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1 INTRODUCTION
In 1997, IMO (International Maritime Organization)
adopted a resolution setting out its vision, principles
and objectives for the human element. The human
element is a complex, multi-dimensional factor
affecting maritime safety, security and marine
environment protection, encompassing the entire
spectrum of human activities performed by ship crew,
shore-based management and regulators. Since the
1980s, IMO has increasingly referred to people
employed in maritime transport and in 1989, adopted
Resolution A.647(16) on guidelines on the management
for the safe operation of ships and pollution prevention
– the forerunner of the International Safety
Management Code (ISM), which became mandatory
under the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS).
The human factor is crucial for the proper
functioning of shipping. Over the last year, EMSA has
been working with the European Commission and EU
Member States on a comprehensive review of the IMO
International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) for Seafarers
[3][4].
Currently, work on the development and
implementation of regulations governing the safe
navigation of autonomous ships is being carried out by
IMO and the European Union (EMSA - European
Maritime Safety Agency). This work is extremely
difficult due to the not fully recognized relationship
between human responsibility and automation of
Human Factor in MASS Shipping
T. Abramowicz-Gerigk, Z. Burciu & A. Smacki
Gdynia Maritime University, Gdynia, Poland
ABSTRACT: The paper presents the influence of the human factor on the safety of autonomous shipping with
respect to interaction between management personnel involved in autonomous ship operation - Ship Master and
ROC (Remote Operation Centre) operator. Against the background of the works conducted by International
Maritime Organization (IMO)and the European Union, the influence of the human factor was analysed
depending on the MASS (Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship) level of autonomy defined by IMO. A Bayesian-
based model was proposed to assess the reliability of the Ship Master, ROC operator and their influence on the
operational reliability of sea voyage of MASS with level 2 of autonomy. The mutual high reliability of both the
Ship Master and ROC operator allows for significant improvement of sea voyage reliability. The prospect theory
was introduced in the analysis of decisions making process in risky conditions of ROC operator, remotely
controlling MASS with level 3 of autonomy, without a crew on board. The influence of the operator’s prospect
and emotions can be described using decision weight functions. In both studied cases, decision support and
cooperation is very important and the estimated influence of the human factor is lower than for a ship with level
1 of autonomy operated by Ship Master without ROC support.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 19
Number 4
December 2025
DOI: 10.12716/1001.19.04.05
1090
processes responsible for the safety of ship, cargo and
marine environment [4].
IMO currently uses the term Maritime Autonomous
Surface Ship (MASS) to refer to any ship that is subject
to the provisions of IMO instruments and exhibits a
level of automation currently not recognized by
existing instruments.
The MASS Code being prepared will regulate
technological, legal and safety issues, including
hazards resulting from the operation of MASS:
navigation, monitoring, reliability of technical systems,
cooperation of MASS with ROC (Remote Operations
Centre) and rescuing people at sea.
To facilitate the process of defining the scope of
regulations, the levels of autonomy have been
organized as follows [16]:
− level one (MASS I) - ship with automated processes
and decision support - seafarers are on board to
operate and control shipboard systems and
functions, some operations may be automated and
at times may be unsupervised, but with seafarers on
board, ready to take control,
− level two (MASS II) - remotely controlled ship with
seafarers on board - the ship is controlled and
operated from another location, seafarers are
available on board to take control and to operate the
shipboard systems and functions,
− level three (MASS III) - remotely controlled ship
without seafarers on board - the ship is controlled
and operated from another location,
− level four (MASS IV) - fully autonomous ship - the
operating system of the ship is able to make
decisions and determine actions by itself.
The paper raises an important issue of the human
factor modelling in systems design. The Ship Master
and ROC operator responsibilities related to different
levels of ship autonomy are discussed. The Bayesian-
based model is proposed to determine the reliability of
MASS II Ship Master, ROC operator and their influence
on sea voyage operational reliability. The prospect
theory and Poisson process are proposed for the
assessment of MASS III operator decision making
process.
The presented selected problems of modelling the
human factor in maritime shipping are related to the
systemic approach of safety assessment in
transportation chain [10] and maritime autonomous
transport systems [2][10][14].
2 ACCIDENTS RELATED TO HUMAN ELEMENT
AT SEA
From the analysis on safety investigations [3], it was
determined that, from 2014 to 2023, 58.4% of accidental
events were linked to human action and 49.8% of the
contributing factors were related to human behaviour.
When considering both events related to human action
and human behaviour contributing factors, the human
element relates to 80.1% of the investigated marine
casualties and incidents. These trends are common for
all ship types.
In the analysed period from 2014 to 2023, the
average share of the human factor in the analysed co-
creating factors is 80.1%. Among the types of ships,
fishing vessels have the lowest impact of the human
factor equal to 76.0%, while ships classified as other
types show the highest impact of 89.2%. Cargo ships
show 80.3% of human impact, passenger ships 79.9%,
and service ships 82.5% [3].
Following the adoption by the IMO Guidelines for
the implementation of the ISM Code by maritime
administrations (Resolution A.788(19) in 1995), the
revised Guidelines transformed the idea of
implementation ISM Code based on direct compliance
with the rules, with prescribed interpretation, into a
culture of "thinking". This meant self-regulation of
safety and the development of a "safety culture" in
which everyone should feel responsible for undertaken
actions to improve safety and efficiency.
The human factor is a key element in ensuring the
safety of maritime transport. It is recognized as a factor
contributing to the majority of casualties in the
shipping sector and a key element in the protection of
safety of life on ships. Therefore maritime safety and
the safety of navigation can be improved by focusing
more on the human element. The development of the
ISM Code support and encourage the development of
a safety culture in shipping.
In addition to the already heavy workload related
to the human element, mainly resulting from the work
of IMO Sub-Committee on HTW (Human Element,
Training and Watchkeeping) - terms of reference and
related regulatory instruments, such as the assessment
of information provided by STCW Parties, the
implementation of technical cooperation activities (in
the context of environmental protection, facilitation,
safety and security) and coordination of the Model
Course Programmes, there are relevant activities and
initiatives related to the human element arising from
the scoping of MASS regulations [23].
3 MASS OPERATOR - REMOTE SHIP MASTER
The “MUNIN” project (Maritime Unmanned
Navigation through Intelligence in Networks, Funding
Scheme: SST.2012.5.2-5: E-guided vessels: the
'autonomous' ship) introduced the concept of the Shore
Control Centre (SCC), a control room where operators
would monitor and control autonomous ships, later
called by IMO Remote operation Centre.
The Ship Master and Remote Ship Master – ROC
operator are responsible for the control of MASS
including navigation, taking actions to ensure the
safety of the ship, protection of the marine
environment, maintaining order on board, preventing
damage to the ship, people and cargo on board. The
Ship Master must hold a valid Ship's Master's
Certificate and other certificates in accordance with the
requirements of the applicable international
instruments and national regulations established by
the flag state administration. The same requirements
apply to the Remote Ship Master [23].
3.1 MASS operator decision-making process
Depending on the information and state of
environment, not controlled by the ROC operator, the
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decision-making process may vary depending on the
existing conditions [13]:
− decision made under conditions of certainty – the
effects can be predicted without error, there is
neither risk nor surprise;
− decision made under conditions of risk – it is
possible to determine a set of consequences and
assign them a certain probability of occurrence, the
entity has no basis for knowing which result will
occur;
− decision made under conditions of uncertainty – it
is impossible to calculate all the consequences or
determine with what probability they will occur, it
is difficult to determine the risk of failure.
3.2 Psychological determinants and mechanisms of
decisions made by the MASS operator
The psychological approach is an attempt to explain
the irrationality of decision-makers' behaviour,
resulting from certain personality traits or the situation
in which the decision-maker finds himself. In
particular, factors such as: asymmetry between profit
and loss, previous failures, selective attention,
decision-making under external load are considered. It
focuses particularly strongly on issues related to the
tendency to take risks. According to the assumptions
of psychological analysis, human errors are the effect
of the causal chain (Figure 1) and can be traced to
sources in the human psyche and personality [14].
Figure 1. Causes of system failure - J. Reason's model.
By referring this model to the MASS sea voyage, the
following factors leading to failure can be indicated:
− organizational factors – e.g. poor organization of
the structure of the sea voyage of the autonomous
ship in the transportation system,
− inefficient supervision of the Ship Master/ROC
operator – improper management of the sea voyage
− conditions conducive to hazards –
hydrometeorological, navigational, operational
conditions of the autonomous ship, posing a threat
with its navigation,
− improper actions of the Ship Master /ROC operator
– poor and inadequate implementation of the tasks
of the sea voyage.
The research presented in [15] showed the
importance of “feelings” that the seafarers perceives on
the navigation bridge by looking outside of the
window and experiencing e.g. “standing wave”,
“rolling” and “sense of balance” with the vessel.
Despite the navigation equipment and observation of
the environment, the feeling the vessel’s motions
reduced their stress. Therefore, unlike the Ship Master
of MASS I, who is on the navigation bridge, for the
operator in the remote operation centre, some new
elements influence the operator’s situational
awareness due to the lack of direct feeling of the ship.
Long-term stress can affect the operator's decision-
making by changing the ability to assess risk. People
under stress may be more likely to make riskier
decisions [5][24].
The following properties that characterize decision-
makers – ROC operators [11][12] are defined by the
prospect theory:
− the decision-maker is risk averse in the case of very
probable gains and low probable losses,
− the decision-maker is risk prone in the case of low
probable gains and high probable losses.
The MASS operator's assessment of a situation that
is burdened with risk will always make losses seem
greater than gains. In the second part of the prospect
theory [12], its authors - Kahneman and Tversky state
that: "people tend to overestimate small probabilities
and underestimate large ones". It concerns the way
people estimate the probabilities of individual events.
Emotions have a huge impact on risk assessment.
Fear makes the perceived risk exceed the actual risk,
while euphoria underestimates the perceived level of
riskiness of the situation [20][21]. The operator's
actions with the support of the team (experts) can cause
the subjective value of risk to decrease. It results. With
lower risk and motivates action.
4 INFLUENCE OF HUMAN ELEMENT
DEPENDENT OF THE LEVEL OF MASS
AUTONOMY
The current approach to improving safety in maritime
transport is based on the pursuit of systems
integration, the development of Maritime Intelligent
Transportation Systems (MITS) and reducing the
influence of the human factor. The implementation of
the human factor in the system designs is now the
usual practice. In case of MASS related systems the
human factor models can be dependent on the level of
autonomy.
MASS I which is the ship with automated processes
and decision support systems, with seafarers on board
to operate and control shipboard systems and
functions. Some operations may be automated and at
times be unsupervised but with seafarers on board
ready to take control [16]. The contributing factors
categorized as ‘human behaviour’ and factor related to
events caused by human action are considered as
influenced by human factor.
In the event of a sea voyage carried out by a fully
autonomous MASS IV, there will be no human factor.
This factor may occur in the event of MASS IV failure
or her participation in an emergency operation, when
the control will be taken over by the ROC
operator/Ship Master and when MASS IV will be
operated on a lower level of autonomy e.g. MASS I,
MASS II or MASS III.
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The new approach to human element modelling is
proposed in the paper for MASS II and MASS III.
4.1 Influence of human element on the reliability of sea
voyage of MASS II
The human factor considered in relation to MASS II,
remotely controlled and operated, with seafarers on
board, available to take control and operate the vessel's
systems and functions when necessary [17], is related
to both the Ship Master and ROC operator.
In this case, the application of the Bayesian-based
method to determine the influence of the human factor
on the safety of the MASS II sea voyage allows for the
different Ship Master/ROC operator relationships to be
taken into account in the decision-making process.
General assumptions of the Bayesian-based method
[2][6][7] are as follows:
− using Bayes theorem (1), the observation results are
combined with a priori information, which gives us
an a posteriori distribution of the estimated
parameter,
− the decision regarding the choice of the estimator of
the parameter of interest is made in such a way that
the expected losses resulting from this decision are
the smallest.
( )
( )
( )
1
P P( )
P
P P( )
ii
i
n
ii
i
A B A
AB
A B A
=
=
(1)
where:
A – primary event,
B – secondary event.
An example of the influence of the human factor on
the operational reliability of MASS II sea voyage is
presented in Table 1 [1].
Table 1. The influence of the human factor on the reliability
of the MASS II sea voyage
Roperator
RShipMaster
RMASS II
ROC operator
reliability
Ship Master
reliability
MASS II sea voyage
reliability
R
0.89
0.87
0.57
0
0.48
0.26
0.54
0
0.16
0
0
0.1
1
0.92
0.61
0.93
1
0.61
1
1
0.64
Table 1 shows that:
− high experience/sea practice of the Ship Master or
ROC operator mutually influences the increase in
the reliability of the ROC operator or Ship Master
(good understanding and communication): RMASS II =
0.64,
− decrease in the reliability of ROC operator reduces
the reliability of the Ship Master and vice versa -
decrease in the Ship Master’s reliability reduces the
reliability of ROC operator (e.g. lack of
communication): RMASS II= 0.57,
− lack of sea practice and lack of experience of the
Ship Master and MASS II operator means that the
safety of sea voyage will be low: RMASS II = 0.1.
The presented example indicates that only high
qualifications of ROC operator and Ship Master
guarantee a high level of safety during the voyage. The
following example presents the influence of
determined hazards on the MASS II voyage
operational reliability with respect to the course
change in order to avoid excessive approach to another
vessel. The considered events are defined as follows:
− A1 - an event where ROC operator decides to change
course in order to avoid excessive proximity to
another vessel,
− A2 - an event where the MASS II Ship Master
decides to change course in order to avoid excessive
proximity to another vessel,
− A3 - an event where the change of course will allow
to avoid the excessive proximity
−
B
- an event where a change in course will worsen
the excessive approach situation.
The assumed probabilities of the events B and
B
are equal to 0.6 and 0.4 respectively.
−
1
P( ) 0.6AB=
- probability of accurate ROC
operator assessments of the course change during
the sea voyage,
−
1
P( ) 0.5AB=
- probability of incorrect ROC
operator assessments of the course change during
the sea voyage,
−
2
P( ) 0.7 AB=
- probability of accurate MASS II
Ship Master assessments of the course change
during the sea voyage,
−
2
P( ) 0.5AB=
- probability of incorrect MASS II
Ship Master assessments of the course change
during the sea voyage.
From Bayes theorem we obtain the probabilities of
the correct decision regarding the change of course of
MASS II by operator (2) and Ship Master (3).
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
11
P P( )
P 0.64
P P( )P
B A B
BA
B P A B B A B
==
+
(2)
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2
22
P P( )
P 0.68
P P P( )P
B A B
BA
B A B B A B
==
+
(3)
If we assume that the events A1 and A2 are
independent, then from the Bayes theorem we obtain
the probability of a correct decision related to the
change of MASS II course, under the condition the
opinions of the Ship Master and ROC operator are
taken into account (4).
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
12
12
1 2 1 2
P
PP
0.72
P P P P
B A A
B A A B
B A A B B A A B
=
==
+
(4)
This example confirms that taking into account two
unanimous opinions of MASS II Ship Master and ROC
operator during the voyage increases the safety level of
MASS II by limiting the impact of the human factor.
4.2 Influence of human element on the safety of sea voyage
of MASS III
Safety of MASS III which is a remotely controlled ship,
operated from another location, without seafarers on
board [16] depends on ROC operator who will
undertake a number of actions to ensure a safe voyage.
1093
The operator’s decisions are influenced by both the
psychological and professional factors, and ROC
personnel support.
The decisions making process in risky conditions is
dependent on the prospect and subjective opinion
related to operator’s emotions. Therefore instead of a
probability function, the prospect theory [12]
introduces a function of decision weights (Figure 2),
showing the decision weights not always
corresponding with the determined probability.
The risk assessment is greatly influenced by
emotions, which cause people to underestimate
medium and high probabilities and overestimate low
probabilities. Fear makes the perceived risk exceed the
actual risk, while euphoria lowers the perceived
riskiness of the situation [20].
Figure 2. Decision weight functions
To minimize the possibility of the operator’s stress,
each planned stage of the journey must take into
account possible hazards. The conclusion from the
analysis of hazards, based on the MASS III sea voyage
risk matrix [1] and the Poisson process determining the
probable number of maritime accidents in a designated
area is that MASS III operator should have an
appropriate team of advisors. Poisson process used as
a model determining the number of accidents allows
the operator to be guided by the criterion of the
expected value of the utility function - a weighted
average of the utility values of all possible results. The
weights are equivalent to the probabilities of
occurrence of these results.
The actions of the operator with the support of the
team of experts can cause the decrease of the subjective
risk value and motivates an action. Therefore, the
influence of the human factor in MASS III operation,
provided that the above statements are maintained,
should be lower than for manned MASS I.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of Maritime Autonomous Surface
Ships to shipping routes caused the impact of the
human factor on the safety of a sea voyage dependent
on the level of autonomy (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Estimated impact of the human factor in MASS
shipping
The impact of the human factor on the safety of a
voyage carried out by both the ROC operator and Ship
Master of MASS II, in the case of harmonious
cooperation will be smaller than for a crewed MASS I.
According to theorems based on Kahneman and
Tversky's prospect theory [12], the MASS III operator's
actions should be cautious and more conservative due
to the overestimation of low probabilities. Thanks to
the support of the advisory system and the ROC staff,
the influence of the human factor is also lower in this
case than in the case of MASS I.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work was supported by the projects of Gdynia Maritime
University No. WN/2025/PZ/03 and No. WN/2025/PZ/08
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