169
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 CyClaDesProjectOverview
The CyClaDeS project (http://www.cyclades‐
project.eu) is designed to promote the increased
impactofthe human element inshipping across the
designandoperationallifecycleofships.Theproject
bringstogetheramulti‐disciplinaryteamtofocuson
all the key steps in the lifecycle; the stakeholders;
where the barriers to human element int
egration
occur;andhowto best locate, produce, disseminate,
and apply human element knowledge within the
overallcontextofshipping.
The advantage of the research project is realized
by supporting the integration of the human element
in the design and operational life‐cycle from
a
ppreciation,toconcept,todesign,toapplication, to
evaluationandapproval,tomaintenance.Theproject
seeks to identify human element guidance and
materialfromwithinthemaritimeandotherdomains
and“translate”thisinformationinawaythatcanbe
utilized by the diverse stakeholders involved at
variousstagesintheship’slife‐cycle.
1.2 CaseStudies
The project pla
n includes the conduct of a series of
case studies to demonstrate the application of crew‐
centered design information and methodologies
Exploring Bridge-Engine Control Room Collaborative
Team Communication
A.Kataria
M
aRiSaResearchGroup,WorldMaritimeUniversity(WMU),Malmö,Sweden
E.Holder
FraunhoferInstituteforCommunication,InformationProcessingandErgonomics(FKIE)Wachtberg,Germany
G.Praetorius,M.Baldauf&J‐USchröder‐Hinrichs
M
aRiSaResearchGroup,WorldMaritimeUniversity(WMU),Malmö,Sweden
ABSTRACT: The EC funded CyClaDes research project is designed to promote the increased impact of the
humanelementin shippingacrossthedesignandoperationallifecycleofships.Itaddresses the designand
operationofshipsandshipsystems.OneoftheCyCla
Des’tasksistocreateacrew‐centereddesigncase‐study
examinationoftheinformationthatissharedbetweentheBridgeandEngineControlRoom(ECR)thathelps
the crew coordinate to ensure understanding and complete interconnected tasks. This information can be
providedinvariousways,includingcommunicationdevicesorobtainedfromacommondatabase,display,or
eventheshipenvironment(e.g.,therolloftheship).Aseriesofsemi‐structuredint
erviewswereconducted
withseafarersofdiverserankstogetabetterideaofwhatcommunicationdoes,orshould,takeplaceandany
problems or challenges existing in current operations and i
nterdepartmental communications, as seen from
both the bridge and ECR operators’ perspectives. Included in the interview were both the standard
communicationsandinformationsharedduringplanningandexecutingavoyage,aswellasspecialsituations
suchassafety/casualtytasksorencounteringheavyweather.Theresultswereanalyzedintermsofthegoalsof
thecommunication,theprima
rysituationsofinterestforcommunicationandcollaboration,thecommunication
mediaused,theinformationshared,andtheproblemsexperienced.Theseafarerinterviewshelpedtoexplore
on‐boardinterdepartmentalcommunicationandtheresultsarepresentedinthepaper.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 9
Number 2
June 2015
DOI:10.12716/1001.09.02.02
170
collectedfromthemaritimeandotherdomains.Four
primary focal areas were chosen for case studies to
addressavarietyofshipboardareas,worktypesand
work environments and the different methods that
could be applied to these. These included: Control
roomenvironments,Controlpaneldesign,designfor
accessibility, and
novel applications. Novel
applications included adaptive automation to
mitigate fatigue and communication and
collaborationprocesses.
Communication and collaboration between the
bridgeandECR,thetwocontrolcentersoftheship,
was selected as the focus for this particular case
study. Problems and misunderstandings were
reported by seafarer members of the
project
consortium and anecdotal evidence collected by
project members in prior research. The goal of the
case study was to objectively examine coordination
between the two control centers to describe the
communication and coordination that takes place,
verify existing problems and to identify potential
solution concepts in order to demonstrate a
crew‐
centereddesignmethodology.
The first step in this process was to conduct a
seriesofsemi‐structuredinterviewswithseafarersof
different ranks to get a better idea of what
communication does, or should, take place and any
problemsorchallengesexistingincurrentoperations,
as seen from both
the bridge and ECR operators’
perspectives. These results are reported in the
following sections. A second goal of the case study
interview was to evaluate the methodology for
applicabilitytothemaritimecontextanddetermineif
an interview template or other guidance could be
provided for future work concerning maritime
communication
andcollaboration.
2 THEORECTICALUNDERPINNINGS
2.1 SelectLiterature
Coordinationofactivitiesislargelyachievedthrough
communicationinlargesocio‐technicalsystemssuch
as ocean going ships (Flin, OʹConnor, & Crichton,
2008).Theenvironmentonboardcanbeclassifiedasa
complex environment, characterized by task
distributionacrossship’spersonneland
availabilityof
technology as permissible and embedded in the
organizational structure (Hetherington, Flin, &
Mearns,2006).Technology mediated communication
therefore plays a pivotal role in coordinating work
betweenparticipants.
The concept of joint activity put forth by Clark
(1996)isusefulininterdepartmentalcommunication
onboard.Jointactivityisdefinedby
Clarkasanactivity
carriedoutbyanensembleofpeopleactingincoordination
witheachother.
Figure1.AdaptedfromJointActivity(Kleinetal.,2005)
Joint activity is facilitated and realized with the
help of three basic components, namely – criteria,
requirements and choreography (Klein, Feltovich,
Bradshaw, & Woods, 2005). Intention and
interdependence are the two main criteria of a joint
activity. Participants should have the intention and
commitment to participate in the activity and
interdependence
requires participants to coordinate
and align their individual goals for profitable
outcomesfortheparticipants.
Interpredictability of actions and common ground
betweenparticipantsaretheprerequisiterequirements
ofajointactivity.Adaptabilitytotheongoingprocess
requires interpredictability i.e. the ability to predict
and/or foresee the actions and reactions of
other
participants in the joint activity. Common ground
refers to the common knowledge, beliefs and
assumptions of the participants in the activity. It
facilitates communication and coordination between
the participants. Common ground accords
communicative competence to the participants and
thereforeeasesthecommunicativeburdenduetothe
common stock of knowledge.
Task/work/industry‐
specifictechnicaljargonwhichenablesparticipantsto
understandeachotherwhileworkingtogetherinthe
jointactivityisanexampleofcommonground.
The final component of a joint activity is
choreography of the activity which comprises – joint
actions, signaling,andcoordinationandcancome with
accompanying costs
for one or more of the
participants. Participants need to signal their
intentionandcoordinatetheirjointactionstoensure
success of the joint activity. At times one or more
participants may have to postpone their individual
personalgoalsinordertoachievethejointgoals.This
impliesthatchoreographyof
jointactionsmaycome
with attendant costs wherein common goals are
prioritizedoverindividualones.
Jointactivityisessentialwithregardstotrainingin
inter‐departmentalcommunication.Itisonlywhenits
prerequisites, namely requirements, criteria and
choreographyare met thatwe have the ground ready
forasuccessfuljoint
activitybetweentheparticipants.
Noteworthy is that joint actions do not imply joint
activity as they are but a part of choreography within
the overall activity. For a successful joint activity to
take place, participants need to be aware of its
components and their role in the overall scheme of
thingstoensureasuccessfuloutcome.Inthisrespect,
171
the authors argue that connecting joint activity to
trainingisbeneficial.
Literature on communication in shipping has
hitherto not focused on inter‐departmental
communication between the bridge and the engine
roomon‐boardandthispapermakesgoodthisneed.
Communication in shipping has been studied in the
contextof
theVesselTrafficService(VTS)(Froholdt,
2010; Kataria, 2012; Kataria & Praetorius, 2014).
Communicationasakeyissueinmultilingualcrews
emerged in the ethnographic research undertaken
onboardbyresearchersaspartofthelargerresearch
project on transnational seafarer communities (see
Sampson&Zhao,2003).
Most literature on interdepartmental
communicationandcollaborationisinthediscipline
ofManagementwithafocusonproductdevelopment
and the bottom line. Interdepartmental integration
was found to have positive implications for product
development performance (Kahn, 1996). The author
differentiates between interaction and collaboration
and goes on to identify that while both interaction
and collaboration
have a positive effect on product
developmentperformance,collaborationhasagreater
impactanditfacilitatesinterdepartmentalintegration
while interaction could be limited to meetings and
documentationofinformationexchange.
Interdepartmentalinteractionshavebeenfoundto
haveanimpactonproductquality(Menon,Jaworski,
& Kohli, 1997). Interdepartmental conflict and
connectedness affect product quality and
interdepartmental connectedness has been identified
as more important for product quality in turbulent
market and technological conditions. The study
results also indicated that leadership characteristics,
reward system and organization structure influence
interdepartmentalinteractions.
In one study, pro‐social value orientation in
employees was identified as having
an impact on
concerns for the goals of the organization and other
departments and led to the increased likelihood in
problem solving behavior during interdepartmental
negotiations(Nauta&De‐Dreu,2002).
Collaboration capability has been defined as the
actor’s capability to build and manage network
relationships based on mutual trust,
communication and
commitmentandhasbeenidentifiedasaprerequisite
for the creation of a sustainable competitive
advantage and can be considered as an integrative
concept(Blomqvist&Levy,2006).
The concept of joint activity and literature from
management can help contextualize and unpack
interdepartmental collaborative teamcommunication
on‐boardoceangoing
vessels.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Interview
A total of 20 semi‐structured qualitative research
interviewswereconductedexploringtheinformation
exchangebetweenthebridgeandtheEngineControl
Room.Aninterviewguidewasdevelopedthathelped
toexplore,notonlythethestandardcommunications
and information shared during planning and
executing
a voyage between the departments, but
also, special situations such as safety/casualty tasks
etc. The goal of the interviews were to get a better
idea of what communication does, or should, take
place and any problems or challenges existing in
currentoperations,asseenfromboththebridgeand
ECRoperators’
perspectives.
Theintervieweesweredeckandengineofficersof
management rank with the exception of one Cadet
who was somewhat limited in providing informed
opinionsbyvirtueofalackofexperience.
Table1.InterviewParticipants
_______________________________________________
Intervieweenumber SeafaringRank
_______________________________________________
1ChiefOfficer
2Captain
31
st
Officer
4Navalofficer
5ChiefOfficer
6ChiefOfficer
7ChiefOfficer
82
nd
Officer
92
nd
Officer
10Captain
112
nd
Officer
12ChiefOfficer
132
nd
Officer
14DeckCadet
153
rd
Officer
162
nd
Engineer
172
nd
Engineer
18ChiefEngineer
19NavalCommander
20MasterMariner‐Pilot
_______________________________________________
3.2 DataCodinginCAQDAS
Emergentthemesintheinterviewdatahaveinformed
the thematic in‐vivo coding of the interview
transcripts. The data was coded and themes and
patterns in the data were identified. The primary
purpose of exploring interdepartmental
communicationon‐boardwastoexplorethegoalsof
communication between the two departments, the
purpose of communication, the situation/scenario
necessitating the communication, the media used in
the interaction, the information shared during the
communicationandtheproblems,ifany,experienced
duringthecommunicationprocess.
The data was thematically grouped and further
microcodedinto27codesasappropriate.
Theresults
revealedthediversepurposesofbridge‐engineroom
communication according to the interviewees; they
further identified key inter‐departmental
communicative acts; the various safety and time
critical situations and events in a voyage requiring
interdepartmental communication; the tools and
strategiesthatsupportcommunication;theyalsogave
theirinputon
thedesignofcommunicationtoolsand
on‐boardsystems;theiropinionsofinterdepartmental
communication;perceivedinterdepartmentalculture;
suggestions and solutions for improving
communication.Theintervieweesalsoreflectedupon
whetheracommonlanguagewasrequiredforbridge‐
ECR communication; they further mentioned the
172
organizational/on‐boardpolicyforinterdepartmental
communication; the interviewees identified the
information required by the bridge from the engine
control room and vice versa in their daily work
interactions; the interviewees provided their
perceptiononthe presence of the ChiefEngineer on
thebridgeaswellasontheinstallation
ofCCTVsin
the engine control room and on the bridge for joint
and shared awareness. The interviewees also gave
theiropinionsregardingtheinstallationoftheengine
control room panel on the bridge. The interviewees
perceived a fissure between the two departments;
theyreflectedonthemiscommunicationbetweenthe
twodepartmentsthatcansometimestakeplace.The
role of leadership was identified in improving
interdepartmental communication, which is in line
with management literature on the subject. The
importance of empathy and an appreciation for the
work of the other department was noted by the
interviewees in improving bridge‐engine room
communication on‐board which has parallels with
pro‐social values in management literature. Direct
facetofacemeetingsbetweentheChiefEngineerand
theCaptainwereconsideredbeneficialforpromoting
collaborative team communication on‐board as it
wouldsetanexampleforthepersonneltofollowsuit.
The interviewees also
reflected on multinational,
multilingual crews and the impact on inter‐
departmental communication, if any. The following
sectiondiscussestheresultsoftheresearchingreater
detail.
4 RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
The results were divided into 6 main sections to
highlightthecoretypesofinformationthatshouldbe
soughtoutin
mostcommunicationandcollaboration
situations. It was thought that if novice designers
werenotabletoadaptthedetailedtemplate,thenat
leastthe categories could focus the interview on the
key information required and provide examples of
contentforguidance.Theresultsarediscussedinthe
followingsub‐sections.
4.1 Goalsofthecommunication
There were three main goals of the bridge‐ECR
communications.Thefirstwastopreparethevesselto
be ready or available, for example to maneuver,
respond to orders, bunker, or allocate power. The
secondwastobepreparedandtorespondeffectively
toaccidents,incidents,
andfailures.Thethirdwasto
alert the other control center concerning situational
variables,suchasweather,maintenance,delays,pilot
onboard, etc. The goals of the interdepartmental
interaction inform the communication scenarios that
canbefurtherexploredbytheconceptofjointactivity
(Klein et al., 2005) to inform interdepartmental
communicationtraining.
4.2 Situationsofinterestforcoordinationand
communication
Thepurposeofbridge‐engineroomcommunicationis
primarily business‐related, focusing on the routine
communications and communications required
during key events in a voyage. These included
examples such as the departure and arrival phases
duetothecoordinatedchecklistsand
constraintssuch
asthesignificantadvancenoticerequiredtocomplete
tasks such as switching fuels. This also included
communications for events that affect propulsion,
such as when the tugs are attaching or towing.
Approaches to shallow water or dangerous areas
were also important because then maneuvering
becomes more time critical
as there is a need to be
preparedforanaccidentorincidentandthepotential
need to manually operate the engines. Incidents or
maneuvering where more power might be required
werealsoreportedasimportant.Thesecouldinclude
for example collision avoidance, anchoring or
berthingandanyotherincidentwhere
morepoweror
maneuvering might be required (e.g., crowded
areas—fishing, separation zone, port areas). One
interviewee noted that immediate anchoring during
collision avoidance caught him by surprise as the
engines need time to adjust. Another interviewee
reported having to coordinate to control the
revolutionsperminute(RPM)swhenslowsteaming.
Problemswiththemachinery,suchasblackoutor
other power/engine failure, were listed as situations
where coordination is important but challenging. It
wasnotedthatitisalsoimportanttoknowwhenthe
engine room is really busy in order to time
communications better (i.e., there is no one there to
answer the phone). Another example given was
trying to start engines, as not all control is in one
place (bridge or ECR). Also included was
coordinationforaccident,incidents,orgroundingsto
understand the damage situation, as well as the
maneuveringneedsandoptions.
Communication can also be required when
coordinating electrical power availability, generator,
or pump requirements. Delays to the schedule (e.g.,
strongcurrent,traffic,pilotdelay,etc.)shouldalsobe
communicated. Bunkering and ballasting operations
were also reported to require communication and
coordination,especiallyifundertimepressure.
For dredging operations it was reported that it
couldbehelpful
tohavethechiefengineeruponthe
decktohaveabetterviewandunderstandingofthe
situation and to coordinate directly with the engine
department. Overall, it was noted that with
automated engine rooms the communication is
mostlyjustreporting.
The interdepartmental communication situations
on‐board fulfill the
requirements of interdependence
andintentionofajointactivity(Kleinetal.,2005)asthe
situations require the participants to commit with
intent to cooperating in the activity to have a
favourable outcome. Interpredictability and common
ground between the participants can be facilitated
with the development of novel solutions, which
would
also aid the chorography of the joint activity
through joint actions, signaling and coordination. The
conceptofjointactivityneedstobeutilizedtoinform
173
training for interdepartmental communication in
diversescenariosfacingthepersonnelonboard.
4.3 Communicationmedia:
The key tool used for bridge‐ECR communication is
the telephone and other tools like the VHF, walkie‐
talkie, citophone, a voice tube, telegraph, speakers;
papermessages,includinginstructingapersontorun
up and down
between the departments are used as
appropriate in facilitating inter‐departmental
communication.Byfarthetelephonewasreportedas
the preferred choice of communication, which often
includedadirectlinefromthebridgetotheECRand
sometimes included various telephone sets mounted
around the engine room. The walkie‐talkie
was
reportedtobeusedbutthatitdoesnotwork in the
engineroomanditsuseisdifficultduetonoiseand
distortion. The chief engineer often also meets in
personwiththebridge,forexamplebeforearrivalor
whenproblemshappen.Theintercomwasalsonoted
to have
the advantage that everyone can hear the
conversation and it can also be used hands‐free to
allowworktocontinue.Thiswasonlyreportedbya
naval mariner though and not from merchant
mariners.
Included in this discussion of how the control
centers communicate was the concept of positioning
thechiefengineerofficeronthebridgewithanECR
mimic panel as is becoming standard practice on
some ships. The mariners interviewed provided
mixedopinionsonhavinganengineerdirectlyon,or
close to, the bridge in general. Positive factors
included:some reported that having the chief/watch
engineeronthe
bridgeimprovesthecommunication
between bridge and engine department (e.g., as an
interpreter), a better understanding of the other
department’s situation and mutual tasks, the ability
for the engineers to provide information directly to
thebridgeandseethenon‐verbalreactions,andmore
of a team feeling. Negative factors
included: the
engineeronthebridgecanfeelfrustratedbynotbeing
able to see and interact directly with the other
engineers;especiallyinemergencysituationsthechief
engineeroftenneedstobebackdowninECRquickly
andhavedirectinteractionswiththepersonnelthere;
confusion and distraction by having
two concurrent
tasks in one room; and increasing the number of
alarms experienced in the bridge area which is an
already existing problem. It was also noted that the
ECR console on the bridge often only gives a
restricted view of the operational status of the
machinery (e.g., single windows
that have to be
viewed in isolation) and not the overview that is
desired by the engineers. Taking the chief/watch
engineer out of the engine room can also leave the
restoftheengineersfeelingevenmoreisolated.
4.4 Examplesprovidedofinformationshared
Each mariner provided examples of the types
of
information shared and just the trends and not the
detailed list are included here. The communication
mostly focusses on rpm, speed, pressure, air, valves
and the information required to make the engine
ready for ensuing maneuvers or prepare for
upcoming demands (e.g., auxiliary engines, bow
thrusters). The purpose of
bridge‐ECR
communicationsislargelylinkedtotherequirements
ofthebridgeandtosafetyandtimecriticalsituations
at sea. Additional items included examples such as
pre‐departure discussion, stability and trim
calculations, delays and changes to the schedule,
critical maintenance that impacts the other
department, power and pressure demands
throughout the ship, and administrative issues such
as drills and meetings. There can be a difference
depending on if the engine room is manned or
unmannedaswell,andnoticemustbeprovidedifthe
statuschangesorsomeoneisinthemachineryspaces.
4.5 Problemswithcommunicationandcoordination
The mariners also reported the problems that they
had experienced with communication and
coordination. A lack of advanced warning and
updates was one type of problem experienced and
was seen to include misunderstandings and
miscommunications(e.g.,forgottencommunications).
An example given was with the 1 hour notice
requiredtoslowdown
theenginesformaneuvering
and to pick up the pilot. In the example given the
pick‐uptimegotchangedbutwasnotcommunicated
well with the engine room resulting in being
unpreparedandhavingtorepeatthemaneuver.This
forgetting can take place, both across departments
andwithinthe
departments.
One group of problems involved a lack of
understanding of the other group’s job and context,
such as how the engines work, what engineers do,
andtheconcernsthebridgehas.Bridgeofficersnoted
that they do not always know the difficulties and
concernsforengineersrelatedtoamaneuver
suchas
whentheywanttogofromfullaheadtofullastern.
Anotherexamplewasgivenwhereafteramaneuver
the engineers might ask as to why so many engine
orderswererequired.Therecanalso be adifference
inprioritiesinthetwodepartments,namelyconcern
for the
engines vs. optimal speed or ship handling.
The engineers noted that sometimes there may be
someproblemswiththeenginesthatthebridgedoes
not completely understand and think the maneuver
requestshavehigherpriority.
Another group of problems was related to not
knowingwhatwasgoingonintheother
department
(e.g., are actions in process, is the other department
really busy). One part of this is knowing when the
other department is occupied in work and when to
time the communications that are non‐urgent. One
example was the bridge needing to coordinate the
pre‐departurechecklistwiththe
engineeratthesame
time that the engineers are very busy getting the
engines ready for departure. The ECR officers
reportednotbeingabletoseewhathappenedonthe
bridgeandoftentheupcomingsituation(e.g.,harbor
andtraffic)thatmightrequiremaneuvers.Thebridge
reporting not knowing what is
going on when they
giveanorderandafteratimeseenochangeandget
no call. It was also noted by the engineers that the
situationcanbeevenmoreexaggeratedwhenthereis
a pilot onboard as the pilots have an even less
understandingoftheship
andtheonboardsituation.
174
A related problem was the engineers being
unreachable, for example at times when all of the
engineers are outside of the ECR, especially during
unmannedperiodswhereasingleengineerhasalot
ofroomtocover.Itwasfurthernotedthatthealertto
aphonecallisnot
distinctfromotheralertsandthis
can cause it to be ignored. Alarm and alert
presentationwaslistedasageneralproblemaswell.
There were also reports of inter‐departmental
culture clashes that can inhibit good coordination.
The general issue appears to be that of a rivalry or
status
conflict where there are perceptions of the
bridgeofficersintheirnicewhitesuitsthatareseento
getallthecreditandblametheproblemsonthe“blue
collar”engineers.Thecontroloftheenginesisseenas
a way that the engineers can take back some of the
status
and power. One interviewee even referred to
thedivisionbetweenthetwoasa‘hugeBerlinwall’.
Thereweremixedreportsofproblemswithmulti‐
national crews. A couple of interviewees mentioned
differences in nationalities clashing occasionally and
some language issues but others noted that even
whencrewswereof
thesamenationalitytheregional
differences could come up. One interviewee also
noted that in multinational crews it is usually for
bigger companies and there is more of a system
(regulated process) in place so that is better.
Management literature on interdepartmental
integrationandcollaborationandpotentialimpacton
productquality
andcompetitiveadvantageisrelevant
here(seeKahn,1996;Menon,Jaworski,&Kohli,1997;
Blomqvist&Levy,2006)
4.6 Potentialsolutionstoidentifiedproblems
Theintervieweeswerealsoaskedabouttheirideasfor
solutions to the problems they mentioned and ideas
onhowtoimprovecommunicationandcoordination
ingeneral.
Thesewillbeexpandedonastheproject
proceeds and priority solutions will be evaluated
usinghumancentereddesigntechniques.Overallthe
solution concepts fall into 3 main categories:
technologies that aid in communication or provide
situational awareness (e.g., shared displays, CCTV,
hands‐free or portable devices), procedural
improvements(moreco
‐planningandjointactivities),
andtraining(teamresourcemanagementtraining,co‐
training,cross‐training).
Examples provided included providing shared
displays (or parts of these displays or information
content) to support a better understanding of the
situation, as well as of the other department in
general. These included displays such as
providing
ECRpanelsonthebridgeorbridgechartdisplaysin
the ECR. The simple solution is to just provide an
identical display or mimic but some thought should
alsobegiventohowtheotherdepartmentwoulduse
this information and if customization (e.g., de‐
cluttered display, alternative display format,
or
presentationofadditionalinformation)iswarranted.
Discussion also included providing CCTV
equipmenttobetterseewhatisgoingonintheother
departmentandwhenpersonsareavailable,orwhere
theymightbecontactedoutsidetheECR.Therewere
privacy issues included in this concept and, if
implemented,having
camerasinboththebridgeand
enginedepartment’sareasmightbebettertoaddress
both privacy and hierarchy issues. One interviewee
suggested that this type of solution might be more
appropriate for the chief engineer when he is in his
cabin and ECR in unmanned. Another interviewee
suggested that this might
be helpful if the single
person in the engine room (ER) was injured. This
might also support another interviewee’s problems
withinterpretingthedeadman’salarmintheERby
providing a way to check on the status. This could
allow both a quicker reaction and also assist in
deciding
toresetthealarmbeforeitescalates.Another
interviewee noted that in critical situations there
would not really be any time to be looking at these
monitors.Itshouldbenotedthatshipshaveworked
out rather sophisticated systems of hand signals for
usewhencommunicatingviaCCTV.
Another set of
solutions involved including the
engineersmoreintheplanningprocessasthismight
address some of the personality/status conflicts and
alsoprovideimprovedsharedunderstanding.Shared
planning was reported as effective where the chief
engineersignsoffonthevoyageplanandalsohasthe
informationofwhen to expect
thepilot or arrivalat
certainareasorplaces.Itshouldbefurtherconsidered
if this information could then be provided as a
physicalreminder,orschedule,andalsoincludeany
updatesorchanges. It wassuggested that especially
when first joining a ship the captain and chief
engineershouldmeet
andreachanunderstandingof
responsibilities(whateachpersondoes–2
nd
engineer,
chiefofficer,etc.).
Communication is an aspect of Maritime
Education and Training (MET); and addressing
interdepartmental communication in training, has
beenidentifiedasoneofthepotentialsolutionsinthe
study. Communication within the bridge team is
addressedinIMO model course1.22 (2002) on ‘Ship
Simulation and Bridge
Teamwork’, however hitherto
there is no model course which specifically involves
interdepartmentalcommunicationperse.TheBridge
Team Management (BTM) and Bridge Resource
management (BRM) and Engine Room Team
Management courses are offered by private players
and some public universities, but these exclusively
focus within the departments and not between
departments and there is no available IMO model
courseonthesesubjects.
Shipboard drills involve communication between
crew and are conducted to meet the regulations
enshrinedinSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)(IMO,1974,
as amended) convention and competency
requirementsaslaidoutintheStandardsofTraining
Certificationand
Watchkeeping (STCW) (IMO, 1978,
asamended)convention,suchasRegulationVI/2on
‘mandatory minimum requirements for the issue of
certificatesofproficiencyinsurvivalcraft,rescueboatsand
fastrescueboats’andRegulationVI/3on‘…trainingin
advanced firefighting’. Drills in emergency
preparedness do not specifically address the diverse
scenarios
in which the bridge and engine room
communicate as they are largely concerned with
competence training for preparing for emergencies.
Even though modern simulation facilities are
becomingstateoftheartinMET,combinedexercises
using linked Ship Engine Simulator (SES) and Ship
175
HandlingSimulator(SHS)isnotthestandardcaseyet
(see Baldauf et al, 2015). The standard case is the
stand‐alone use of an SES or SHS for training
exercises specifically designed for engineers or
navigators.Safetycriticalexercisesbelongtostandard
courses as well as to BRM/BTM courses, however
communication problems between bridge and ECR
arerarelyaddressedinsuchexercises.
The IMO Standard Marine Communication
Phrases (SMCP) (2002) Section AII/2 lists ‘Standard
Engine Orders’, however these telegraph orders are
given,acteduponandconfirmedbymembersofthe
bridge team and do not involve the engine room
directly
in verbal communication. The IMO SMCP
(2002) briefly refers to communication phrases
regarding ‘briefing on operation of main engine and
auxiliary equipment; …on pumping of fuel, ballast water
etc.’and‘briefingonspecialmachineryeventsandrepairs’
in sections B1/1.9, B1/1.10 and B1/1.11 respectively.
However these phrases are very limited
in the
communication they cover. Interdepartmental
communication is thus found wanting. From the
interviewsitcanbegleanedthatthetrainingavailable
currently does not adequately address
communicationaspectsbetweentheECRandbridge
team.
Communicationhaspreviouslybeenidentifiedin
maritimeaccidents(seeSchröder‐Hinrichsetal.,2012)
andtraining
inour study wasalsoseenasawayto
addresssome of the personalityand communication
issues enumerated by participants. This training
could take the shape of including the engineers in
someBridgeResourceManagement(BRM)trainingor
havingmoreinclusiveteammanagementtrainingfor
engineers,possiblycombinedwith
bridgeofficers as
well. This training could also be additional co‐
training, especially on emergency situations. The
benefitsofthisweresecondedbytheNavyexperience
whichincludesco‐trainingforscenariossuchasfire,
collisions, distress and emergency situations, and
enginefailure.Thelasttypeoftrainingsolutionwas
cross
‐trainingwherebridgeofficerslearnmoreabout
engine dynamics and management beyond the
minimal training already provided and engineers
learn more about ship handling. There was some
discussionifthetwocontrolcenterpositionsmightbe
combined in the future requiring this type of cross‐
training and expertise. The authors
argue for the
utilization of the concept of joint activity in inter‐
departmental communication training to support
favourable outcomes for the participants in the
overallinterestoftheship.
It was also suggested to consider further hands‐
free options for communications as both the bridge
andECR/ERareoftenbusytrying
tosolveaproblem
orconcentratingandthereforedonotcallandprovide
information.Automaticinformation(i.e.,shipcloud)
couldalsohelpwiththisandrequirenoactionfrom
sender.
Another suggestion was to implement policy
restricting engine room calls to business and
importantitemstoincreasetheurgencyand
tendency
toprioritizeansweringwhencalled.
One bridge officer interviewee suggested
displaying a timetable for all the actions that the
bridge requests from engine room and with a
notification when the action has been seen and
completed. This was seen as a way to provide
confirmationforbothsides.
The ideas
for solutions are being further
investigated through additional interviews and
methodstodefinescenariosofinterestandhowthese,
orothersolutions,mightsupportthem.Aconceptfor
a high‐priority solution will be defined as this
research task proceeds and further evaluated with
endusers.
5 CONCLUSIONSANDFUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Thefindingsfromtheinterviewswithseafarerswere
usedasthebasistoinformoneofthepackagesofthe
CyClaDes research project, which pertained to the
applicationofinnovativeergonomicconcepts.Thetaskin
particularconcentratedonperformingacrew‐centered
design case study of the communication and
collaborationprocessesbetweentheship’sbridgeand
theECR.Thefindingsrevealedthetasksundertaken
bythe bridge andengine room personnel in context
and revealed the inherent decision making required
andthe importance of having shared understanding
forjointcriticaltasks.Thefindingsalsorevealedthe
problemsfacedbypersonnel
on‐boardwithrespectto
interdepartmental communication and gave initial
ideasaboutthedevelopmentofpotentialsolutions.
The planned activities to follow in the research
work, include: onboard observations; detailed
discussionsbetweentheprojectteam,especiallywith
theseafarerstodefinepertinentscenarios,roles/tasks,
required information, and key sub‐divisions;
the
developmentofalistofcommunication/coordination
scenariostofocusdesigneffortson;anonlinesurvey
to validate for each identified scenario, the
informationexchangedandtoobtainaratingforthe
need for communication, frequency of problems
experienced, and need for improvement that will be
used to prioritize where to
focus for solution
concepts; and the development of solution concepts
and potentially prototypes to test those concepts.
Future research efforts will continue to iteratively
develop and design potential solutions to facilitate
inter‐departmentalcommunicationon‐board,whileat
the same time taking into account the barriers to
implementation and ascertaining
the viability of the
developed solutions and encouraging uptake by
undertakingprototypetesting.
A secondary focus running concurrently is the
evaluation of the applicability of the methods being
used in the case study to maritime applications,
identifyingwaystoimprovetheirunderstandability,
applicability and implementation by other maritime
designers.
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