1409

1 INTRODUCTION

Cargo storage and handling operations have always

generated the risk of fire. The containerization has

increased safety as the goods were separated from each

other with solid walls of the container. However, there

may be dangerous goods inside, some of which could

pose a risk of a fire ignition. There is also a special type

of container that is capable of storing perishable cargo.

This type of refrigerated container is equipped with the

aggregate that maintains a constant, low temperature

inside but generates heat outside of the container.

Taking this into consideration, the risk of fire remains

at non-zero level. The conclusion could be made that it

would be useful to develop a universal, autonomous or

semi-autonomous fire detection or fire prevention

system. This article aims to outline the theoretical

concept of one of them.

The paper is divided into four paragraphs,

excluding introduction and conclusion:

− literature review - short description of the papers

and research related to the topic, published in

recent years,

− fire prevention policy at container terminals - the

paragraph contains short description of Polish

container terminals, applicable regulations with the

citations of proper documents and the fire

prevention methods maintain in the terminals,

− outlining the problem – fire incidents in seaports

and container terminals - it contains fire incidents

that occurs in recent years,

− fire prevention system - this paragraph presents the

concept of the proposed system, including the

operation algorithm.

This article is an introduction to further research

and development process of creating the system that

fulfills stated requirements.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Articles related to the topic can be divided into three

categories:

− use of drones and robots for firefighting and fire

prevention operations;

Drone-based Fire Prevention System on Container

Terminals - A Theoretical Study

P. Wójcik & P. Wierzbicki

Gdynia Maritime University, Gdynia, Poland

ABSTRACT: The article presents the proposition of developing an innovative fire detection system, based on

unmanned aerial vehicles and multiple sensors. The paper contains short review of recent literature related to the

topic, current state of fire prevention policy at the container terminals, scoping on the Polish seaports. To prove

the necessity of the improvement of fire detection methods it has been described the fire incidents from recent

years. The article also outlines the design assumptions of the proposed system as well as the theoretical workflow.

Potential issues, further improvements and prospect have been pointed.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 19

Number 4

December 2025

DOI: 10.12716/1001.19.04.40

1410

− risk assessment and safety management at seaports

and terminals;

− fire prevention and firefighting systems on vessels.

It is hard to find a study that combines these

categories. Alon, Rabinovich, Fyodorov and Cauchard

in [1] present a user-centered perspective on the

integration of semi-autonomous drones in firefighting.

In [2] Bogue shows details of recently developed

firefighting robots and their applications. Roldán-

Gómez, González-Gironda and Barrientos proposed a

multi-robots firefighting support system based on

drones swarm [9]. In the described system, groups of

drones were used for prevention, surveillance and

extinguishing fire. Apart from the drones the system

also uses the Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented

Reality (AR) interfaces to manage control and provide

quick and convenient information exchange between

mission commander, team leaders and team members

in the field of operation. In [4] - Jin, Kim and Moon

present a development of a firefighting drone capable

of suppressing nascent low-intensity fires.

Ngo Van Nam presents the analysis of fire

prevention operations and systems in Vietnam [8]. His

paper shows statistics of legal actions taken in the last

few years by ports and Vietnam authorities to increase

fire safety. The article also points out some

recommendations and advice for further work on the

described topic. The authors of [7] provide a

comprehensive analysis of the status of the risk

assessment process and its associated methods at Baltic

Sea Region major seaports. Christowa in [3] performs

identification and analysis of threats in Polish seaports.

The authors of the [6] analysed the fire incidents

that occurred on the container ships during the past

decade. They focused on 23 cases and presented a

detailed description of each of them. The paper

includes dates of incidents, locations on the vessels

where each fire broke out, the causes of fires and the

extent of the damage. There is also information about

methods used to extinguish the fire, the number of

victims and whether external help was necessary. In

the conclusions the authors point out the statistics

resulting from their work and propose possible

solutions to the described problem.

3 FIRE PREVENTION POLICY AT CONTAINER

TERMINALS

3.1 Polish container terminals

A container terminal is a complex used for handling

containers - transshipment from various means of

transport in order to continue their journey or storage

in yards. This can take place both between ships and

wheeled vehicles (trucks and trains). In this case we are

talking about a maritime container terminal, which is

usually located close to or even inside larger cities, as

well as being part of a larger port infrastructure.

In Tri-City area we can distinguish two main

container hubs:

− Baltic Hub (Container Terminal at the Szczecin

Quay) in Gdańsk [Fig. 1]

− GCT (Gdynia Container Terminal) and BCT (Baltic

Container Terminal) in Gdynia [Fig. 2]

Figure 1. Baltic Hub, image source:

https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Ruszyla-rozbudowa-

terminalu-Baltic-Hub-w-Gdansku-warta-ok-2-mld-zl-

8447249.html last accesed 19/03/2025

Figure 2. Baltic Container Terminal, image source: own

collection

3.2 Applicable regulations

The transshipment and transport of goods in

containers cannot take place without the risk of

transporting dangerous goods, which must be

"transported" from one place to another, most often

using sea transport, and therefore stored in port

container terminals. This can lead to dangerous

situations, which port authorities try to prevent as

much as possible. The IMDG Convention

(International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) - the

International Dangerous Goods Code, i.e. the code for

the safe transport of dangerous goods by sea issued by

the IMO (International Maritime Organization) and

updated every two years. It divides goods into

dangerous classes, regulates and standardizes issues of

packaging, marking of goods during transport, as well

as their placement on ships. Additionally, you can also

find guides there (e.g. first aid in the event of human

1411

exposure to hazardous substances), a list of procedures

in the event of a fire of dangerous substances, as well

as guidelines for the storing of dangerous materials in

containers.

3.3 Fire prevention methods

However, it is also necessary to ensure supervision of

containers located in the storage yard in the container

terminal. In this respect, the "Regulation of the Minister

of Maritime Economy and Inland Navigation of 21

December 2016 on fire protection supervision in Polish

maritime areas and sea ports and harbours" [10] as well

as the "Regulation of the Minister of Foreign Trade and

Maritime Economy of 24 February 1981 on fire

protection in the area of sea ports and harbours" [11]

provide the legal basis.

In Chapter 10 of the Fire Protection Regulation, we

can read paragraphs devoted exclusively to the storage

of containers and methods of preventing spontaneous

combustion of cargo placed in them.

"§ 63.

1. Containers should be stored only on the premises of

container bases or in designated storage yards.

2. Container bases and container storage yards should be

equipped with fire hydrants, fire-fighting equipment and

devices in accordance with applicable standards and with

means of direct communication with the port fire brigade.

§ 64.

1. Container bases and container storage yards should be

divided into quarters. The length of a quarter may not

exceed 100 m, and the width - four times the width of the

containers stored in a given quarter.

2. The permissible stacking of containers may amount to a

maximum of 5 layers, except for containers loaded with

easily flammable materials and refrigerated (air-

conditioned) containers, which may be stacked to a height

of 3 layers.

3. Stacking of containers loaded with class I hazardous

materials and particularly hazardous materials of other

classes is not permitted.

4. Fire routes of at least a width of 6 m, with a hardened

surface.

§ 65.

1. Refrigerated (air-conditioned) containers with internal

combustion engines and containers loaded with dangerous

and explosive materials should be stored in designated

quarters.

2. Refueling in the tanks of refrigerated (air-conditioned)

containers may only be done from a tanker truck.

§ 66.

Container repairs may only be done in places designated for

this purpose.

§ 67.

Container bases and container storage yards should be

equipped with signs in Polish and English prohibiting

smoking and the use of open fire. " [11]

4 OUTLINING THE PROBLEM – FIRE INCIDENTS

IN SEAPORTS AND CONTAINER TERMINALS

4.1 The scale of the fire problem in ports around the world

All port logistics centers, not only in Poland, are

exposed to the risk of accidents or fires during their

daily work. Although today early fire warning systems

are working better and better, detecting even the

slightest temperature fluctuations, managers of

container yards must be constantly on their guard.

"The main fire hazard of a port results from the

concentration of national assets of enormous value in a

limited area, which consists of port infrastructure,

materials, cargo, ships, industrial warehouses,

equipment, installations, communication routes, etc. A

similar degree of concentration of so many and so

expensive investments and material goods does not

occur anywhere else in the country, even in the largest

industrial centers." [5]

The best example of an incident in a port was the

recent fire in a hall on the premises of the hazardous

waste incinerator in the Port of Gdańsk – the Port

Service complex operating at the Northern Port, built

in 1954. As we can read in an interview with the

spokeswoman for Port Service, Ms. Anna

Lewandowska, the workshop part caught fire, and as a

result no hazardous goods were damaged, however,

the fire brigades sent to extinguish the fire (22 sent,

only 19 came on time) also ensured that there were no

leaks of extinguishing agents into either the water or

the air, which directly reduces the long-term impact of

the fire on both the environment and the operation of

the port.

Figure 3. Smoke over the Northern Port in Gdańsk, image

source: own collection

1412

4.2 Consequences of fires

"Sea ports, as economic facilities located at the interface

between land and sea, are prepared in terms of

technical and organizational aspects to handle foreign

trade, by sea, together with means of sea and land

transport. Therefore, ensuring an acceptable level of

fire safety in ports must include within its scope all

threats related to the characteristics of each of them.

Although certain groups of fire threats are common to

all types of ports, it would be necessary to differentiate

the scale and effects of their impact depending on

whether they concern commercial, passenger or

military ports. Considering civilian ports, it should be

borne in mind that especially those located in the

agglomerations of Gdańsk-Gdynia or Szczecin-

Świnoujście, are key elements for the national economy

of our country. They also have the largest number and

variety of threats. A separate category in terms of fire

threats are fuel ports, such as the Northern Port in

Gdańsk, where, due to the trade exclusively in media

with specific fire characteristics - fire-hazardous

materials, dedicated early detection and mitigation

systems for this type of threat are used. " [5]

In addition to the danger to the port crew, it is also

worth remembering:

− economic losses – damage or complete destruction

of cargo, downtime in port operations, need to

clarify the situation, control early warning and

prevention systems, additional staff training,

− environmental losses – potential leaks of hazardous

cargo into the atmosphere, negative impact on the

natural environment as well as on people living in

close proximity to the port (the best example is the

ban on opening windows and leaving the house

during and immediately after the fire extinguishing

operation in the port of Gdańsk)

− logistical losses – the need to provide access during

fire extinguishing operations, stop work at the

terminal and find another place to store goods for a

specified period of time, conduct an accident

investigation.

There are incidents related to the dangers of storing

cargo in containers all over the world. On August 12,

2015, in the port of Tianjin in North China, explosions

occurred in a storage yard located in Binhai New Area,

as a result of which 173 people died (including 104

firefighters taking part in the firefighting operation)

and many others were injured. The explosions, with a

power of about 800 tons of ammonium nitrate

(equivalent to about 256 tons of dynamite sticks)

occurred within about 30-40 seconds of each other.

Although the cause of the incident was not known at

first, after conducting an appropriate investigation, the

cause of the explosion was found - incorrectly stored

refrigerated container carrying nitrocellulose, as a

result of which it overheated, and caused the harm.

4.3 Difficulties in responding to fires in ports

Despite increasingly modern early warning systems,

incidents at ports involving fires continue to be a major

challenge for container terminals.

Main reasons for the difficulties in responding:

− a vast area where containers are located,

− stacking of containers,

− delayed response of the services.

Due to the above, there is a growing need to find a

modern way to early detect and warn of an

approaching disaster, for example by using unmanned

aerial vehicles – drones, equipped with appropriate

devices that help in everyday work on the safety of

container terminals and ensuring continuity of work.

5 FIRE PREVENTION SYSTEM

Taking into account the previous chapters, it is safe to

point out an argument that it is necessary to develop

new firefighting and fire preventing or detection

systems. The last decade has brought rapid growth in

the fields of automatics, autonomous or semi-

autonomous vehicles, including unmanned aerial

vehicles and Virtual-Reality (VR) or Augmented-

Reality (AG) related technologies. This fact brings the

opportunity to combine these ideas and try to create a

fire prevention system based on them.

5.1 Theoretical outline of the system

Solution proposed in this paper include drones

equipped with both normal and thermal cameras as

well as the sensors to detect smoke, dustiness and fire-

related pollution. To maintain high effectiveness, it is

necessary to use some of the sensors directly in

container stacks. VR could be an optional feature. The

main characteristics of the system should be as follows:

− semi-autonomous - it should be possible to fix

regular autonomous patrol path for the drones and

to take manual control over them, when necessary,

− constant - the sensors mounted in containers stacks

should maintain constant monitoring of basic

parameters and the unmanned aerial vehicles

should patrol specified area in regular intervals,

− three level alarm - entering each level should

depends on the measurements taking by sensors,

− weather insensitivity - the system should take

actual weather conditions into consideration when

entering the next alarm level.

Every device should be connected to one server that

performs analysis of the measurements and manages

the states of the system.

As previously stated, the system should include

three levels of actions:

− Normal mode - static sensors constantly monitor

each parameter, drones patrol area autonomously

on the fixed routes and taking additional

measurements; the drones should fly in regular

intervals; if every parameter fits in established

requirements the report is generated.

− Pre-alarm mode - if one of the sensors detects

abnormal parameters (e.g. temperature of a

container higher than expected) the system should

generate a warning. The nearest drone should be

sent to the area that generates the warning and

switch to manual control. Next, the properly trained

worker should use the drone to check if the

dangerous situation really occurs. Depending on

the outcome the worker should turn off the pre-

alarm mode or switch to alarm mode. In both cases

the system should save logs from the incident and

generate a report.

1413

− Alarm mode - if multiple sensors detect abnormal

parameters or one of the measurements indicate

much higher temperature than expected or the

worker starts the alarm mode manually or the

system stays in the pre-alarm mode for too long it

should enter the alarm mode. Nearest drones

should be sent to monitor the situation and collect

additional data. The information about the fire

should be automatically sent to the fire station and

to the terminal and port authorities. The zone

exposed to the fire and the neighboring areas

should be warned and evacuated. The system

should collect all possible data, save logs and

generate detailed report after the end of the alarm.

The general algorithm of the system is show in the

chart below:

Figure 4. The algorithm of the system

5.2 Issues

The previous paragraphs provide a general description

of the proposed system. However, there are some

potential issues that have to be pointed out. In most of

the world there are specified restrictions about

operating a drone. The law in Poland provides

different types of licenses, divided in two categories -

open and special. The specification of the described

system would require the special license. In

consequence, the process of training the worker to

operate a drone would be more difficult and expensive

and obtaining appropriate consents to perform

described actions would be more complicated.

Restrictions directly related to the operation of aerial

vehicle in the port area may also pose a problem.

Another difficult case is to set the optimal places for

sensors to maintain effective measurement of the

scoped parameters. The devices must not influence the

normal workflow on the terminal and simultaneously

they have to collect enough data to provide constant

and proper monitoring of the container stack.

The process of practical development of the

described system should also cover the way of

exchanging and storing the data. There are many ways

to do it and every solution has some advantages and

disadvantages. The optimal method depends on the

device selection, planned budget and the detailed

design assumptions.

The described system will collect a large amount of

data. The information gathered from the sensors won’t

be directly connected to the particular cargo. However,

it could provide many details about the inner working

process at the terminal, the dangerous incidents and

the methods of handling them. Taking into

consideration the geopolitical situation of Poland and

the growing possibility of escalation of the war fought

directly abroad, as well as the fact that our country is

involved in this conflict in the socio-economical way it

is crucial to maintain high standards of cyber security.

Although it is difficult to predict the specific usefulness

of the information gathered by the described system, it

could potentially be utilized in some sort of sabotage

or similar military actions. It is necessary to define

strict terms of gaining access to the data and to ensure

safety.

5.3 Possible improvements and prospects

The system proposed in this article is originally

designed for operation in container terminals,

particularly in Poland. However, if the solution proves

effective it could be implemented on other types of

terminals with minor changes.

The system itself could also be improved by

expanding the patrol paths of the drones and

expanding the devices by mounting additional dust

sensors on them. This solution could be especially

useful in the mass terminals, where it could examine

the level of dustiness at particular distances from the

terminal.

In the future the system could be expanded to

collect and process even more types of data, which

could be useful in statistical analyses, research related

to the environment and planning the seaports areas.

6 CONCLUSION

The main goal of this paper is to propose an innovative

fire prevention system that could be implemented in

the container terminals. The previous paragraphs

contain descriptions of the particular functions of this

system as well as the exemplary algorithm of work.

Both the issues and prospects were mentioned. Further

research is necessary and this paper stands as an

introduction to the practical development of the

system described in the article.

REFERENCES

[1] Alon, O., Rabinovich, S., Fyodorov, C., & Cauchard, J. R.

(2021). Drones in Firefighting: A User-Centered Design

Perspective. In Proceedings of the 23rd International

Conference on Mobile Human-Computer Interaction

(Vol. 24, pp. 1–11). Association for Computing

Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3447526.3472030

[2] Bogue, R. (2021). The role of robots in firefighting.

Industrial Robot the International Journal of Robotics

1414

Research and Application, 48(2), 174–178.

https://doi.org/10.1108/ir-10-2020-0222

[3] Christowa, C. (2023). Safety Management in Polish

Seaports: Identification and Analysis of Threats.

European Research Studies Journal, XXVI(4), 615–631.

https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/1

17758

[4] Jin, J., Kim, S., & Moon, J. (2024). Development of a

firefighting drone for constructing fire-breaks to suppress

nascent Low-Intensity fires. Applied Sciences, 14(4), 1652.

https://doi.org/10.3390/app14041652

[5] Kopczewski, M., & Tobolski, M. (2011). Logistyczne

zabezpieczenie działań ratowniczo-gaśniczych podczas

pożarów w portach morskich. Logistyka - Tom Nr 5

(2011) - BazTech - Yadda.

https://yadda.icm.edu.pl/baztech/element/bwmeta1.elem

ent.baztech-article-BUS6-0038-0047

[6] Krmek, I., Kos, S., & Brčić, D. (2022). Analytical research

of the container ships cargo area fires in the period from

2010 to 2020. Naše More, 69(1), 62–69.

https://doi.org/10.17818/nm/2022/1.8

[7] Nagi, A., Indorf, M., Singer-Neumann, C., & Ojala, L.

(2019). Current state of risk assessment in Seaports: An

Empirical study. In Springer eBooks (pp. 79–101).

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25412-4_4

[8] Nam, N. V. (2023). Security of fire prevention and fighting

for seaports in Vietnam meets requirements for

international integrating. European Science Review, 5–

6(3), 13–20. https://doi.org/10.29013/ESR-23-5.6-13-20

[9] Roldán-Gómez, J. J., González-Gironda, E., & Barrientos,

A. (2021). A survey on Robotic Technologies for forest

Firefighting: Applying drone swarms to improve

firefighters’ efficiency and safety. Applied Sciences, 11(1),

363. https://doi.org/10.3390/app11010363

[10] Rozporządzenie Ministra Gospodarki Morskiej i Żeglugi

Śródlądowej z dnia 21 grudnia 2016 r. w sprawie nadzoru

przeciwpożarowego w polskich obszarach morskich oraz

morskich portach i przystaniach. (n.d.).

https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WD

U20170000118

[11] Rozporządzenie Ministra Handlu Zagranicznego i

Gospodarki Morskiej z dnia 24 lutego 1981 r. w sprawie

ochrony przeciwpożarowej na obszarze morskich portów

i przystani. (n.d.).

https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WD

U19810050020