International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 1

Number1

March 2007

The Colregs and the Princess Alice

J.F. Kemp

Marine Navigation Consultant, Arundel, UK

History is more or less bunk – Henry Ford (American Industrialist)

The only way forwards is backwards – Boris Johnson (British Politician)

ABSTRACT: There is currently considerable interest in the international regulations for preventing collisions

at sea (the Colregs). Suggestions for changes are made, but their validity is difficult to assess because, apart

from some very limited simulator experiments, there is no possibility of testing new proposals before they are

introduced. Given this situation, it is instructive to look back at past times when the Colregs were somewhat

different so that we may, at least, avoid some of the mistakes of the past. In this paper, the author’s aim is to

look at the lessons that might be learned from one, particularly tragic collision between the Princess Alice and

the Bywell Castle in 1878.

1 LEARNING FROM HISTORY

There have been many articles in publications such

as the Journal of Navigation and Seaways, proposing

changes in the international regulations for

preventing collisions at sea (the Colregs). In the past,

some of these have been implemented, for example

in the 1972 regulations which came into force in

1977. Arguments for and against changes continue

to be presented but the validity of these arguments is

difficult to assess because, apart from some very

limited simulator experiments, there is no possibility

of testing new proposals before they are introduced.

Given this situation, it may be instructive to look

back to past times, when the Colregs were somewhat

different so that, at least, we may avoid some of the

mistakes of the past.

There is not space in this paper to make a

complete review of the effectiveness, or otherwise,

of past forms of the Colregs. The author’s aim is to

simply look at the background to one particular, and

tragic collision. This occurred in the River Thames

between the Princess Alice and the Bywell Castle on

3 September 1878.

2 A NOTABLE COLLISION

The Princess Alice was a paddle steamer, returning

to London from a “moonlight trip” to Gravesend.

She had about 700 passengers on board, most of

whom perished as a result of the collision. The

Bywell Castle was a screw driven collier, proceeding

downstream in ballast. She struck the Princess Alice

just forward of her starboard paddle box and the

Princess Alice sank in about four minutes. Not many

people could swim in Victorian times, and those

who could swim were hampered by the heavy

clothes they wore – especially the women. Around

600 people lost their lives.

Before looking at the navigational circumstances

leading up to the collision, it is instructive to recall

the state of the collision regulations at that time.

3 NINETEENTH CENTURY COLREGS

Following the introduction of steam ships in the

early 19th Century, regulations for the prevention of

collision (Colregs) became necessary. At first, these

were local rules applying to particular rivers, like

"keep to the port side" (in the Mersey) and "keep to

the starboard side" (in the Thames).

In 1840, Trinity House set out standard rules for

the whole of the UK, and adopted the "keep to the

starboard side" rule for all rivers and narrow

channels. Trinity House also introduced the so-called

“larboard helm rule” whereby, in an encounter in

open waters, each ship should avoid collision by

turning to starboard. These rules were given the

force of law in the UK by an Act of Parliament in

1846 At the same time, ships’ navigation lights,

green to starboard, red to port and white at the

masthead were also specified.

Subject to minor changes in wording, these rules

were consolidated by Shipping Acts in 1851 and

1854. However, the larboard helm rule was seriously

flawed, so radically new rules were introduced in

1863.

The main purpose of the 1863 Colregs was to get

rid of the unsatisfactory larboard helm rule, and

this was done for all cases except for ships meeting

end-on. Unfortunately the legislators were so

anxious to make a new start that they also omitted

the existing perfectly satisfactory rule requiring

steamships to keep to the starboard side of narrow

channels. This was a clear case of throwing the baby

out with the bath-water.

In 1867, Thomas Gray (an under-secretary at the

UK Board of Trade) produced a pamphlet explaining

how the new Colregs should be applied. This

included some verses which are by no means

forgotten today. For example:

When both sidelights you see ahead,

Port your helm and show your red (i.e. turn to

starboard – the old larboard-helm rule)

Green to green or red to red,

Perfect safety, go ahead.

If to starboard, red appear

It is your duty to keep clear.

In 1876, a Joint Committee of the Admiralty, the

Board of Trade. and Trinity House recommended,

inter alia, that the rule to keep to the starboard of

narrow channels should be reinstated. Unfortunately,

this recommendation was not implemented until

1880. Tragically, this was too late for those

passengers and crew of the Princess Alice, who had

lost their lives two years earlier.

From 1880 onwards, the "keep to starboard" rule

has worked well in rivers and narrow channels.

Meanwhile, the old larboard helm rule, requiring that

each vessel in an encounter should alter course to

starboard, continued to create mischief, although it

only applied to ships meeting end on. It contributed

to many collisions during the next one hundred

years. Unfortunately, no-one could devise a better

rule for meeting ships, and the solution has been to

introduce marine traffic separation schemes which

provide one-way lanes and thus reduce the number

of end-on meeting encounters, - e.g. in the Dover

Strait.

4 GUIDANCE IN 1878

In the absence of the "keep to starboard side of

narrow channels" rule in 1878, the only real

guidance for the masters of the Princess Alice and

the Bywell Castle was that they should follow "the

ordinary practice of seamen". However, this was not

a simple matter in a tidal river such as the Thames.

From 1840 to 1863, ships had been required to keep

to the right in rivers and narrow channels. On the

other hand, it was quite normal for ships proceeding

upstream to give way to ships proceeding

downstream. Also, ships proceeding against the tide

(like the Princess Alice) would try to keep out of the

main tidal stream, while ships proceeding with the

tide (like the Bywell Castle) would prefer to keep

within the main stream. Furthermore, ships requiring

deep water would tend to keep in the centre of the

channel and to the outside of bends. So vague advice

to follow "the ordinary practice of seamen" was not

helpful in deciding which side of a channel a ship

should keep to. (See appendix 1 for a comparison of

the 1867 and the 1972 versions of the applicable

rule).

The two shipmasters would also, of course, have

had in mind the rules for steamships meeting in open

waters. Prior to 1863 the rule for two ships

approaching so as to involve risk of collision was

that they should each alter course to starboard. This

was the old “larboard helm” rule, previously

mentioned. It was effective in cases where a precise

collision situation existed, but it proved to be lethal

when one ship believed there was risk of collision

and the other believed it to be a safe passing

situation. Many collisions developed from situations

such that, if no action had been taken, the two ships

would have passed clear. In fact it is still the case,

today, that most collisions result from situations

such that, if neither ship had manoeuvred, there

would have been a close, but safe passing.

The 1863 regulations did away with the larboard

helm rule except for the case of steam ships meeting

end-on or nearly end-on. However, for that situation

it was felt necessary to emphasise the principle that

ships should not alter course unnecessarily away

from a safe passing situation. This was the purpose

of Thomas Gray’s verse:

Green to green or red to red,

Perfect safety, go ahead.

It was also the purpose of a set of “Explanatory

Clauses” which were promulgated with the force of

law in 1868. They were incorporated into the

Colregs from 1880 to 1977 (see Appendix 2) and are

permanently burnt into the memories of those of us

who were at sea prior to 1977.

It is fair to say that hard-won experience of the

pre-1863 rules had made people highly conscious of

the danger that an unnecessary alteration of course to

starboard by one of the two ships involved might

convert a safe, green-to-green passing situation into

a collision. In 1878, the shipmasters of the Princess

Alice and the Bywell Castle would have been well

aware of this danger, and would have had Thomas

Gray’s exhortations and the wording of the

Explanatory Clauses fresh in their minds.

Taking all the circumstances together, even

without a specific rule for narrow channels in force

at the time, one would have expected the Princess

Alice and the Bywell Castle to have kept to the

starboard side of the river and so to have passed

clear of each other. Captain Harrison of the Bywell

Castle attempted to do this, but Captain Grinsted of

the Princess Alice turned to port instead. Probably he

was already on the south side of the River and was

intending to avoid the strongest part of the ebb tide

by keeping to the inside of the bend around Tripcock

Point (Margaret Ness). In doing so, he would have

expected to pass the Bywell Castle green to green

which, according to Thomas Gray's rhyme, was

perfectly safe.

We will never know what was in Captain

Grinsted's mind, but it is a poignant thought that he

might have made a different decision if the Joint

Committee's recommendation to reinstate the "keep

to the starboard side of a narrow channel" rule had

been implemented earlier.

5 WHISTLE SIGNALS

In 1878, there were no whistle signals prescribed for

steam ships in sight of one another. Such signals

were introduced on a voluntary basis in 1880, and

became compulsory in 1897. The convention was

(and still is) to sound one short blast to indicate an

alteration of course to starboard, two short blasts to

indicate an alteration of course to port, and three

short blasts to indicate a movement of the engines

astern. Since 1960, it has been permissible to

supplement these whistle signals with a flashing

light.

It is a sad thought that, if whistle signals had been

available to the masters of the Princess Alice and the

Bywell Castle, they might have coordinated their

actions and avoided collision.

It is of interest that, at the 1948 International

Conference on Safety at Sea, a US delegate, (Captain

Farwell, USCG) proposed that whistle signals

should be used to indicate on which side a vessel

intended to pass another. Specifically, one short blast

would propose a red-to-red passing, to be confirmed

by one short blast by the other ship, if accepting.

And two short blasts would propose a green-to-green

passing, to be confirmed by two short blasts by the

other ship if accepting. This convention had long

been used with great success in US inland

waterways. It is difficult to understand why such

“intent and consent” signals have never been accepted

internationally. If the convention had been in force in

the Thames in 1878, it could well have saved 700

souls.

6 CAPTAIN HARRISON

Captain Harrison and his crew on the Bywell Castle

all survived the collision. His ship was a collier, 250

feet (76 metres) long and displacing 890 tons. She

was proceeding down-river, in ballast, after a refit.

The Bywell Castle was riding high in the water, so

that her bow was 20 feet (6 metres) above the

waterline.

At about 1945, Captain Harrison and his pilot,

Captain Dix, were on the upper bridge. Their ship

was proceeding at half speed down the centre of

Gallions Reach. An ebb tide was running, which

would have increased the Bywell Castle’s speed

from 5 knots through the water to about 6 knots over

the ground. (See figs 1A and 1B.)

In the absence of the Princess Alice, Captain

Harrison would probably have kept the Bywell

Castle in mid-stream as his ship turned to starboard

around the ninety-degree bend leading into Barking

Reach. This would have made good use of the

favourable tide.

In the event, Captain Harrison saw the red

sidelight and white masthead light of the Princess

Alice when the ships were about a mile apart. This

would have been about four minutes before the

collision.

Fig. 1. The positions of the Princess Alice and the Bywell

Castle at 5 minutes before the collision (1A), and at the time of

the collision (1B), based on a contemporary chart

Captain Harrison did not have a difficult decision.

On seeing the lights of the Princess Alice, he altered

course to starboard, which took him nearer to the

south shore. This measure was in accordance with

the suspended rule that ships should keep to the

starboard side of narrow channels. It also avoided

crossing the bows of the Princess Alice. The Bywell

Castle would, in any case, have soon needed to turn

to starboard to negotiate the bend in the river.

Finally, since his ship was in ballast, Captain

Harrison would not have been unduly worried by the

relatively shallow water that tends to accrue on the

inside of bends.

At the last minute, when the ships were about 100

metres apart, Captain Harrison saw that collision

was imminent, and he gave orders to stop engines

and go astern. The order to stop engines was carried

out, but collision occurred before the engines were

put astern.

7 CAPTAIN GRINSTED

Captain Grinsted, and most of his crew, did not

survive the collision, and any assessment of the

circumstances on board the Princess Alice is

therefore speculative. The ship was considerably

smaller than the Bywell Castle, with a length of 209

feet (67 metres) and of 251 tons gross. Amazingly,

for such a small ship, she was licensed to carry 936

passengers.

At 1945, the Princess Alice was in Barking

Reach, approaching Tripcock Point (Margaret Ness).

She was making 11 knots through the water, which

the ebb-tide would have reduced to about 10 knots

over the ground. (See figs 1A and 1B.)

It is likely that Captain Grinsted saw the green

sidelight and the white masthead light of the Bywell

Castle at the same time as Captain Harrison saw the

lights of the Princess Alice – when the ships were

about a mile apart. However, Captain Grinsted had a

more difficult decision.

He knew that he would soon have to turn to port

to negotiate the ninety-degree bend into Gallions

Reach. He was probably already on the south side of

the river, and would thus have been in a position to

save time by keeping to the south side as he rounded

the bend. By doing so, the distance would be shorter

and the adverse tide would be weaker. Perhaps

reciting Thomas Gray’s verse to himself he might

have had in mind that a green-to-green passing was a

safe as a red-to-red passing.

A turn to starboard, on the other hand, would

have taken the Princess Alice across the bows of the

approaching ship, which is something no shipmaster

likes to do. Captain Grinsted would have known that

the Bywell Castle was a large ship because of the

height of her green sidelight above the water. He

might have expected her to keep to the deep water in

the centre of the stream or towards the outside of the

bend. He would not have been able to see that, as a

ship in ballast, the Bywell Castle did not need the

deepest water. Finally, he might have worried that, if

he altered course to starboard, there might have been

insufficient room for the Princess Alice to pass

between the approaching large ship and the north

shore.

In the event, Captain Grinsted chose to alter

course to port. A bad move as it turned out, but he

had probably made many similar decisions in the

past, with perfectly satisfactory results. Whatever the

case, the author would not have liked to have been in

Captain Grinsted’s shoes, and to have faced the

dilemma he had to resolve only four minutes before

the collision.

8 CONCLUSIONS

The author believes that a number of conclusions

can be drawn from consideration of the Princess

Alice – Bywell Castle collision that still have

relevance today.

1 Rules (such as the current rule 14) which require

action by both vessels in an encounter are

dangerous. They can result in conflicting

manoeuvres. In the past, they have converted

many safe passing situations into collisions.

2 It follows from (i) that rules which are designed

to reduce the probability of vessels meeting end-

on are of great importance. Examples are rules 9

and 10 of the current Colregs.

3 There is great value in two ships reaching an

agreement to accept a red-to-red or a green-to-

green passing situation when it is safe to do so. It

is important that means and procedures (whistle

signals, flashing lights or otherwise, including

radio or electronic communication) should be

available, and that they should be used, to allow

such agreements to be reached.

REFERENCES

Cockcroft, A.N. 2007. The Colregs. Seaways (Letter). March

07. London. Nautical Institute.

Kemp, J.F. 1976. Two hundred years of the collision

regulations. Journal of Navigation, 29,341. Cambridge

Cambridge University Press.

Syms, R. 2006/7. The Colregs. Seaways. December 06, January

07 & February 07. London. Nautical Institute.

Thomas, D. 2002. The Fatal Flaw: Collision at sea and the

failure of the rules. Carmarthenshire, UK. Phaiacia.

APPENDIX 1

Rules which invoke the “ordinary practice of

seamen”

1863 – Article 20: “Nothing in these rules shall

exonerate any ship, or the owner, or master or crew

thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to

carry lights or signals, or of the neglect to keep a

proper look-out, or of the neglect of any precaution

which may be required by the ordinary practice of

seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.”

1972 – Rule 2(a): “Nothing in these rules shall

exonerate any vessel or the owner, master or crew

thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to

comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any

precaution which may be required by the ordinary

practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances

of the case.”

APPENDIX 2

Explanatory Clauses promulgated in 1868 and added

to the rule for steam ships meeting end-on from

1880 until 1977.

“This Article only applies to cases where ships

are meeting end-on or nearly end-on, in such manner

as to involve risk of collision, and does not apply to

two ships which must, if both keep their respective

courses, pass clear of each other.

The only cases to which it does apply are, when

each of the two ships is end-on or nearly end-on to

the other; in other words, to cases in which, by day

each ship sees the masts of the other in a line, or

nearly in a line with her own: or by night, to cases in

which each ship is in such a position as to see both

the side lights of the other.

It does not apply by day to cases in which a ship

sees another ahead crossing her own course; or by

night where the red light of one ship is opposed to

the red light of the other, or where the green light of

one ship is opposed to the green light of the other, or

where a red light without a green light, or a green

light without a red light, is seen ahead, or where both

green and red lights are seen anywhere but ahead.”