International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 6

Number 1

March 2012

103

1 INTRODUCTION (ASSOCIATED PRESS,

MARCH 2010)

On Thursday the 4

of March 2010, Somali pirates

hit a Spanish fishing boat off the coast of Kenya

with a rocket-propelled grenade as private security

on board returned fire at the would-be seajackers.

The successful defense of the fishing vessel Albacan

illustrated two trends driving up the stakes for sail-

ors and pirates off the Horn of Africa:

Better trained and protected crews are increasing-

ly able to repel attacks, but Pirates eager for multi-

million-dollar ransoms are now resorting to violence

much more often to capture ships.

Two-thirds of attacks by Somali Pirates are being

repelled by crews alone, without the aid of the coali-

tion warships that patrol the Gulf of Aden, according

to an analysis by the London-based International

Maritime Bureau. Most did so without the use of

armed guards, although in 2009 private security con-

tractors helped repel pirates in at least five incidents

off the Somali coast.

As it gets harder for pirates to capture ships, the

Somali gangs are more likely to fire at sailors with

automatic weapons in order to force vessels to stop.

The IMB states that only seven ships were fired up-

on worldwide in 2004 but that 114 ships were fired

upon in 2009 off the Somali coast alone. That is up

from thirty-nine incidents off Somalia and in the

Gulf of Aden in 2008.

Most crews now post extra lookouts, register with

maritime authorities and practice anti-piracy drills.

Increasing speed and maneuvering, so that a ship

produces more wake or heads into rough waves, can

also make it more difficult for pirates.

The International Maritime Bureau does not rec-

ommend using armed guards due to potential legal

issues and fears of starting an arms race with the pi-

rates or increasing the danger to crews. Armed

guards on ships may encourage pirates to use their

weapons more — a prediction that appears to have

become reality.

Some ships have been forced to rely on sailors'

ingenuity. Crews have thrown everything from oil

drums to wooden planks at would-be seajackers

clambering up ladders. In 2009, a crew played the

sound of dogs barking over an amplifier to frighten

off attackers.

Better training and preparation means that alt-

hough 2009 saw 217 Somali pirate attacks — the

highest number on record — most were unsuccess-

ful. Forty-seven ships were taken, about the same as

Somali Piracy: Relation Between Crew

Nationality and a Vessel’s Vulnerability to

Seajacking

A. Coutroubis & G. Kiourktsoglou

University of Greenwich, London, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT: This paper constitutes an effort to substantiate whether there are certain nationalities of crews

which are for ethnic and / or cultural reasons more (or less) vulnerable to fall victims of Pirates off Somalia.

Such groups (if there are any) in effect indirectly ‘support’ Somali piracy and for this reason they are being

re-ferred to throughout the paper as “Passively Supportive Crews”.

The method (and the rational) in use within this paper is straightforward. Over a three and a half year period

(2007 – June/2010) an analysis is being conducted of all the reported (to the I.M.O. and I.M.B.) attacks in the

region off Somalia.

The analysis focuses on the crew composition of the attacked vessels with special interest cast upon those

Ships (meaning the crews) which eventually succumbed to the pirates and were in the end seajacked.

104

in 2008, which saw 111 attacks, according to the In-

ternational Maritime Bureau.

The attacks are becoming more dangerous for

crew members though. In 2009, more than twenty

ships were fired upon with rocket-propelled gre-

nades, including tankers and chemical tankers. In

one incident, two grenades lodged in the door of a

ship's bridge — the area where the captain steers

from. Many other ships were damaged by small-

arms fire, according to reports from IMB.

Four sailors died and ten were injured off Soma-

lia in 2009. Two were killed during rescue attempts

— one by Yemeni forces and one by the French —

and another died in captivity. The fourth was killed

by a bullet during the attack.

In 2009, the average ransom was around $2 mil-

lion, giving the pirates a total haul of around $100

million during that year. According to industry offi-

cials just up to April 2010, two ransoms paid were

around $3 million and $7 million.

As an industry analyst wryly puts it: “There's a

commercial calculation as well as a humanitarian

one….. It's cheaper to pay a bit more a bit more

quickly than a bit less over a longer period of time,

because of associated costs like compensation to the

sailors, lost work time, and possibly a loss in the

value of the cargo.”

As we are still tackling piracy in accordance with

the ‘International Law in Time of Peace’, it is a mat-

ter of cooperation between the various stakeholders.

It is in this goal that Private (Vessel Owners, Ship

Management Companies), National (Flag States,

Port States) and Supranational (UN, IMO, EU etc)

interests and objectives should converge.

Unfortunately many believe that ‘off-the-shelf’

solutions like barbed wire, high pressure water hoses

or even armed guards on board vessels can on their

own effectively counter the piracy scourge. This is a

fallacy and a very costly-one if not fatal. Only coop-

eration among all kinds of relevant authorities /

market players can create the right environment for

Maritime Security to come to fruition.

All in all, as the Athenian philosopher Socrates

put it squarely right some 2,500 years ago: “The

Man is the Ultimate measure of Everything…..”

1.1 Literature review (Gekara 2008)

Although the forces of economic globalization have

greatly diminished national economic barriers in the

past four decades, labour is yet to enjoy the same

global mobility that capital and finance enjoy. In the

main, labour continues to be locally and nationally

organized and the state still wields immense regula-

tory control through immigration restrictions across

borders (Holton, 1998). Other obstacles like cultural,

and language barriers, and variations in the educa-

tion, training and qualification systems of different

countries also restrict the international movement of

labour (Lauder and Brown, 2006).

However, in shipping, the growth of the Global

Labour Market for seafarers has significantly in-

creased the mobility of seafarers in the past few

years (Wu, 2004). Furthermore, the mobile nature of

seafaring employment, combined with the interna-

tional harmonization of training and certification in

the profession and the use of English as the accepted

international language of seafaring, defines seafaring

in distinctive ways.

Ship-owners have, over the years, designed crew-

ing policies which enable them to increase their

competitive advantage in terms of cost effectiveness.

These policies direct their recruitment strategies and

have, over the years, resulted in increasing the prev-

alence of seafarers from low-wage developing coun-

tries.

The worldwide supply of seafarers in 2005 was

estimated to be 466,000 officers and 721,000 ratings

(BIMCO / ISF, 2005). The OECD countries (North

America, Western Europe, Japan etc.) remained an

important source of officers, although Eastern Eu-

rope has become increasingly significant with a

large increase in officer numbers. The Far East and

South East Asia (the “Far East”), and the Indian sub-

continent remain the largest sources of supply of rat-

ings and are rapidly becoming a key source of offic-

ers.

On the other hand, the 2005 estimate of world-

wide demand for seafarers was 476,000 officers and

586,000 ratings.

2 SOMALI PIRACY (INTERNATIONAL

MARITIME BUREAU, 2007-2010 Q2

REPORTS)

2.1 Review of the recent past (January 2010 – June

2010)

Somali pirates attack vessels in and around the fol-

lowing areas:

Coasts along the northern, eastern and southern

Somalia;

− Red and Arabian Seas;

− Western Indian Ocean (more than 1,000 nm away

from the eastern Africa basin);

− Gulf of Aden;

− Seas off the coasts of Kenya, Tanzania. Sey-

chelles, Madagascar and Oman;

− Straits of Bab el Mandeb.

105

Table 1, Vessel Seajacks off Somalia from January 2007 till

June 2010

Source: International Maritime Organisation, I.M.O., Monthly

Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships from

January 2007 till June 2010

From January to June 2010, there have been re-

ports of 100 incidents carried out by suspected So-

mali pirates. The incidents varied in geographical

location encompassing the waters already mentioned

above. A total of 544 crew members have been tak-

en hostage and a further 10 have been injured. There

have been 51 attacks off the East and South coasts of

Somalia, another 33 attacks in the Gulf of Aden, 14

attacks in the Southern Red Sea, 2 reported in the

Arabian Sea. 27 vessels have been reported

seajacked in this period.

As of the 30

of June 2010, suspected Somali pi-

rates held 18 vessels for ransom with 360 crew

members of various nationalities as hostages.

Somali pirates attack all kinds of vessels: General

Cargo, Bulk Carriers, Tankers, Ro-Ro, Liners, Fish-

ing vessels, Sailing Yachts and Tugboats.

The piratical activities peak each year from Sep-

tember until April and then their numbers start to

drop due to the monsoons that prevail in the area. On

a 24 hr per day analysis basis, the most dangerous

periods for piratical attacks are the dusk and the

daybreak.

Over the years the Somali pirates have evolved in

their use of weapons and tactics. Currently they are

using automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenades

(RPGs). They have also advanced from using dilap-

idated fishing boats to launch their attacks into using

large pirated trawlers as mother-ships to support

smaller attack units.

2.2 Cumulative picture (January 2007 – June 2010

For the purpose of the present analysis a compilation

has been created of all the successful vessel seajacks

off Somalia (Table 1).

The compilation includes the vessel’s name, her

type, flag, gross tonnage, the date of the seajack, but

above all the break-down of her crew in terms of na-

tionalities. In total 81 Seajackings have been record-

ed from January 2007 until June 2010 and they fea-

ture a great variety in terms of vessel types,

registries, gross tonnage etc.

Based on the compilation a matrix was produced

on the crew nationalities of the vessels which even-

tually succumbed to the Somali Pirates and they

were taken to captivity (Table 2).

It seems that mainly the citizens of the Philip-

pines (26.58%), India (9.02%), China (6.58%), Tur-

key (5.56%), Russia (5.49%), Ukraine (5.29%) and

Thailand (5.22%) bore the brunt of Somali Piracy.

The incident compilation also enabled the pro-

duction of the phenomenon’s statistical profile in

terms both of the vessel type (Table 3) and registry

(Table 4).

106

Table 2, Break Down of Seajacked Vessels Crew Nationalities

(Vessel Seajacks off Somalia from 2007 till June 2010)

Source: Various Internet based Press Reports

Table 3, Types of Vessels successfully Seajacked off Somalia

from 2007 till June 2010

Source: International Maritime Organisation, I.M.O., Monthly

Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships from

January 2007 till June 2010

Table 4, Flags of Vessels successfully Seajacked off Somalia

from 2007 till June 2010

Source: International Maritime Organisation, I.M.O., Monthly

Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships from

January 2007 till June 2010

In this case, it seems that Somali Pirates have

shown preference both for bulk carriers (23.4% of

all seajacks within the study’s timeframe) and the

registry of Panama (20.2%). Both findings are statis-

tically in line with the industry’s “ground realities”

since bulk carriers represent 35% of the international

high-seas commercial fleet and the Registry of Pan-

ama is by far the largest worldwide, with 14% of the

International Fleet under its flag.

3 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ON CREWS OF

SEAJACKED VESSELS

In 2003 the Seafarers International Research Centre

(S.I.R.C.) of Cardiff University published its most

recent report / survey on “The Global Labour Mar-

ket for Seafarers Working aboard Merchant Cargo

Ships” (The Global Labour Market for Seafarers

Working aboard Merchant Cargo Ships, 2003).

Philippines were found to dominate the global

seafarer labour market with 28% of the sample stud-

ied holding Filipino nationality. Russians, Indians,

Ukrainians, and Chinese nationals all constituted a

similar proportion of the sample (between 6% and

7%) followed by Turkey, Indonesia, Poland, Greece

and Myanmar in descending order (Tables 5A &

5B).

Table 5A, % of Nationals in Crews of Seajacked Vessels

Source: The Global Labour Market for Seafarers Working

Aboard Merchant Cargo Ships (2003) and Various Internet

based Press Reports

Table 5B, % of Nationals in Crews of Seajacked Vessels

Source: The Global Labour Market for Seafarers Working

Aboard Merchant Cargo Ships (2003) and Various Internet

based Press Reports

TYPES OF VESSELS SEAJACKED (2007-June/2010)

BULK CARRIER

GENERAL CARGO

CHEMICAL TANKER

TANKER

FISHING TRAWLER

CONTAINER VESSEL

TUG

YACHT

DHOW

VEHICLE CARRIER

PASSENGER VESSEL

REE FER

RO-RO

FLAGS OF VESSELS SEAJACKED (2007-June/2010)

PAN AMA

MARS HAL L IS LANDS

ANTIGUA & BARBUDA

LIBERIA

MALTA

St. VINCENT & GRENADINES

U.K.

BAH AMAS

FRA NCE

HONG KONG

THAILAND

SINGAPORE

TURKEY

% OF NATIONALS IN CREWS OF SEAJACKED VESSELS

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Phil ippine s

India

China

Turke y

Russi a

Ukrai ne

Thaila nd

Shri L anka

Romania

Bulgaria

U.S.A.

Burma

Indonesia

France

Syria

Egypt

Poland

Georgia

Greece

Kenya

S. Korea

Nigeria

Tuvalu

Yemen

Italia

Pakistan

Vietnam

Iran

Bangladesh

Danemark

Germany

U.K.

Croatia

Ghana

Moza mbique

Singapore

Somalia

Taiwan

Cameroon

Esthonia

Fiji

Hong Kong

Ireland

Japan

Lithua nia

S. Arabi a

Serbi a

Slovakia

INCIDENT LEVELS

2003 INTER N. LEVELS

5 COUNTRIES , 53% OF S EAJACKED P OPULATION

10 COUNTRIES, 75,5 % OF SEAJACKED POPULATION

% OF NATIONALS IN CREWS OF SEAJACKED VESSELS

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Philippines

India

China

Turkey

Russia

Ukraine

Thailand

Shri Lanka

Romania

Bulgaria

U.S.A.

Burma

Indonesia

Fra nce

INCIDENT LEVELS

2003 INTER N. LEVELS

5 COUNTRIES, 53% OF

SE AJACKED

POPULATION

10 COUNTRIES, 75,5 % OF

SE AJACKED POPULATION

COUNTRIES WITH

NAVAL PRESENCE

107

These ten nationalities constitute 70% of the total

sample.

By far the largest group of ratings by nationality

is Filipino. Filipino seafarers constitute more than a

third of all ratings. Their domination of the ratings

labour market is significant and all of the other na-

tionalities, even in the top ten represented amongst

ratings, can be considered to represent minor group-

ings by comparison.

Whilst seafarers from the Philippines dominate

the labour market overall, their domination (com-

pared with other nationalities) is less marked with

regard to senior officer positions. They remain the

largest nationality group (both in absolute and rela-

tive terms) amongst senior officers; however nation-

alities are much more evenly distributed in the sen-

ior officer category than they are in general.

Filipinos constituting roughly 11% of senior officers

are closely followed by Russians who account for

almost 10% of senior officers. Ukrainians, Greeks,

and Indians account for approximately 6-7% of sen-

ior officers each, and Chinese, Polish, South Korean,

German and Turkish officers are all represented at

the level of around 4% (each). There is a greater va-

riety of nationalities represented at senior officer

level than there is across the board.

Amongst junior officers the domination of the la-

bour market by Filipinos appears as a marked fea-

ture. 24% of junior officers were found to be of Fili-

pino nationality and this proportion is considerably

larger than the one featured by the second largest na-

tional group, Russians, who made up approximately

9% of the sample. Indian, Ukrainian, and Chinese

nationals constitute between around 7% and 8% of

the sample (each), with Polish, South Korean, Indo-

nesian, and Romanian seafarers constituting smaller

groups amongst the top ten nationalities of junior of-

ficer. Ceteris paribus, this distribution of junior of-

ficers suggests that in the future Filipinos will con-

stitute a much larger proportion of senior officers

across the global fleet. However, should there be any

barriers to the transition of Filipino seafarers from

junior to senior officer status; these figures could

suggest that there may be problems in later years for

companies wishing to recruit senior officers.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Analysts around the world have focused on the prox-

imate cause(s) of Somali Piracy and many have

come to silently believe (if not publicly suggest) that

at least in some cases the Somali Pirates enjoy help

from the inside. As mentioned in the introductory

paragraph, the purpose of this paper is to investigate

potential links between the crew nationalities of

seajacked vessels and the occurrence of the seajacks

themselves.

Within this study, a comparison was undertaken

between the crew nationalities of seajacked vessels

against the overall composition of crew nationalities

of the global mariner population. Although the latter

profile is fairly outdated (most recently produced in

2003) it can still provide a good insight into the sta-

tus quo in terms of the nationalities of the interna-

tional shipping crews.

The analysis performed bore no proof whatsoever

that there are ‘passively supportive crews’ of Somali

Piracy. The breakdown by nationality of the crews

falling victim of piracy is broadly (and within the

statistical error-area of ±3%) in line with the overall

participation of crew nationalities in international

shipping.

In more detail (Tables 5A & 5B):

− Filipinos represent 27.8% of the international sea-

farer population and 26.6% of the seajacked

crews.

− Correspondingly, Indians represent 6.6% of the

seafarer population and 9% of seajacked crews.

− Last but not least, the Chinese nationals feature

almost an “utter balance” within the two groups

with 6.1% and 6.6% respectively.

This conclusion does not imply that the crew

composition and the training are not factors of value

to be considered when combating piracy. It simply

suggests that the crew nationality does not appear as

an “operational driver” in the case of successful

seajacks.

Amongst secondary observations the following

ones stand out conspicuously:

1 The five nations (Philippines, India, China, Tur-

key and Russia) that provide international ship-

ping with more than half of its seafarers (51.5%)

bear (through their nationals - seafarers) the main

brunt (53.22%) of seajacks off the coast of Soma-

lia.

2 Among 48 countries in the “seajacked” crew

population from 2007 until June 2010, 3 out of 4

seafarers are nationals of 10 countries (Philip-

pines, India, China, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine,

Thailand, Sri-Lanka, Romania and Bulgaria).

3 It seems that the presence of a country’s Navy

(India, China, Turkey and Russia) off Eastern Af-

rica has no impact whatsoever on the number of

its nationals that fall victims of Somali seajacks.

4 A remarkable observation though demands some

extra attention:

5 Although more than one out of four seafarers em-

ployed onboard seajacked vessels is a Filipino,

108

this island country and indeed maritime nation

has no naval presence off Somalia.

The commercial impact of piracy on the shipping

industry has been massive with more than $100 mil-

lion paid as ransom worldwide in 2009 alone. The

insurance premium for passage through the Gulf of

Aden has increased 10-fold and continues to in-

crease further fuelling the ‘kidnap-for-ransom’ ma-

rine insurance industry. Every ship operating firm

can always re-route its voyages via the Cape of

Good Hope, a decision though that eventually entails

higher cost(s) for the cargo movement. This diver-

sion also affects the delivery - times of commodities

worldwide.

The shipping industry (and global trade on the

whole) has been badly affected and international au-

thorities and governments should take a different

and more aggressive approach to end the pirate

menace off Somalia. Given the recent post 9/11 ex-

ample, declaring war against pirates appears the log-

ical step after this long period of international pro-

crastination. It is worth remembering that the

Golden Age of Piracy came to an end shortly after

the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 when, in

effect, the European states declared war on piracy

and sent their fleets after them. The results were re-

markably immediate and the rest became history.

In such a dire situation, it is of no surprise for

plot-scenarios to come to the surface and to suggest

that there may be some “operational drivers” (na-

tionalities of crews among other things) behind the

spike of seajack cases off Somalia.

This paper did not aim to exonerate a certain pro-

fessional group let alone to extol an existing prac-

tice. It just intended to shed a glimmer of light on a

scientifically “uncharted territory” and consequently

investigate a potential nexus between seajacked-

vessel’s crew nationalities and the seajack itself.

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