International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 6

Number 2

June 2012

195

1 INTRODUCTION

The global trade development caused, that within the

last 20 years, on the oceans, began to appear more

and more tankers, and other vessels that carry a be-

wildering variety of goods (starting from weapons

up to food supplies). The world today transports al-

most 90% of its all freight by sea. On average, it is

estimated that at any time of a day travels more than

10 million containers around the world. One of the

biggest dangers that faces the contemporary world of

shipping is piracy. The phenomenon concentrates,

first and foremost, on waters bordering areas affect-

ed by lack of political authority or severe instability,

bad economic situation and various problems of so-

cial nature. On the other hand another important fac-

tor, which significantly affects the appearance of the

potential risk of the piracy, is the geographical loca-

tion especially presence of gulfs, straits or archipel-

agos, which make piracy possible and very profita-

ble business.

A perfect example of a state meeting all the above

factors governing incurrence and the development of

piracy is Somalia. This country for many years has

been the place of many various armed conflicts,

from small tribal clashes, by a series of conflicts

with neighbouring countries, until the great civil

war, which has been affecting the country since

1991. As a result, there has been a catastrophic de-

struction of infrastructure, agriculture and domestic

industry. Through all these years, Somalia was

struck many times by droughts and natural disasters,

which have led to a lack of food and as a result of

that to unimaginable famine. This difficult situation

caused the break-up of the state structures in the

flame of the war. Somali authorities asked for assis-

tance the international community, which expressed

its approval on several occasions by a number of the

resolution. Finally peacekeepers were established in

Somalia, with a goal to stabilized the tense situation

in the country. All of these missions failed to help

the situation and the only advantage of them was to

show how difficult are the realities in this part of the

world.

The absence of alternative sources to acquire the

means to live stimulates the Somali population to

take up piracy business and related activities. In that

reality piracy seems the only possibility of survival.

In order to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery

it has been decided to regulate legally, what piracy

and armed assault is and then what the difference be-

tween these two offences is. The list of offences has

Preventive Actions and Safety Measures

Directed Against Pirates in the Gulf of Aden

Region

D. Duda & K. Wardin

Naval University, Gdynia

ABSTRACT: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden region became a real threat at the beginning of the 21st century for

the safety of transport in the region. For these reasons, the international community have taken preventive ac-

tions and developed measures to be applied to fight piracy and increase safety in the region. These multilat-

eral activities are based both on international efforts to improve the political situation in Somalia, where pi-

rates have their bases, as well as the introduction of certain practices and procedures to combat piracy in the

Gulf of Aden region.

196

been introduced for this purpose as well as criminal

sanctions for committed acts. There were also intro-

duced the principles of extradition, legal ways of ac-

cusing presumed criminals and how to pass the in-

ternational cooperation. In addition, the United

Nations (UN) Security Council and the European

Parliament in connection with the deteriorating of

political situation and increase in attacks in Somalia,

have decided to post the relevant resolutions con-

taining provisions concerning improvement of safety

and inform about the current situation in this area.

The problem of modern piracy, particularly in the

area of the Horn of Africa, through political implica-

tions is extremely difficult, and therefore, precise

and comprehensive solution is not easy to work out.

It is related to the long-term process of decision-

making in order to prevent criminal acts in this area.

Requires the cooperation of both local and interna-

tional centres, which must overcome a number of

cultural, political, economic barriers and social con-

ditions. It is also very important to act instantly and

try to keep maritime transport as safe as possible.

For these reasons some measures have been under-

taken immediately.

2 ORGANISATION OF MARITIME

TRANSPORT IN A SECURE AND SET

CORRIDOR IN THE GULF OF ADEN

During the early months of 2008, security in the

Gulf of Aden was almost solely provided by the

Combined Maritime Forces ("CMF") Combined

Task Force 150 ("CTF-150"). At various times CTF-

150 has comprised vessels of the United States, the

United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Aus-

tralia, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain,

Portugal, Denmark, Pakistan and other nations. But

piracy has not been its main target—which is gen-

eral maritime security as part of the War on Terror—

and CTF-150 is thinly spread over not just the Gulf

of Aden but also the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea,

the Red Sea and a large part of the Indian Ocean; a

total of 2½ million square miles. To cover this vast

area CTF-150 usually has about 14 ships, including

supply vessels

During 2008 the number of pirate attacks in the

Gulf of Aden dramatically increased, especially

along the coast of Yemen. In August 2008, as

a result of pressure from the International Maritime

Organization and other bodies, CTF-150 established

a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf

Knott J., Somalia, The Gulf of Aden, And Piracy,

http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=72910&print

=1, 21.11.2010.

of Aden (Figure 1.), with the intention of channel-

ling merchant vessels through a corridor that would

in theory afford greater safety, because defensive

measures would be more effective when concentrat-

ed in a smaller area. Thanks to the coalition patrols

of warships and aircrafts, the safety of all vessels

travelling in the basin was ensured. Easier control,

monitoring, and the possibility of faster response,

scored big chances of international forces in the

fight against widespread piracy and everything

seemed to coming back to normal. But all these

measures, although ensuring the safe passage of

some merchant ships, and preventing some board-

ings, could not avert a further large number of hi-

jackings and an even greater number of unsuccessful

attacks. The situation began to worsen and pirates

started to attack more often and farther than ever af-

ter hijacking of MV Sirius Star - an oil tanker – in

November 2008

. It was clear that the MSPA did not

achieve the expected results, and the passage of the

vessel inside the corridor involved increasing risk.

There were not enough warships patrolling MSPA,

and it was quite a widespread area.

Figure 1, Maritime Security Patrol Area 2008 (MSPA), source:

http://www.eaglespeak.us/2008/08/gulf-of-aden-martime-

security-zone.html, 20.11.2010.

In connection with the escalation of action in the

Gulf of pirate, at the beginning of 2009, Interna-

tional Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)

was established (Figure 2.), and boats were advised

to travel in convoys.

The creation of a new corridor was to group

ships, in order to give them additional protection not

only from the army, but also from each vessel in-

cluded in the group. Mutual observation of vessels,

was giving additional protection, so important dur-

ing the transition. The greater number of units pa-

Grinter M., Piracy: what is the solution, 15-16, Maritime

Asia December 2008/January 2009.

197

trolling the corridor, was to discourage Somali pi-

rates to attack ships.

IRTC has to secure safe passage through the Bay.

The zone is plotted by the centre of the Gulf Aden

and ships move one rate for the entire length of the

corridor. In addition, the risk of attack has been lim-

ited by the separation of the corridor into two parts,

for traffic on the East, and for traffic on the West, by

separating the two tracks of two mile safety zone.

Entry in the corridor is strictly controlled, entering

the boundary corridor for specific times, depending

on the speed of the vessel. Delimitation of the corri-

dors for the movement to the East and West, as well

as narrowing them, and the assigning of the vessels

according to their speed possibilities to the time of

entry into the zone, greatly helped forces of military

coalition in this area to make the area safer to pass

Figure 2, International Recommended Transit Corridor, source:

http://asianyachting.com/news/PirateCorridor.htm, 20.11.2010.

Since the introduction in 2009 of the Internation-

ally Recommended Transit Corridor for all ships

passing thorough the Gulf of Aden, cruise-goers can

feel much more secure against the threat of Somali

piracy. Potential cruise passengers should also be re-

assured about such matters as travel insurance,

changes to the cruise excursion schedule and the un-

obtrusive nature of the protection offered.

To make sure that situation is properly handled in

January 2009 was created the CMF's Combined

Task Force 151 ("CTF-151"), commanded by US

Navy Rear Admiral Terence McKnight, with

a specific mandate to counter piracy operations in

and around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the

Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, thereby releasing

CTF-150 to carry out its original task of anti-drug,

Trapla M., Metody zwiększania bezpieczeństwa statku w kon-

tekście wzrostu piractwa, Master’s thesis, Naval University,

57, Gdynia 2010.

anti-smuggling, and other general maritime security

operations

3 OPERATION ATALANTA

Although CTF-151 helps efficiently to keep the So-

mali waters and the Gulf of Aden secure, it is not the

only military mission in the area. Since 8 December

2008 the European Union (EU) has been conducting

a military operation to help deter, prevent and re-

press acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast

of Somalia. This military operation, named EU

NAVFOR Somalia-operation ATALANTA, was

launched in support of Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838

and 1846 which were adopted in 2008 by the United

Nations Security Council. Its aim is to contribute to:

− the protection of vessels of the World Food Pro-

gramme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced

persons in Somalia;

− the protection of vulnerable vessels sailing in the

Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast and the de-

terrence, prevention and repression of acts of pi-

racy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

This operation - the European Union's first ever

naval operation - is being conducted in the frame-

work of the European Security and Defence Policy

(ESDP)

Operation ATALANTA's mission is to:

− provide protection for vessels chartered by the

WFP;

− provide protection for merchant vessels;

− employ the necessary measures, including the use

of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order

to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed rob-

bery which may be committed in the areas where

they are present.

The EU Operational Headquarters is located at

Northwood, United Kingdom. The Political and Se-

curity Committee exercises the political control and

strategic direction of the EU military operation, un-

der the responsibility of the Council.

The operation was initially scheduled for a period

of twelve months. During that period more than

twenty vessels and aircraft took part in EU

NAVFOR. At present it has been extended by the

Council of the European Union until December

2010, and again for another two years, until Decem-

ber 2012.

Knott J., op. cit.

EU naval operation against piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia -

Operation ATALANTA),

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090313

FactsheetEU-NAVFORSomalia-v3_EN.pdf, 25.11.2010.

198

The EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta consists of

units from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,

Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Con-

tributions from third countries such as Norway, are

participating as well. Malta, Portugal and United

Kingdom are also participating. There is also a close

cooperation with Russian, Indian, Japanese and Chi-

nese vessels

The composition of EU NAVFOR changes con-

stantly due to the frequent rotation of units and var-

ies according to the Monsoon seasons in the Indian

Ocean. However, it typically comprises 5 - 10 Sur-

face Combatants (Frigates/Destroyers), 1 Auxiliary

and 3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Units are drawn

from the contributing nations. The Force Head Quar-

ters vessel rotates on a four monthly basis.

The operation can arrest, detain and transfer per-

sons who have committed, or are suspected of hav-

ing committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in

the areas where it is present and it can seize the ves-

sels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels

caught following an act of piracy or an armed rob-

bery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as

well as the goods on board. The suspects can be

prosecuted either by an EU Member State or under

the EU-Kenya agreement, which gives the Kenyan

authorities the right to prosecute

. A website is used

in coordinating both merchant shipping and military

activity. This approach has been welcomed by the

merchant shipping industry. Merchant vessels that

follow EU NAVFOR recommendations run a much

smaller risk of being attacked and/or captured.

Since the start of the operation the number of at-

tacks by pirates has greatly diminished. This is

linked to the dissuasive presence of the vessels of

the EU NAVFOR ATALANTA force and to the

self-protection measures which have been put in

place for merchant shipping at the recommendation

of the European naval force.

Operation EU NAVFOR is part of the global ac-

tion conducted by the EU in the Horn of Africa to

deal with the Somali crisis, which has political, se-

curity and humanitarian aspects.

The EU supports the Djibouti process for peace

and reconciliation in Somalia, facilitated by the UN.

As the effectiveness of protection measures em-

ployed within the Gulf of Aden has increased, pi-

rates have started to operate in previously unused ar-

eas to avoid interdiction by EU NAVFOR and other

counter-piracy forces. Through the 2009 inter-

monsoon periods it became evident that pirate action

groups were operating at ever greater range to avoid

European Union Naval Force Somalia - Operation Atalanta

http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/, 25.12.2010.

Ibidem.

detection. In light of these changes, EU NAVFOR

has increased its area of operations to maintain pres-

sure on the pirates and to continue to constrain their

freedom of action. In doing so, EU NAVFOR en-

deavours to ensure that legitimate maritime traffic

within the region continues to receive the best pro-

tection possible. This procedural change allows EU

NAVFOR units to operate more effectively further

east in the Indian Ocean, giving them a greater abil-

ity to disrupt and deter pirates in this vast area

It is very difficult to evaluate the operation which

has still been in progress. The basic idea behind this

strategy is to deter pirates by making it harder to hi-

jack ships. The strategy is mainly an offshore fo-

cussed strategy, with little emphasis on onshore

measures to prevent piracy, however, in practice it

seems to be combined with an onshore, centralized

state-building strategy. It is very difficult however to

build a stable central government as its power rage is

limited to several city quarters in the capital city

Mogadishu. Without employing local institutions,

authorities fighting piracy might be a very difficult,

expensive and long process, and nobody can guaran-

tee its success.

The containment approach dominates the ap-

proaches to Somali piracy today; major funds are be-

ing used on it in order to contain piracy. The Euro-

pean Union for example uses ”The European

Union’s Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia” and

pledged €212 million for development assistance

from 2008-2013, while the EU’s joint naval endeav-

our, Operation ATALANTA, planned to spend an

estimated $450 million in one year only

. The result

so far can be described as satisfactory but far from

very good as we still can hear about attempts of at-

tacks or successful attacks in the area.

4 DIRECT MEASURES TO PROTECT SHIPS

FROM PIRACY

In the situation of the still growing acts of piracy, of

the coasts of Somalia mainly in Gulf Aden, the In-

ternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) has decid-

ed to issue a series of recommendations on good

practices in the field of the fight against piracy.

Ship-owners and masters of vessels in the area are

recommended to sign their ships on the website of

the Centre of maritime safety on the Horn of Africa-

MSC (HOA) before the vessel enters the Gulf Aden.

It gives the possibility of continuous monitoring by

EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA, and obtaining all nec-

EU NAVFOR, Press release,

http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/eunavfor-atalanta-area-of-

operation-extended/, 22.09.2010.

Gilpin, R., “Counting the cost of Somali Piracy” United

States Institute of Peace Working Paper April 2009.

199

essary information about the situation in the Gulf of

Aden. Unfortunately as IMO delivers every third

ship does not follow this routine and endangers itself

and the crew.

The European Commission calls on EU Member

States, to use all available means of protection,

which are aimed at combating hazards while cross-

ing the Gulf of Aden. At the same time calls on the

EU States, to disseminate, control and up-date best

practices, aimed at combating acts of piracy and

armed attacks in the Gulf of Aden.

IMO issued a series of recommendations aimed at

avoiding slowdown, and inhibit acts of piracy and

armed assault along the coast of Somalia and the

Gulf Aden, intended for companies, operators, cap-

tains and crew members. The practices were accept-

ed by international members of maritime sector (eg.

INTERTANKO - International Association of Inde-

pendent Tanker Owners, ICO - International Cham-

ber of Shipping, BIMCO – The Baltic and Interna-

tional Maritime Council, IMO – International

Maritime Organization and many others)

Generally speaking it is being advised to use the

IRTC and to enter the gulf in groups at scheduled

time which gives the possibility to international

forces to escort the vessels. They should avoid enter-

ing territorial water of Yemen as they are not pro-

tected by international forces. Apart from that the

ships should transit the waters at night as the number

of attacks is much lower at that time.

At the time of planning the transition through the

high risk area, the company together with the captain

of the ship must make the relative risk assessment,

taking into account all the most up-to-date infor-

mation from the area of the threat. This assessment

will allow to estimate the likelihood of attack by pi-

rates, and take additional outside regulation

measures in favour of the fight against piracy. Own-

ers are obliged to register their ships on the website

of the MSC (HOA) – www.mschoa.eu, since it is the

source of many necessary and most up-to-date in-

formation needed when planning a journey in waters

of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. The captain is

obliged to ensure that all procedures associated with

the passage of a vessel by a vulnerable area were

made. He must make sure that the company reported

to MARLO – Maritime Communications Office and

UKMTO Dubai - the United Kingdom Maritime

Trade Operations intention of entry of the vessel in

international Transit Corridor – the IRTC, five days

before the planned entry. If such notification has not

been sent, the captain is required to complete this

obligation. The captain must accurately inform the

crew of the planned passage and anti-piracy protec-

tion measures. The captain decides also if the AIS

Trapla M., op. cit., 78-79.

(Automatic identification System) should be turned

on or not. A very important element in secure

against pirate attack is blocking access to the ship. In

the first instance you should protect and control ac-

cess to the bridge of the captain, the bridge, the en-

gine room, and all cabins inside the vessel.

It is recommended that there is a special dedicat-

ed room onboard -a citadel ‘a hardened’ secure

space in the ship, which fulfils the role of the assem-

bly at the time when the risk of attack has been pi-

rated. It is designed to block and delay access to the

control of the ship by pirates. Although in 2010 mili-

tary forces have freed three vessels by conducting

‘opposed boardings’ while the crew was safely

sealed in citadels. Despite this, shipping operators

are warned that they should not treat a citadel as a

panacea and that a proper risk analysis is essential

Requirements for the placing of the citadel and how

to use it are the newsgroups, for this reason, masters

of vessels, on a regular basis should verify this in-

formation via the MSC (HOA).

Another a very popular way of thwarting a pirates

attack is the use of water and fire hoses and hose to

clean the deck. It is recommended that they are dis-

tributed over the whole length of the deck ready for

use, and the pump, supplying water to the hydrants

should be in on, while passing through high risk are-

as. High pressure water stream addressed in the at-

tackers, effectively can refute the attack.

Additional protection for the ship may be appli-

cable Razor Ship. This is a system of cables wired

along the side of the ship and low placed to enter at

the stern. This is one of the essential elements of the

passive defence before the attack, which can be used

while passing the sea, at the time of berthing at an-

chor and in port. The system has many advantages,

thanks to which it is so popular on ships, and they

are:

− low cost;

− strong psychological barrier to overcome, not

ease to overcame for the attackers;

− easy assembly and dismantling (such a security

system is only recommended in risk areas);

− high efficiency and the possibility of prolonged

use; practical packaging allows the quick and safe

positioning of the crew to wire the whole length

of the ship, and facilitates storage in marine con-

ditions .

− system of passive protection (approaching at your

own risk);

− easy to link individual lengths of wire (in the case

of securing large surface)

− a good tool for protection against pirates, together

with the LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device -

Worwood D., A new anti-piracy bible, Safety at Sea, 23, Oc-

tober 2010, vol. 44 no 500.

200

an acoustic sound waves device which produces,

long range acoustic wave energy of 151dB, for

comparison, the threshold of pain for a man is

about 120dB, it is applied in immediate distress),

it is one of the more effective systems to fight

Another very helpful device in defence against pi-

racy are Counter Piracy Net. This is a substantial

change in the field of passive defence. Plastic con-

tainers with the network should be on the perimeter

of the entire vessel, in the proper distances. In the

event of danger, the security shall be released and to

discharge the net on the surface of the water or just

below it, by pulling along the freeboard and stern up

to 50 metres. In addition, the networks are equipped

with a orange buoys, to act as a deterrent and visual-

ly warning of danger.

BEA Systems is another way to direct the fight

against piracy. BEA Systems has pursued its exper-

tise from the scope of the defence, safety at sea and

airspace sector to develop a technology that enables

the detection of small units and identify actions of

pirates in a radius of 25 km, such distance is suffi-

cient for this that the crew can prepare themselves to

take appropriate action, in order to avoid an attack

BAE System includes such devices as:

− high frequency radar to detect small boats in a ra-

dius of 25 km;

− wide area surveillance system, the system makes

it easy to detect traffic unit and has alarms levels

of risk;

− passive radar identification system (PRISM), in-

tended to provide early warning against unidenti-

fied ships;

− equipped with better lighting, giving the ability to

detect and deter intruders who are in the vicinity

of the ship during the night

Another effective weapon in the fight is an ion

cannon. It supposed to send ion beam with such

force that any electronic systems, responsible for

work of the weapon systems or propulsion and steer-

ing were unable to use. Before the struck boat comes

back to normal, the vessel that became the target of

an attack gets the time to escape

As we can see there are many different, passive

possibilities to protect the ship from pirate attacks.

All of them are probably quite efficient but they

must be put in practice otherwise they are just use-

less gadgets. This is directly connected with money

spend on equipment of modern ships, which should

be able to have such devices installed if necessary.

Trapla M., op. cit., 85-86.

Ibidem, 87-89.

Source: Ion cannon

http://www.sluisvan.net/uzbrojenie_statkow,energetyczne,

20.11.2010.

The money spent on passive protection, training

programmes and other things connected with better

security is a well spent money, which may save the

crew. It should be noticed that the situation in the

Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin has become very

difficult in such a short time that many of ship-

owners, captains and crew members do not want to

accept as true that passing in the described area is

dangerous in spite of the presence of international

forces from CTF 151 and EU NAVFOR.

5 ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN OUTSIDE

PIRACY ZONE

IMO specifies how the crew should behave while

passing through the area of the Gulf Aden and how

should the vessel be carried out. Primarily, the mas-

ter should avoid areas in which the crew is exposed

to the risk. Presence on the external parts of the deck

should be limited to the minimum from dusk to

dawn, however, be aware of the continuous perfor-

mance of watch keeping.

Vessels should be addressed through the Centre

of maritime safety and the licence of the Horn of Af-

rica-MSC (HOA) to the corridor liner - the IRTC, at

appropriate times, depending on the speed of the

vessel. The captain should be in constant contact

with the above mentioned centre and keep track of

the information provided by the institution on the

website.

If the route of the ship is not passing through the

IRTC, this unit should move with full engine, not

slower than 18 knots. Transition by the Bay as far as

possible should be carried out after dark.

It is important that both vessels entering and out-

going from the IRTC do not switch off navigation

lights, while they limit lights on-board. Additional

lighting of a ship using a remotely operated head-

lamps is consistent with the law, but they may not be

jeopardized in any way the security of the maritime

traffic.

During the voyage, special attention should be

given to small boats, which are frequently used to at-

tack by Somali pirates. Their photographs and de-

scription should be on board the vessel. When the

crew enter into suspicion about the approach of this

type of craft to the vessel, the risk assessment should

be made immediately and a report of this event

should be sent to UKMTO Dubai and IMB PRC us-

ing the after the attack report. The pirates boat

should be immediately informed that they had been

noticed using lamps, alarms, and the corresponding

movements of the crew. If possible use of all availa-

ble non-lethal types of weapons, assess their ad-

vantages and usefulness in a given situation, and the

exposure of the ship concerned.

201

It should be mentioned that pirates develop very

quickly and adjust their actions to changing condi-

tions which can be seen for instance in stretching the

area of attacks. This forces International Maritime

Bureau (IMB), military forces, shipping associations

and insurers to take suitable actions by producing

the third version of Best Management Practices

(BMP3).

Released in June 2010 , the new, pocket-sized

BMP3 contains everything that ship-owners, opera-

tors and masters need to know about deterring at-

tacks

. EU NAVFOR commented the BMP3 to be a

very helpful tool to avoid attacks especially because

in multicultural nature of crews and the fact that

standards can vary, it is important to have one com-

mon way of action in case of pirates attacks. The

booklet is distributed free of charge to ships.

It contains additional advice on ship-protection

measures- aimed at counteracting the latest pirate

tactics. It also includes a copy form of the UKMTO

form for vessel position reporting.

As mentioned above reflecting the increasing

range of pirate attacks, the high-risk area defined in

BMP3 has been expanded beyond the Gulf of Aden

to the area bounded by Suez in the north, south to

latitude 10° and east to longitude 78°. The area be-

tween 47°E and 49°E remains the most dangerous

for pirates attacks especially during the daylight.

All the precautions have not entirely prevented

vessels being attacked in or near the transit corridor.

It should be barred in minds that the planning, con-

stant alertness is crucial for the safety of any ship

travelling at the described waters.

If pirates were able to get on board it is very im-

portant that any action taken by both the master and

the crew of the vessel were directed to:

− ensure the safety of all persons on board;

− maintain control over the vessel;

− leaving the ship by attackers.

In case of both, the risk of attack, and in the case

of invading pirates on board a vessel, this fact

should be immediately reported to UKMTO Dubai,

and if possible to the ship-owner. This should be

done before the introduction of the attackers on the

bridge. It is very important that the whole crew is

together (excluding personnel on the bridge) and

remained in the same location on the ship, They

should show no resistance and do not behave in

a daring way. If there is a citadel, it should be

equipped with necessary measures and use them in

the event of intrusion attempts of the pirates. In ad-

dition, the crew should keep away from any illumi-

nators, manholes, and does not try to stop the pirates

Worwood D., op. cit., 22.

from boarding the ship. Be aware of the emergency

communications available from inside the citadel

and as soon as possible connect with the relevant.

It is extremely important to remember these rules,

because they may save crews’ lives in a critical situ-

ation. It would be very helpful to bear in mind such

points:

− ship operators should register at www.mschoa.org

and submit a vessel movement registration-form;

− sent a UKMTO vessel position reporting form

(included in BMP3);

− report transit details regularly;

− define the ship’s AIS policy;

− keep emergency contact numbers near;

− read BMP3 implement protection measures and

test anti-piracy procedures before the high-risk

area;

− maintain crew vigilance and awareness, avoid

complacency;

− drill crews in what to expect and how to react;

− always use the IRTC and Gulf of Aden group

transit;

− if using a citadel, ensure that all crew members

are safely inside;

− if under attack keep the ship moving.

6 CONCLUSION

No matter what temporary precautions we are going

to take and how alert we stay in dangerous waters, it

is important to remember that fighting piracy must

take place not only offshore only, leaving escaping

pirates to shelter and ride off the storm to try another

day. To fight them we must use many methods and

try to engage local institutions. It is true that in So-

malia there is lack of powerful central government,

but local institutions function pretty well and they

should be used in this struggle. So far, focus on a

centralized solution has limited the international

fleets’ access to information from onshore sources.

It has also limited the international fleets’ ability to

cooperate with entities that de-facto hold power

close to the pirate bases

. There is no single solu-

tion to Somali piracy, and none of the described ap-

proaches is entirely successful nor without merit. On

the other hand we have to be aware that European-

founded operations to combat Somalia-based piracy

could be hit by major public spending cuts

. Many

countries in Europe have serious problems with con-

structing their budgets and extra money spent on pi-

racy might be a difficult overweigh impossible to

bare for next year or years to come. It can also be

Hansen S. J., Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden, Norwegian

Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 3, London 2009.

Cuts and counter-piracy, Safety at Sea,13, November 2010,

vol. 44 no 501.

202

heard that shipping must stop relaying on a limited

military presence and deal with the problem through

proper crew training and vessel design

. It is of

course a solution but there are also voices saying

(especially BMP3) that the use of special armed

guards on board the ships is not the best solution.

Total elimination of piracy through the constant

control of the Gulf of Aden by using the ships in-

volved in the ATALANTA operation and others is

rather unlikely but its limitation should contribute to

resolve these issues and gain stability. However, this

cannot be the only step done by the ’West’ in order

to ensure safety in this part of the world. We have to

offer Somali pirates some alternatives, work oppor-

tunities otherwise ex-pirates are likely to slip back

into a life of maritime crime.

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