International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 3

Number 3

September 2009

345

1 INTRODUCTION

Somalia - a country in Eastern Africa has a strategic

location on Horn of Africa, along southern ap-

proaches to Bab-el-Mandeb and shipping route

through Red Sea and Suez Canal. Somalia is bound-

ed to the north by the Gulf of Aden, to the south and

east by Kenya, to the west by Ethiopia, to the north-

west by Djibouti and finally to the east by the Indian

Ocean. The country has 2,340 km land boundaries

(Djibouti 58 km, Ethiopia 1,600 km, Kenya 682 km)

and 3,025 km of coastline.

The total area of Somalia is 637,700 sq km; the

country has a population (2005 estimate) of 8,6 mil-

lion. Population counting in Somalia is complicated

by the large number of nomads and by refugee

movements in response to clan warfare. The main

ethnic groups are: Somali 85%, Bantu and other

non-Somali 15% (including Arabs 30,000). Islam is

the state religion in Somalia, and most of the people

(90%) are Sunni Muslims, a Christians (mostly Ro-

man Catholic) are less than 1% percent of ethnic

Somalis. Mogadishu (the capital of Somalia), Har-

geysa, Kismaayo and Marka are the principal cities

of the country (CIA word factbook).

Uranium and largely unexploited reserves of iron

ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, natural gas

and oil reserves are main natural resources of the

Somalia (CIA word factbook).

It is said that Somalia was an example of fallen

country, because the legal government was not able

to effectively execute the power over the territory of

the country.

2 ROOTS OF THE PIRACY IN SOMALIA

Of course the piracy problem should not be limited

only to waters around Somalia, because it is a

worldwide problem, but now the Somali piracy

problem is the most popular in world media, so the

authors decided to focus the analyze only in the wa-

ters around Somalia. The maritime area around the

Somalia is very important for world economy. Al-

most 11% of the world’s seaborne petroleum passes

through the Gulf of Aden and waters around the

Somalia. It shows the importance of Somali waters

for world economy.

Figure 1. Somalia and the political fragmentation of the coun-

try in the beginning of XXI century.

Source:

http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcsomalia.htm,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/

somalia.htm

The Somali Piracy New or Old Challenge for

International Community

D. Duda & T. Szubrycht

Polish Naval Academy, Gdynia, Poland

ABSTRACT: Nowadays it is obvious that maritime transport is the core element of word economy so each

disturbance in the world shipping can create more or less serious problems for world economy, especially

now when the world crises appeared. The piracy activities showed that shipping safety in the Gulf of Aden

and waters around the Somalia should be considered as an international problem. The Somali piracy has com-

plex reasons, so it is not easy to provide safety of shipping in this region without wide spectrum of action and

international cooperation. The paper presents analyze of piracy root in Somalia, the development of piracy ac-

tivities and steps of international community which should be taken to provide safety and secure shipping in

this region.

346

The country has been without a strong central

government since 1991, when the Mohammad Siad

Barre was ousted after 22 years in power. Since that

time the political situation in the country is similar to

puzzle. The state collapsed into chaos and criminali-

ty, Somalia had been a field of fight for power be-

tween numerous clans, subclans and religious frac-

tions. The country has been suffering from war,

instability and natural and humanitarian disasters.

We should not see piracy off the coast of Somalia

only as a result of the continuing political instability

and lawlessness in this country.

It must be said, that the Somali piracy was also

closely connected with economical situation of So-

mali people and problems with over fishing and tox-

ic waste disposal around Somalia.

There are the highest concentrations of fish in the

waters around coast of Somalia. Somali fishermen

used to catch a wide variety of seafood (tuna, sar-

dines, dorado, perch, shark and lobster). At the turn

of the millennium, Somalia was home for about

30,000 professional and 60,000 occasional fisher-

men. Fishes were traditionally export products of

Somalia. Now (because of instability and permanent

war in Somalia) about 700 ships from other coun-

tries, are casting local fishermen nets along Soma-

lia’s coastline, and they show a little consideration

for the fish stocks, local fishermen or over fishing.

None of the foreign trawlers has a license for fishing

around Somalia. Today trawlers from faraway places

continue to ply the waters off the long coastline.

There are ships from Japan, India, Italy and Spain

and others countries (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ afri-

This fishing activity is named by Jeylani Shaykh

Abdi, a Somali fisherman, as an economic terrorism.

He said „They are not just robbing us of our fish.

They are ramming our boats and taking our nets -

including the catch”. According the Somali people,

the intruders, used nets with very small mesh sizes

and fished with banned dragnets, and with dynamite

in some cases. The Somali fishermen outcry to the

United Nations and the international community was

loud and clear - but without any results. The Spanish

fishing cutter that pirates hijacked in May 2008 and

the Thai trawler which was sunk by Indian warship

in early November provided evidence of how attrac-

tive the Somali fishing area is worldwide.

Somali fishermen have also problem with toxic

waste. The huge amount of toxic waste was dumped

at sea after the collapse of the regime of former

President Siad Barre in 1991. Because the country

has no coast guard, the Somali coastline has no pro-

tection against European ships dumping dangerous

waste at sea. Proper waste disposal in Europe costs

about 400 times more than illegal waste dumping in

Somalia. That toxic waste has been dumped in So-

malia for a long time, and the international commu-

nity is looking on and „doing nothing about it”. So

the international community gives the pirates „a

convenient excuse to legitimize their actions”.

The Somali pirates have repeatedly argued that

they were forced into piracy by the demise of fishing

and the practice of dumping toxic waste at sea. But it

is not the main reason, only a small fraction of tradi-

tional fishermen have switched to piracy.

Nevertheless, toxic waste and illegal foreign fish-

ing are convenient arguments for the pirates. Januna

Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirate group said that

“We are still waiting for its ransom for the MV

Faina (pictures 2), a Ukrainian vessel carrying

tanks, weapon and military equipment. All we do is

ask ransoms for the ships we hijacked because we

believe a ransom represents a legal tax that a gov-

ernment may have taken. We are defending our wa-

ters from foreigners dumping toxic waste and plun-

dering our sea resources. I hope the world can

understand that this is the responsibility of Somalis

and we shall one day be rewarded for our efforts.

The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we be-

lieve this money is nothing compared to the devasta-

tion that we have seen on the seas” (Somali pirates:

Sea bandits or coastguards).

The Somali piracy activity is similar to ava-

lanche. Back in 2005, there were almost 100 gun-

men. Now (in 2008) there are between 1,100 and

1,200 pirates (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa).

Figure 2. Somali pirates in small boats hijacked the arms-laden

Ukrainian freighter Faina

Source: United States Navy, via Agency France-Press - Getty

Images

Without naval or coastguard forces patrolling its

EEZ, local fishermen turned to piracy to stop illegal

fishing and toxic dumping in Somali waters.

But there is another point - pirate life is attractive

for many young men in this one of the poorest coun-

tries on the planet. The profits from piracy are im-

mense. The men carrying out the hijackings keep

about 30 percent of the ransom money (20 percent

goes to the bosses, 30 percent is paid in bribes to

government officials and 20 percent is set aside for

future actions). “He used to be a poor fisherman a

year ago but now he is rich. He bought three beauti-

347

ful houses in the same neighborhood. He had a wife

but married a second one recently. There were may-

be 150 cars in the wedding convoy. He is pirate

now (http://news.bbc.co.uk).

“If you ask around, everybody will tell you pi-

rates are bad. But that’s just in the conversation,”

said Haji Abdi Warsame, an elder from the coastal

town of Eyl, a major piracy hub on Somalia’s Indian

Ocean coast (Somali pirates: Sea bandits or coast-

guards).

Corruption is also important factor of piracy. His-

torical analyze of piracy shows that corruption was

the key element (both in ancient time and modern

history). “Presumably, all key political figures in

Somalia are profiting from piracy” said Roger Mid-

dleton, an analyst with the Royal Institute of Interna-

tional Affairs in London. “This is just like any busi-

ness for us. We care about it just like anyone would

care about their job. I have been on the ocean for a

long time, not to fish but to hunt down ships in our

territorial waters, which nobody will guard if I don’t

do it,” he explained (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa

)

All those reason shows how complex is the problem

of piracy in this part of the world.

So if we (international community) want to stop

piracy, we should not only fight with pirates. We

need to stop all illegal activities as well.

3 SPREADING THE AREA OF PIRACY

ACTIVITIES

Few years ago the main targets for piracy were both

fishing boat which according the local Somali popu-

lation provides illegal fishing in the Somali Econom-

ic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and vessels, which were

suspected of illegal toxic waste disposal. At that

time the pirates attacked vessels no farther than 50

miles way of the coast.

The first reaction of ship owners for piracy at-

tacks was to increase the distance of shipping line

from the coast. But the pirates changed their tactics;

they started to use the mother ship. They attacked

vessels farther and farther from the coast. While

previous attacks took place within 200 nautical miles

away from land, now even the ships sailing 400, 500

or event 600 miles away from the coast of Somalia

are not safe. Also the size of the vessel doesn’t mat-

ter. The Sirius Star supertanker (332 meters), owned

by Saudi oil company Aramco, was hijacked rough-

ly 450 miles southeast of Mogadishu (pictures 3).

There is an interesting question why the hijacking

act of the Sirius Star had so great impact on the

world mass media. Why was this accident so fa-

mous?

Last year took place many other important but

less spectacular piracy actions, for example in Sep-

tember, Somali pirates captured in the Gulf of Aden

a MV Faina Ukrainian vessel with 33 tanks (T-72)

and other military equipment. According to the latest

International Maritime Bureau (end of the Novem-

ber 2008) data in the 2008 more than 110 vessels

have been attacked around Somalia. The pirates cap-

tured 42 ships, 286 crew members remain as hostag-

es following attacks in the Gulf of Aden and waters

around the Somali coast. Negotiations to free 14

ships are on-going. The piracy accidents in Gulf of

Aden and waters around Somalia are presented in

the table 1. It is easy to notice that in other region

the piracy threat is bigger than in the waters around

Somalia.

Table 1. Piracy and armed robbery against ships.

___________________________________________________

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

___________________________________________________

Gulf of Aden 18 8 10 10 13

and Red Sea

Waters around 3 2 35 10 31

Somalia

Nigeria 39 28 16 12 42

Indonesia 121 94 79 50 43

Total in the world 445 329 276 239 263

___________________________________________________

Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau piracy and armed

robbery against ships annual report 2007

Figure 3. Tanker Sirius Star and satellite imagery of the tanker

anchored near Gaan on the Somali coast

Source: http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/showflat.php/Cat/0/

Number /1242871/an/0/page/0

There is a simple answer for this question. The

1,800 feet long Sirius Star tanker, can carry about 2

million barrels of oil and is one of the largest ships

in the world. The ship’s cargo is worth about 100

million USD. The pirates showed that now global

sea-borne trade of strategic resources could be

threatened. This is the main reason why Somali pi-

rates and their actions are present in headlines of in-

ternational media. The case of Sirius Star showed

that “these new piracy events are a signal about the

security situation here - if the piracy can go 400

miles out to sea, they can go 600 miles, and they can

go anywhere. To find a solution to the escalating se-

curity situation, first of all we need to established

cooperation between all contributing navies more ef-

348

ficient. […] we also need to make sure that all na-

vies can act with similar rules of engagement” (Zoro

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 November 2008).

4 INTERNATIONAL ACTION TAKEN TO

DECREASE THE SOMALI PIRACY THREAT

The problem of Somali piracy is complex and there

are different proposals how to increase the shipping

security in the Gulf of Aden and water around So-

mali coast. The international community tries to take

wide spectrum of actions against piracy in this area.

Some of the actions are obvious some are rather con-

troversial. Nowadays we can say that international

maritime community took such actions for shipping

protection as:

− multinational (CTF 150), NATO (Standing

NATO Maritime Group 2) and EU NAVFOR

(Operation ATLANTA) naval task forces;

− protection of vessels by private military contrac-

tors and armed guard on merchant vessels;

− non-lethal self-protection methods;

− reflag of the vessels;

− change the shipping lines.

Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) has been

established in 2003 to monitor, inspect, board, and

stop suspect shipping in the Gulf of Oman, Gulf of

Aden, Arabian and Red Sea and finally Indian

Ocean (picture 4).

Figure 4. The area of responsibilities of CTF – 150

The CTF 150 area of responsibility is 6,2 million

sq km and includes the crossing of main world oil

and gas shipping lines. There are three choke points

of world oil and gas transport: Sues Channel, Bad-

el-Mandab and Hormuz. The eastern and northeast-

ern Somali coast are high – risk areas for piracy at-

tacks and hijackings for ransom. According western

analyses it is also area of drug smuggling and im-

portant area of counterterrorism mission. Commo-

dore Bob Davidson (Canadian Navy) Commander of

CTF 150 identified the three highest priorities for

CTF 150:

− maritime security operation, which he calls “the

classic counterterrorism mission”;

− counter-piracy operation;

− counter drug missions (drug money is going

back to either the Taliban or Al-Qaeda).

He added that “there are no restrictions to taking

action once pirates get on board and there is a hos-

tage situation. Another challenge is if the vessel that

has been taken has gone into Somali waters. Under

the law of the sea prior to the UN resolution, act of

piracy inside territorial waters is not a piracy act but

armed robbery and therefore it is a local law-

enforcement issue” (Newell

Jane’s Defence Weekly,

17 September 2008).

The task forces usually consist of several ships

(destroyers, frigates and auxiliary ships, helicopters

and maritime patrol aircrafts) from such NATO

countries as: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ita-

ly, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United

Kingdom and the United States. Ships from such

non NATO countries as: Pakistan, Australia, New

Zealand, Sweden, India, Malaysia, Russia and China

also participate in counter-piracy operation. The

command of the task force rotates between the dif-

ferent participating navies, and usually last between

four to six months. It is easy to notice that for each

participant countries the area of CTF – 150 respon-

sibilities is vital for economical prosperity. Commo-

dore Davidson said that “We want to show Canadian

interest in the region not just in Afghanistan but in

the maritime world as well” (Newell

Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 17 September 2008).

The head of China’s National Defence University

major-general Jin Yinan said “I believed the Chinese

navy should send naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden

to carry out counter-piracy duties. With China as a

major world economy, it’s very difficult to say that

security problems across the world have nothing to

do with us. If we don’t take effective action, how

will they see us abroad, and how will Chinese peo-

ple view their government?” (Frank, Lloyd’s List, 5

December 2008).

Also the Council of the European Union (EU)

announced on 10 November its intention to proceed

with the first deployment EU naval task force for

counter-piracy operations off Somalia. The mission

is also opened to non-EU participation. Up to six

vessels including three frigates and supply ship plus

three or more maritime surveillance aircrafts are ex-

pected to join EU NAVFOR Somalia for Operation

Atlanta in December 2008. This year-long mission

will provide escort protection for civilian vessels de-

livering food to displaced people in the war-torn

country as a part of the UN World Food Program.

One month after the Council of the European Un-

ion decision the German government decided to con-

tribute in the counter-piracy mission Atlanta with

349

1400 soldiers and frigates. The navy would also be

allowed to arrests pirates and bring them to trail in

Germany, said home secretary Wolfgang Schäuble.

(Fish, Jane’s Navy International, December 2008).

The EU NAVFOR counter-piracy task force will

in some circumstances provide free armed guards to

protect vulnerable merchant vessels in the Gulf of

Aden, as a part of its response to the explosion in pi-

racy close to Somalia. But there is important ques-

tion what does vulnerable merchant vessels mean?

NAVFOR officials stressed that World Food Pro-

gram (WFP) ships would have first call on military

resources. The Royal Netherlands Navy had de-

ployed in the end of November frigate HrMs De

Ruyter, which escorted two WFP vessels on its mis-

sions from Kenyan port of Mombasa.

Also NATO joined to counter-piracy operation in

the area around Somalia. Three warships from

Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 have begun es-

corting WFP vessels carrying aid to Somalia. The

NATO group consist of the Hellenic Navy’s frigate

HS Themistocles, the Italian destroyer ITS Luigi Du-

rand De La Penne, and RN’s frigate HMS Cumber-

land.

The NATO ships since early November have

been operated under newly adopted joint rules of

engagement (ROE). The new NATO ROE and oper-

ating plan are addressing to counter-piracy efforts

and escort responsibilities for ship carrying humani-

tarian assistance organized by WFP to the more than

three million Somalis. The new ROE is sensitive to

their national commands, which allow navies to

board vessels suspected of illegal acts and confiscat-

ed illegal weapons. According to NATO spokes-

woman Carmen Romero, it means the ability to ar-

rest, detain people suspected of being pirates (Zoro,

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 November 2008). There

are many examples that use of force may create seri-

ous political problems.

Below there are examples of different military ac-

tion, which were taken by ships in last two months

of 2008.

The Indian Navy ship INS Tabor sank a pirate

“mother ship” on November 18, after coming under

heavy fire from pirates. But two speed boats laden

with suspected pirates escaped. The “mother ship”

was a former Thai trawler, boarded by pirates. The

Thai crew members were killed during the fight be-

tween pirates and Indian ship. This accident has

caused embarrassment to the Indian Navy, and may

have serious impact on future naval responses to

Somali piracy.

On 25 December the German frigate Karlsruhe

received distressed signal from crew of Egyptian

vessel Wadi al-Arab. The vessel was under piracy

attack 50 miles off Yemeni coast. The German ship

sent the helicopter to support the crew of Wadi al-

Arab. The pirates escaped when they saw the heli-

copter. After few hours the Karlsruhe stopped the

piracy motor boat and captured six pirates. But the

German government ordered to free pirates who

were captured by German sailors. The spokesman of

EU NAVFOR captain Achim Winkler said that ”the

pirates could by arrest and sent to Germany only if

they attack German vessel or the German citizen

would be injured during the piracy attack”(Kuźmicz,

Gazeta Wyborcza 18 grudnia 2008).

On 2 December Danish ship Absalon rescued a

group of suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden after

receiving a distress signal from their vessels, which

had technical problem in heavy seas. According the

international law Absalon had to help the vessel. The

Danish sailors discovered a number of weapons

onboard the vessel, similar to those which are often

used in pirate attacks on merchant ships. Due to

weather, it was impossible to take the ship in tow

and vessel was sunken in the interest of shipping

safety. The pirates were later handed to authorities in

Yemen.

The military actions, which were taken by ships

from different countries, show the different aspects

of military action in the maritime area around Soma-

lia.

Commodore Bob Davidson said that “It is a mis-

sion that is part operational, part diplomacy, but it

really is about building co-operation in the region”

(Newell, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 September

2008).

The government of the autonomous Puntland re-

gion on the west bank of the Gulf of Aden has also

moved to respond to the piracy activity. Puntland

troops boarded and recapture an Indian cargo vessel

on 21 October 2008.

5 USING ARMED GUARD ON MERCHANT

VESSELS AND ENGAGING PRIVATE

SECURITY COMPANIES

There is another solution for increasing the shipping

security - using armed guard on merchant vessels

and engaging private security companies. A small

but growing number of ship-owners are exploring

the use of armed personnel to guard ships sailing

through the waters of the Gulf of Aden. Private se-

curity contractors said that they were getting more

queries from companies interested in their services,

including the use of weapon. While the most mari-

time executives flatly refuse to even consider the

presence of armed guards on their vessels, others

seem to be seduced by the idea. ”Some owners have

a fascination with the concept of armed guards sail-

ing on ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, but many

350

ship-owners abhor the idea and, generally there is far

more talk than action” (http://www.abc.). Using

armed guard and engaging private security compa-

nies on merchant vessels raise many numbers of is-

sues, from legal points to morality matter.

There is an opinion that we (international commu-

nity) can not blame the ship owners for taking secu-

rity measure into their own hands, but this is not the

best answer for piracy threat. We will never have

enough warships to protect the whole area – so we

need to find a long-term solution that involves more

efficient co-operation, designated escort lanes and

getting to the mother ship if possible” (Zoro, Jane’s

Defence Weekly, 3 December 2008). There are

around 20 ships in the water around Somalia, so

each ship should take responsibilities for almost 300

thousands sq km. Company spokeswomen Anne

Tyrrell said “We absolutely think it would be a good

idea to employ such companies [private security

companies]. US - based Blackwater Worldwide has

already offered its service in the form of its own

vessel. There have been initial conversations with 15

shipping companies but there have been no contracts

signed” (Zoro, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 Novem-

ber 2008).

To support the idea presented by Anne Tyrrell we

can give many examples. One vessel was boarded

while it was sailing in a French Navy convoy with

three British unarmed security guards onboard, who

were forced to jump overboard when they came un-

der heavy fire. Andy MacDonagh, a director of pri-

vate military contractor Raven Special Project said

that for most people, contemplating the use of fore-

arms was distasteful. But he said that non-lethal al-

ternatives were not working. How do pirates in a

small boat can stop a 30 000 tone ship? It is fore-

arms, that all it is. But as soon as you fire back, they

are going to turn round and go the other way be-

cause they are so vulnerable (Zoro, Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 26 November 2008).

But on the other hand there are quite different

opinions in this matter. There is opinion that “The

risk of engaging private security companies may in-

crease the probability of potential casualties aboard”

(Reyes, Lloyd’s List, 4 December 2008). Hiring

armed guards is a controversial step that goes

against the advice of international shipping bodies,

including the Round Table of industry associations

and the International Maritime Bureau. Both organi-

zations strongly oppose this option. There is a fear

being expressed that it may not to be possible to

control the actions of the armed contractors. We

should stress that seafarers are not trained profes-

sionals in the use of weaponry. There are not regula-

tions which ban weaponry on board of the vessels.

Many countries have no express prohibition against

arming the crew members. Although we should say

that some country recommendation are for some are

against. For example:

Registrar general of Jamaica Ship Registry Eric

Deans said that “We do not have any explicit rules

regarding the arming of ships. We leave the security

of a vessel to the discretion of its owner”.

Liberia - our policy is to discourage arming mer-

chant ships, but Liberian law does not prohibit it and

we will not do more than try to discourage it.

“The use of armed guards was not officially en-

couraged, it was not prohibited either” said spokes-

men UK Ship Register.

Isle of Man “Manx flag neither encourages nor

prohibit weapon”.

Barbados Maritime Ship Registry principal regis-

trar said “We have not got a position formulated, be-

cause it has not come up with any of our ships. It is a

bit difficult; we would have to sit back and think it

through” (Osler, Lloyd’s List, 12 December 2008).

Head of security at the Chamber of Shipping Pe-

ter Hinchliffe said that France has informally offered

armed guards for several months, as part of its loose

escorting arrangements for group of ships (Reyes,

Lloyd’s List, 4 December 2008).

Blackwater private military contractors are ready

to provide armed protection to vessels sailing close

to coast of Somalia. British Concern Maritime and

Underwater Security Consultants is understood to

offer armed personnel, while stressing that such a

policy should only be adopted in very specific cir-

cumstances, where vessels are judged particularly

vulnerable, or the cargo carried is of high value.

But there is also another aspect of the problem.

Putting EU military guard (or guard from private se-

curity companies) on vulnerable vessels in the coun-

ter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden may raise

serious problems from an insurance viewpoint

. War

risk insurers cover crew members killed or injured in

pirate incidents but armed guards are not considered

as a crew. The armed guards onboard may increase

the insurer’s fee for vessels sailing in this region.

6 CHANGE THE SHIPPING LINES OF THE

VESSELS

More and more ship-owners consider the change of

shipping lines to avoid this dangerous region. For

example German cruise operator Hapag-Lloyd

Kreuzfahrten will no longer operate vessels carrying

passengers through the Gulf of Aden. Hapag-Lloyd

Ship owners have to pay 10 times more insurance premiums

for coverage of passage through the Straits of Aden.

351

Columbus had to passes through the Gulf of Aden

on its round-the-world voyage. But all 246 passen-

gers and most of the crew flew from Yemen to Du-

bai and stayed three days in five-star hotel in Dubai,

while the Columbus passed through the piracy – rid-

den region with skeleton crew onboard. The ship

kept a distance of 400 miles away from the Somali

coast, as was advised by local authorities.

A large scale rerouting of vessels to avoid the

threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden besides the raise

of cost could also lead to problems with fuel supply.

The vessels sailing around the Cape of Good Hope

can bunker the fuel in two places: South Africa or

the Canary Islands. However, there is a difficulty to

supply the vessels in South Africa, particularly after

the fire that closed Durban’s Engen Refinery in No-

vember. The refinery could be out for three months.

Durban’s Engen Refinery is one of the main suppli-

ers of marine fuel in South Africa and other suppli-

ers are also facing potential supply shortage. The

bunker installation in Canary Islands is not devel-

oped for fuel supply for increasing vessels traffic.

This limitation and economical aspect (raise of the

cost) can the main obstacle for rerouting of vessels

to avoid the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

7 NON-LETHAL SELF-PROTECTION

METHODS

There are many different types of non-lethal weapon

which can be installed on board of vessels. Accord-

ing the Chamber of Shipping operators should con-

tinue to explore non-lethal self-protection methods.

First of all there is no legal restriction for using such

weapons on the board of shipping vessels. There are

several different types of such weapon, for example:

long-range acoustic devices (LRAD), Active Denial

System (ADS), Non-Lethal Slippery Foam and Daz-

zle Gun.

In early November 2005 about 160 km off the

coast of Somalia pirates with RPGs and firearms at-

tacked luxury cruise ship Seabourn Spirit but they

not succeed. The crew used the LRAD to protect the

vessel. The effectiveness of LRAD during the attack

on was not completely clear, but the pirates did not

succeed in boarding the vessel.

But there are also examples when the LRAD was

non effective during the piracy attack. On 28 No-

vember the long-range acoustic devices LRAD

which is the most popular and widely used as non-

lethal weapon was ineffective during the piracy at-

tack on the chemitanker Biscaglia. According the

American Technology Corp (ATC) the main reason

of the ineffectiveness was the number of LRAD’s

and its locations on the ship. Mr. Stuckey vice-

president of ATC said “You cannot just strap an

LRAD to the stern of a ship and expecting it to work

throughout the vessel. What if I strapped a 50 caliber

machine gun to the stern of the ship? How effective

is that going to be at the bow? You have got super-

structure in the way, and it is a significant distance

forward. There is a lot blocking your path. But is it

fair to say a machine gun is an ineffective weapon,

or is it being ineffectively employed. One LRAD

device on the chemitanker Biscaglia was placed in

the stern. According the ATC because of his size the

ship should have two LRAD (one on each board)

and it should be place at the midships – not stern.

Most attacks do not see pirates approach from the

stern, but midships, where the bow waves are not

such an issue” (Osler, Lloyd’s List, 9 December

2008).

8 REFLAG OF THE VESSELS

Some ship-owners consider a possible switch away

from flag of convenience towards national registries

with credible naval assets. For example if a British

flagged vessel is under attack, any British naval ves-

sel in the area would have to respond. But it is also

not a perfect solution, because military action

against pirates on board of the vessel can be danger-

ous for crew. The naval specialists pointed out that

such action from legal point of view can be compli-

cated. It can be a serious dilemma for commanding

officer to take or not military action. The nationality

of the owner (vessels or cargo) and nationality of the

crew members will be also a very important issue.

Analyze of military action of naval ship shows that

first of all naval ship provides protection for their

national flag vessels. The security of the crew will

be also a very important factor of the military activi-

ties.

9 CONCLUSION

There are many regions when the piracy activities

have impact on world shipping. The modern piracy

analyzes show that roots and piracy actions as well

as counter-piracy operations all over the world in

many aspects are similar but not the same. Of course

there are general conclusions for piracy problems all

over the world:

− roots of piracy;

− social, political and economical aspects of piracy;

− impact (especially economical) on world or re-

gional shipping;

− types of counter-piracy activities;

− tactics of piracy attacks.

352

But because of political, military, social, econom-

ical, geographical factors the problem of Somali pi-

racy has an individual and complex character.

According the authors it is not possible to solve

the Somali piracy problem only by military means.

The core element in counter-piracy operation in this

region is political stabilization in Somalia. The in-

ternational community and Somali government

should take at the same time political, economical

and military actions against piracy. The action

against piracy should include such elements as:

− the political stability must be established in So-

malia;

− the Somali government must received the military

support from international community, but mili-

tary cooperation should respect the sovereignty of

Somalia;

− the international law of the sea should be obeyed

by other countries;

− the country should received effective economical

support for rebuilding the state economy;

− a comprehensive operation to eliminate armed

robbery and other criminal acts against ships at

sea should include the relevant operations on

land;

− it should be a close cooperation between nation

participating in counter-piracy operation;

− the ship owners should take the whole spectrum

of activities which can increase the safety of the

vessels.

It should be emphasized that the main goal of

Somali pirates is ransom, so the risk for crew is ra-

ther limited. So far only very few sailors were killed

or injured by pirates in the water around Somalia.

Compare to the other region of the world it is a main

difference between Somali pirates and pirates in the

rest of the world.

There is another point, which can be a key ele-

ment of Somali piracy problem. Sheikh Hassan Da-

hir Aweys (Somali Islamist leader of Alliance for

the Re-Liberation of Somalia) told that “We are call-

ing for the immediate release of all international

vessels under the command of Somali pirates, who

are undermining international peace and trade”. He

pointed out that piracy was almost eliminated during

the six months in 2006 when the Union of Islamic

Court, ruled most of southern and central Somalia.

“We are the only force that could eliminate piracy in

the Somalia waters, but the world rejected to give us

the opportunity to rule Somalia, despite the will of

the vast majority of the people of Somalia. If we are

given the opportunity to fight piracy and general

lawlessness we can do that comfortably. Piracy is

part of lawlessness, and during our months of Islam-

ic leadership, pirates were underground (Blackwater

in London, Lloyd’s List, 3 December 2008)”.

Africa Expert at Exclusive Analysis told that “We

expect the Islamist groups to increase their internal

competition for power, leading to intensified

fighting around the capital Mogadishu however pi-

racy attacks launched off the southeastern coast

would probably be significantly reduced” (Frank

Lloyd’s List, 4 December 2008).

But on the other hands it can be even worst solu-

tion if we consider the global war with terrorism.

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