International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 6

Number 1

March 2012

109

1 PIRACY – DEFINITION AND MAIN AREAS

OF PIRATES’ ACTIVITIES

Piracy is an activity known and grown for thousands

of years. At present in many parts of the world it is

treated as a type of legacy or rather part of tradition

and so also gladly continued by the population who

is experiencing poverty and hunger. Modern day pi-

rates are particularly active in the regions in the wa-

ters of the intensive transport by sea. Piracy for

many years was treated as an individual problem in

each country the coast which existed, and it was not

considered as a serious threat to a maritime

transport. Such an approach of communities and in-

ternational institutions to this issue caused the nega-

tion of this problem and treating the difficulty as not

the most important one. Looking at the world in

terms of maritime transport and its more than 95%

of the share in the general transport, and also 80%

share in the overall transport of crude oil, petroleum

and its derivatives, this issue should be put on the

first place

. The lack of the activities caused that the

problem has not disappeared but it has arisen at the

end of XX and the beginning of XXI century and

has become an immense difficulty for the maritime

transportation in many parts of the world.

While talking about piracy it should be clear what

is understood by this phrase. The easiest and most

understandable definition of piracy is given by In-

Wardin K., „Ocena zagrożeń bałtyckich strumieni transportowych

działaniami terrorystycznymi”, 25, Belstudio Warszawa 2007.

ternational Maritime Bureau (IMB) and according to

IMB piracy is defined as: an act of boarding or at-

tempting to board any ship with the intent to commit

theft or any other crime and with the intent or capa-

bility to use force in the furtherance of that act

As mentioned before, the problem is not equally

the same in all places where piracy flourishes in the

XXI century. Generally speaking we can distinguish

five most dangerous regions in the world, as figure 1

shows below, which are really infected with pirates’

activities and it influences

maritime transportation in a great matter. These are

the following:

− Western and eastern coasts of Africa and the Red

Sea;

− The Horn of Arica and the Gulf of Aden;

− The coast of south-east Asia and northern coasts

of the Indian Ocean;

− The coast of south America;

− The coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

Hansen S. J., Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden, Norwegian

Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 3, London

2009.

Influence of Pirates' Activities on Maritime

Transport in the Gulf of Aden Region

D. Duda & K. Wardin

Polish Naval University, Gdynia, Poland

ABSTRACT: Modern piracy is one of the items appearing on the seas, which has a great impact on maritime

transport in many regions of the world. Changes that happened at the end of XX and beginning of XXI centu-

ry became significant in the renaissance of piracy. The problem is present in many parts of the world but it

become a real threat in year 2008 around a small country of Somalia and in the area called the Horn of Africa

especially in the region of Gulf of Aden. Because international waters are very important for maritime

transport so pirates’ attacks have great influence over this transport and on international community.

110

Figure 1, Piracy hot spots,

http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Threats.pdf, 28.12.2008.

The article focuses only on one but very signifi-

cant region, the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin,

although the problem is very extensive and present

in other regions as well. The Gulf of Aden and the

Somali Basin is strictly connected with Somalia,

a country situated in the Horn of Africa, and prob-

lems related to this country. To understand all as-

pects of piracy there it is necessary to learn briefly

about Somalia as an African country.

2 SOMALIA AND ITS WATERS – A PIRATE-

INFESTED COUNTRY

Somalia has made international headlines for almost

two decades, first as a place of civil war character-

ized by clan warfare and humanitarian catastrophe,

then as a failed state, and finally as source of modern

piracy. Somalia has been without an effective central

government since 1991. In that year President Barre

was overthrown by opposing clans. But they failed

to agree on a replacement and plunged the country

into lawlessness and clan warfare. Years of fighting

between rival warlords and an inability to deal with

famine and disease have led to the deaths of up to

one million people. After the collapse of the Siad

Barre regime in 1991, the north-west part of Somalia

unilaterally declared itself the independent Republic

of Somaliland. The territory, whose independence is

not recognised by international bodies, has enjoyed

relative stability

. A two-year peace process, led by

the Government of Kenya under the auspices of the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

(IGAD), concluded in October 2004 with the elec-

tion of Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed as President of the

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia

and the formation of an interim government, known

as the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions

(TFIs). President YUSUF resigned late in 2008

while United Nations-sponsored talks between the

TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-

Somalia country profile,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.

stm, 16.11.2010.

Liberation of Somalia (ARS) were underway in Dji-

bouti. In January 2009, following the creation of a

TFG-ARS unity government, Ethiopian military

forces, which had entered Somalia in December

2006 to support the TFG in the face of advances by

the opposition Islamic Courts Union (ICU), with-

drew from the country. The TFIs are based on the

Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlines a

five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a

new Somali constitution and a transition to

a representative government following national elec-

tions. However, in January 2009 the TFA amended

the TFC to extend TFG's mandate until 2011. While

its institutions remain weak, the TFG continues to

reach out to Somali stakeholders and to work with

international donors to help build the governance

capacity of the TFIs and to work toward national

elections in 2011

Somaliland is not the only part of the country

which declared independence and does not want to

be ruled by federal government

. For the situation

has not changed in the country and the people were

starving to death, they turned into piracy considering

it as a ‘modern way of living’ in such difficult times.

During August 2008, the frequency of Somali pi-

racy exploded and the drastic increase in occurrence

meant that waters adjacent to Somalia became the

most pirate-infested waters in the world

. However,

Somalia as a country is not pirate infested, the pi-

rates usually operate out of only several regions, us-

ing only certain ports to anchor their hijacked ships.

In order for piracy to occur there must be available

targets - sea traffic in the area where potential pirates

might operate. This is probably the most obvious

reason why the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin

is a very profitable region to practice piracy.

The Gulf of Aden

, and waters around Somalia

are important areas for navigation. The Gulf of Aden

is located between the north coast of Somalia and

the Arabic Peninsula and connects the Indian Ocean

through the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb with the Red

Sea. This is the trail which traverses approximately

21 thousand vessels annually, transporting goods

and production of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to

Europe and North America. In Arabic, Bab el-

Mandeb means "gate of tears", referring to the ex-

The world factbook: Somalia,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/so.html, 22.11.2010

The other parts: Xizbul Islam, Hrakat al-Shabab Mujahideen,

Unaligned or Neutral, other countries. Somalia,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia, 16.11.2010.

Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships,

Annual Report 2008, International Maritime Organization

(2009) MSC.4/Circ.115

Its area - 259,000 km², average depth 1359 m, maximum

depth 5390 m (Alula Fartak trench).

111

ceptionally difficult navigation in the Strait. Its

length is about 50 km and the width at the narrowest

point about 26 km. There is Perim island situated in

the middle, which divides it into two parts Bab Is-

kandar (Strait of Alexander) and Dact al-Majun. The

waters on the whole width are territorial waters of

the coastal States (Yemen, Djibouti) and the ship-

ping takes place on the basis of the law for the tran-

sition of the transit. In 2007 3,3 million barrels of

crude oil were transported this way per day out of a

world total of about 43 million barrels per day,

mainly to Europe, the United States and Asia. The

waterway is part of the important Suez Canal ship-

ping route between the Mediterranean Sea and the

Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. The gulf is known

by the nickname ‘Pirate Alley’ due to the large

amount of pirate activity in the area. The Strait of

Bab el-Mandeb separates the Gulf of Aden and the

Red Sea, and both coasts are occupied by soldiers. In

particular, the African coast, which was a witness in

the past to the border disputes and resulted in nu-

merous posts to keep the area as safe as possible.

Therefore, the Strait itself is not visited by pirates so

often.

The figures show definitely that the route is very

important for maritime transportation of oil but not

only, and so the safety of this region should be the

priority for international community. The described

route is the shortest sea way to Europe and North

America, allowing to save an average of 6,000 nau-

tical miles and a journey around the Cape of Good

Hope, which significantly reduces the time of

transport and fuel consumption. It should be also

added that, due to both the width and depth, which

restricts the movement of the units in the Suez Ca-

nal, some of the vessels must travel around Africa to

get on the Mediterranean and to Americas. It is

mainly about super tankers called VLCC (very large

crude carriers).

3 POSSIBLE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR

PIRACY IN SOMALIA

According to some scientists, observing the piracy in

the area, there are several factors to be taken under

consideration while analysing the problem: culture,

exclusion and relative deprivation, poverty, organi-

zational sponsorship, failure of legal and maritime

counter-strategies, and weak/weakening

state/institutional structures

These six factors can be collected in two sets of

possible reasons for piracy. The first one would be:

poverty, organizational sponsorship, failure of coun-

ter-strategies and weak/weakening state/institutional

Hansen S. J., op.cit., 4-5.

structures, which tends to view piracy as a product

of rational cost-benefit analyses conducted by the

potential pirates. Basically, it is claimed that people

engage in piracy because they benefit more from it

than from other, alternative activities, either because

there are no alternatives (lack of work opportuni-

ties), or because the benefits that can be achieved by

piracy are really great. Piracy exists there rather as

the result of a balance between expected gains from

piracy, and expected losses from working as pi-

rates

.This could be due to several reasons. Pun-

ishment for piracy could be weak, because the state

or institutions are so weak that piracy cannot be pun-

ished, which is true in case of Somalia. The govern-

ment might not want to fight piracy because of good

illegal profits from the trade or because confusion in

legal matters acts as a hindrance to punishment.

Another two factors: culture, exclusion and rela-

tive deprivation focuses on different matters. Culture

could lead to some kind of social legitimacy of pira-

cy. In the case of Somalia, the piracy traditions are

weak, and thus lack the power to explain the rela-

tively modern phenomena of piracy. The relation be-

tween those two ideas, culture and tradition of piracy

is rather poor in case of Somalia so this reason can-

not be a real explanation in this case. Another reason

for piracy in this country, related to exclusion and

relative deprivation is so called the ‘Coast Guard’

version claimed by the pirates themselves focuses on

piracy as a product of the need to prevent illegal

fishing. Pirates are kind of coast guards patrolling

and protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing.

The next idea is connected with another version of

the ‘empty sea’. The argument is linked to the pov-

erty of the country and the cost/benefit balance. It

claims that the pirates simply have no alternatives

due to overfishing the sea is said to have become

empty.

There is also the third version suggesting that pi-

racy started out as a defensive measure taken due to

illegal foreign fishing, which over time has turned

into professional piracy. Although as given above

the reasons can differ there still is one the most im-

portant factor in motivating pirates to engage in this

activity and it is the profit. This is the motive that

appears in almost every interview with an arrested

pirate. No matter what is or are real reasons for pira-

cy in this region the fact is that the frequency of at-

tacks has dramatically increased in 2008.

Ibidem, 7.

112

Figure 2, Number of pirate attacks in Somalia and in Gulf of

Aden, source: Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery

against ships, Annual Report 2008, International Maritime Or-

ganization (2009) MSC.4/Circ.

The most warring is the fact that in 2010, accord-

ing to Best Management Practices book 3 (BMP3

)

the is a significant increase in range of pirates at-

tacks. The high-risk area defined in BMP3 has been

expanded beyond the Gulf of Aden to the area

bounded by Suez in the north, south to latitude 10°

and east to longitude 78°. The area between 47°E

and 49°E remains the most dangerous for pirates at-

tacks especially during the daylight

4 HOW THE PIRATES OPERATE

The 2008 boom led to the fragmentation of piracy,

and groups became smaller and more varied. There

are groups of few former fishermen and a skiff or

groups of about even 200 pirates involved in the

business. In general, groups seem to be recruited

from individuals with previous family or village ties.

Sometimes a group has a tied family connections.

There are also groups organized around a skilful

leader and have no family ties at all. Each pirate

group is usually a loose constellation around a pirate

leader who is usually a veteran pirate, reinvesting

funds in new pirate missions, who often functions as

a fund raiser. The second way is a number of people

coming together. In this case everyone brings his

own food and guns, but the boat is owned by a spe-

cific person.

There are three basic modes of organization. The

first is the whole operation is owned by one man

who funds everything. In such cases, the owner

agrees with the people involved in the mission on

certain percentage of payment if a ship is captured.

The third way consists of a fund raiser who col-

lects money from investors and then funds the pirate

Military forces, shipping associations, insurers and IMB

have come together to produce the third version of Best

Management Practices, which was released in June 2010.

Worwood D., A new anti-piracy bible, Safety at Sea, 22,

October 2010, vol. 44 no 500.

Ibidem, 22.

mission. In all three cases, the pirate leader should

be well-connected and respected in the community,

and thus able to draw upon his personal network for

protection and problem solving

How the mission is organized also influences

how much it costs varying from multi-ship group,

which usually is more expensive to organize into

a small one-skiff group, which may need no more

than $300 to run an attack. Smaller operations have

less chances to be successful but on the other hand

there are fewer people to share potential profits.

Usually pirates retie when they collect $50,000 and

more.

Surprisingly the technological resources available

are limited. GPS systems and night vision goggles

are used but not common. GPS and goggles are of-

ten ordered from local businessmen who travel to

Dubai especially to buy them. Ship identification

systems are very rarely used, sometimes pirates use

so called spotters in ports to get the information

about a vessel but the most common way is to ob-

serve the area and make an attempt to capture a spot-

ted vessel (slow with low freeboard, preferably

without passive security or barbed wire). The pirates

tend to be self-financing and the money from hijack-

ings is reinvested in new attacks. Additionally, for-

mer pirates that have invested their gains in legiti-

mate business quite commonly reinvest in piracy

An attack usually is conducted in a typical and

following way: pirates spot flowing vessels with the

latest technology. Choose the objective and board on

large units, sufficiently fast to escape in the event of

failure of the attack. The use of a pirate ‘mother

ship’, carrying personnel equipment, supplies and

smaller attack craft has enable attacks to be under-

taken in a greater range from the shore. Somali pi-

rates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship be-

ing attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to

climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long light-

weight ladders to climb up the side of the vessel be-

ing attacked. Once onboard the pirates will generally

make their way to the bridge to take control of the

vessel. Once on the bridge they will demand that the

ship slows down or stops to enable further pirates to

board. If the crew does not let them onboard they

start shooting. If the attacked crew agrees to let them

in, they would probably spend several months in pi-

rates’ base waiting for overbought and ransom. If the

crew does not let the pirates on board they fulfil

their threats

. Attacks have taken place at any time

of the day. However many attacks have taken place

early in the morning at first light. They try to operate

Hansen S. J., op.cit., 34-35.

Ibidem, 36-37.

Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of

Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area, International Mari-

time Organization, 9-10, London 2010.

100

150

Number of

atacks in

Somalia and in

Gulf of Aden

113

from and in areas, where local authorities have little

or no power (central or south Somalia), because it

allows them not to spend any money on bribes,

which means more money to share. The money from

the ransom, after paying all costs, is divided between

the group that directly attacked the vessel and the

group that guarded it afterwards. Hijackers get more

than the guards. However, the highest share goes to

the first person that boards the ship. The myths of pi-

racy in the greater Gulf of Aden are many, but the

average pirate group is a clan-based, low-tech group,

consisting of former fishermen

Statistics show that the aim of Somali pirates be-

come all types of ships, their size is not able to dis-

courage piracy. On the contrary, the larger vessels,

the greater the risk, that they become the target of an

attack. Hijacking of a large enterprise, carrying ex-

pensive goods entails huge profits for the snatchers,

which obtain in exchange for the release of the crew

and the ship. In 2008 in the Gulf of Aden and Soma-

lia it could be noticed the largest, as yet, increase of

tankers hijackings, carried out in a very large dis-

tance from the land, along the East coast of Africa.

The purpose of each attack is to occupy a ship, but

not every attack is successful one as mentioned be-

fore. Every vessel with varying speed and low side

becomes a potential attack target

The report from 2008 with 111 incidents shows

how dangerous area for navigation is the Gulf of

Aden and the East coast of Somalia. The number of

attacks in this area increased by approximately

250% compared with the year 2007 and 2005 (no-

ticed accordingly, 44 and 45 attacks) and approxi-

mately five times in comparison with the year 2006

(only 20). The number of attacks in August 2008 on-

ly, at 19, and rising in November and October 15

and 16, respectively

. In 2009 there were 217 ships

attacked with 47 vessels hijacked Somalia accounts

for more than half of the 2009 figures. 2009 has

however seen a significant shift in the area of attacks

off Somalia. While the 2008 attacks were predomi-

nantly focused in the Gulf of Aden, 2009 has wit-

nessed more vessels also being targeted along the

east coast of Somalia

. According to IMB reports in

the first half of 2010 there were 100 armed attacks

reported off the coast of Somalia including 27 vessel

hijackings

. The profits which the pirates make with

the money are enormous for them, therefore, aban-

Hansen S. J., op.cit., 41.

Trapla M., Metody zwiększania bezpieczeństwa statku w kon-

tekście wzrostu piractwa, Master’s thesis, Naval University,

44, Gdynia 2010.

Reports on Acts of Piracy..., op.cit., 27.

2009 worldwide piracy figures surpass 400, http://www.icc-

ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=

385:2009-worldwide-piracy-figures-surpass-

400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51, 22.11.2010.

A new anti-piracy bible...,op. cit., 22.

doning this activity in the country without prospects

is practically only a wishful thinking.

5 PIRACY THE THREAT TO MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION

Piracy in Somalia is a much greater threat than it

might seem. The international community tackling

this problem must bear in mind each potential haz-

ard resulting from piracy. This threat can be classi-

fied in three aspects:

− the importance of piracy for international trade,

and in particular the transport of oil;

− the danger for the environment;

− the potential terrorist threat.

Safety at sea has been seriously jeopardized in re-

cent years, thanks to the emergence of incidents of

piracy in key and strategic transit points, which un-

doubtedly the Gulf of Aden is. In addition to the di-

rect impact on vessels, crew, cargo, as well as the

maritime industry, piracy threatens worldwide

commercial marine. Obviously, it is crucial that

firms, which delays with the delivery of goods to the

port of destination, will be losing money. Adding to

this the costs paid in ransoms, piracy should be no-

ticed as a serious threat to the trade from an econom-

ic point of view. The cost of freight rose from

Rs4,000 ($132) to Rs5,600 ($ 185) for a 20ft con-

tainer and Rs8,000 ($ 265) to Rs11,200 ($370) for a

40ft container. The line justified the tariff by citing a

persistent risk of pirate attacks

. As it shows these

consequences are not limited only to companies,

whose vessels are hijacked but there are also serious

concerns of the increase in costs of insurance premi-

ums for vessels intending to go through the Gulf of

Aden. Their growth, is not only caused by an ongo-

ing risk of war, but also dramatically increasing

number of hijacked units. During 2008, insurance

premiums were raised ten times

. It is estimated

that for the increasing number of passing vessels on

that route the cost of insurance from the risk of war

for 20,000 ships can reach even 109 400 million dol-

lars. If the costs of an additional insurance become

too burdensome for the company, or the transition

by the Gulf of Aden seems too dangerous, the deci-

sion is taken about extension of the routes to Europe

and North America, bypassing the Cape of Good

Hope. Companies increasingly decide to bear higher

costs associated with the time of arrival at the port of

Pirate range ever more vast, Safety at Sea, November 2010,

vol. 44 no 501, 12.

Costello M., Shipping insurance costs soars with piracy

surge off Somalia, The Times,

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_se

ctors/banking_and_finance/article4727372.ece/.,

11.09.2008.

114

destination, fuel and crew, then risking hijacking

vessels, endangering crew’s life or paying higher in-

surance premiums. All the above, directly influence

prices to cover the costs of transporting the goods.

The Gulf of Aden is used to transport the oil from

Arab countries and the already high price of this

valuable in the XXI century raw material may be in-

creased, due to the price of its transport and high in-

surance.

Large tankers passing through the Gulf of Aden,

which are the most common pirates’ goals, might

pose a danger associated with spills of substances in-

to the sea, so sensitive and important ecosystem.

During the attack on the Japanese oil tanker Taka-

yama (was targeted by pirates in April 2008), by 20

graph hole oil was leaking out into the sea. The con-

sequences of this event could be much more serious,

if not fast reaction to the leakage of the substance. It

is necessary to keep in minds that the pirates and

their actions are based on the basis of much better

weapon. The use of firearms, including rocket-

propelled grenades, in the direction of the vessel

could cause a fire, run a vessel on the ground and

even sinking, which in turn can induce ecological

catastrophe destroying marine birds and animals for

many years. The objective of the pirates is forced to

pay the ransom note, if the crew puts the resistance,

going to more radical methods, may lead not only to

the death of innocent people, but also an ecological

disaster.

Piracy has become in recent years a very popular

form of acquiring money and pirates have become

‘heads’ of international terrorism. It should be noted

that currently there are no institutions relating to

such events. Maritime terrorism must be treated se-

riously, and it was indicated by the attack on the

American destroyer USS Cole, and killing 17 Amer-

icans. Creating a hypothetical situation in which ter-

rorists would attack a VLCC tanker on the approach

to the Suez Canal and would cause its sinking, the

consequences of such incident could be multiplied.

Ships waiting to pass the Canal would be queuing or

heading for the Cape of Good Hope giving pirates

even more possibilities of being attacked.

Terrorism at sea takes many forms:

− directed at military and civilian vessels

;

− kidnapping, hostage-taking and boats, which are

tender cards for terrorists;

− characterised by a high level of cruelty directed

against the crew of a ship, and taken vessels be-

come floating weapons.

As 6 October 2002, during the attack on MV Limburg Yem-

en ship attack was terrorism, BBC,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2324431.stm.,

13.10.2003. as 6 October 2002, during the attack on MV

Limburg

A terrorist organization can allocate financial

gains from piracy to sponsorship this type of activity

around the world. It is suspected that Al-Shabaab, a

terrorist group from Somalia gains money in this

way

. The activities of the pirates in Somalia is be-

coming increasingly dangerous, and very often links

with terrorists. The best solution is to prevent the

worst scenarios than attempt to solve the problem af-

ter the escalation.

6 CONCLUSION

The problem with Somali piracy is one of the most

important issue in the XXI century. Maritime

transport has become the back bone of our economy

and we cannot allow anybody or anything to hamper

it or threaten, as we simply cannot afford it. Not tak-

ing any steps to fight or reduce this activity would

mean that we have to pay extra money for longer

routes, ransoms, costly equipment and expensive in-

surance. The world’s economy has already been suf-

fering problems since 2008 crisis, paying further

costs may be very difficult for even well developed

countries. Somalia is a very special country in terms

of its internal condition, and as an international

community we have to help the country to stand up

on its feet or we leave it as it is and would pay even

higher costs. The matter is complex and would take

many different kinds of measures to stabilize the sit-

uation at sea but it seems not possible to tackle pira-

cy without solving the problem inside the country.

There are centres of power onshore in Somalia and

they can be allies in the struggle against piracy; that

is if they have power adjacent to the pirate bases and

some interest in fighting it. Today, these centres of

power are an untapped resource that could be used in

this struggle. They could also be used to monitor pi-

rate groups on shore, to register them, and to prevent

piracy. However, there has to be something in it for

the local partners, either through active fishery pro-

tection or through local purchases

. The question is

if we –as the international community – are ready to

pay the costs of this actions. If not we have to be

prepared to pay for the actions undertaken, but not

necessarily successful. It is up to us.

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