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1 INTRODUCTION
Maritime governance is becoming increasingly
complex. European coastal states must manage several
interrelated policy areas, including shipping,
environmental protection, maritime safety, fisheries,
and the development of the blue economy. These
responsibilities are distributed across different
institutions and regulatory frameworks, creating
governance systems that operate across local, national,
regional and international levels that may overlap or
conflict [3]. Such multi-level governance appears to be
a defining feature of the European seas examined in
this article, where decision-making involves
interactions between states, regional organisations,
and international bodies [8, 14]. While such
arrangements reflect the diversity of maritime
activities, they require effective coordination to
function as a coherent system. This remains a persistent
challenge. This complexity is particularly evident in
the Baltic Sea region, where environmental
governance, economic activities, and international
regulatory obligations intersect, resulting in
fragmented institutional arrangements and persistent
coordination challenges [16, 17].
Previous research has focused on how maritime
governance should be organised to address these
Fragmentation, Capacity, and Coherence: Rethinking
Maritime Governance in Small Coastal States
A. Kaldma & L. Timberg
Estonian Maritime Academy of Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia
ABSTRACT: Maritime governance in European seas is characterised by increasing regulatory complexity and
institutional fragmentation. While previous research has highlighted the challenges of coordination, the impact
of fragmentation on the inspection, surveillance and enforcement systems through which maritime governance
is implemented, has received less attention. This article examines how institutional fragmentation affects
maritime governance capacity through the organisation of inspection and surveillance systems in Estonia. Using
a qualitative case study of Estonia, it combines qualitative document analysis with structured institutional
mapping. The analysis applies a coding framework based on coverage, overlap, gap, and update lag. The analysis
shows that Estonia's maritime governance system is characterised by fragmented institutional responsibilities,
overlapping inspection functions and an update lag in which new regulatory requirements are not systematically
reflected in institutional mandates. Although most regulatory obligations are formally assigned, fragmented
responsibilities lead to overlaps, coordination gaps, and inconsistencies in inspection and surveillance systems.
The article contributes to maritime governance research by demonstrating how institutional fragmentation affects
operational governance capacity, and by identifying the lack of systematic updating of mandates as a structural
source of governance fragmentation. The findings suggest that improving maritime governance requires formal
mechanisms for coordinating institutional responsibilities and systematically updating mandates in response to
evolving regulatory requirements.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 20
Number 3
September 2026
DOI: 10.12716/1001.20.03.20
738
coordination challenges. Approaches such as
ecosystem-based management and blue economy
governance emphasise cross-sectoral integration and
alignment between stakeholders and policy objectives
[4, 15]. At the same time, studies highlight the need to
balance the competing goals of sustainability,
economic development, and security [1, 5, 9]. These
approaches provide normative models for integrated
governance but largely assume that institutional
structures can coordinate responsibilities and
implement policies effectively.
In practice, maritime governance systems often fall
short of these expectations. Rather than operating as
integrated systems, responsibilities are spread across
separate institutions and legal frameworks, leading to
fragmented governance arrangements. Research has
shown that overlapping mandates, unclear
responsibilities, and weak coordination mechanisms
create challenges for policy coherence and
implementation [3, 17]. Policy capacity studies also
show that fragmentation limits the ability of
institutions to coordinate actions and respond to
regulatory demands [11, 18]. Studies on barriers to
sustainable blue economy development identify weak
coordination, institutional inefficiencies, and capacity
constraints as key challenges [7], while research on
knowledge integration emphasises the difficulties of
aligning diverse actors and information systems in
fragmented governance contexts [12]. In addition,
recent work highlights a gap between regulatory
design and implementation, particularly in the context
of enforcement and operational coordination [10].
Despite these findings, the existing literature has
paid limited attention to how institutional
fragmentation affects the operational dimension of
maritime governance. Maritime governance is
implemented through systems of inspection,
monitoring, and surveillance, that translate regulatory
requirements into practice. These functions are
typically spread across several public authorities, but
their organisation and coordination remain under-
researched. As a result, it is unclear how fragmented
governance systems affect enforcement outcomes.
This gap is particularly relevant in small coastal
states, where administrative capacity is limited and
coordination challenges may have greater impact.
Evidence from Estonia suggests that maritime
governance responsibilities are dispersed among
several institutions under sector-specific legislation
including the Transport Administration Statute, the
Environmental Board Statute, the Maritime Safety Act,
the Police and Border Guard Act, the Ports Act, the
Water Act and related legislation. Existing
coordination mechanisms are insufficient to ensure
coherent implementation [6], and the impact of such
fragmentation on inspection and surveillance systems
has not been systematically analysed.
This article addresses this gap by examining how
institutional fragmentation affects maritime
governance capacity through the organisation of
inspection and surveillance systems. It focuses on
Estonia as a case study, while contributing to broader
understanding of governance challenges across
European seas.
This article contributes to maritime governance
research by demonstrating how institutional
fragmentation shapes the operational capacity of
inspection and surveillance systems and by linking
governance structures to enforcement outcomes in the
context of a small coastal state.
The significance of this study lies in linking
institutional structures to operational governance
outcomes. Based on this analysis, the article makes two
main claims. First, institutional fragmentation weakens
governance capacity by creating inconsistencies in
inspection and surveillance responsibilities. Second,
improving governance requires a systematic
mechanism for allocating and updating institutional
responsibilities in response to regulatory changes. This
means moving from static governance structures to a
more adaptive and integrated system.
The following sections describe the methodological
approach used to map institutional responsibilities and
regulatory obligations, followed by analysis of how
inspection, surveillance, and reporting functions are
distributed across Estonian governance institutions.
The article then examines the resulting fragmentation
patterns and their implications for governance
capacity, coordination, and implementation of
maritime regulatory requirements.
2 METHODS
This study applies a qualitative case study design [19]
to analyse how institutional fragmentation affects
maritime governance capacity in Estonia. The
approach is appropriate because maritime governance
responsibilities are defined in legal and administrative
documents, allowing for the tracing of institutional
mandates and their alignment with regulatory
requirements.
Data collection is based on three sources. First,
national legislation was analysed to identify the
responsibilities assigned to public authorities in
maritime governance. These include sectoral laws
covering transport, environmental protection,
fisheries, border control, marine safety, cultural
heritance, and port governance. Second, European
Union legislation and international maritime
conventions were reviewed to identify regulatory
requirements related to inspection, monitoring, and
enforcement. Third, institutional mapping data was
compiled to link regulatory requirements with
assigned responsibilities across authorities. Data
sources are described in Table 1. The complete corpus
of legal and policy sources used for institutional
mapping is listed under Legal and Policy Sources.
Table 1. Data sources analysed to identify institutional
responsibilities and legal obligations in the Estonia's
maritime governance system
Source
Number
analysed
Analytical purpose
Estonian legislation
26
Institutional mandates
Institutional statutes
11
Authority responsibilities
EU legislation
8
Legal obligations
International
conventions
14
Inspection and reporting
requirements
TOTAL documentary
sources
59
Estonia was selected as a representative small
coastal state with extensive maritime responsibilities
739
but limited administrative capacity. Maritime
governance functions are spread across several
ministries and agencies, making Estonia a suitable case
for examining how institutional fragmentation affects
governance capacity. The sample includes all Estonian
public authorities with formally defined maritime-
related responsibilities. Institutions were identified
through statutory mandates, ensuring coverage of all
major governance areas, including maritime transport,
environmental protection, fisheries, border
management, ports, cultural heritage protection, and
maritime safety.
Data analysis was conducted using qualitative
document analysis [2] and a structured coding
procedure. The analysis consisted of four steps. First,
regulatory requirements related to inspection,
monitoring, surveillance, reporting, and enforcement
were identified from EU legislation and international
conventions. Second, statutory responsibilities were
extracted from Estonian legal acts and assigned to the
relevant institutions. Third, regulatory legal
requirements were matched with institutional
responsibilities. Finally, each function was coded
according to four criteria: coverage (a responsibility is
assigned), overlap (more than one institution is
responsible), gap (no institution is clearly responsible),
and update lag (new regulatory legal requirements are
not reflected in institutional mandates). These criteria
were used to assess the extent of institutional
fragmentation and its implications for governance
capacity.
Coding was done by comparing each regulatory
legal obligation with the statutory mandates of the
responsible institutions. Where a single institution had
a clearly defined mandate the function was coded as
coverage; where several institutions shared
comparable responsibilities it was coded as overlap;
where there was no explicit mandate, it was coded as a
gap; and where regulatory legal obligations had
evolved without corresponding changes in
institutional mandates it was coded as update lag.
Figure 1 summarises the analytical framework and
coding procedure.
Figure 1. Analytical framework linking data sources,
document analysis, and structured coding to assess
institutional fragmentation and governance capacity.
The method is justified by its ability to directly link
legal responsibilities to regulatory requirements and
operational functions. Unlike approaches that focus on
stakeholder perceptions or policy outcomes, this
method examines the formal structure through which
governance is implemented. This allows fragmentation
to be identified as a structural condition rather than a
descriptive observation.
The analytical process is reproducible because it is
based on publicly available legal acts, institutional
statutes, and regulatory documents. Researchers can
replicate the study by identifying relevant institutions,
extracting their statutory responsibilities, matching
these responsibilities to legal requirements, and
applying the same coding framework for coverage,
overlap, gaps, and update lags. The approach also
enables systematic comparison of different maritime
governance systems.
3 RESULTS
The results show that Estonia's maritime governance
system is characterised by institutional fragmentation,
overlapping enforcement responsibilities, and
persistent update lag. While most regulatory functions
are formally assigned, responsibilities are dispersed
across several authorities and are not systematically
adjusted to evolving international and European
requirements. These structural features create
coordination challenges and reduce governance
capacity in inspection, monitoring, and surveillance
systems.
3.1 Institutional structure of maritime governance
The institutional mapping shows that Estonia's
maritime governance system lacks a central
coordinating authority and is characterised by a
fragmented distribution of responsibilities across
sector-specific institutions. These include institutions
responsible for maritime safety, environmental
protection, border control, fisheries, and port
governance. The institutional mapping, based on
statutory provisions, confirms that no single authority
holds comprehensive responsibility for maritime
governance. Instead, responsibilities are allocated
independently across policy areas, resulting in a
dispersed governance structure. This finding reflects
broader observations in the maritime governance
literature, that describe governance systems as
inherently multi-level and institutionally distributed
[1, 14].
The mapping process reveals that fragmentation is
embedded in the formal structure of governance rather
than emerging only at the implementation stage. The
institutional distribution of responsibilities and their
relationship to regulatory obligations is illustrated in
Figure 2. For example, environmental protection
functions are divided between environmental
authorities and operational actors such as the Defence
Forces, while port-related inspection responsibilities
involve both transportation and environmental
institutions.
3.2 Inspection and surveillance system
The analysis shows that fragmentation becomes more
pronounced at the operational level, where inspection,
DATA SOURCES
National
legislation
Institutional
mapping
International and
EU regulations
DOCUMENT
ANALYSIS
Qualitative
analysis
MATCHING
PROCESS
Regulatory
requirements –
Institutional
mandates
STRUKTURED
CODING
Coverage
Overlap
Gap
Update lag
ANALYTICAL
OUTPUT
Institutional
fragmentation
Governance
capacity
740
monitoring, and surveillance functions are spread
across several institutions. Responsibilities overlap and
are sometimes incomplete, while institutions operate
within their own statutory frameworks. The structured
coding of these functions using the criteria of coverage,
overlap, gap, and update lag reveals significant
inconsistencies in how regulatory requirements are
implemented.
International conventions and EU regulations were
analysed to identify operational governance
obligations, which were then matched with the
responsibilities assigned to Estonian ministries,
agencies, and operational actors through their statutes
and sector-specific legislation. Figure 2 illustrates the
institutional distribution of these functions, while
Table 2 summarises the coded results for
representative governance functions.
Figure 2. Institutional allocation of monitoring, inspection,
surveillance, reporting and enforcement responsibilities
across Estonia's maritime governance system
The figure illustrates how regulatory obligations
arising from international and European frameworks
are translated into operational governance functions
and distributed among several Estonian authorities. It
shows that responsibilities for monitoring, inspection,
surveillance, and reporting are allocated through
separate sector-specific governance structures rather
than through an integrated system. By linking
regulatory obligations with responsible institutions,
the figure visualises the fragmented nature of maritime
governance and highlights the lack of a central
coordination and updating mechanism capable of
systematically aligning institutional mandates with
evolving regulatory requirements. The resulting
overlap, parallel monitoring systems, coordination
gaps, and update lag represent the core governance
effects identified in the analysis.
Table 2. Examples of regulatory obligations, institutional
allocation, and fragmentation patterns in Estonia's maritime
governance system
Function
Regulatory
requirement
Responsible
institution(s)
Finding
Port State Control
inspections
Directive
2009/16/EC
Transport
Administration
Coverage
Maritime safety
inspections
Maritime Safety
Act; SOLAS
obligations
Transport
Administration
Coverage
Port reception
facilities and ship
waste management
Directive (EU)
2019/883
Transport
Administration,
Environmental
Board
Overlap
Marine
environmental
monitoring
Marine Strategy
Framework
Directive
(2008/56/EC);
Environmental
Board, Ministry of
Climate, Defence
Forces (selected
Overlap
Environmental
Monitoring Act
monitoring
activities)
Oil pollution
surveillance and
response
MARPOL;
Environmental
Liability Directive;
Water Act
Environmental
Board, Police and
Border Guard
Board, Defence
Forces
Overlap
Fisheries
monitoring and
control
Common Fisheries
Policy obligations;
Fishing Act
Environmental
Board,
Agriculture and
Food Board,
Police and Border
Guard Board
Overlap
Border
surveillance in
maritime areas
Schengen
obligations; Police
and Border Guard
Act
Police and Border
Guard Board
Coverage
Underwater
cultural heritage
protection
UNESCO
Convention on the
Protection of
Underwater
Cultural Heritage;
Heritage
Conservation Act
National Heritage
Board,
Environmental
Board
Overlap
Wreck removal
and hazard
reporting
Nairobi Wreck
Removal
Convention
Transport
Administration,
Environmental
Board
Overlap
Offshore
environmental risk
monitoring
Directive
2013/30/EU
Environmental
Board, Transport
Administration
Overlap
Marine
biodiversity
monitoring
Convention on
Biological Diversity;
Nature
Conservation Act
Environmental
Board
Coverage
Cross-sector
maritime risk
assessment
Multiple EU and
IMO instruments
No clearly
designated
coordinating
authority
Gap
System-wide
review of new
maritime
regulatory
obligations
Multiple EU
regulations and
international
conventions
No formally
assigned
institution
Gap
Mapping of
institutional
responsibility
coverage across
maritime sectors
Multiple EU and
IMO instruments
No formally
assigned
institution
Gap
Coordination of
inspection
planning across
maritime
authorities
Multiple sectoral
regulations
No formally
assigned
institution
Gap
Integration of
monitoring and
surveillance data
across authorities
Multiple reporting
obligations
Partial
responsibilities
distributed across
authorities
Gap /
Overlap
Assignment of
responsibilities
following
introduction of
new EU maritime
regulations
Emerging
regulatory
requirements
Responsibilities
updated ad hoc
by sector
Update
lag
Incorporation of
new international
reporting
obligations into
institutional
mandates
IMO and
environmental
conventions
No systematic
review
mechanism
Update
lag
Alignment of
institutional
statutes with
evolving
All maritime
governance sectors
Institution-
specific
amendments only
Update
lag
741
regulatory
obligations
Updating
surveillance
responsibilities
when new
monitoring
technologies
become mandatory
Emerging EU
digital reporting
requirements
No coordinated
updating process
Update
lag
The coding results show a clear pattern. Core sector-
specific inspection and surveillance functions are
generally assigned to responsible authorities, whereas
cross-sector coordination functions are characterised
by institutional gaps. Environmental monitoring and
pollution response often involve overlapping
institutional responsibilities, while mechanisms for
reviewing and updating institutional mandates are
largely absent. These patterns correspond to the four
coding categories used in the analysis and demonstrate
that fragmentation extends beyond institutional design
into operational governance.
3.3 Regulatory alignment and update lag
A key finding of this study is the existence of an
“update lag” between regulatory developments and
institutional responsibilities. Analysis of EU and
international regulations shows that new inspection
and monitoring requirements are constantly being
introduced. However, the corresponding institutional
mandates are not systematically updated to reflect
these changes.
In several cases, regulatory requirements are only
partially implemented or not clearly assigned to any
institution. This creates a mismatch between
regulatory obligations and governance structures. The
lack of a formal mechanism for reviewing and
updating institutional responsibilities leads to uneven
implementation across sectors. The coding analysis
also shows that the update lag is most evident where
new cross-sectoral coordination, reporting, and
surveillance requirements have emerged without
corresponding institutional adaptation.
4 DISCUSSION
The discussion considers the implications of the
findings for maritime governance theory and practice.
It examines how institutional fragmentation affects
governance capacity, discusses update lag as a
structural feature of fragmented governance, considers
the relevance of the findings for small coastal states,
and reflects on the strengths and limitations of the
study.
The results show that institutional fragmentation
has a measurable impact on governance capacity.
Although most operational functions are formally
assigned to public authorities, fragmented institutional
arrangements generate overlaps, coordination gaps,
and administrative complexities that reduce the
effectiveness of inspection, monitoring, and
enforcement systems. These findings support previous
research highlighting the importance of coordination
and clear allocation of responsibilities for effective
governance [11, 18].
The institutional mapping also shows that
fragmentation is embedded in statutory governance
structures rather than occurring only during
implementation. This finding is consistent with
previous studies that describe maritime governance as
inherently multi-level and institutionally distributed
[3, 8, 14], while extending this literature by showing
how institutional arrangements directly influence
operational enforcement systems.
One of the main contributions of this study is the
identification of the update lag as a structural feature
of fragmented maritime governance. Existing literature
has highlighted gaps between regulatory design and
implementation [10], but the present analysis shows
that these gaps are reinforced by the absence of
systematic mechanisms for reviewing institutional
mandates as regulatory obligations evolve.
Fragmentation should therefore be understood not
only as a static distribution of responsibilities but also
as a dynamic governance process. As international and
European regulatory requirements continue to expand,
governance systems that lack formal updating
mechanisms become progressively less and less
aligned with their legal obligations.
Although the empirical analysis focuses on Estonia,
the identified governance mechanisms are relevant for
other small coastal states facing similar administrative
capacity constraints. Sector-specific governance
structures may adequately support individual policy
areas while simultaneously creating coordination
problems within the broader maritime governance
system. The analytical framework developed in this
study therefore provides a basis for examining
institutional fragmentation in comparable governance
contexts.
The findings also suggest that improving maritime
governance does not necessarily require the creation of
new institutions. Instead, governance capacity can be
strengthened through formal mechanisms that
periodically review regulatory developments, assign
new responsibilities, and coordinate institutional
mandates across sectors.
This study focuses on formal institutional
arrangements as defined by legislation and statutory
mandates. This approach provides a systematic and
reproducible basis for analysing institutional
fragmentation and comparing governance structures
across jurisdictions. However, it does not capture
informal coordination practices or variations in
operational implementation.
Future research should combine institutional
mapping with interviews, organisational analysis, or
comparative case studies to examine how formal
governance structures interact with administrative
practices and enforcement outcomes in different
maritime governance systems.
5 CONCLUSION
This article examines how institutional fragmentation
affects maritime governance capacity through the
organisation of inspection and surveillance systems.
The results show that maritime governance in Estonia
742
is structurally fragmented, with responsibilities
divided among several institutions whose mandates
are defined in separate statutory frameworks. The
analysis also shows that this fragmentation is most
evident at the operational level, where inspection and
surveillance functions show overlaps, gaps, and weak
coordination. A key result is the identification of an
“update lag,” whereby new regulatory requirements
are not systematically incorporated into institutional
mandates, leading to a mismatch between regulatory
obligations and governance structures.
The article contributes to the field by linking
institutional fragmentation to operational enforcement
systems, thereby extending existing research on
maritime governance. Previous studies have similarly
identified fragmentation, coordination challenges, and
gaps between regulatory design and implementation
[3, 10], but they primarily focus on legal frameworks or
policy-level dynamics. In contrast, this article shows
that fragmentation is embedded in the statutory
allocation of responsibilities and becomes
operationally significant through inspection and
surveillance systems. These differences arise from the
methodological focus on institutional mapping and
structured coding of responsibilities, rather than
stakeholder perceptions or policy analysis. As a result,
the article advances the literature by providing a
systematic framework for analysing how governance
structures translate into enforcement outcomes and by
identifying the absence of institutional updating
mechanisms as a key driver of fragmentation.
The significance of this work lies in demonstrating
that improving maritime governance requires not only
better policy design but also the development of
mechanisms to ensure that institutional responsibilities
are continuously aligned with evolving regulatory
requirements.
The analysis assumes that formal statutory
responsibilities accurately reflect the allocation of
governance functions and that legal documents
provide a reliable basis for identifying institutional
roles. At the same time, the study is limited by its focus
on formal structures, which may not fully capture
informal coordination practices or variations in
implementation across contexts. Future research
should extend this approach to comparative analyses
of European maritime governance systems in order to
examine how institutional updating mechanisms can
be designed and implemented more effectively.
The analysis focuses on formal institutional
responsibilities defined in legislation and statutory
mandates and does not assess how coordination
functions in everyday administrative practice or
operational decision-making. The study also does not
quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of individual
authorities or enforcement outcomes but rather
examines how governance structures allocate and
organise regulatory responsibilities across the system.
The analysis of statutory mandates shows that core
monitoring, inspection, and reporting functions are
largely covered within sector-specific legal
frameworks. Environmental, maritime safety, and
border surveillance obligations are assigned to
appropriate authorities through existing legislation.
However, these responsibilities are spread across
institutions without a unified system for coordination
or integration. As a result, while individual obligations
are formally addressed, there is no mechanism to
ensure their comprehensive and coherent
implementation across the maritime governance
system.
The results show that institutional fragmentation
becomes operationally visible through inspection,
monitoring, and surveillance systems, where
overlapping mandates and coordination gaps directly
affect implementation capacity. There is no statute that
assigns responsibility for mapping regulatory
obligations, reviewing coverage across institutions and
updating mandates as new rules emerge. Although
based on the Estonian case, the mechanisms identified
reflect broader governance challenges associated with
fragmented maritime governance systems across
European seas.
The findings suggest that improving maritime
governance does not necessarily require the creation of
new institutions, but rather the development of
mechanisms that systematically align institutional
responsibilities with evolving regulatory
requirements. Rather than implementing new
European Union and IMO obligations through ad hoc
adjustments, governance systems should include
formal procedures for reviewing new regulatory
requirements, assigning responsibilities, and assessing
the need for coordination between institutions. Such
mechanisms could include statutory coordination
requirements, inter-agency review processes, or
dedicated coordination bodies responsible for ensuring
comprehensive coverage of monitoring, inspection,
and reporting functions. At the operational level, more
integrated inspection systems could be supported by
shared information systems, coordinated inspection
practices, and clearer allocation of mandates, thereby
reducing overlaps, gaps, and inconsistencies in
enforcement. The practical priority for Estonia is to
establish a permanent mechanism for coordinating and
updating maritime governance responsibilities across
institutions.
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