707
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, maritime transportation is "navigating" the
rough waters generated by cyber threats, trying to find
a suitable and safe route to allow activity to be
conducted at sea. At the current time, when there is a
disharmony between the safety environment and
technological developments and cyberthreats develop,
the willingness of all maritime stakeholders to work
together is needed to meet the challenge of ensuring
cybersecurity at sea and carrying out various tasks in
maritime industry transportation. It is difficult,
because the maritime domain has begun to coexist with
the cybersecurity domain, which has developed as a
result of the digital transformation and has reached
offshore operations with all its potential.
In maritime domain which has expanded to include
cyberspace, there are maritime stakeholders. They
characterize by their individual, unique attributes
taking into account the nature of their internal
organization, the arrangement of roles and mutual
relations/interactions between their various
participants. Each of them constitutes an individual
safety management system with an organizational
structure and a documented system enabling the
implementation of safety policies by all the
organization's personnel and stakeholders working
with it. The complexity of external relations and
internal arrangements generates the emergence of a
complex cybersecurity management system having its
own unique structures of organizational, process and
technological nature during while performing theirs
duties at sea. The elements of this system and selected
elements of the environment in order to carry out the
assigned tasks that make up the activity at sea are a
variety of interactions that make up a complex system
of maritime cybersecurity management. Its structures
Metasystem for Maritime Cybersecurity Management
During Digital Transformation at Sea
A. Mrozowska
Polish Naval Academy, Gdynia, Poland
ABSTRACT: Nowadays, maritime transportation is "navigating" the rough waters generated by cyber threats,
trying to find a suitable and safe route to allow cargo to be transported by sea. At the current time, when there is
a disharmony between the safety environment and technological developments, the willingness of all maritime
stakeholders to work together is needed to meet the challenge of ensuring proper cybersecurity management in
maritime transportation. The aim of the paper is to describe the metasystem for maritime cybersecurity
management during carriage goods by sea. This system takes into account both users and designers of the system.
This ensures a holistic approach to maritime security during digital transformation. Finally, the author presents
the structure of the meta-cybersecurity system involving the Polish Armed Forces, sea rescue services and
individual stakeholders participating in port and sea trade. The practical using of the system is rooted out in
the conventional vessel but the author takes into account application the system for maritime autonomous surface
ships.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 19
Number 3
September 2025
DOI: 10.12716/1001.19.03.02
708
include designers of systems, equipment, software,
spare parts, etc., as well as users of these designed and
implemented solutions. They bring their collection of
competence to prepare and implement such new
solutions adapting the technological development and
cybersecurity environment, taking into account the
application of this system over a certain period of time,
i.e.: network designer, systems designer, equipment,
software designers, ship designers, port infrastructure
designers and builders, CCTV, etc. The main aim of the
paper is to describe the metasystem for maritime
cybersecurity management during carriage goods by
sea.
Metasystem for maritime cybersecurity
management includes elements that have not
previously been included in the present structure of
security management systems. However, it is firmly
rooted in the hitherto high efficiency of their
functionality, which determines the construction of the
metasystem. meta system is developed based on the
previously adopted safety management standard
established in the ISM Code, which takes into account
the provisions of resolution MSC.248(98). The
provisions of the resolution draw attention to the need
to extend the previously developed SMS to include
cyber risk, resulting from the digitalization of maritime
activities and the threats associated with it. Also, the
progressive pursuit of the maritime industry to
increase autonomy in shipping generates attention to
extending the previously adopted safety management
systems to include cyber security management, an
integral part of which is to take into account cyber risk.
That is very important because the entry into service of
ships with varying degrees of autonomy is becoming a
matter of time.
The work consists of four chapters, which indicate
the stages and needs of the development of security
management systems, which ultimately lead to the
development of a structure of a cybersecurity
management metasystem. The objectives of the
individual chapters are as follows:
1. Defining the functional requirements required for
implementation in the SMS by the shipowner of a
conventional ship in accordance with the provisions
of the ISM Code;
2. Implementing the provision Resolution MSC.428
(98) to the previously established SMS, in particular
cyber risk management;
3. Indicating the main elements of the cybersecurity
management metasystem implementing the
cybersecurity management metasystem using
management processes
4. Describing elements to ensure safety on maritime
communication routes on which both conventional
and MASS ships will navigate.
The work was prepared based on the author's own
experience in the functioning of systems gained during
several years of experience in a position responsible for
the development, implementation and improvement of
the SMS (ISM Code) and studying the literature on the
subject, mainly legal acts, drafts of changes in
regulations related to the development of autonomous
shipping as a member of the MSC Section at the IMO
Center at PRS. The result of the conducted research is
the structure of the meta-system for managing
cybersecurity, which takes into account its
implementation by all maritime stakeholders including
those who will be responsible for managing MASS
operations.
2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ACCORDING
TO PROVISION OF ISM CODE
The standard for managing the safe operation of ships
was established by SOLAS`74, implemented in
Chapter IX of the Convention. The provisions of the
ISM Code obligated the shipowner or the entity
managing on its behalf to establish, implement,
maintain and improve a safety management system.
SMS means "an organizational structure and
documented system that enables the shipowner's
personnel to effectively implement safety and
environmental policies." The main formative elements
of the SMS are as follows: international formal
regulations, flag state of the vessel regulations,
classifier regulations security, non-technical,
environmental risks internal regulations of the
shipowner/manager regulations at the local level. A
system is a kind of structured and documented
roadmap for ensuring the safe operation of a ship.
A properly functioning SMS is essential in
eliminating risks to human life and health, material
losses and environmental pollution. The SMS is a
comprehensive system, which takes into account both
management through quality and environmental
management, with the overriding goal of creating safe
working conditions at sea. The shipowner/manager
will not be allowed to operate ships, if they do not also
meet the functional requirements established in the
ISM Code that includes the following functional
requirements:
− safety and environmental policy;
− instructions and procedures to ensure safe
operation of ships and protection of the
environment in accordance with relevant
international and flag state legislation;
− specific terms of reference and manners for mutual
communication between shore-based and ship-
based employees, as well as the communication of
these employees among themselves;
− accident reporting procedures, as well as non-
compliance reporting procedures;
− procedures for operation and emergency
preparedness;
− procedures for internal audits and management
system reviews.
Figure 1. SMS components in accordance with the functional
requirements of the ISM Code. Source: Own study.
vessel
Risk management
Audit and review of the
management system
States of hazard and
response
Maintaining the condition
of the ship/marine vessel
Functional
requirements
Designees /
functionaries
Documentation of the safety
management system
Crew of the ship /
marine vessel
Captain of a ship
/marine vessel
Shipowner / manager
Safety management
policy
Operational activities
Reporting and analysis
709
The diagram in fig. 1 presented the main
components of the SMS according to the functional
requirements integral to it. Without their fulfillment,
the safety management system cannot be properly
established by the shipowner and then verified for
compliance with the requirements of the ISM Code by
the maritime administration, resulting in the inability
to operate a ship/marine vessel.
The ISM Code tool is a well place in this area as a
solution to expand its provisions. Therefore,
implementing cybersecurity solutions through the
provisions of the ISM Code has become the right
solution. The provisions of this international document
are both rigorous to implement, but versatile enough
to allow ship owners/managers to implement its
provisions taking into account the specifics of their
operations and the types of ships/marine vessels they
manage. In addition, these requirements oblige the
shipowner to take a systemic approach to maritime
safety at every organizational level of the ship owning
company, including both the shipowner's office staff
and the crew members of the ship/marine vessel. The
digitalization of the maritime industry has forced the
need to implement solutions to ensure cybersecurity at
sea therefore MSC.428(98) resolution, as implemented
in the ISM Code, appears to be the first step towards a
systemic approach to ensure the appropriate level of
cybersecurity for conventional vessels, remote or
autonomous ship operations with various levels of
autonomy.
3 THE PROVISION OF RESOLUTION IMO
MSC.428(98) AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
TO SMS, IN PARTICULAR CYBER RISK DURING
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMATION AT SEA
(IN MARITIME TRANSPORT)
The introduction of the resolution's provisions into the
SMS resulted in the need to implement cyber risk
management methods by ship owner/ manager. In
addition, the functional requirements have been
expanded to add the following issues related to
ensuring cybersecurity management, by:
− establishing a cybersecurity management policy;
− preparing and implementing cybersecurity
management procedures;
− identifying cybersecurity resources and assets both
in the ship management/owner's office of the
marine vessel and directly on the ships;
− ensuring proper means and channels of
communication;
− ensuring that incidents can be reported, analyzed,
and responded to;
− identifying threats and assessing risks of occurrence
using cyberspace;
− identifying opportunities to improve already
implemented solutions through systematic
management system audits and reviews of the SMS
management.
The elements that affect the design of the SMS
under the current ISM Code and the incorporated
MSC. 428(98) resolution and in the context of maritime
autonomous surface vessels are based on cybersecurity
management. Cyber risk management is important
to ensure proper preparation in case of crisis situation
at sea caused by cyberattack on the networks and
systems of a ship or stakeholders of the maritime
industry (maritime transport). Cyber risk management
defined in an iterative process that consists of:
identifying, analyzing, assessing (figure 2) and
communicating cyber risk, and accepting, transferring,
avoiding or reducing risk to an acceptable level while
taking into account the costs and benefits of actions
taken by stakeholders participating in managing
maritime cyber risk. The stages of cyber risk
management in maritime transport have been
decomposed into four main stages, in line with the
approach to critical infrastructure security
management:
− preventing cyber threats;
− preparing for cyber threats;
− responding to cyber threats;
− recovering the ability to perform tasks.
Proper cyber risk management is important due to
the fact that MASS came into force soon in international
voyage. Moreover, MASS and conventional vessel will
be proceeding in the some sea area but they have
different situation awareness. It is worth emphasizing
that cybersecurity issues are not addressed in the
MASS Code. Therefore, it seems that the ISM Code,
together with the expanded IMO resolutions, will
support the safety of MASS operations as well as
conventional ships. Safety management systems will
need to address individual issues of managing MASS
operations and in correlation with MASS operations of
conventional ships, as well as smart seaports.
Figure 2. Cyber risk management process based on ISO/IEC
27001:2022. Source: Own study based on J. Krawiec,
Cyberbezpieczeństwo. Podejście systemowe, Oficyna
Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej, Warszawa, 2019.
Figure 3. Elements influencing the design of the safety
management system of MASS with various levels of
autonomy.
Shipowner
MASS cyber security
management system
International
conventions, codes
and other laws,
including the MASS
Code
Remote operation
center (ROC)
Classifier
regulations
Seaport VTS
surveillance area
Internal
regulations of the
shipowner/manag
er
Cybersecurity
OT and IT systems
MASS’s flag state
regulations
Regulation at the
local level
Characteristics of
the
shipowner/manag
er of the MASS
Area of operation
of MASS;
Level of MASS
Cybersecurity
management plan
developed for MASS
and ROC
710
The elements that affect the design of the SMS
under the current ISM Code and the incorporated
MSC. 428(98) resolution and in the context of maritime
autonomous surface vessels are shown in the fig.3.
4 THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF CYBERSECURITY
MANAGEMENT METASYSTEM USING OF
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
The digital sea project under development, on which
MASS will mostly sail, systematically replacing
conventional ships, needs a system that is
hierarchically superior to the systemic approach to
maritime safety and cybersecurity management
adopted to date. By extending understanding of
management systems, the author builds a metasystem
for managing cybersecurity in maritime transportation
during the digital transformation of shipping, at the
threshold of which are MASS with various levels of
autonomy. The resulting metasystem is capturing an
emerging transformation focusing on the sources of
construction of safety and security management
systems, their interactions, and the designers of these
systems along with their users. In addition to the
resulting metasystem, an interpretive paradigm is
created, which involves taking into account subjective
sources of data processed on the basis of knowledge,
but allowing the implementation of new solutions
under certain conditions of uncertainty arising from
the inability to predict the phenomena occurring in the
new way of implementing maritime transportation in
the cyberdomain, taking into account MASS as an
object transporting various types of goods. The
metasystem for maritime cybersecurity management,
shown in fig.4, includes elements that have not
previously been included in the structure of safety and
security management systems. However, it is firmly
rooted in the hitherto high efficiency of their
functionality, which determines the construction of the
metasystem. Its structures included designers of
systems, equipment, software, spare parts, etc., as well
as users of these designed and implemented solutions.
They bring their collection of competence to prepare
and implement such new solutions adapting the
technological development and cybersecurity
environment, taking into account the application of
this system over a certain period of time. Network,
systems, equipment, software designers, ship
designers and builders, port infrastructure designers
and builders, CCTV, etc. Designers design on the basis
of data and sets of competencies to make the closer and
farther users of the system form a kind of metasystem,
built from functional requirements to execute maritime
transportation globally.
The selection of these components is the result of
perceiving the issue of the safety management system
from as the result of their dynamic interactions.
Regardless of the development of automation,
technology, autonomy in shipping, this clash between
the functionality of devices and the center as a human
being will have its place.
Figure 4. Metasystem for maritime cybersecurity
management. Source: Own study
However, the functioning of the metasystem in the
age of the technological revolution at sea is being
pinned down by a sequence of activities in the form of
implementing processes that link the elements of the
metasystem to each other.
Fig. 5 shows the expanded metasystem with
management processes. The first of these is planning.
It includes the development of strategies and action
plans necessary for their implementation. This includes
analyzing the environment, assessing resources, and
forecasting events.
The second management process in metasystem is
organizing, which involves arranging and allocating
resources so that the set goals can be met. In this
process, the organizational structure is defined, along
with roles, responsibilities, and the allocation of
tangible and intangible assets for task performance.
The work system, planned and operational activities
are also defined.
Another process is directing, that is, motivating,
communicating and supervising the implementation of
the tasks set. Also included in this stage is the
identification of anomalies and problems and the
relocation of resources to carry out tasks arising from
disturbances, emergency conditions, etc., as well as the
handling of detected anomalies, emergency conditions,
etc.
The final process is monitoring and evaluating the
results based on the actions taken. It involves
comparing results with assumptions and identifying
deviations from the assumed norm. It also provides an
oversight of activities, that they are appropriate and
timely.
Figure 5. The architecture of management processes in the
metasystem of cybersecurity management in maritime
transportation. Source: Own study
Maritime cybersecurity
(in transport)
management system
with surrounding
elements
Designers
Users
Project
experience
Knowledge
Functional requirements
of management systems
Skills
Knowledge
Professional
experience
Skills
Application - system application area
in different layers
They recognize,
they analyze,
they interpret,
they evaluate
they recommend
design
They recognize,
they describe,
they design, they
implement,
they check, they
correct
They analyze,
they co-create,
they evaluate,
they test, they
use
They learn, they
use, they verify,
they test, they
update
Planning
Organization
Managing
Controlling
Cybersecurity
management
metasystem in maritime
transportation
711
The diagram in fig.6 shows the elements that build
the management process for achieving the goal of
ensuring the safety of maritime transportation and
uninterrupted delivery of cargo on time. Given the
complexity of the problem and the many different
stakeholders operating under conditions of uncertainty
and subjectivity in the era of digital transformation,
decision-making at the level of the central bodies that
will carry out the implementation of management
processes should be taken into account. The leading
role should be taken by the Ministry in charge of
digitization together with the Ministry of Maritime
Affairs, which on the basis of the established pattern of
proceeding based on management processes, involve
other bodies with specialists from different industries,
so as to jointly develop a system based on knowledge
and experience, but also experts who do not have
dedicated knowledge of IT, cybersecurity or maritime
safety, but are logisticians or experts from the
manufacturing industry, etc. A kind of mixture of
different kinds of potential is being created, based on
processes that result in decisions based on actions:
planned, organized, guided and controlled. They
comprehensively shape the concept of a cybersecurity
management system for shipping cargo by sea. The
decision that is the end result of the decision-making
process affects the entire operation of the concept.
Figure 6. Elements that build decision-making processes.
Source: Own study
5 THE ELEMENTS TO ENSURE SAFETY ON
MARITIME COMMUNICATION ROUTES
WHERE OPERATE CONVENTIONAL VESSEL
AND MARITIME AUTONOMOUS SURFACE
SHIP
The cyberdomain of maritime transportation has
become a complex environment of occurring
relationships between its resources, constituting a
logical sequence of consecutive actions and also
parallel activities , the implementation of which leads
to the execution of tasks arising from the
implementation of maritime transportation. An
industry that is critical to the multidimensionality of
global safety, but its vulnerability to a range of threats
occurring in the maritime transportation cyberdomain
constricts to properly define and organize security in
the new safety environment of the maritime
transportation domain. The main focal points of
maritime transportation, are the means of transport,
i.e., the ship carrying various types of cargo, and the
point of contact between land and sea, where goods are
transshipped - the seaport.
A seaport, due to the significant amount of
information processed in it to ensure global trade and
port operations, is an information hub (fig.7).
Moreover, a vessel with all its data potential, which it
uses to ensure the safety of navigation, ship operation
and handling of transported cargo, is an information
hub (fig.8).
Figure 7. Seaport as an information hub.
Figure 8. Vessel as an information hub.
When defining management processes in a
cybersecurity management system, it is important to
consider the ship/marine vessel and the port facility,
which are the center of the system. However, in order
to ensure their realization of tasks, the maritime
cybersecurity management system consists of the
following systems that constitute the external
environment:
− system for defending maritime routes in
communication and cyberspace;
− ship traffic surveillance and management system;
Management processes
Understanding the goals and
the environment, in which the
goal is to be achieved
Analysis of the potential and
possibility of achieving the goal
Development of objectives
Management of available
resources
Implementation of planned
activities
Controlling the implemented
measures
Monitoring and implementing
ongoing adjustments to
operations
Performance management
Reporting and reviewing
implemented solutions in
accordance
with the original assumptions
Planning
Organization
Managing
Controlling
712
− government administration management system
(shipping);
− the system for protecting the maritime national
border;
− cybersecurity system for networks and systems;
− maritime search and rescue system;
− operational communications and alert system.
Taking into account the intensification of
technological development in the maritime industry,
figure 5.10 shows the elements of the external
environment and the relationship between the
maritime cybersecurity management system using
maritime autonomous surface ships. In this case, the
ship and port facility safety management systems that
have been extended to include cybersecurity issues,
disappeared. This is due to the assumption that this
system will support MASS 3 and 4, which level of
autonomy will require the organization of remote
operation centers and consideration of response in the
event of disruption to the MASS operating system, as
well as disruption to the remote operation center itself.
New elements have been included in the MASS
maritime transportation cybersecurity management
system to enable operational activities at the
appropriate level of MASS navigation safety as
navigation safety in the body of water on which MASS,
as well as conventional ships, will operate. Also, when
MASS enters service, automation and autonomy are
increased at the port facilities targeted by MASS.
Therefore, systems related to autonomy at the port
facility are also included.
Figure 9. Elements of the external environment of the MASS
maritime cybersecurity management system. Source: Own
study
The cybersecurity management system for
maritime transportation is presented. The system
consist of number of subsystem which extended part of
managing safe operation, the remote control system
from the center, and the architecture and its
accessibility of the network and systems in cyberspace.
However, just listing the systems and building them is
not enough: the right interface between them is
needed, so that conventional ships and autonomous
ships can travel the sea routes together, the interface
between the systems, which takes into account other
operational systems of conventional ships and MASS,
is needed to ensure their appropriate level of safety.
There is a need for a design and usable element that
ensures the safety of navigation as well as data
transmission of data at sea at the same time.
Therefore, the system includes designers who
participate at every stage of system development,
starting from the design of devices, networks, systems,
technology implementation, project preparation, etc.
Moreover, it causes the culture of safety at sea to evolve
towards a culture of cybersecurity at sea, in which,
regardless of the development of systems, a human
will play a significant role either as a designer or as a
user of the system or subsystems of the complex meta-
system for managing cybersecurity in the cold (in
maritime transport).
6 CONCLUSIONS
The accumulated research material allowed the
preparation of management processes, based on
functional requirements that enable the use of a
systems approach to ensure cybersecurity in maritime
transportation which finally is prepared safety
metasystem management at sea (in maritime
transportation). It was rooted out in the fact that system
is noted that the maritime cybersecurity management
system is a system made up of other separate systems
interconnected by mutual relationships, which differ in
their specifics, but there are common processes that
guide maritime stakeholders to carry out their assigned
tasks in maritime transportation and are critically
important for their success, i.e., planning, establishing,
implementing, maintaining and improving.
The accumulated research material allowed the
preparation of management processes, based on
functional requirements that enable the use of a
systems approach to ensure cybersecurity in maritime
transportation.
Attention was paid to the role of systems that
constitute the preparation safety management system
which is extend to cybersecurity management systems.
The research resulted in preparation the
metasystem in which the center, regardless of the level
of automation, is a human being who makes decisions,
supervises the movement of the ship and monitors the
safe operation of the ship, and thus performs
management processes. In the metasystem of
cybersecurity management, a significant role in
building the concept of the system is played by a
human being ( as a designer), who, with its entire team
of competencies, designs the devices, networks,
systems, programming, which are then operated by it
as a user. Effective cybersecurity systems which consist
of alla maritime stakeholders, enable users to work in
a secure environment and reduce vulnerabilities by
presenting their readiness to repel a possible cyber
threat as well as a physical one. However, the author
understands that the proposed solutions are new and
carry a kind of subjectivity. Therefore, a concept with
consideration of the metasystem in different
perspectives: the user, the designer and the external
environment of the system is indicated. Thanks to such
an arrangement, it was possible to obtain the very
essence of competence needs in building a safety
environment for the strategic transport of cargo, as well
as its reception in a Polish port.
Surveillance and
management system for
ships, MASS and remote
operation center
Cybersecurity system for
networks and systems
System for defending
maritime routes in
communication and
cyberspace
MASS maritime search
and rescue system
The system of security of the
maritime national border
Government management
system (digitization and
shipping)
Cybersecurity
management system
Security management
system in cyberspace
Cybersecurity
management system
in maritime MASS
transport
Port facility
Ship / marine vessel
Operational
communications and
emergency alert system
Availability system (including satellite) of IT,
operational and communication
infrastructure in the port and on ships
MASS safe operation
management system
Remote operation
center management
system
Maritime users (the all maritime stakeholders)
Designers
713
The time of digital transformation in shipping,
where tradition meets modernity, is haggard with all
sorts of disruptions. The situation creates a sense of
unfamiliarity with the changes taking place,
uncertainty in a new hitherto unexplored dimension.
Therefore, the author, in concluding her research,
understands that she has not exhausted the topic,and
hopes that it will be developed and continued by other
researchers. Especially with taking into account in
future research the need to maintain a balance between
the development of autonomy in shipping, innovation
in technological progress and the safety environment,
ethics and progress, taking into account the limits of
human capability, working in extreme conditions, and
the rational use of technology in an environment,
where nature sets its laws. It is also important to take
into account the fact that humanity will continue to be
wise and proactive rather than reactive and be able to
skillfully use technological advances for the successful
operation of maritime transportation in the maritime
cyber domain.
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