493
1 INTRODUCTION
The decisions taken and arrangements performed in
maritimeworldhavealways,fromeverhistory,based
on the previous incidents, accidents and losses. The
importanceofhumanfactorinthemarine accidents,
whichcausegreatdamagesonnature,economyand
maritime companies, have been officially considered
withtheacceptance
ofthesubjects“therequirementof
focusingonhumanactivitiesfor the safe operations ofthe
vesselsandtheneed forprovidingahighstandardofsafety,
securityandenvironmentalprotectionaimingtoobtainan
eminent reduction of maritime accidents” and “high
priorityofhumanfactorissues inthe
workingprogram of
the Organization since plays an important role in the
prevention of sea accidents” by International Maritime
Organization(IMO,2004).
The human based errors cause more marine
accidentswhencomparedtoequipmentbasederrors
(Shea and Grady, 1998). The human error has been
startedtobeacceptedasthe
mainreasonofcollision,
runningaground and petroleumleakage etc. marine
incidents. At the same time, according to many
research and analyses, nearly 70‐80% of the marine
incidents have been caused by the human errors
(ArslanandEr,2007).ThestatisticsofIMOrelatedto
the global figures of
marine accidents have
establishedtheshareofhumanerrorasbetween80%
and85%(Ece,2008).
Theconcept“Error”isbeingdefinedas“thefault
performed without intention, purpose or desire”; as
well as the definition “the person or the institution
notabletodemonstratethebehaviourincompliance
with the
requirements of the situation and time”
Investigation of Watchkeeping Officers' Watches
Under The Working Hours Ineligible to STCW
Regulation
H.Yılmaz,E.Başar&E.Yüksekyıldız
KaradenizTechnicalUniversity,MaritimeTransportation&ManagementEngineering,Trabzon,Turkey
ABSTRACT:Inparallelwiththeincreaseinthevolumeofworldtrade,cargohandlingratesandseafarersʹpace
ofworkhasincreased.AlthoughtheSTCWregulationsandrestrictionsonworkinghourshasimproved,this
tempo has brought with it insufficient
resting hours, especially in short sea transport. It is known that
individualsunderstressandintensiveworkloadsaremorepronetomakingmistakesduetofatigue.Inthis
study,theofficers’workinghoursaresimulatedinfull‐missionsimulatoratshortsea transporttoinvestigate
errors made during the navigation and
port watches. For this purpose, the data were obtained from 7
volunteerswatchkeepingofficerswiththehelpofvideomonitoringandchecklistsinthefull‐bridgesimulator
systemandalso,systemrecordsincargohandlingsimulator.Withthisstudy,introducedwhattypesoferrors
madeduringnavigationandport
watchesbywatchkeepingofficers undertheintensepaceofwork.Andthe
errorsareevaluatedunderthelegislationofinternationalmaritime.Asaresult,tocomplywiththelimitations
of working hours, it is necessary to increase the number of officers responsible for operations on short sea
transport.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 7
Number 4
December 2013
DOI:10.12716/1001.07.04.03
494
(Çakmakçı, 2001). According to Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), the
human error coverage also includes the
unsafe/dangerous actions of the operators, the
preparatory conditions of unsafe/dangerous actions,
incompetent audit and organizational effects. The
human error may be classified as errors based on
skills, decision errors and perception
errors. The
reasons of the errors are physical and technological
surrounding factors, psychological and physical
situation of the operator, human resources
management and personal underlying/preparing
factors such as rest and alcohol usage and
organizational factors such as insufficient allocation
and maintenance of resources and incompetency of
audits.Ifweconsider
thewatchkeepingofficerasthe
performerofanyerrororbreachduringthevoyageof
avessel,thenwemayalsotaketheindividualfactors
such as stress, physical and psychological fatigue,
motivation,workloadandworkinghoursetc.andthe
surroundingfactorssuchasangleofviewandlength
of
thebridge,lightingandvisualobstructionsetc.as
thefactorsaffectingtheerror(Reason,1990;Shappell
andWiegmann,2000).
With the ever increasing emphasis placed on the
humanfactorinmarineaccidentsintherecentyears,
thestudiesofIMOandotherresearcherswithhuman
focus have demonstrated a rise.
Fatigue and human
errorsnaturallyarewithinthescopeofsuchstudies.
The maritime accidents, indeed, may be defined as
catastrophicincidentswhenconsideredthenumberof
peopleintheships, environmentaldamages andthe
values of the ships and carried cargos (Chauvin,
2011).
According to the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch
(MAIB)data,2031vessels,100GTandgreater
commercialvesselsregisteredinUKsearegistry,have
participated to the marine accidents between 1998‐
2011yearsand20vesselsamongsuchaccidentshave
been lost (MAIB, 2012). French Marine Accident
InvestigationOffice(BEAmer)havereportedatotalof
418 marine incidents
for the period 2004‐2011
(BEAmer, 2004‐2011). According to the Federal
Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU)
data, 60 marine incidents have occurred including
commercialvesselsinGermanwatersintheyear2010
and89incidentsin2011(BSU,2011).MarineCasualty
Investigation Board (MCIB) has reported that the
number
of ships participating in marine incidents
through 2002‐2010 had been 123 (MCIB, 2011). The
Standing Commission for Maritime Accidents and
IncidentInvestigations(CIAIM)hasstated41marine
incidents in 2009 and 91 marine incidents in 2010
(CIAIM, 2010; 2011). The Swedish Maritime
Administration (SMA) data show us that 1294
accidents had occurred in Swedish registered ships
between 1997 and 2006 and also 1555 near miss
incidents (SMA, 2007). According to Latvia Division
for Investigation of Marine Accidents (DIMA) data,
thetotalnumberofaccidents/incidentsis140between
the years 2004‐2009. 92 of these incidents havebeen
realized in Latvian
waters and 48 out of Latvian
waters. Again DIMA reports that 55 incidents have
been faced in relation with fishing vessels between
the years 1993 and 2009 (DIMA, 2009). Danish
Maritime Authority (DMA) has stated 435 marine
incidents in Danish waters between 1998 and 2007
(DMA,2008).466incidentshave
beenexperiencedby
thecommercialvessels,and325marine incidents by
fishingvessels,withDenmarkandGreenlandregistry
between the years 1999 and 2008 (DMA, 2009). The
Accident Investigation Board of Finland (AIBF) has
reported59accidentsfortheperiodbetween2002and
2006(AIBF,2007).Themorewedeepenthe
statistics
anddatasourcesrelatedtomarineaccidentsthemore
wemayunderstandtherealnumbersofaccidentsare
notlimitedwiththeaforementionedfigures.
Thelossesofliveandcommodityhavebeenfaced
in such marine incidents as well as caused
environmentalpollutionandeconomicdamages.The
subjects being
focused on happened to include the
originatingenvironmentalproblemsandexamination
ofmarineaccidents,intime.
This study aims to determine what kind of
mistakes made by the watchkeeping offiers under
intensepace of work. Further studies will shedlight
onisconsidered.
1.1 WatchkeepingOfficerandWorkingHours
Certain functions
shall continue uninterruptedly 24
hoursinthevesselenvironmentandtheworkstobe
performed by the humans shall be arranged as to
provide resting periods. Thus, working in shifts in
accepted for such kind or works. The watchkeeping
officer is the deck personnel with complete
information about the locations
and functions of all
the safety and navigational aids on the vessel. The
watchkeeping officer is responsible for the safe
navigation of the vessel, under the general
instructions of the master, as for preventing the
collisions and running aground. These officers are
alsoresponsibleforperformanceoftheoperations in
a
mannernotjeopardizingthepersons,vessel,cargo
andtheportintheirportwatchesaswellprotecting
the marine and surrounding environment (IMO,
2011).
The working hours and resting periods of the
watchkeeping officers are arranged under the
International Convention on Standards of Training,
CertificationandWatchkeepingforSeafarers(STCW)
with2010Manilaamendments(IMO,2011).Seafarersʹ
HoursofWorkandtheManningofShipsConvention
(C180)alsoprovidesarrangementsonworkinghours
incompliancewithSTCW.Theworkinghoursofthe
seamen have also been arranged under European
Union Directives and national regulations of the
countries.Table1summarizesthe
informationrelated
to the working hours and resting periods of the
seamen under STCW and C180 conventions,
EuropeanUnionDirectivesNr.1999/63/EC(European
Union, 1999) and Nr. 2003/88/EC (European Union,
2003) and applicable Turkish Seamen Regulations
(OfficialJournal,2002).
It may be the case as noncompliance to the
working hours aforementioned,
over working and,
accordingly,fatigue.Itisknownthatoverworkingis
afactorthat triggers thefatigueand, in relation,the
humanerror(IMO,2001).
495
Table1.Regulatoryarrangementsrelatedtotheworkinghoursoftheseamen
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Legislation Dailyresting Dailyrestingperiods andintervals Weeklyresting Dailyworking Weeklyworking
hourshourshourshours
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
STCW* Min.10 –Max.twoperiods,oneofwhichshall Min.77hours
hoursbelest6hours
–Intervalsbetweenperiodsshall
notexceed14hours
C180 Min.10 –Max.twoperiods,oneofwhichshall Min.77hours Max.14hours Max.72hours
hours
belest6hours
–Intervalsbetweenperiodsshall
notexceed14hours
1999/63/EC Min.10 –Max.twoperiods,oneofwhichshall Min.77hours
Hoursbelest6hours
–Intervalsbetweenperiodsshallnotexceed14hours
2003/88/ECWeeklyworkinghoursshallbemax.
48hoursandcomplywithSTCWandC180.
Seamen Min.10 –Max.twoperiods,oneofwhichshall Min.70hours
Regulations hoursbelest6hours(Including
–Intervalsbetweenperiodsshallemergency
notexceed14hourssituations)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
*IncludingManila2010arrangements
2 METHODS
It is a known fact that the increased working hours
and difficulties of the working environment is an
importantfactortowardsthetirednessoftheseamen.
This study has been conducted to determine the
errors of the watchkeeping officers subject to
excessive working hours
during their watches; and,
cameramonitoringsystemandchecklistshavebeen
usedinthefull‐missionbridgesimulatorenvironment
whereasthesystemrecordshavebeenusedforliquid
cargo handling simulator. This study has been
performed with healthy 7 male volunteers, between
22‐24 age interval (average age 22,3),
who have the
competency of unlimited watchkeeping officer.
Duringthedatacollectionstage,thetankersimulator
has been used for total 245 hours and the bridge
simulator for total 154 hours. Each volunteer is
worked with total 8 days of which 1 day to be
preparationday.Thevolunteershavebeen
observed
duringaoneweekprogramcarriedout.
2.1 WeeklyWorkingandRestingProgram
Thestudies relatedtothetopicoffatigueinmaritime
profession have shown that the fatigue is more
eminentlyobservedinshortseashipping(Smithetal.,
2006; Uğurlu et al., 2012). This study
also has
considered, for the formation of the working hours
program, the working hours of certain tankers
working in short sea shipping in Sea of Marmara.
While determining the working hours data, the
resultsofaninterviewperformedwith8mastersand
watchkeeping officers, working in the tankers
navigating between the
İzmir Tütünçiftlik region
platforms andİstanbul Ambarlı region platforms in
theSeaofMarmara,havebeenalsobasedon(Uğurlu
etal.,2009).Theperiodsrequiredbythethirdmateto
performitsduties,ofwhomtheworkinghoursareto
be simulated according to the obtained data, have
beenshowninTable2.
Accordingtosuchhours,ifthescenariostartswith
the watchkeeping by third mate, the minimum
working hours indication shall happen as shown
under Figure 1. Each division represents the 10
minutes part of a day. The meanings of the color
codeshavebeenexplained
below.
Table2.Theperiodsrequiredforthethirdmatetoperform
itsduties(Uğurluetal.,2009)
_______________________________________________
DutiesAverage
time
_______________________________________________
Receivedocumentsfromagentbeforedeparture 0h30m
Preparingthebridgeforunberthing0h30m
Unberthingmaneuver0h40m
Navigationwatch4h10m
Preparingthedocumentsforagentinarrivalport1h00m
Preparingthebridgeforberthing0h30
m
Berthingmaneuver1h30m
Deliverythedocumentstoagentafterberthing 0h30m
PassageplanningandpreparingISM(International
SafetyManagement)documents3h00m
(atdischargingport)
PreparingtheISMdocuments(atloadingport) 1h00m
Portwatch(ifthecargo
operationofthevessel
upto24hours,twowatchesinday)4h10m
Preparingthebridgebeforeanchorage0h30m
Anchorwatch4h10m
_______________________________________________
(m:minute,h:hour)
496
Figure1.Theminimumworkinghoursof3rdmate
The3
rd
officersworkingonsuchvesselwhomhas
dutiesinFigure1,hasa pproximately30minutesfor
breakfast, lunch or dinner in a day. White areas
meanstheofficer’srestingtimes,buttheofficersuse
onlylongrestingperiods,notshortperiodsuchas1
or 2 hours in real life
due to next duties. The color
codespresenttheminimumtimesrequiredforduties.
Inpracticalworkinglife,anypersonmayneedmore
time. Therefore, therest periods can be shorter than
expected.
2.2 EstablishmentofNavigationScenarios onthe
BridgeandObservationCriteria
The navigation scenarios have been realized in
SINDEL MISTRAL
®
4000‐Full‐mission bridge
simulator centre. The voyage area in the bridge
simulator,accordingtotheprogram,hasbeenSeaof
Marmaraandthevoyagesareroundtripsfromİzmit
Bay’s Tütünçiftlik refinery area toİstanbul Ambarlı
platformarea.Consideringthevesselsinthescenario
are tankers, it has been
planned the loading in the
refinery inİzmit Tütünçiftlik and unloading in a
platform inİstanbul Ambarlı. The route distance
betweenTütünçiftlik and Ambarlı is 56 nm whereas
takes 4 hours. The general view of route is given
underFigure2.
İzmit Tütünçiftlik platform has been selected as
the loading point and the time lapsing inthe
loading port has been established asabout 20
hoursincludingberthinganddeparturemanoeuvres.
A platform in Ambarlı area has been taken as the
unloading point and the time lapsing in the
unloading point has been established as about 24
hours
includingberthinganddeparturemanoeuvres.
Despite 24 hours pilotage services in theİzmit
Tütünçiftlikarea,Ambarlıareapermitmanoeuvring
onlyindaylightandthepilotageservices
areestimatedtobeobtainedonlybetweenthehours
07.00‐18.00.
Whileimplementingthe scenarios, theoperations
required to be performed by the watchkeeping
officers on the deckhouse have been followed by
usingcontrolforms.Theoperationsperformedbythe
volunteer, in the role of watchkeeping officer, in
certain scenario parts are more significant when
compared to the generality of all the operations.
These are preparing the vessel to manoeuvre before
the departure of the
vessel and the period in which
thecommandisdeliveredtothewatchkeepingofficer
duringthenavigation.
Underthecoverageof1weekprogramappliedto
thevolunteers,voyageisperformedfromAmbarlıto
Tütünçiftlik terminal on the 1
st
day and from
Tütünçiftlik terminal to Ambarlı on the 2
nd
day.
During the following course of the program, 6
th
day
scenario,inwhichtheofficerisexpectedtobetired,is
made parallel to 1
st
day and the 7
th
day scenario in
parallelto2
nd
day.
The periods in which the watchkeeping officer is
monitored/observedareasfollows:
Preparing the bridge before the departure of the
vessel
Theinternalandexternalcommunicationsduring
andafterthepreparations
Theoperationsrequiredtobeperformedafterthe
boardingandleavingofpilot
The
passing movements with the vessels during
theseparationpass
The passing movements with the vessels on
voyage
The bridge routines to be performed all through
thenavigation
The communications tobeperformed all through
thenavigation
Thenavigationassessmentlistsareformedtoease
themonitoringofthe
bridgeoperationsandrecording
the data. Also vessel passing lists are formed for
assessingthepassesbythetargetvessels.TheTable3
demonstrates the decided control points and related
regulations. Abbreviations associated with the
legislation and categoriesmeanings given under the
table.
497
Figure2.Thegeneralviewoftheroute
ISM :InternationalSafetyManagementCode
SOLAS :InternationalConventionofSafetyofLifeat
Sea
COLREG :TheInternationalRegulationsforPreventing
CollisionsatSea
GMDSS:GlobalMaritimeDistressandSafetySystem
VTS :VesselTrafficService
N.L. :NationalLegislation
P.I. :PortInstruction
P.E. :PreparingEquipment
E.C. :ExternalCommunication
D.P./R. :DocumentPreparation/Records
I.C. :InternalCommunications
M./N.:Maneuvering/Navigation
Table3.Controlpointsandrelatedregulations
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Nr. ControlpointsLegislation Categori
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Didheputthemapsinorder?ISMP.E.
2 Isthemaptobeusedready?ISMP.E.
3 Isthesteeringgearadjustedto“controlconsole”?SOLAS P.E.
4 Arethesteeringgearpumpsready?SOLAS P.E.
5 Isthesteeringgeartested?SOLAS P.E.
6 Doeshe
manuallycontrolthesteeringgear?SOLAS P.E.
7 Arethenavigationlightsopen?COLREG P.E.
8 IstheBravoFlaghung?COLREG E.C.
9 Isthewhistletested?COLREG P.E.
10 Arethewindpaneladjustmentsperformed?ISMP.E.
11 Isthe“meter”adjustmentisperformedinEchosounderpanel?ISM
P.E.
12 Istheradaron?COLREG P.E.
13 Aretheradar“day/night”adjustmentsperformed?COLREG P.E.
14 AretheVHFsopen?SOLAS P.E.
15 IstheMF/HFopen?SOLAS P.E.
16 DidheturnINM‐Cto“power”?SOLAS P.E.
17 DidheturnINM‐Cto“login”?SOLAS
P.E.
18 Didhepreparepilotcard?ISMD.P./R.
19 Didhecompletetheformofnavigationwithpilot?ISMD.P./R.
20 Didhecompletethecontrolformbeforedeparture?ISMD.P./R.
21 Didheasktotheengineroomthetimerequiredforbeingready?ISMI.C.
22 Did
hecallthemasterandaskedforconfirmationtocallthepilot?ISMI.C.
23 DidhecallthepilotfromVHFCh12?N.L./P.I. E.C.
24 Didheinformthemasteraftercontactingwithpilot?ISMI.C.
25 Didheinformtheengineroom?ISMI.C.
26 Didheinform
thedeck?ISMI.C.
27 Didhehangthehotelflag?COLREG E.C.
28 Didherecordthetimeof“PilotonBoard”?ISMD.P./R.
29 Didhepresentthepilotcardtothepilot?ISMM./N.
30 Didherecordthetimeof“DisembarkofPilot”?ISMD.P./R.
31
Didhepulleddownthehotelflag?COLREG E.C.
32 DidheinformSectorMarmarafromCh10whileenteringthesector?N.L./VTS E.C.
33 DidheinformthepilotbeforearrivalfromVHFCh12?(1hour)N.L./P.I. E.C.
34 DidheinformSectorMarmarafromCh10whileleaving
thesector?N.L./VTS E.C.
35 Didheinformthemasteraftercontactingthepilot?ISMI.C.
36 Didheinformthemasterbeforearrivingtothepilotstation?(30m)ISMI.C.
37 Didheinformtheengineroombeforearrivingthepilotstation/separation?(30m)ISMI.C.
38 Did
heinformSectorMarmarawhileenteringtheseparation?N.L./VTS E.C.
39 VesselpassesCOLREG M./N.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
498
Figure3.Totalerrorsanddegreesofimportance
2.3 CreateofLiquidCargoHandling Scenarios
The watchkeeping officers, besides their the bridge
navigation watches, are observed under their real‐
time loading and unloading watches. These watches
are performed in tanker simulation laboratory and
have been named as port watches. The detailed
instructions as formed and presented to the
watchkeeping
officersfortheportwatchestoexplain
the operations to be performed by them and to
prevent the errors that may originate from lack of
experience.Thesewatchkeepingofficersareinformed
in line with the STCW convention requirements,
tankercomplianceandtankeroperationscertification.
The monitoring of the officer during
the port
operations is performed and recorded automatically
by the TRANSAS
®
LCHS 4000 OIL (V.1.0) LCC
TANKERliquidcargohandlingprogrambeingused
intankersimulator.Thus,thedetectionoftheerrors
happenstobepossible.
3 FINDINGSANDDISCUSSIONS
3.1 NavigationScenarios
The weekly total working and resting hours of the
volunteers,during theconductedstudy,havebeenin
Table
4. The total resting periods of the volunteers,
afterperformingtheirminimumdutiesintheTable2,
havevariedbetween57hours30minutesto63hours
30minutes.Theworkinghoursinturnhavechanged
about between 95 hours and 102 hours. When
consideredthelegalregulationsgivenunderTable
1,
itmaybeseenthatthelegal72hoursworkinglimitis
exceededand therestinghoursareleftunder the77
hourswhichisthelegalminimumlimit.Thus,under
thelightofaforementionedfacts,itmaybesaidthata
watchkeepingofficeroftankeratshortsea
shippingis
subject to over activity and accordingly under the
effectofthefatigue.
Theerrorsperformedbythevolunteerssubjectto
theworkinghoursandrestingperiodsinTable4have
been provided under Figure 3 by means of control
points and significance priorities. The degree of
significanceforthe
navigationsafetyhasbeenshown
ontop of thegraphiccolumnsthatincludethe error
figures of each point. The significance degrees are
listedfrom1to5(1asthemostimportantand5asthe
leastimportant).
According to the Figure 3; the volunteers have
madeerrorsmost
frequently,duringtheirnavigation
duties under the program, under the titles internal
andexternalcommunicationsandpassingmaneuvers
with the other vessels. The distribution of the total
errorsbymeansoftheirsignificancedegreeshasbeen
providedunderTable5.
Table4.Weeklytotalrestingandworkingperiods
_______________________________________________
Volunteers TotalRestingHours TotalWorkingHours
_______________________________________________
161h00m98h50m
261h25m98h10m
361h10m95h30m
463h30m94h40m
563h10m96h30m
657h
30m101h50m
757h50m100h00m
_______________________________________________
Table5.Errorfiguresoverthesignificancedegrees
_______________________________________________
SignificanceDegrees TotalErrors Percentage(%)
_______________________________________________
120858,0
2215,8
39626,7
4298,1
551,4
_______________________________________________
TOTAL359100
The errors seen in Table 5 have occurred, under
the one week working program, through the
navigation watches of the watchkeeping officers
subjecttooveractivity(4navigationwatchesforeach
volunteer); it is a serious situation that 58% of the
total error points has been of 1
st
degree importance
group. When considered that the errors under 1
st
degree importance are navigational anoeuvres and
vesselpassages,itisunderstoodthatawatchkeeping
officersubjecttooveractivity,andtiredaccordingly,
may make errors in very important operations that
mayendangerthesafetyofthevessel.
499
When the control points are assessed against the
legalregulations,itcanbeseenthat,amongthetotal
359 errors made by the volunteer watchkeeping
officers, 58% have been under ISM coverage, 23%
under COLREG coverage, 13% under local
regulationsand6%underSOLAScoverage(Figure4).
Figure4.Distributionoftheerrorsoverregulations
Figure5.DistributionofErrorClasses
When the control points are assessed against the
classifications under Table 3, it can be seen that,
among the total 359 errors, 33% relates to internal
communication, 24% relates to external
communication, 18% relates to equipment
preparation,14%relatestodocumentpreparationand
records,and11%relatestomaneuverandnavigation
(Figure5).
3.2 LiquidCargoHandlingScenarios
When the system records related to the load
operationsperformedbythevolunteerwatchkeeping
officers under port watches, as in tanker simulation
laboratory, are examined, it may be seen that the
volunteers have reduced the valves, stopped the
pumpbeforedecreasingthespeed
ofthecargopump,
openedmistakenvalves,forgottensomevalvesopen
aftertheoperation,closedtheloadentryvalveswhile
the terminal continues to function, closed the entry
valve of the tank while the ballast pump is in
operationduringtheballastintake,openedmistaken
manifolds, functioned the mistaken pumps,
performed
unnecessary valve opening/closing
transactions, performed unloading with double
pumps contrary to the operational instructions,
performed ballast operations without a command,
triedtoclosethealreadyclosedvalves,re‐instructed
without being aware of the already functioning
terminal, started the cargo pump before the
dischargingline isready and not complied
with the
criteriarelatedtotheorderofoperationsgivenunder
operationalinstructions.
Valvereductioncausestheincreaseofpressurein
thelineanddamageonthesame.Itisaknownerror
also general in practice. It may also be named as a
breach since performed against the rules. Stopping
the pump without decreasing the pump speed may
damagethe respective pump. Thefunctioningofthe
dischargingpumps of the vesselbefore thelines are
ready will mean damage on thepump. A valve not
beingopenedinthelinemeansthelineisnotready.
Forgetting the valves open
after the operation then
shallresultwithuncertaintyabouttheposition(ready
ornot)ofthelineinasubsequentoperation.Opening
the mistaken manifold valve or establishing a
mistakenlineconnectionisaserioussituationwhich
may result with discharging the liquid loads to an
environmentotherthanthe line
ortothe sea. Inthe
same manner, closing the respective loading valves
while the terminal pumps continue to load into the
vesselmaycauseexplosionofthemanifoldorlineas
well as damage on the terminal pump and
environmentalpollution.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Thefasttransportoftheproductsfromtheproducer
to the consumer have gained importance together
withthetechnologicaladvances.Forthefasttransport
ofcommodities,fastloading,fastunloadingandport
durations have been reduced and the navigation
speeds of the vessels have increased. Thus, the
working periods and intensity
of the crew have
increased in parallel with the increased maritime
operations. Many actions have been taken together
with such increased working load as well as many
accepted rules, however, this could not prevent the
human errors to play an important role in the
occurred accidents. Establishing the effects of
the
fatigue on the risk of errors by the seafarers will be
important by means of prevention of marine
accidents.
It is a known fact that the intensity of the
operations and works in the tankers at short sea
shipping cause the increase of the working loads of
the watchkeeping officers
assigned in such vessels.
This study has established the errors realized by
watchkeepingofficersunderfatiguebymakinguseof
bridgeandtankersimulators.Consideringtheresults
ofthisstudy,itisthoughtalinearrelationshipexists
between the fatigue and error making tendency.
Compliancewiththerestingperiodsprovided
tothe
watchkeeping officers by the international and
national regulations has an utmost importance. Not
complyingsuchperiodsordividingsuchperiodsinto
parts shall mean not providing the required resting
periodstotheofficers.Thus,itrequiresuninterrupted
restingperiods.Itcanbesaidthatworkinginbreach
500
ofrules increasethe tendencyof the officer to make
error.
Workingtimeregulations mustbe complied with
to the maximum. To comply with the limitations of
workinghours,itisnecessarytoincreasethenumber
ofofficersresponsibleforoperationssuchvessels.
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