(2002),p.1721).
The concept of Situation Awareness (SA) which
traces its origins from the military aviation domain
(Endsley, 1995a) has also led to research in other
domains andcan be
termed ascritical consideration
incollaborativesystemdesignandoperation(Salmon
etal.2009).Intheiranalysesofmaritimeaccidentfor
theperiodbetween1987and2001,Grechetal.(2002)
have stated that 71% of the human errors can be
attributedtoproblemsrelatedtoSA.Therearemany
ways
inwhichSAcanbedefinedhowever,themost
widely used definition is the one given by Endsley
(1995a), where SA is termed as perception of
information elements in the surrounding,
comprehension of their meaning and projection of
theirfuturestatus.Takingasystemicview,Stantonet
al. (2006) have
proposed the theory of Distributed
Situation Awareness (DSA) which they argue can
better explain the technology mediated interactions
and dynamic nature of SA within complex
collaborative systems. DSA is defined as “activated
knowledgeforaspecifictask,ataspecifictimewithin
asystem”(Stantonetal.2006,p.1291).
In this
paper we compare some of the central
themesrelatedtothetheoryofDSAinthecontextof
pilotage operations and argue that evaluation
methods for bridge team performing pilotage
operationsinsimulatedorrealscenarioshouldhave
underpinningassumptionsontheoryofDSA.
2 PILOTAGEOPERATIONSINMARITIME
DOMAIN
Pilotage can be termed as one of the most complex
andcriticaloperationinthemaritimedomain(Darbra
et al. 2007). The importance of piloting vessels with
continuously increasing dimensions and hazardous
cargoes in the vicinity of some of the biggest
metropolitanareasintheworldhasbeenundermined
in the
research literature and by the industry (Van
Erve&Bonnor,2006).Evenafterignoringthefactors
like culture, weather and geographical challenges,
studiesinvolvingpilotagehasreceivedlessattention
intheir basicform aswell. Lappalainenet al.(2014)
have pointed out that pilotage is studied very little
internationally or
otherwise and have argued for
pilotage based on established “good practices” as
deemedbytheliterature.
Bruno&Lützhöft(2009)havedefinedpilotageas
the control of a complex system and theorized that
combinationoffeedbackandfeedforwardmechanism
is used in the pilotage to build a construct and
exercise control
on the system. Although the
composition of bridge team varies depending upon
the type of vessel and other factors, it can be
postulated that bridge team during pilotage
effectively involves coordination between Captain,
Pilot and Duty officer. The captain has the overall
responsibility ofthe safe execution of operation and
actsontheadvicegiventohimbythepilotpertaining
to specific information to be considered when
maneuvering in the port. Pilot is an individual,
usuallyamastermarinerhimself,whohasthespecific
knowledge related to navigation and traffic
regulations in the port of call. Duty officer is the
junior navigation officer present in the bridge who
usuallyassistthecaptaininnavigationbyperforming
associated secondary functions (such as monitoring
thehelmorders,cross‐checkingpositionetc.)andacts
inasupportivecapacity.Figure1describes theflow
of information in the bridge during pilotage
operation.
Figure1. Information flow on bridge during pilotage
operations.
The communication links and the interfaces the
equipment have, effects how the team builds and
maintain SA. The bridge team has a continuous
exchange of information amongst each other and
artefacts at their disposal. The execution of tasks is
carriedoutbyinteractionandfeedbackreceived.The
SA in this case
can said to be distributed at system
level,theteamisactingasajointcognitivesystem.
3 DISTRIBUTEDSITUATIONAWARENESS
ThetheoryofDSA,originallyproposedbyStantonet
al.(2006)describesSAasanemergentpropertywhich
isdistributedacrosstheagentsandartefactswithina
socio‐technical
system (Salmon et al. 2009, p.58). In
otherwords,SAistobeanalyzedatasystemiclevel
in such settings. The methodology of DSA, as
describedbyStantonetal.(2006)canbesummedinto
three main parts: (1) Elicitation of knowledge (2)
Extraction of knowledge objects and (3)
Representation
ofrelationbetweenknowledgeobjects
andthephaseswheretheyareactivated.Salmonetal.
(2009,p.59)havestatedthatincollaborativesystems,
team members may be engaged in perception,
comprehension and projection tasks separately, thus
drawing an extension to Endsley (1995a) model for
theSAtothecontextof
collaborativesystem.
However, there are some unique positions also
takenbytheproponentsofDSAtheory.Notablythe
notionthatSAatteamleveliscompatibleinnature.
Salmon et al. (2010) theorize that the different team
membersdue differenceingoals, roles,schemas etc.
291
may have different view of situation and therefore
ratherthansharingwhattheyknow,thecohesiveness
in the team is achieved by compatibility, or
integrating the available information to their
schemataandinterpretingtotheirindividualneed.
Central to the DSA theory is the idea of
transactionalSA. Salmonet
al. (2010) suggestedthat
theSAismaintainedinthesystembytheexchangeof
informationbetweentheagentsorthetransactionsof
SA.Teamswithmoretransactionsbetweenmembers
are found to perform better than teams with less
transactions (Sorensen & Stanton, 2016). However,
somecommunicationbetweenagentsmay
betacitin
nature. Oneof the tenets proposedby Stanton et al.
(2006) as the basis of DSA is that agents may
communicate through non‐verbal behavior, customs
andpractice.
Basedonabove,thetheoryofDSAcanbesummed
upintothefollowingmainpointswhicharerelevant
for
collaborative settings: (1) The analysis is to be
doneatsystemlevel, takingall agents,artefacts and
interaction between them into account. (2) The
frequencyoftransactionsisanimportantindicationof
teamperformance(3)Communicationbetweenagents
maybetacitand(4)TheSAofteamiscompatiblein
nature.
4 DSAINPILOTAGEOPERATIONS
To date there has been little exploration of DSA in
maritime domain. Of the applications presented in
literature, Naziret al. (2015)have described the key
sub‐systems and their interaction in maritime
domain. Sandhåland et al. (2015), meanwhile, have
provided empirical data about shipboard
practices
gathered from Platform Supply Vessels (PSVs)
favoring a DSA perspective. Within the pilotage
operations in maritime domain, there has been no
previous application of DSA models or methods.
Based on the central themes identified for the DSA
theoryintheprevioussection,pilotageappearstobe
an appropriate operation
to adopt DSA perspective,
howevernotwithoutconsideringthelimitations.
4.1 SAisdistributedacrossagentsandartefacts
During pilotage operation, the SA can be said to be
distributed across agents and artefacts. The bridge
team members are carrying out different activities
and monitoring different aspects of the system and
thus
no one member of the team has the complete
awarenessorthe“fullpicture”.Further,somecritical
information, is being held by the bridge equipment.
For the identification of the targets, the details are
accessed through Automatic Identification System
(AIS).Thisinformationisimperativeinthenavigation
andcollisionavoidance
duringthepilotageand itis
accessedbythebridgeteammembersbyviewingthe
AIS display or by an AIS overlay provided in the
ECDIS. However, this theme does not address the
issue,whentheinformationisavailabletoindividuals
buttheymayfailtoperceiveitduetova rious
factors
(Jones & Endsley (1996) as cited in Endsley (2015),
p.26).
4.2 SAtransactionsoccurinbridge
SAismaintainedbycontinuoustransactionsbetween
the agents. The bridge team members interact with
each other, often in close‐loop mode, for
giving/following the navigation‐related orders. The
teamalsohasto
monitororinteractwithVery High
Frequency (VHF)radios in orderto be aware of the
trafficmovements.However,anadequatenumberof
transactions does not necessarily result in adequate
level of SA as the relevancy and accuracy of
communicationshouldalsobeaccounted.
4.3 Tacitcommunicationinbridge
Non‐verbal
behaviors, customs and practices are
carried out by the bridge team for tacit
communication which may not be so apparent for
non‐nativeparticipant.Thisisinagreementwithone
of the tenets proposed for conceptual testing and
identification of a system for the purpose of DSA
analysis.Table1
belowprovidesanexample.
Table1. An example of tacit communication in the bridge
duringpilotageoperation
_______________________________________________
Agent Perception Comprehension Projection
_______________________________________________
Rateof Senses Calculatesthe Displaystherate
in
turn change rateofchange degreeper
minute
indicator inheading
Pilot ReadsROT DeterminesGivestherudder
indicator counter‐helmto ordertoDuty
beappliedfor officer
steadyingtheship
Captain Noticesnew DeterminestheOrdersthenew
rudderordernewheadingto headingtopilot
givenbymaintaincourse
thepilot
_______________________________________________
4.4 BridgeteamhascompatibleSA
Inthecaseofmaritimepilotage,theaboveargument
canbegivenastheroleofeachbridge‐teammember
is different in addition to the differences in
experience, goals and hierarchy. The bridge team
members includingthe pilot, actas a joint cognitive
system in the execution of the tasks, where each
member has their own sub‐goals while the safe
navigationfrompilotpointtotheberthorvice‐versa
being the common goal for the team. One possible
limitationin considering compatible aspect of SAin
bridge is the physical proximity
between the bridge
team members during the operations. The team
membersare notseparated geographically,therefore
anyrolespecificinformationorinterfacefortheteam
membersmaynotresultinperceivedadvantage.
In Table 2, we present the pros and cons as
discussed in aforementioned sections related to the
applicabilityof
DSAmodelforpilotage.
292
Table2.ProsandConsofDSAperspectiveforpilotage
_______________________________________________
Themes ProsCons
_______________________________________________
Systemlevel Levelofanalysis Severalfactorssuchas
analysis includesbridgeteam cognitiveprocesses
andequipment. alsoneedtobe
considered
SAIndicatesSAis Needtotakeinto
transactions maintainedby accounttherelevancy
transactionsbetweenoraccuracyof
bridgeteam.communication
Accountsfordynamic
natureofSA
Compatible Takesintoaccount Relativelylessphysical
SAdifferenceintraining,separationinbridge.
experienceandroles. Compatibleviewmay
Bridgeteammembersnotgiveadded
mayrequirerole advantage
‐specificinformation
presentedtothem
_______________________________________________
5 DISCUSSIONS–BRIDGETEAMWORK
EVALUATION
With multiple agents working collaboratively in
bridge toachieve a common goal and the argument
thatteamshavecognitiveproperties,theevaluationof
bridge team members should bebased on measures
that best capture their performance. As discussed
above,theconceptofDSA
meritsconsiderationwhen
measuring performance of teams in collaborative
settings. The methods which are adopted for
measuringbridgeteamperformanceshouldtherefore,
haveanunderpinningontheoryofDSAasdescribed
above.Thefollowingguidelinesshouldbeusedwhen
evaluatingteamworkinpilotageoperations:
5.1 Mappinginformationelementsand
theirusage
Mappingofinformationelementshavebeenfoundto
beusefulinteamperformanceresearchastheyreveal
the underlying knowledge network (Marshall et al.
2015). Salmon et al. (2008) and Stanton et al. (2009)
have proposed the use of propositional network
methodology which describe the system SA as the
network of information elements. The term
“informationelements”referstoconceptsinassessing
the DSA (Salmon et al. 2009, p. 63). The usage of
informationelementsbybridgeteammembersduring
thedifferentstagesinpilotagecangiveanindication
ofSA.Thus,SAcanbemeasureddynamicallyandit
wouldbepossibletoidentifywhichmembershadthe
accessto whichsubset ofinformationelements. One
possible limitation of this approach is that it is
subjectivein nature,therefore requiresvalidation by
comparing multiplesets ofdata (Salmon etal. 2009,
p.71).Figure2provides anexampleofpropositional
network
for pilotage operation. The information
elementsrepresentedhereistheknowledgeused by
agentsandartefactsfortheoperation.
Figure2.Anexampleofpropositionalnetworkforpilotage
operations.
5.2 Frequencyofcommunication
The frequency of communication is an important
indicator of team performance. As demonstrated by
Sorensen & Stanton (2016), the teams with more
communication perform better. Therefore, the
frequency of communication can be described as a
measureforevaluating teamperformance.Theuseof
frequency scale for team
performance assessment is
appropriate when quantity of occurrence for certain
action is characterizing the performance of teams
(Smith‐Jentschetal.2013).
5.3 Measuringinteractionatvariouslevels
Bridge team members in pilotage operation have
different levels of interactions. The team members
have individual level of interaction as well as
amongst team members. In this situation, the
performance should be measured at multiple levels
i.e. individual level and team level (Marshall et al.
2015).Ifallmeasuresaretakenatonelevel,itmaybe
insufficienttodetectdeficienciesinteamperformance
(Rosenetal.2008).
6 CONCLUSION
Inthispaper,
wehavearguedthattheoryofDSAcan
have implications on bridgeteam work. DSA of the
bridge team members and the interactions amongst
them are important factors to be considered during
pilotage. Finally, based on the central themes
identified from the DSA theory, we have proposed
guidelines that can
be considered when evaluating
bridgeteamperformance.
7 LIMITATIONS
The proposed application of framework and
evaluationguidelines aretheoreticalin naturebased
on state of art knowledge. Further studies in the
context of pilotage will contribute to the validity of
guidelinesproposedhere.
293
8 FUTURERESEARCH
We suggest that future research should be directed
intomodelling ofDSA inpilotage operationsby the
use of propositional network methodology and
exploring the relationship between frequency of
communication between bridge team members and
performance in laboratory settings. The authors are
currentlyinvolvedindesigningan
experimentforthe
purposeofmodellingDSAinpilotageoperations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors of this paper would like to thank Ms.
RahelehKari,graduatestudentatUniversityCollege
ofSoutheastNorwayforhercontributions.
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