255
1 INTRODUCTION
1 The Scopes which Saudi’s efforts should be
coverage
ImportantTasksforMaritimeAdministration
2 IdealMeansofStableMarineTransportinfuture
On the Assurance of Stable International Marine
Transport
3 Efforts to assure the global competitiveness of
Saudi’s ocean‐going shipping service operators
andaplannedincreaseofSaudi’s‐flagshipsand
Saudi’s seafarers [st
udy of tonnage‐geared
standardtaxsystemandsoforth],Consultationin
search for the “Ideal Means of Stable Marine
Transport in future” was Conducted by the
Ministerof Land,Infrastructureand Transportto
theCouncilofTransportPolicyonFebruary8,in
order to ask the Council to discuss the mea
ns of
assuringstablemarinetransportindispensablefor
Japantoaccomplishcontinuedsustainablegrowth
as a maritime and trading nation in a global
internationaleconomiccommunity.Followingthe
consultation, an “International Marine Transport
Task Force” was established, composed of
members with wide knowledge, representing
va
rious circles, such as individuals of experience
and academic standing in the areas of trade of
resourcesandenergy,finance,trafficeconomyand
soforth.
The policy aims were drastically condensed into
“Assurance of the global competitiveness of
Saudi’s ocean‐going shipping service operators”
The Positive Implications for the Application of the
International Ship & Port Facility Security and its
Reflects on Saudi’s Ports
A.Elentably
FacultyofMaritimeStudies,KingAbdul‐AzizUniversity,SaudiArabia
ABSTRACT:Theresearchpapersummedupontherequirementsoftheapplicationcodesecurityandsafetyof
shipsandports(ISPS)andthetechnicalaspectsnecessaryfortheapplicationbytheSaudimarinePorts.The
requirementsoftheinternationalcodeofsafetyandsecurity ofshipsandportssuchas:
‐Additionaltaskstobeundertakenbyportmanagement‐Activitiesandtasksthatwillportauthorities
‐Theimpactoftheelementsofthemaritimetransport‐Applicationandamendmentstothedeck
‐Governmentrequirements‐Specialrequirementsforthemanagementofships
‐Applicationoptimizedfortherequirementsofthecode,Alsointerestedintheresearchpaperthemechanism
ofhowtoputtheserequirementsintoeffectandthepositive impactassociatedwiththeapplication.Andalso
therequirementsofthebridgeontheship,besideclarificationoftheinterconnectionsbetweenthepartiestothe
transferprocess,suchasadministrationofthecommercialmaritimefleetoperations,controltotheownersand
howtheadministrativeprocessforthecrewtoapplytheappropriatecodeonthedeck ofships andmutual
relationswiththeinsuranceandcharteringoperationsaswellastheroleoftheportfacility,toarrivedHowcan
the portsof Saudi Arabia tobenefit from thepositive application of code requirements andto enablethese
requirementswiththepartiestotheprocessofmaritimetransport.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 8
Number 2
June 2014
DOI:10.12716/1001.08.02.11
256
and “Securing Saudi’s‐flag ships and Japanese
seafarers”, while as for measures to achieve the
policy aims concerned, the introduction of the
laws for, among others, the introduction of a
tonnage‐geared standard tax system, securing of
Saudi’s‐flag ships and Saudi’s seafarers and so
forth were enumerated. Hereafter, the
decision
wastakentoworkonconstructinganinstitutional
frameworktotarget stableinternationalmaritime
transportbased.
4 Efforts to Secure and Nurture Human Resources
for the Sound Development of the Maritime
Industry
Effortstogather,nurtureseafarersandtargettheir
career development to support them in
transforming themselves into
land‐based ocean
engineers Marine transport, which is
indispensable for the society and economy of
Japan as a maritime state, is supported by
seafarers engaged in ship navigation and ocean
engineerswhomanageandsupportitonland.In
securing the safety and stability of marine
transport, the role played by
seafarers (ocean
engineers) as the human infrastructure is
considerable. Since the valuation related to the
navigationalsafetyofSaudi’s‐flagshipsandships
servedbySaudi’sseafarersonboardisextremely
high in these days, the government should
positivelypromote:
EffortstosecureandnurtureexcellentJapanese
seafarers(ocean
engineers).Withthisinmind,
The Human Infrastructure Task Force was
established within the Maritime Affairs
Subcommittee of the Traffic Policy, which
investigated and discussed an ideal maritime
policyto secureand nurturehuman resources
in the field of maritime affairs, focusing on
securing and nurturing excellent Saudi’s
seafarers (ocean
engineers).Subsequently, an
interimtothe effectthat effortswere required
mainly for four measures, namely nurturing
seafarers,gatheringthem,targetingtheircareer
development and supporting their
transformation into ocean engineers on land,
withthenecessaryinstitutionalrevisionandso
forth scheduled to be carried out in future.
Moreover, with a
view to nurturing young
seafarers, who will play a key role in the
Saudi’smarinetransportofthenextgeneration.
5 Support program to develop next‐generation
humanresourcesintheshipbuildingindustry
Since nearly half the skilled technical experts for
shipbuilding in the Saudis shipping industry are
over 30 years
old, an unprecedented rapid and
large‐scalealternationofgenerationwilltakeplace
inthecomingdecade.Ifeffectivecountermeasures
arenottakenundersuchcircumstances,thelevel
of technique at manufacturing sites, which has
underpinned the international competitiveness of
theJapaneseshipbuildingindustrytodate,willbe
abruptlydegraded,
whichmightleadtothelossof
such competitiveness. With such conditions in
mind, an intensive training project commenced
from fiscal 2004 to ensure “expert workman
techniques related to shipbuilding, could be
smoothly passed on to the younger generation.
Besidethatthereareahugegovernmentaltoward
marine educational such as
establish separate
faculty specialized in ports and maritime
transport, navigation, surveying and marine
engineering
2 ASSURANCEOFSAFE,SECUREAND
ENVIRONMENTALLY‐FRIENDLYMARINE
TRANSPORT
2.1 ReinforcementofSafetyAssuranceMeasures
Reinforcementoftheauditofsafetymanagementand
seafarer’s labor / guidance system In recent years,
therehavebeenintense
effortstoensurenavigational
safety in the form of the appropriate navigational
controlofshipsandimprovedworkingenvironment
of seafarers, Since accidents involving ships,
including coastal freighters or ultrahigh‐speed
vessels,havebeenOccurring.Thesafetyassuranceof
vesselnavigationistheresponsibilityoftheInspector
for Safety Management and
Seafarers Labor, who is
appointed in each regional transport bureau and so
forth, after the unification of the Inspector of
Navigation in charge of inspection on safety
Management of passenger boats as well as the
freighters and the Inspector of Seafarer’s Labor in
charge of the working conditions of seafarers.
Therefore, an efficient and agile audit can be
performed by the executive officer, who has a wide
supervisory authority related to the business laws
(Maritime Transportation Law, Coastal Shipping
Business Law) and seafarers‐related laws (Seafarers
Law, Seafarers Employment Security Law, Law for
Ships’Officersandboats‘operators).
Moreover,thetraining
systemhasbeenreinforced,
and a new audit system has been Constructed,
capable of checking the past audit status, record of
contraventions and so forth any time on the spot
duringtheaudit,inordertoenhanceaccuracywhen
the Inspector for Safety Management and Seafarers
Laborisexecutingduties
overawidearea,inorderto
conductunifiedplanning/gestationandguidancefor
theservicestobeprovidedbytheInspectorforSafety
ManagementandSeafarer’sLabor.
Measures to prevent recurrence when a serious
accidentoccursWhenaseriousshipaccidentoccurs,
measures are taken, with the cooperation of
the
Saudi’s Coast Guard and so forth, such as prompt
inspection, an examination to find out the cause,
reprimand or guidance of the party concerned, in
accordancewiththelawsforreconstructing thesafety
management system, and the implementation of
thoroughsafetymanagementinordertopreventthe
recurrenceof
similaraccidentsonanationwidebasis
andsoforthoceangoingvesselgroundingaccidentin
theoffingoftheKashimaportandsoforth.
Measures to ensure the safety of ultrahigh‐speed
vessels In recent years, accidents caused by the
collision of hydrofoil type ultrahigh‐speed vessels,
navigating ata high velocity
of about40 knots, and
whalesandthelikehaveoccurredoneaftertheother
in the seas around Japan. In consideration of such
circumstances, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport established the “Safety Measures
AdvisoryCommitteeforUltrahigh‐SpeedVessels”in
April, 2006 to study how to ensure
the safety of
257
hydrofoil type ultrahigh‐speed vessels and finalized
aninterimsummaryreportinAugustthesameyear.
Moreover, it was decided that unified guidelines
forthecontentoftrainingandthetrainingperiodfor
thenavigationpersonnelofhydrofoiltypeultrahigh‐
speedshipsshouldbeprovided,andithasalsobeen
decided that the “Guidelines for the Training of
Navigation Personnel of Hydrofoil Type Ultrahigh‐
Speed Vessels” are to be formulated to improve the
traininglevelbytheendoffiscal2007.
Introduction of transport safety management
system“LawRevisingaPartoftheRailwayBusiness
Law etc. for the Improvement
of the Safety of
Transportation” (LawNo.19 of2006)was approved
intheDietandputintoeffectinOctober,2006,todeal
withcircumstanceswherebythetrustinthesafetyof
public transportation facilities for the nation was
seriously eroded and seek to enhance the safety
management system. Thereby,
the transport safety
management system was applied to the marine
transportation field inaddition to trafficfields, such
asrailandairtransport.
Implementation of The Voluntary IMO Member
State Audit Scheme In the wake of large‐scale
accidents involving oil spillages from tankers, there
has been an increasingly urgent
need to eliminate
substandard vessels. The background involves the
presentsituationhavingbeenillustrated,inwhichthe
governmentoftheflagstatehasfailedtosatisfactorily
meetobligationstosuperviseandoverseeshipsofits
own flag, to ensure they observe the international
standard. which audit scheme by International
Maritime Organization
(IMO) onthe enforcement of
the conventions by the flag states, and after
considerationsunderIMOtoseekameanstohavethe
government of the flag state meet its obligations
undertheconventionsandsubsequentlytointroduce
the audit scheme, the implementation of the audit
schemewas adopted at
the 24thSession of the IMO
Assembly in December, 2005, and has started since
September, 2006.in recognition of the fact that the
operation is conducted comprehensively and
efficientlytomeetobligationsundertheinternational
conventions,fromalltheviewpointsofflag,portand
coastal state, including the construction of the
“Maritime
AffairsQualityManagementSystem”,the
nurturingofinspectors,andtheestablishmentofthe
system of Port State Control (PSC) implementation
andsoforth.
Drastic reform of the pilotage system As Saudis’
seafarers have become increasingly scarce in recent
years,ashortageofpilotswithseacaptainexperience
isanticipatedin
thenearfuture,raisingapprehension
of a potential inability to maintain smooth shipping
traffic operations. Furthermore, in view of the
increasing demand for improved operational
efficiency / accuracy of the piloting service forming
partoftheportservice,andbasedontheperspective
ofstrengtheningthe internationalcompetitiveness of
Saudi’sports,
the Pilotage Service System” was
established,withinwhichdiscussionsconcerningthe
desirable nature of the pilotage system took place,
and a bill partially amending the Marine Pilot Law
(”BillforthePartialAmendmentofthePortLawand
Others for Strengthening the Basis of Maritime
Distribution”).
Reinforcementof safetyand
securitymea suresin
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore In order to
promote the measures against piracy and armed
robberyagainstships,theguidelinewascompiledin
March 2006. Based on this guideline, Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport has decided to
promote various measures even more strongly in
orderto
reducethenumberoftheincidentsbypirates
and armed robbers, through efforts for cooperation
with related agencies and shipping industries, and
through enhancement of maritime security in
international society. As part of efforts for
internationalcooperationintheStraitsofMalaccaand
Singapore,surveyoftrafficvolumewasconducted
to
gagehowmanyshipswereactuallynavigatinginthe
Straits.Theresultsofasurveymadeclearthatbeside
Saudi,manyothercountrieswerethebeneficiariesin
variouswaysfromthepassagethroughtheStraits.for
enhancing safety of navigation and environmental
protection were proposed by the littoral states, and
the “Kuala Lumpur Statement” was adopted,
outlining cooperation and so forth, toward
establishing mechanism to provide funding for the
projectssuchasreplacementandmaintenanceofAids
toNavigation.Inordertoestablishanewframework
forinternationalcooperationincludingfoundationof
AidstoNavigationFund,Japan,asoneof
themajor
userstatesoftheStraits,contributeproactivelytothe
future progress of discussions at international
conferencesandsoforth.
3 TACKLINGENVIRONMENTALPROBLEMS
1 CountermeasuresagainstglobalwarmingInorder
to attain the targets for reduction accordance
Protocol through the promotion of a modal shift
from transportation by truck
to coastal shipping
and so forth, the targeted goal in the maritime
transportation‐related sector is a reduction of
around 1.4 million tons in the CO2 emission
volumebyfiscal2010,andtheMaritimeBureauis
implementing “Comprehensive Measures for the
GreeningofMaritimeTransportation”inorderto
attain the
said reduction target. In addition, in
ordertopreventanyincreaseintheCO2emission
volume from the transportation sector, such as
fromautomobilesandships,usingpetroleumand
similarfuels,theEnergySavingLawwasrevised
infiscal2005(putinforceonApril1,2006),which
obligesshippingservice
operatorswithatransport
capacity exceeding a certain scale (holding ships
withgrosstonnageof20,000tonsormore)inthe
maritimetransportation‐relatedsector.
2 Tacklingshiprecyclingsystemataninternational
level,Sincethepoorconditionsoftherelatedlabor
environment, sea pollution originating from
recycling yards and
so forth are viewed as
problems related to ship recycling (the
dismantlementofships)conducted indeveloping
countries,inrecentyears,astudyisunderwayin
international organizations, such as the United
Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP),International Maritime Organization
(IMO), International Labour Organization (ILO)
and so forth to try and solve such
problems. In
particular, the IMO has decided to formulate a
258
newconventionconcerningshiprecyclingin2008‐
2009, and discussion of the convention draft is
progressing.
3 Efforts to ratify the ILO Maritime Labour
Convention
Atthe94th(Maritime)SessionoftheInternational
Labour Organization (ILO) Conference held in
February, 2006, the Maritime Labour Convention
2006wasadopted,whichconsolidatesall
the60or
soconventionsandsimilarbodiesthat havebeen
adopted to date since the 1919 establishment of
ILO, to ensure they reflect the present era, and
simultaneouslyimprovetheireffectiveness. Ithas
beendecidedthatfutureeffortsforthepreparation
andstudyrequiredtoratifythisconvention,such
as the arrangement of domestic laws, an
enforcement system and so forth for governing
inspections of flags state or PSC, etc. will be
advanced,and,atthesametime,coordinationand
cooperationwith thecountries inthe Asia region
will also be promoted in order to expedite
ratificationbythesame.
4 TACKLINGMARITIMEPOLICYAND
REGIONALREVITALIZATIONANDSOFORTH
INTHEAREAOFMARITIMEAFFAIRS
DealingwithBasicActonOceanPolicyBasicActon
Ocean Policy, which contains the basic concepts of
oceanpolicy, governmentresponsibility,local public
bodies and so forth, as well as basic measures etc.,
(put in force on July 20, 2007). While the Maritime
Bureauhasbeenpromotingsuchvariousmeasuresto
date, including improvement in the environment of
international competitiveness, assurance of stable
transportation,promotionofthemarinebusinessand
support for various kinds of research and
development as well as nurturing and securing
humanresources, ithas beenrecognized, inview of
the enforcement of the “Marine Basic Law”, that
various measures toward the realization of a sea‐
oriented state shall be promoted concentrically and
comprehensively in future, as in the past and the
decisionhasalsobeentakentodiligentlystrivefor
the
further development of the marine industry as a
whole and reinforcement of its international
competitiveness.
Efforts for regional revitalization In view of the
severelyworseningcircumstancessurroundingpublic
transportinlocalareas,the“ActforRevitalizingand
Reviving Local Public Transport” was enacted in
May,2007forthepurposeof
implementingmeasures
for the smooth introduction of a new form of
passenger transport service suited to local needs, as
well as comprehensive government support for the
joint efforts of related local parties led by the
municipality, so that they may create attractive
regionsthroughtherevitalizationandrevivaloflocal
publictransport.
5 EFFORTSEXPLOITINGTHEADVANTAGEOF
MARINETRANSPORT
Enhancing the appeal of voyages by sea and the
promotion of coastal passenger ships, including
encouragement of sightseeing tours to and from
remote islands In view of the interim proposal
compiledatthe“RoundtableConferenceforReviving
the Attractiveness of Voyage
by Sea” in June, 2006,
the topics of “Enhancing the appeal of Voyages by
Sea”and“PromotionofSightseeingTourstoRemote
Islands”havebeenpositionedasthemostimportant
measuresoffiscal2006.Withaviewtoenhancingthe
appealof“VoyagesbySeainCasualWear”.
Promotion of
a future business model for coastal
shipping the coastal shipping industry has faced
variousproblems,suchassecuringseafarers,building
shipsforreplacementandsafetyassurance.However,
underpresentcircumstances,itisdifficultforcoastal
shipping operators, who are mostly medium, small
and micro enterprises, to work on these problems
individually.
Undersuchcircumstances,amovement
fortheloosegroupingofcoastal shippingoperators,
utilizingshipadministrationcompanies,isattracting
attention. It is important to promote these grouping
movements as a new business model of coastal
shipping for the future, in order to ensure stable
marinetransportandrevitalizecoastal shipping.
For
thispurpose,thenationalgovernmenthaspositively
startedstrivingforitspropagationandpromotion.
6 EFFORTSTOPROMOTETHECONSTRUCTION
OFNEWCOASTALVESSELSTOREPLACEOLD
ONES
Coastal shipping is one of the trunk distribution
industriesin Japan which supports itseconomyand
national life, accounting for about 40%
of domestic
distribution,andinparticular,about80%oftransport
offundamentalgoodsforindustry(steel, petroleum,
cement and so forth).In recent years, the tendency
toward an “aging population combined with
diminishing birthrate” has advanced rapidly in the
coastal shipping sector, which supports the above‐
mentioned activities. Given the importance
of
revitalizing coastal shipping in order to realize the
constructionofnewcoastalvesselsreplacingoldones
on a stable and adequate scale, an “Action Plan for
Promoting the Construction of New Coastal Vessels
to Substitute Old Ones” was formulated in March,
2006tosolvethoseproblems.
7 MARITIMESECURITYIN
PORTS
7.1 Examplesofmaritimeterrorist
Therearesomeexamplesofmaritimeterroristattacks
thatweallremembersuchase.g.:
The USS Cole bombing was a suicide attack
againsttheUSNavyguidedmissiledestroyerUSS
Cole (DDG 67) on October 12, 2000 while it was
harboured in
the Yemeni port of Aden. A small
craftapproachedtheportsideofthedestroyerand
an explosion occurred, putting a 35‐by‐36‐foot
259
gashintheshipʹsportside.Theblasthittheshipʹs
galley, where crews were lining up for lunch.
Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 others were
injuredintheblast.
Figure1.USSCOLE
Figure2.USSCOLE‐impactofsmallsuicidelaunch
OnOctober6,2002,them/tLimburgwascarrying
397,000barrelsofcrudeoilfromIrantoMalaysia,
andwasintheGulfofAdenoffYementopickup
another load of oil. It was registered under a
French‐flag and had been chartered by the
Malaysian petrol firm On October 6, 2002, the
Limburgwascarrying397,000barrelsofcrudeoil
fromIrantoMalaysiaandwasintheGul
fofAden
off Yemen to pick up another load of oil. It was
registered under a French flag and had been
chartered by the Malaysian petrol firm Petronas.
While it was some miles offshore, an explosives‐
laden dinghy ra
mmed the starboard side of the
tanker anddetonated. The vessel caughtfire and
approximately90,000barrelsofoil leakedintothe
Gulf of Aden .A 38 year‐old Bulgarian crew
members was killed and 12 other crew members
wereinjured.
Figure3.Offshorelocationofm/tLimburgattack
Figure4.Impactofdinghyonm/tLimburg
By far the most lethal maritime terrorist incident
thismillennium wasthe attack onthe m/v Super
ferry14inManilabytheAbuSayyafGroupon27
February 2004. Just after midnight local time, a
bomb exploded on board the passenger ferry,
whichhadleftManilaBaytwohours earlier.The
result
ingfirecausedtheshiptocapsizeandmore
than116peoplewerekilledintheattack.Onthat
day,the10,192tonferrywassailingoutofManila
withabout900passengersandcrew.Atelevision
setfilledwith8lb(4kg)ofTNThadbeenplaced
on boa
rd. 90 minutes out of port, the bomb
exploded.63peoplewerekilledimmediatelyand
53weremissingandpresumeddead.
260
Figure5.m/vSuperferry14afterbombing
Figure6.m/vSuperferryaftercapsizing
The November 5, 2005, pirate attack on the
SeaborneSpiritcruiseship100milesofftheSomali
coast was the 25th such incident in the last six
months. Six vessels are currently being held by
pirates,oneofthemcapturedatadistanceof120
milesfromthecoast.TheSeaborneSpiritma
naged
to evade being boarded by two boatloads of
pirates on inflatable speedboats armed with
grenade launchers and machine guns. The ship,
with more than 300 people on board, was on its
waytotheKenyanportofMombasawhereitwas
due to pick up more passengers, including
Aust
ralians. The ship came under attack at 5.30
a.m. as the pirates approached in at least two
speedboats shooting at the ship with grenade
launchersand machine guns. Theywere repelled
by the ship’s crew who set off electronic
countermeasures, described asʺa loud bangʺ by
one of the passengers. One crew member was
slight
ly injured in the early‐morning incident.
TherewasatleastoneRPGthathittheship, onein
astateroom.Therewerecallsfora navaltaskforce
totrytostopattacksinSomaliwaters‐amongthe
mostdangerousintheworld.
Figure 6. Workers are seen painting the flank of the US-
owned Seaborne Spirit ship docked in Port Victoria in the
Seychelles archipelago on November 7, 2005 after experts
removed an unexploded grenade embedded in a passengers
cabin. (AFP photo)
In Southeast Asia in particular, since the
September 11 attacks a number of worst case
scenarioshavebeenpostulatedbythe mediaand
academics alike. The formation of a terrorism‐
piracynexus was, andstill is,seen as apotential
alarmingdevelopment.Itwasbelievedthatgiven
the high rates of pira
cy seen in the regionʹs
waterways,coupledwiththevaluableknowledge
and skills of the pirates, it was only a matter of
timebeforeterroriststeamedupwithpirates.The
possibility of terrorists blocking strategic
waterwaysliketheMalaccaandSingaporeStraits
was also seen as a real threat. Predictions were
ma
dethatmilitantscouldsinkalargevessel ata
narrow chokepoint in one of the regionʹs
waterways, block the passage of shipping and
cause widespread economic chaos. Despite these
isolated incidents of maritime terrorism and the
predictions of worst case scenarios, maritime
terroristattacksare,andhaveremained, quit
erare.
They constitute only two percent of all
internationalterroristincidentsoverthelastthree
decades.Whilethereisnodoubtthata numberof
terrorist organizations have the desire or
motivation to carry out attacks of this kind, in
generalthere isstillcurrently alackof capabilit
y
inthisareaofoperationanditislikelytoremain
the case inthe immediate future. Attacks against
maritime targets require specialized equipment
and skills; they also might require some
knowledge of local shipping patterns, boat
operation and maintenance, and boarding
techniques. Even the attack involving the USS
Cole,conceivably one ofthe simplest methodsof
a
ttacking a maritime target, failed in its first
attempt. The original intended mark was in fact
theUSSTheSullivan.However,intheirfirsttryat
launching the suicide boat, the al‐Qaeda
operatives underestimated the weight of the
explosives they were carrying on boa
rd and the
boat sank as it entered the water. Although, at
present, the probability of a large‐scale maritime
attackislow,thethreatofmaritimeterrorismmust
not be ignored altogether. There is evidence that
preliminarystepshavebeenmadebytheal‐Qaeda
261
networkinparticulartodevelopsomecompetency
inthis area. Recently,a basicdiving manualwas
recovered in Kandahar in Afghanistan and it is
believedthatthisisevidenceofalargerplantoset
up and run a diving school. J.I. (Jemaah
Islamiyahʹs) has also been conducting training
in
the southern Philippines in order to develop
underwaterdestructioncapability.Inaddition,J.I.
and a number of other jihadist groups based in
Indonesia already fully exploit the maritime
domain for the purposes of transporting people
andarmstoandfromthe Philippines. Thethreat
of terrorist acts against the
shipping and port
industryisreal andnot imaginary. Itis forthese
reasonstheAssemblyofIMO,inNovember2001,
decided that the organization should review
measures and procedures to prevent acts of
terrorism that threatenthe security of passengers
andcrewandthesafetyofships.Itisalso
obvious
that the Contracting Governments to the 1974
SOLAS Convention, when they adopted the
special measures to enhancemaritime security in
December 2002, were well aware of potential
threats.
8 MARITIMETRANSPORTATIONSECURITYACT
OF2002(MTSA)
Aftertheterroristattackof9/11in2001ontheWTC
twin towers
the fear of imports of mass destruction
weapons or terrorists transported by ships in
containers was imminentand the US took measures
by installing the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA) in January 2002. The goal of
MTSA is to prevent a Maritime Transportation
SecurityIncident(MTSI)with:
loss
oflife
environmentaldamage
transportationsystemdisruption
Economicdisruptiontoaparticulararea.
MTSA calls for a series of plans on the national,
portandindividualvessel/facilitylevel‐this“family
of plans” concept worked well for oil spill response
and was used to increase MTSA awareness
throughout
the maritime community to coordinate
informationandtodealwithpotentialthrea ts.Vessels
and facilities that load/carry certain dangerous
cargoes (flammable, potentially explosive, caustic or
environmentally hazardous) must have individual
security plans that address fundamental security
measures such as access controls, communications,
restricted areas, cargo handling and monitoring,
trainingandincident
reporting.
The“portplan”calledtheAreaMaritimeSecurity
Plan covers facilities and waterway venues such as
parks or public piers that are not required to have
individualsecurityplans.TheAMSplanisdeveloped
and implemented by an Area Maritime Security
Committee with representatives from federal, state,
and local
governments as well as industry and the
publicsector. These Committees andthe AMSplans
arethebackboneofcommunicatingandcoordinating
surveillance and preparatory measures as threats to
ourmaritimeinfrastructurewarrant.
9 CSI/CTPAT(SUPPLYCHAINSECURITY)
One of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
programmesistheContainerSecurity
Initiative(CSI)
programme for CBP‐inspectors at large overseas
ports. The duty of such inspectors is to pre‐screen
cargocontainers being shipped to the United States,
i.e. identify and inspect high risk containers before
theyare loaded onships at theirport of origin. The
programmefocusesonfour
coreelements:
1 Using automated information to identify and
targethigh‐riskcontainers
2 Pre‐screening containers as high risk before they
arriveataUSport
3 Using detection technology to quickly pre‐screen
high‐riskcontainers
4 Usingsmart,tamper‐proofcontainers
Companiesandorganizationsbecomeparticipants
in the
programme by defining and implementing a
formal internal supply chain security programme
based on a self assessment against guidelines
providedbytheCBPthataddressvariousitemssuch
as procedural security, physical security, education
andtraining,accesscontrols,manifestproceduresand
conveyancesecurity.Customs and BorderProtection
instituted the 24‐
Hour Rule, which requires
informationoncargodestinedfortheUnitedStatesto
be submitted through the CBP Automated Manifest
System (AMS) by the carrier or by a “non‐vessel
operatingcommoncarrier”iftheyareAMScertified.
Therulerequiresdetaileddescriptiveinformationfor
all cargo. It requires cargo vessels
entering ports to
provideacargomanifest24hoursbeforeleavingtheir
last foreign port. A “Do Not Load” order may be
issued for the carriers at the foreign port for cargo
that does not meet the 24‐Hour Rule. Some new
programmes focus on point‐to‐point verification of
the global supply chain. Operation Safe Commerce
(OSC) and Safe and Secure Trade Lanes (SST) both
aim atfinding reliable and cost effective procedures
andtechnologiestotrackcontainersfromtheirpoint
of origin to their final destination. Operation Safe
Commerce (OSC) is a public/private partnership
implemented by the Transportation Security
Administration.OSCisdedicatedtofindingmethods
and technologies to protect commercial maritime
shipments from the threat of terrorist attack, illegal
immigrationandothercontrabandwhileminimising
the economic impact on this critical transportation
system.Itisafederallyfundedprogrammeproviding
atest‐bedfornewtechniquestoenhance
thesecurity
ofcontainerizedshipping,fromtheoverseaspointof
originthroughoutthesupplychaintotheUSpointof
distribution. Those security techniques that prove
most successful under the programme will then be
recommended to create international standards for
secureandefficientcontainerizedshipping.
10 CSI:CONTAINERSECURITYINITIATIVE(12
‐
04‐2002)
Containerized shipping is a critical component of
internationaltrade.AccordingtotheCBP:about90%
oftheworldʹstradeistransportedincargocontainers
almosthalfofincomingUStrade(byvalue)arrivesby
containers onboard ships nearly sevenmillion cargo
262
containers arrive on ships and are unloaded at US
seaports each year. As terrorist organizations have
increasingly turned to destroying economic
infrastructure to make an impact on nations, the
vulnerability of international shipping has come
under scrutiny. Under the CSI programme, the
screeningofcontainersthatposeariskforterrorismis
accomplished by tea
ms of CBP officials deployed to
workinconcertwiththeirhostnationcounterparts.
CSIconsistsoffourcoreelements:
1 identifyhigh‐riskcontainers.CBPusesautomated
targeting tools to identify containers that pose a
potential risk for terrorism, based on advance
informationandstrategicintelligence.
2 pre‐screenandevaluatecontainersbeforetheyare
shipped. Containers are screened as early in the
supply chain as possible, generally at the port of
departure.
3 use technology to pre‐screen high‐risk containers
to ensure tha
t screening can be done rapidly
without slowing down the movement of tra
de.
This technology includes large‐scale X‐ray and
gamma ray machines and radiation detection
devices.
4 usesmarter,moresecurecontainersthatwillallow
CBP officers at United States ports of arrival to
identifycontainersthathave beentamperedwith
duringtransit.
The initial CSI programme has focused on
implementation at the top 20 ports shipping
a
pproximatelytwo‐thirdsofthecontainervolumeto
theUnitedStates.Smallerports,however,havebeen
added to the programme at their instigation and
participation is open to any port meeting certain
volume, equipment, procedural and information‐
sharingrequirements.Futureplansincludeexpansion
to additional ports ba
sed on volume, location and
strategic concerns. The CSI programme offers its
participant countries the reciprocal opportunity to
enhance their own incoming shipment security. CSI
partnerscansendtheircustomsofficerstomajorUS
portstotargetocean‐going,containerizedcargotobe
exported from the US to their countries. Likewise,
CBP shares informat
ion on a bilateral basis with its
CSIpartners. JapanandCanadaarecurrentlytaking
advantage of this reciprocity. CSI has also inspired
and informed global measures to improve shipping
security. In June 2002, the World Customs
Organization unanimously passed a resolution that
willenableportsinall161membernationstobeginto
developprogra
mmesaccordingtotheCSImodel.On
22 April 2004, the European Union and the US
Department of Homeland Security signed an
agreementthatcallsforthepromptexpansionofCSI
throughouttheEuropeanCommunity.
11 C‐TPAT‐CUSTOMS‐TRADEPARTNERSHIP
AGAINSTTERRORISM
C‐TPAT is a joint government‐business init
iative to
buildcooperativerelationshipsthatstrengthenoverall
supplychainandbordersecurity.
C‐TPATrecognizesthatCustomscanprovidethe
highest level of security only through close
cooperation with the ultimate owners of the supply
chain: importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse
operatorsandma
nufacturers.Throughthisinitiative,
Customsis asking businesses to ensure theintegrity
of their security practices and communicate their
security guidelines to their business partners within
thesupplychain.
C‐TPAT offers trade‐related businesses an
opportunitytoplayanactiveroleinthewaragainst
terrorism. By participating in thi
s first worldwide
supply chain security initiative, companies will
ensure a more secure and expeditious supply chain
fortheiremployees,suppliersandcustomers.Beyond
these essential security benefits, CBP will offer
benefits to certain certified C‐TPAT member
categories,including:
a reduced number of CBP inspections (reduced
borderdelayti
mes)
priority processing for CBP inspections (front‐of‐
the‐lineprocessingforinspectionswhenpossible)
assignment of a C‐TPAT Supply Chain Security
Specialist(SCSS)whowillworkwiththecompany
to validate and enhance security throughout the
company’sinternationalsupplychain
potential eligibility for CBP Importer Self‐
Assessment progra
mme (ISA) with an emphasis
onself‐policing,notCBPaudits
EligibilitytoattendC‐TPATsupplychainsecurity
trainingseminars.
International Ship and Port Facilities Security
Code(ISPScode)
TheISPScodeislimitedtoshipsover500gt. the
mainobjectivesoftheISPScodeareasfollows:
Todetectsecuritythrea
tsandimplementsecurity
measures
To establish roles and responsibilities concerning
maritime security for governments, local
administrations, ship and port industries at
nationalandinternationallevel
To collate and promulgate security‐related
information
To provide a methodology for security
assessments so as to have in pla
ce plans and
procedurestoreacttochangingsecuritylevels.
In Belgium they installed a central Federal
Committee for the Security of Port Facilities
(FCSPF)anda LocalCommitteefortheSecurityof
Port Facilities (LCSPF) for each seaport.The
membersofthesecommitteesareshownbelow:
FGD
Internal Affairs
FGD
Mobility and transport
FGD
Finances / Justice /
Defence / Intelligence
Designated authority / member state
Federal Committee for Security of PF (FCSPF)
Internal affairs
Security Finance Justice
TransportMobility
Ministries
Members FCSPF
National
Designated
Authority as
foreseen in the
ISPS code
Local Police
Port
Commander’s
Office
Intelligence
Local representative of the FCSPF
Local Committee for Security of PF (LCSPF)
Members LCSPF
Audit team
Local
representatives of
the Designated
Authority
CustomsFederal Police
42 x IPZ Mar. Pol. A/G/Z/O Port lieutenants
Intelligence of the
State
Customs
Federal Level
Local Level
Defence
Intelligence
Figure7.FederalandLocalCommitteesfortheSecurityof
PortFacilities
263
The process and flow chart used by the port
authorityofGhentisillustratedbelow:
ISPS Process
ISPS code EU RD (FCSPF)
MUSC
LCSPF
PFSO
+
Toolkit
Port Security Assessment
Port Facility Security Plan
Port Facility Security Assessment
Completed
To be completed
Authority
Advisory
Basis for
Performance
Figure8.ISPSprocess
Flow chart
Compl etin g
Toolkit
Drafting
Action Plan
updates
needed
?
completed
?
Se lf
Assessment
Action Plan
Drafting
PFSP
NO
Y
ES
Y
ES
NO
Present PFSP
to LCSPF
Control by PA
Control by
Cus toms
Control by cal
Politce
Control by
Intellige nce
Control by MP
Implem ent
additional
measures
Imp lem ent
additional
measures
OK?
OK?
OK?
OK?
OK?
Pres ent PFS P
to FCSPF
if at leas
t
one NOT O
K
if all O
K
Responsibility of the company
Responsibility of the LCSPF
Key Decision Moments
Figure9.Flowchartforfollow‐up
Ashiphastogivehissecuritylevel(SL1,2or3)24
hours before arrival in port.It is the designed
authority of the government of the flag state that
decidesabouttheSLofitsships.Themasterofthe
shipcantakeextrasecuritymeasuresifhewants,but
he cannot put his SL on a higher level.Only
emergencysafetymea
surescanoverrulethesecurity
measures provided in the SSP (Ship Security Plan).
IftheSLoftheportfacilityishigherthanthatofthe
ship, then the SSO (Ship Security Officer) has the
obligation to equalize the security level of the ship.
Whentheshiphasahighersecurityleveltha
nthatof
theportfacility,theSSOtogetherwiththePFSO(Port
Facility Security Officer) have to make up a DOS
(DeclarationOfSecurity).
Itis thedesigned authorityof the government of
theporttha
tdecidesabouttheSLoftheportfacilities
intheportarea.ThesecuritymeasuresforeachSL
arewritteninaPFSP(PortFacilitySecurityPlan).
The security measures are more severe when the
SLishigherandalsodependontherisksthatcanbe
encountered at the port facilit
y.For instance a
dangerousgoodsterminal,apassengerterminalora
container terminal willbe fenced andguarded.An
openbulkterminal,withnodangerous commodities,
will only be fenced and guarded on the ship/shore
interface when we have an SL 2 or 3.At security
level 1 we have business as usual, without any
economic constraints. The security mea
sures can be
visualizedinthefollowingtemplates:
Port facility
Maritime Police (SPN) check crew and other personnel aboard
Customs check cargo
Patrol (Port Authority) check irregularities on the water surface
BLU-code (Stevedore - Terminal ) check loading/unloading of the ship
Crew declare in DOS that there needs to be control and registration
of everybody who goes on board/from board
Security Level 1
Non Sensitive Terminals - OBC
(e.g. dry/wet bulk, general cargo)
Figure10.Nonsensitiveterminals–OBC–SL1
PIDS
Port facility
Bringing PIDS into place before arrival of the ship or maximum within 4 hours
Active access control of persons and cargo (both on PF and gangway) with physical and/or electronic
devices
Inform police about higher risk probability
Secure contracts with security firms
Effective roll-out of this scenario every 2 “exercises” (i.e. once every three years)
Security Level 2
?
Non Sensitive Terminals - OBC
(e.g. dry/wet bulk, general cargo)
Figure11.Nonsensitiveterminals–OBC–SL2
Port Facility
Bringing PIDS into place before arrival of the ship or maximum within 4 hours
Active access control towards persons and cargo (both on PF and gangway)
With dogs, armed security guards and probably army forces
Secure contracts with security firms
Effective roll-out of this scenario every 2 “exercises” (i.e. once every three years)
Inform Police about higher risk probability
Security Level 3
FCBH
Non Sensitive Terminals - OBC
(e.g. dry/wet bulk, general cargo)
Figure12.Nonsensitiveterminals–OBC–SL3
264
Sensitive Terminals - CONTAINER
(e.g. Container, Ro/Ro, Petrochemical)
Port Facility
Active access control towards persons, cargo and vehicles (both on PF and
gangway) with physical and/or electronic devices
Effective fencing
Security Level 1
Figure13.Sensitiveterminals–containers–SL1
Port Facility
Security Level 1 +
More frequent contact between SSO and PFSO
Higher level of control by security guards
Inform Police about higher risk probability
Security Level 2
?
Sensitive Terminals - CONTAINER
(e.g. Container, Ro/Ro, Petrochemical)
Figure14.Sensitiveterminals–container–SL2
Port Facility
Security Level 2 +
Advice from the Federal Committee for the Security of Port Facilities
Security Level 3
FCBH
Sensitive Terminals - CONTAINER
(e.g. Container, Ro/Ro, Petrochemical)
Figure15.Sensitiveterminals–container–SL3
Port Facility
Effective fencing (perimeter of the ship) depending on the Security Level
Control of the building and its environment
Access Control at Port Facility
Co-ordination of security measures with SSO in DOS
Physical control of a certain % of the luggage by the SSO (agree upon % in DOS)
Pre announcement of ship chandlers
SPN: 1. Control of crew and passengers from non-Schengen countries
2. Control of the waterside if possible
Customs: Possible control if coming from other countries without bilateral agreements with Belgium
Security Level 1
Customs
Police
?
Passenger Terminals - PAX
(e.g. Cruise ships, ferry)
Figure16.Passengerterminal–SL1
Security Level 1 +
Higher level of control by security guards
Access control with metal detector / X-ray scan
Security Level 2
Port Facility
Customs
Police
Passenger Terminals - PAX
(e.g. Cruise ships, ferry)
Figure17.Passengerterminal–SL2
Port Facility
Security Level 3
FCBH
Customs
Police
Security Level 2 +
Advice from the Federal Committee for the Security of Port Facilities
Passenger Terminals - PAX
(e.g. Cruise ships, ferry)
Figure18.Passengerterminal–SL3
Thereisalwaysaccesscontroltotheshiponeach
security level.This can be done by means of
authorisedpasses delivered bythe port authorityor
the federal government (e‐id card) or by the PFSO
(e.g. alfapass), be it an authorised visitor badge as
describedinthePFSP.
265
Figure19.AlfapassRFID‐cardport
12 CONCLUSION
The Saudi government should have taken
implementation various security measures, the
governmentʹs Maritime Transportation Security Act
of2002(MTSA)providesadditionalsecuritytoSaudi
ports.TheInternationalConventionfortheSafetyof
Life At Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) provide further
security. and should concern with the following
aspects:
A ship security plan must outline measures to
preventweaponsandotheritemsthatcouldbeused
to harm passengers and crew from being brought
aboard the ship, unless carried by authorized
personnel.
Ashipsecurityplanhastolistrestrictedareas
ona
shipandhowaccessto thoseareas willbedeterred.
Howunauthorizedshipaccesswillbepreventedalso
mustbedetailed.
Theplanshouldincludewhatresponsemeasures
willbetakenwhenthereisasecuritybreachorthreat,
including maintaining ship operations. How
responses to security commands from
government
agencies will be handled also must be included, as
wellashowtheshipwillbeevacuatedifnecessary.
The plan will list security responsibilities of the
crew, including auditing security, training for
implementation of security measures, reporting
security problems and reviewing and updating the
planperiodically.
The plan
mustindicate when security equipment
is tested, where security system activation locations
are and procedures and training regarding the
securitysystem.
Thesecurityplanmustdesignatewhothesecurity
officer is on the ship. The security officer is
responsible for ensuring the shipʹs security and that
the plan is carried
out. The security officer also
overseessecuritymaintenanceandtraining. Asecond
security officer from the company owning the ship
also is mandated, with that person working to
develop the plan and having it approved by the
company before implementation. The company
securityofficeractsasaliaisonwiththe
shipsecurity
officer.
ISPS or International Ship and Port Facility
Security,codeimplementedashipsecurityplanand
provided preparation for action in the event of a
terroristattackonaship.TheActrequirescommercial
yachts heavier than 500 GT to be certified. ISPS
security training also enacted mandatory training
againstpiracyattacksandincludesbothshipandport
personnel.
Several categories of job types are required to
receive training in order to comply with safety
requirements. This include the company security
officer, the vessel security officer, the head
company/vessel/ship security officer, the facility
security officer, facility or vessel personnel
with
specific security duties, port facility security officer
andothershiporportfacilitypersonnelwithspecific
securityduties.
Awidevarietyofspecifictrainingsubjectsprepare
personnel to address safety issues. Classes include
general maritime security, port awareness, tactical
operations, tactical boat operations, safe boarding
techniquesandprocedures,incidentresponse,
tactical
underwater operations, emergency medical
procedures, basic and advanced fire fighting, crowd
control, crisis management, advanced sea survival,
basicfirstaid,first aid careatsea,personalsurvival
techniques,personalsafetyandliabilityand medical
refresher.
The MTSA requires SOLAS‐certified vessels that
are over 300 gross tonnage (GT), to
carry an
automated identification system. This rule also
applies tosmall passenger vehicles that are certified
to carry more than 150 passengers. The original
version of the rule also applied to specified
commercialvesselsoninternationalvoyages,aswell
as certain other commercial vessels, but the
government rethought this revision after
the vessel
operators complained about the costs of installing
suchsystems.
Ownersof foreignSOLAS vesselsdo nothave to
submitsecurityplanstotheSaudiRolesforapproval.
However, under MTSA regulations, non‐SOLAS
foreign vessels still have to submit security plans
accordanceSaudiRolesfor approval.Theymay
also
comply with an alternative security plan, or with
measures suggested in another bilateral or
multilateral agreement. The Saudi Authority should
have to examine and enforces a vesselʹs compliance
withinternationalsecurityregulationsandmaydeny
non‐compliantvesselsentrytoSaudiports.
The Saudi Authority maritime security
requirements allow
some flexibility for non‐SOLAS
vesselsandportfacilitiestoparticipateinalternative
securityprogramsiftheywishto.Thisallowsthemto
tailor security measures to the requirements of their
industries.However,allvesselsmustfollowsecurity
plans.
This paper is intended to serve as a conceptual
piece that
draws from the interplay between
engineering and supply chain approaches to risk in
thecontextofrecentmaritimesecurityregulations.It
is hoped that cross‐disciplinary analysis of the
perception and impact of the security‐risk will
stimulatethinkingonappropriatetoolsandanalytical
frameworks for enhancing port and maritime
266
security. In so doing, it may be possible to develop
new approaches to security assessment and
management,includingsuchaspectsassupplychain
security. The framework and methods reviewed in
this paper could serve as a roadmap for academics,
practitioners and other maritime interests to
formulate risk assessment and management
standards and procedures in line with the new
security threats. Of particular importance, new
relevant approaches can be developed to assess the
reliability of the maritime in the context of the
complexnetworktheory(Bichou,2005;Angeloudiset
al.,2006;Bellet.al,2008).Equally,furtherresearchcan
build on this
to investigate the mechanisms and
implications of security measures on port and
shipping operations, Companies, ports and other
parties active in today’s international supply chains
face a large number of regulations and private
initiativesprescribing measures to be taken inorder
to raise the level of supply chain security. These
measures
range from putting up a fence around the
terminal facilities at a seaport, to establishing a
certified security programme at the production
facility(‘pointofstuffing’)inordertobeadmittedto
theʺgreenlane”.
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