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1 INTRODUCTION
The geopolitical landscape of the Baltic Sea Region
(BSR) underwent significant transformations during
the late 20th and early 21st centuries, profoundly
impacting its transport networks and regional
integration. During the Cold War era, the Iron Curtain
effectively bisected the Baltic Sea, creating two distinct
and largely isolated zones. The conclusion of the Soviet
period saw the Baltic Sea only partially interconnected
by transport infrastructure, reflecting the region's
political division. The disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the subsequent accession of the Baltic States
to the European Union (EU) redefined this area as a
frontier between Russia and the EU. In the immediate
post-Soviet period, the newly established boundaries
remained relatively permeable. However, as the 21st
century progressed, these borders became increasingly
defined and less ambiguous.
The 1990s witnessed substantial disruptions in the
transport sector due to these geopolitical shifts. As the
situation stabilized in subsequent years, the 2004
enlargement of the EU fundamentally altered the
nature of the border with the Former Soviet Union
(FSU). This expansion effectively relocated the EU's
eastern frontier, introducing a new geopolitical
discontinuity in the eastern Baltic region.
The eastern shore of the BSR experienced a
profound economic transition, evolving from centrally
planned economies to market-oriented systems. The
Baltic States have garnered significant attention due to
their emergence as new markets within the EU and
their crucial role as transit corridors for trade with
Russia. This dual function underscores their strategic
importance in the evolving economic and political
landscape of the region.
Over the past few decades, the Lithuania port of
Klaipeda has experienced remarkable growth,
From Crisis to Resilience: The port of Klaipeda
and the Reshaping of Baltic Trade Flows (2014-2023)
A. Serry
Le Havre Normandy University, Le Havre, France
ABSTRACT: Geopolitical tensions on the European Union's eastern borders are profoundly reshaping trade flows
and logistics chain organization. Through the study of the port of Klaipeda (Lithuania), this article analyses the
impact of successive crises (Russian-Ukrainian conflict since 2014, tensions with Belarus in 2020-2021, war in
Ukraine since 2022) on the activity of a major port in the eastern Baltic. Based on quantitative traffic data (2010-
2023), AIS data and interviews with port stakeholders, this research highlights a triple dynamic: the disruption
of traditional East-West flows, particularly for hydrocarbons and fertilizers; the emergence of new North-South
trade routes; and the accelerated diversification of port activities. The results demonstrate the port's adaptation
capacity to geopolitical shocks while emphasizing its structural vulnerability in an unstable regional context. This
study contributes to understanding the interactions between geopolitics and port geography in European border
areas.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 19
Number 1
March 2025
DOI: 10.12716/1001.19.01.16
136
transforming from a Soviet-era facility into a key player
in global trade. However, the Port of Klaipeda’s
trajectory has been deeply influenced by the volatile
geopolitical environment surrounding it, particularly
the political turmoil in Belarus and the war in Ukraine.
This paper aims to provide an analysis of the impact
of successive geopolitical crises on the operations of the
Port of Klaipeda and, by extension, trade flows in the
Baltic region. The crises under scrutiny include the
Russo-Ukrainian conflict (2014), tensions with Belarus,
and the ongoing war in Ukraine (2022). The study seeks
to highlight the port's capacity to adapt to these shocks
while also highlighting its structural vulnerability in an
unstable regional context. The hypothesis
underpinning this analysis is that geopolitical crises
disrupt traditional east-west trade flows, particularly
in regard to hydrocarbons and fertilisers, and
concomitantly foster the emergence of new trade
routes, particularly towards the north and south. In
order to achieve this objective, the paper employs a
range of methodologies, commencing with a
conventional approach to transport geography which
is predicated on the study of port traffic. The analysis
is enriched by field interviews with key port players
and analyses based on the use of AIS data (Kerbiriou,
Serry, 2023). In doing so, it offers insights into how
ports like Klaipeda can navigate both crisis and
opportunity in an increasingly interconnected and
volatile world.
2 KLAIPEDA, A BALTIC PORT WITH COMPLEX
DYNAMICS
2.1 Baltic ports, tensions and their consequences
During the 1990s, the problem arose of finding a safe
and economically satisfactory route for Russian
products to reach the Atlantic. Although Russia has
regularly pursued policies aimed at using the economy
to serve political ends, flows on the scale of the
globalised market have crossed the Baltic borders
relatively easily. The evidence is clear: since the mid-
1990s, the ports of the eastern Baltic have been
characterised by steady growth in traffic and port
modernisation. Initially, this trend was shared by the
majority of ports, both Baltic and Russian. Total traffic
in the Baltic Sea doubled between 1997 and 2019 (from
420 million tonnes to more than 800 million tonnes).
According to severall forecasts, a continuous growth of
cargo turnover was expected in the Baltic ports
(Matczak, N.K. Meyer, E. Ooms, M. Vološina, H.
Warmelink, J. Zaucha, E. Czermański, C. Coornaert, A.
Koch, 2018). Growth has been most sustained on the
eastern shore. Till 2013, cumulative cargo turnover has
kept an increasing level even and was dominated by
bulks, mainly oil products. In reality, maritime
transportation had a positive evolution until the mid-
2010s. For instance, the Baltic Sea Region has a regular
rise in containerised transport (Wolff, Herz, Flamig,
2011). Container flows in the Baltic Sea were growing
roughly in line with the worldwide market from 2010
until 2014 but suffered a severe downturn in 2015
(Ojala, 2016).
The crisis in Ukraine has indeed had multiple
repercussions on logistics and port activities in the
Baltic region. Before the crisis, the Baltic countries were
strategic transit points for trade between Europe and
Russia (Liebuvienė, Čižiūnienė, 2021). With the
economic sanctions imposed on Russia, the volume of
trade between the European Union and Russia,
including exports and imports of Russian goods, has
significantly decreased. In fact, the cargo turnover of
many Baltic ports was heavily dependent on Russian
foreign trade transhipments through these ports.
Primarily, the ports strategy and infrastructure were
being developed with the hope of attracting Russian
transit. Except the Russian ports, the ports of Riga and
Klaipeda were the most dynamic in the region, using
the Russian proximity but also different hinterland
possibilities toward Belarus, Ukraine or Central Asia.
In 2012, the port of Riga estimates transit to account for
approximately 70%-77% of all freight handled. In
Lithuania, the port of Klaipeda was less dependent on
transit traffic than other ports of the Baltic States with
42% of transit traffic, out of which 78% came from
Belarus.
Relations deteriorated further with the economic
sanctions imposed on Russia in July 2014. Russia
responded with an embargo on Western agri-food
products, and Moscow used the sanctions to pursue a
substitution strategy: hitting imports to boost domestic
production. As a result, competition between ports has
intensified since 2014. The stagnation of Russian
demand and European economic sanctions against
Russia, as well as the strategies of maritime alliances,
have challenged the overall increase in demand and
shared growth in favour of increased competition
between port centres. The decline in traffic in some
Baltic ports is indicative of this trend: overdependence
on Russia is a factor in the vulnerability of the Eastern
Baltic ports. While the mutual economic sanctions
imposed by the European Union and Russia did not
initially have a significant impact on the operation of
Baltic ports, Moscow's decision to stop exporting its
petroleum products via Baltic ports in 2018 has
changed the situation. This has caused a drastic
reduction in goods transiting through Baltic ports. The
reduction in trade with Russia has had a direct impact
on Baltic Sea ports such as Saint-Petersburg, Klaipeda,
Riga, and Tallinn. To compensate for the decrease in
Russian traffic, ports are trying to diversify by
attracting goods from other regions. This includes
agricultural products from Central Europe or energy
products destined for Northern Europe. However, this
transition requires investments in logistics and
infrastructure.
It is particularly the case in the energy sector. The
Baltic countries, once dependent on Russian supplies,
have accelerated the transition to other energy
suppliers, notably by building LNG (Liquefied Natural
Gas) terminals. The port of Klaipeda, for example,
plays a key role in importing LNG for Lithuania and its
neighbours (Serry, Gritsenko, 2015). Russia also used
to export significant quantities of coal and minerals via
Baltic ports. With the sanctions, these flows have
considerably decreased, negatively impacting the
logistics sector in the Baltic region. Concretely, the
seaports of the Baltic states continued to play a
significant transit role in the shipping of Russian
foreign trade cargo till 2021 (Volovoj & al., 2021).
Land traffic was severely disrupted by sanctions
and the war. Particularly, railways were a key
infrastructure for transporting Russian raw materials,
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such as coal, fertilizers, and oil, to Baltic ports. The
crisis and sanctions have reduced this type of
transport, leading to a decrease in revenue for Baltic
railway companies and a reconfiguration of logistics
networks. Consequently, new routes have been
favoured, bypassing Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and
using transit corridors via Poland or other Northern
European ports. For example, some Scandinavian and
Polish ports have seen an increase in their activity with
flows redirected from Baltic ports.
Even if it's not at the heart of our approach, the
conflict has increased risks in the Baltic Sea, causing
insurance costs for ships transiting the region to rise.
Additionally, the increase in fuel prices and operating
costs due to geopolitical instability has made
operations more expensive for logistics operators.
Moreover, sanctions imposed on Russia have added
administrative complexity for companies operating in
the region. Enhanced security inspections, as well as
checks to ensure goods do not violate sanctions,
increase delays and costs for logistics operators.
Evidence indicates that the eastern coast of the
Baltic is experiencing adverse effects (Figure 1) due to
events in Belarus and Ukraine, while ports in the west
are relatively unscathed. The map, based on 2013, the
last year before the sanctions, clearly shows the strong
impact of the sanctions on Baltic ports. However, this
development remains precarious due to its
vulnerability to international geopolitical
uncertainties, unilateral decisions by the Kremlin, and
global energy tensions that directly impact maritime
flows (Serry, 2023). After 2022, in the majority of ports,
a fundamental change in the structure of
transhipments was observed over the course of a single
year (Kuźmiński, 2023).
Figure 1. Traffic trends for eastern Baltic ports from 2013 to
2023.
2.2 Evolution of the Port of Klaipeda
At the point where the Curonian Spit joins the Baltic
Sea, the port of Klaipeda has been established. This is
Lithuania's primary, if not sole, port, with an estimated
capacity of 25 million tons (mt) in 2001 (Brodin, A.,
2003) which grew to more than 52 mt today (Bagočius,
Zavadskas, Turskis, 2013). The evolution of the
Klaipeda port since the early 1990s can be delineated
into three distinct phases. The initial phase
encompassed the port's pivotal administrative and
financial reorganization, a crucial step in aligning the
port with the tenets of the market economy. The second
phase entailed the restoration of traffic levels that had
declined following the declaration of independence
and the modernisation of existing infrastructure. Once
nationalist fervour gave way to reason, the port agreed
to re-establish trade relations with CIS countries. The
specialization of the Soviet port in a particular area of
trade meant that former partners were in demand. As
a result, the port quickly regained its pre-independence
freight levels. The third phase involved attracting new
traffic, particularly containers. From this point of view,
the port of Klaipeda has benefited from numerous
investments, such as those in the Smelte terminal,
which has been under the control of Terminal
Investment Limited since 2008. The aim of these
investments has been to increase the terminal's
capacity, modernize its tools, and turn it into a regional
hub.
The results have been substantial, as the port's
traffic has increased from barely 10 million tons in 1990
to a maximum of 47.8 million tonnes in 2020 (Figure 2).
The Klaipeda port has been the leader in terms of cargo
volume among the ports of the Baltic States for the fifth
consecutive year (Liebuvienė, Čižiūnienė, 2021).
Figure 2. Traffic development of the port of Klaipeda
between 1990 and 2023 (in tons). Source: Eurostat, Klaipeda
State Seaport authority.
Despite the fierce competition between the region's
ports, the port of Klaipeda has managed to diversify its
activities while remaining true to its core business of
exporting dry bulk from the CIS (Serry, 2019). With
almost half of all fertilizer traffic in the Baltic, Klaipeda
has dominated this activity since the early 2010s. It
benefits from a number of advantages, including its
ideal location for transporting Belarusian potassium
salt, which has encouraged players in the industry to
invest there. In this sector, integration was at work, as
illustrated in 2013 by the acquisition of a stake in the
BKT (Biriu Kroviniu Terminalas) combined terminal
dedicated to the fertilizers of the leading Belarusian
manufacturer, Belaruskali (Serry, 2013). Additionally,
-
5000 000
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20000 000
25000 000
30000 000
35000 000
40000 000
45000 000
50000 000
2023
2021
2019
2017
2015
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
138
it invested in the modernisation of rail connections to
facilitate the export of its products.
“Since 2004, Belarus made a decision that, well, we
will more and more use Klaipeda port. And they
started to do that. And probably 2020, 2021 was those
two years of peak of Belarusian transit cargo” (Port of
Klaipeda, Head of Communications and Marketing,
December 2024). From a structural perspective, dry
bulk was a pervasive feature of the Klaipeda port. In
2013, dry bulk accounted for 47% of the port's total
traffic (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Traffic structure and evolution (2013 – 2023).
Source: Eurostat, Klaipeda State Seaport authority.
Liquid bulk is mainly carried by the Būtingė oil
terminal inaugurated in 1999 to meet Lithuania's crude
oil import needs, mainly to supply the Mažeikiai
refinery. It is also historically connected to the
Klaipedos Nafta business for the export of
manufactured goods and since 2014 to LNG flows.
Indeed, un autumn 2014, the first terminal in the
Eastern Baltic Sea, the floating LNG barge with a
symbolic name “Independence”, was commissioned in
Klaipeda allowing Lithuania to fulfil its energy
diversification goal. The terminal, leased from
Norway’s Hoegh LNG, has the capacity to supply 4
bcm of gas annually, covering then about 80% of the
total Baltic States’ consumption (Serry, 2017).
Finally, the port handles a diverse range of general
cargo mainly ro-ro and containerized traffic even if
Klaipeda port is also handling goods like metal
products, construction materials, packed fertilizers or
oversized cargo. Container handling is a significant
and growing aspect of Klaipeda's port operations with
record-breaking performances exceeding 1 million
TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units) in 2022 and 2023.
From a regional point of view, Klaipeda is now one of
the market leaders (Bartosiewicz, Kucharski, 2023), the
second-largest container hub in the Baltic Sea behind
Gdansk. Ro-ro traffic is also omnipresent in the port
(5,25 Mt in 2023). Ferry traffic in Klaipeda remains
robust, with multiple weekly sailings to various
destinations, Sweden (Karlshamn), Germany (Kiel) or
Denmark (Koge). The port continues to serve as a
crucial link between Lithuania and other Baltic and
North Sea countries, facilitating both passenger and
cargo transport. Klaipeda attracts regional leaders in
ferry segment like TT-Line and DFDS (Urbanyi-
Popiołek, 2023).
In addition to stevedoring in Klaipeda port, there is
also a sufficiently intense movement of cruise ships
(Rapalis, Šilas, Žaglinskis, 2022). It is also interesting to
mention the existence of the shipyards as they are
making fishing trawlers and some floating docks. The
strength of Klaipeda Port lies in the diversification of
cargoes, as the port is suitable for stevedoring any type
of cargo. This is one of the main reasons why the port
maintains good results and overtakes its competitors
(Table 1), who only handle one or specific types of
cargo. Another strength of the port is the long-term and
continuous investment in the port infrastructure and
technological development of the terminals. About half
a billion euros have been invested in the port's
infrastructure since 2007, in addition to the
technologies installed by private stevedoring
companies (Argyropoulou, 2022).
Table 1. Market share of Baltic ports (2022).
Tons
124,2
57,3
38,9
36,1
23,5
18
15,9
14,9
8,1
7,8
Source: Klaipeda State Seaport authority.
So, with 4,000 employees in all of the companies
(Port of Klaipeda, Head of Communications and
Marketing, December 2024), the port is not only the
economic lung of the city and the region, but also plays
an active role in the 14% of the GPD represented by the
Lithuanian transport sector.
3 PORT OF KLAIPEDA: NAVIGATING
GEOPOLITICAL SHIFTS AND ADAPTING TO
NEW TRADING REALITIES
As demonstrated in the preceding discussion, the port
of Klaipeda functions as a pivotal logistics hub, not
only for Lithuania but also for several neighbouring
countries within the region, including Belarus, as well
as Russia and Ukraine. Its significance in global trade,
particularly in the context of facilitating the export of
Belarusian products, has been a notable aspect of its
recent economic activity. Nevertheless, the geopolitical
dynamics of the region, most notably the ongoing
situation in Belarus and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine,
have had a profound influence on port activities, both
prior to and following the outbreak of the conflict in
Ukraine in 2022.
3.1 A port affected by the regional (geo)political situation.
Prior to the crisis in Ukraine, the port of Klaipeda
played a pivotal role in Belarusian foreign trade,
functioning as a nexus for the export of Belarusian
products, particularly fertilisers, and as a pivotal hub
for the supply of general cargo. Belarus, under the
leadership of President Alexander Lukashenko, has
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historically utilised the Lithuanian port as a conduit for
its exports to global markets, notably the European
Union. The strategic importance of Klaipeda as a
transport hub for Belarus is further underscored by its
advantageous geographical proximity and the
presence of well-developed rail infrastructure that is
well-suited to the transportation of heavy and sensitive
goods. Additionally, the Lithuanian port functioned as
a transit hub for Russian exports bound for Western
markets. However, these exports were predominantly
directed towards Russian ports or the more northerly
Baltic ports.
The impact of the domestic political situation in
Belarus on the port of Klaipeda intensified from 2020
onwards, with the escalation of political tensions and
mass demonstrations against Lukashenko's disputed
re-election. In response to the violent repression of
opponents and Belarus's growing diplomatic isolation,
the European Union intensified its sanctions against
the country, thereby limiting trade opportunities.
Since December 2021, Belarus has been unable to
export potassium chloride through the Lithuanian port
of Klaipeda, which accounted for 90 % of its shipments.
Belaruskali has been forced to shift its focus to
alternative markets, including new ports in Russia.
The outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in February
2022 had a considerable impact on trade relations
between Belarus and Lithuania, thereby exacerbating
geopolitical tensions in the region. Due to its provision
of political and military support to Russia, Belarus was
subjected to novel European economic sanctions,
which had a considerable effect on cross-border trade.
In response to these sanctions, Lithuania has taken
diplomatic steps to reduce trade with its Belarusian
neighbour, particularly with regard to the transport of
goods through the port of Klaipeda. “We are not
dealing anymore with Russian transit cargo with some
exceptions. For example, food products.” (Port of
Klaipeda, Head of Communications and Marketing,
December 2024).
The most notable consequence of these measures
has been a substantial decrease in the transit volumes
of Belarusian goods through the Klaipeda port. Indeed,
in 2022, several shipping and logistics companies
phased out their activities with Belarus, redirecting
their trade flows to other Baltic ports, notably Poland
and Finland. The drop in traffic was particularly
significant between 2021 and 2022, from 45.6 to 36.1
million tonnes. A further decrease followed in 2023, to
32.7 million tonnes. This shift in trade patterns has had
a substantial impact on the port's revenue and
employment in the maritime sector, particularly with
respect to exports of Belarusian fertilizers and oil,
which constituted a considerable portion of the port's
traffic.
From a categorical perspective, liquid cargoes have
remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 7 and
11 million tonnes per year. Conversely, dry cargo has
exhibited considerable variability, increasing from 17
million tonnes in 2013 to a peak of 24 million in 2020,
subsequently declining to 9.2 million in 2023.
Concurrently, general cargo experienced an overall
increase, rising from 11.5 million tonnes in 2013 to 15.9
million in 2023 (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Traffic structure before and after the beginning of
the war in Ukraine. Source: Klaipeda State Seaport authority.
In addition to the direct impact on trade with
Belarus, the war in Ukraine has also had a significant
impact on security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region.
For instance, the Lithuanian fertilizer producer
Achemos Grupe, ceased production in 2022 due to high
energy costs, despite its involvement in the vertical
integration of the fertilizer industry. The escalation of
tensions has given rise to mounting defence concerns,
which in turn have had a bearing on port strategies.
Klaipeda, a pivotal port within the region, has been
compelled to fortify its resilience in the face of
prospective threats, including by implementing novel
security measures. The war has also led to heightened
concerns regarding the security of energy supplies,
impacting infrastructures associated with the storage
and transportation of oil and gas.
The crisis in Ukraine has had a significant impact on
the organisation of logistics and the configuration of
supply chains in the region. The situation has had a
pervasive impact on all ports, transport corridors,
trade flows and logistics infrastructures. The impact of
the Russia-Western world crisis on Baltic ports since
2013 has been considerable and multifaceted. As has
been demonstrated, prior to 2013, the port of Klaipėda
was reliant, to some extent, on the transit of Russian
and Belarusian goods. However, this situation began to
change in 2014, following Russia's annexation of
Crimea and its support for the Donbass separatists.
3.2 From Crisis to Opportunity?
As we already saw, the geopolitical crisis arising from
the war in Ukraine has had a significant impact on port
activities in the Baltic Sea region, particularly with
regard to cargo flows and logistics. However, some
ports like Klaipeda have demonstrated resilience by
adapting their strategies and exploring new business
opportunities.
The initial disruptions, primarily caused by the loss
of Belarusian cargo, were particularly acute for the dry
cargo terminals. The Executive Director of the
Association of Lithuanian Stevedoring Companies
(December 2024) noted a significant change: “The same
terminal that previously handled Belarusian fertilizers
is now processing Lithuanian grain.” Despite the
challenges, container traffic has shown a positive trend,
somewhat compensating for the downturn in other
cargo types, such as transit cargo. Changes in trade
routes have been another notable consequence of the
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geopolitical situation. As the conflict reshaped
traditional trade corridors, new import and export
patterns emerged. For instance, the Executive Director
observed, “Looking at turnover excluding cargo from
or to Belarus, we can say that the remaining cargo
volumes have remained stable. However, the direction
of trade has shifted—imports now include crushed
stone from Sweden and Norway, and steel from
Turkey, instead of Belarus.”
This shift is indicative of broader strategic
adjustments occurring within the Baltic ports.For
instance, Tallinn has undergone a redefining of its role,
with the port's strategy evolving from a vital link
between East and West to one connecting North and
South (Vihman, December 2024).This is part of a wider
rethinking of regional connectivity, as evidenced by
Klaipėda's port also adapting its function. The Head of
Communications and Marketing at Klaipėda Port has
remarked that the port is seeking to redefine itself, with
practical outcomes such as the Rail Baltica project,
moving away from its traditional role as a gateway
from West to East.
Nevertheless, these transitions are accompanied by
a number of challenges. The Head of Communications
and Marketing at Klaipėda Port emphasised the
constraints imposed by geographical and
infrastructural factors, particularly the legacy of rail
connections constructed for trade with Russia and the
former CIS countries: “In general this idea to quickly
somehow reinvent ourselves is rather naïve. It's not
possible to just become something else just because you
decided so. Geography is limiting you anyway, and
there is so much infrastructure which was built,
especially for connecting the Baltic states ports to
Russia and former CIS countries, railway standard. It's
impossible to quickly change that, so it will not happen
very quickly, but we are looking. We are thinking in
this perspective how to work more with Western
European countries.” (Port of Klaipeda, Head of
Communications and Marketing, December 2024).
From the private sector's standpoint, numerous
companies are investigating novel prospects while
maintaining a flexibility in their options, anticipating
potential future advancements. A case in point is the
ongoing relationship between the port and Belarusian
fertilizer producer Belaruskali, which remains a
shareholder in the BKT terminal. As the Executive
Director of the Association of Lithuanian Stevedoring
Companies pointed out, “Belaruskali is waiting for the
end of sanctions to resume fertilizer exports to
Klaipėda. Logistically, it remains the best solution.”
This indicates a level of uncertainty and caution, with
companies hedging their bets on the eventual lifting of
sanctions.
Furthermore, the port and port companies have
identified transshipment as a potential solution to the
issue at hand. Unlike traditional cargo flows, which
require extensive hinterland connectivity,
transshipment involves the transfer of cargo from one
vessel to another, thereby bypassing the need for
inland transport. This model has the potential to offer
greater flexibility in adapting to shifting trade routes
and to reduce dependency on long-established
connections.
Concretely, containerised traffic grew rapidly
during the period under review, from 450 428 TEU in
2013 to 1 069 678 in 2024. This growth helped partially
offset the decrease in other cargo types, particularly
transit cargo. The increase in capacity offered by
container ships calling in the port is a perfect
illustration of this trend, , while the capacity dedicated
to dry bulk has decreased. As demonstrated by the
graph, the energy independence strategy that has been
implemented by Lithuania since 2014 with the
commissioning of the LNG terminal, is of particular
significance. Following 2022, there was a notable
acceleration in the implementation of this strategy.
Figure 5. Capacity offered by type of vessel in the port of
Klaipeda, 2013-2023. Source: AIS data, 2024.
Returning to containerised traffic, the substantial
increase observed in 2022, from 700 000 to 1 million
TEUs, can be primarily attributed to the transshipment
of empty containers, predominantly those travelling
from Russian ports via Klaipeda to other locations.
However, since 2023, transshipment volumes have
experienced a slight decline, indicating a shift towards
full containers stevedoring. This suggests that a greater
proportion of cargo is being exported from or imported
to Lithuania, rather than merely empty containers
being repositioned (The Executive Director of the
Association of Lithuanian Stevedoring Companies,
December 2024).
The notable increase in container traffic observed at
Klaipeda in comparison with other Baltic ports can be
attributed primarily to the enhanced capacity of the
port and the efficiency of the terminals. The port of
Klaipeda, Head of Communications and Marketing
(December 2024) states: “we have more capacity, we
have kind of efficient terminal. Klaipedos Smelte is
ranked as one of the best MSC terminals in their group.
What comes to efficiency, what comes to price for
movement, and so on and so... So we are kind of strong,
because of terminal efficiency, pricing for
transshipment”
The increasing focus on container traffic may be
attributed to its higher efficiency relative to other cargo
types, particularly as ports seek to streamline
operations and reduce costs. Efficiency has become a
key factor in maintaining competitiveness. A study by
Bartosiewicz et al. (2024) on the efficiency of maritime
container terminals in the Baltic Sea region emphasized
that efficiency can be evaluated from multiple
141
perspectives, including operational performance,
technological integration, and logistics management.
A methodology has been developed for the
evaluation of one of the factors contributing to this
efficiency, namely the speed with which containers are
handled on terminals. The combination of AIS data
(number of port calls, vessel capacity) and port traffic
enables the estimation of the average length of
handling of one TEU in a port (Serry, 2019).
Figure 6. Average handling time per TEU according to AIS
data. Source: AIS data, 2024.
As demonstrated in Figure 6, there is a clear and
indisputable enhancement in the efficiency of
Klaipeda's container terminals over the past decade.
Notably, the findings particularly emphasise the
accomplishments attained in 2023.
Despite the efforts of ports and businesses to adapt
to the new geopolitical landscape, stakeholders have
expressed dissatisfaction with the level of support from
public authorities. The Executive Director of the
Association of Lithuanian Stevedoring Companies
remarked, “Public authorities have focused mainly on
sanctions and compliance issues, rather than providing
assistance to help national businesses survive in these
challenging times.” This sentiment reflects a broader
concern about the lack of strategic support for the
private sector, which has had to navigate these crises
largely on its own. Vaidotas Sileika, Chief Executive
Officer at Klaipeda Container Terminal, thinks that the
Lithuanian government, should not change the
directions of the port's activities and keep the priorities
- investments in the Port of Klaipėda should be
encouraged. The activities carried out in the port
should be recognised as an important project for the
country, and the construction of the city's southern
bypass and the European railway line "Rail Baltica" to
Klaipėda is expected.” (https://ve.lt/verslas/klaipedos-
uostas-atsispyre-nuo-dugno).
In addition to its strategy for coping with the
decline in traffic, the port of Klaipeda has had to
multiply its adaptations:
− It had to invest in infrastructure to improve its
capacity to accommodate larger ships and diversify
its activities. Investments were made in container
and bulk terminals to handle more diversified cargo
flows. The port also strengthened its links with
other Baltic ports, such as Riga and Tallinn, to
optimise logistics chains.
− The port also played a role in facilitating the transit
of Ukrainian agricultural products after Black Sea
ports (such as Odessa) were largely closed due to
the conflict. While Ukrainian exports by land and
rail were complex, a large proportion of the goods
that were previously transhipped through
Ukrainian ports have been redirected since 2022 to
the ports of Poland (Savchuk, 2024) in which
alternative transport chains have been set up
(Fernandes, Teixeira, Santos, 2023). But Klaipeda
became also an alternative for Ukrainian grain.
− In the context of escalating tensions, the issue of
port infrastructure security assumed a heightened
priority. Klaipeda was compelled to implement
enhanced security measures, particularly in
response to the potential risks of cyberattacks and
military incidents within the Baltic region. This
necessitated investments in advanced surveillance
systems and a deepening of collaborative efforts
with Lithuanian authorities and NATO.
4 CONCLUSIONS
While the geopolitical crisis triggered by the war in
Ukraine has undoubtedly posed significant challenges
for Baltic ports, particularly in terms of cargo flow and
infrastructure, these challenges have also created
opportunities for strategic adaptation and
reorientation. Ports such as Klaipėda (and Tallinn)
have sought to redefine their roles in regional trade,
exploring new routes, cargo types, and operational
models. However, the process of adaptation is complex
and constrained by infrastructure and geographical
factors, requiring time and careful planning.In the
private sector, companies are similarly exploring new
opportunities while maintaining flexibility, often
waiting for geopolitical conditions to stabilise. The role
of efficiency, particularly in the container sector, has
become a critical element in navigating this new
landscape. Notwithstanding the challenges, the crisis
has prompted innovative thinking and could, in the
long run, offer significant opportunities for those ports
and businesses that can effectively adapt.
The ongoing Russo-Western crisis, which has been
in effect since 2013, has undeniably reshaped the
dynamics of Baltic ports, particularly in terms of trade
flows and infrastructure. It has had a profound impact
on the Baltic port landscape. The region's ports are
facing significant challenges in the face of an unstable
geopolitical context, which continues to exert a
considerable influence on their operations and
development. All the ports in the region have been
affected, and some, such as the port of Ventspils, are
now in a catastrophic situation, while many are seeking
to adapt. This upheaval has also prompted strategic
adaptation, as evidenced by the efforts of ports such as
Klaipeda to redefine their roles within the regional
trade ecosystem. Klaipeda has not only diversified its
cargo handling capabilities and modernized its
infrastructure but also embraced a more flexible
approach to navigating the uncertainties of the region.
The port's strategic emphasis on container traffic and
energy independence, notably through the
development of LNG terminals, underscores its
proactive response to evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Notwithstanding the considerable challenges
encountered, including a diminution in trade with
Belarus and the broader impact of regional tensions,
Klaipeda has proven resilient, maintaining its
142
competitive position in the Baltic by adapting to new
trade routes and emerging market demands. The role
of efficiency, particularly in the container sector, has
become a critical element in navigating this new
landscape. However, these adjustments are
constrained by legacy infrastructure and geographical
factors, underscoring the need for careful, long-term
planning. While private sector efforts have been
significant, they have sometimes been deemed
insufficiently supported by public policies adapted to
the new geopolitical realities.
In contemplating the future, the trajectory of Baltic
ports, with specific reference to Klaipeda, is
inextricably linked to the prevailing geopolitical
dynamics. While prospects for growth are evident,
particularly in the domains of diversifying energy
supplies and enhancing operational efficiency, the
ongoing investment in infrastructural development,
exemplified by the Rail Baltica initiative, is imperative
for ensuring their long-term viability. The crisis has
illustrated that adaptability and innovation can
engender new opportunities, enabling Baltic ports,
notably Klaipeda, to sustain their strategic importance
in a continually evolving geopolitical context.
This situation calls to mind the well-known phrase
attributed to Rahm Emanuel, the former Speaker of the
U.S. House of Representatives, which suggests that
crises often bring significant challenges, but that they
can also act as catalysts for positive change, pushing
organizations or governments to adapt, innovate, and
implement reforms that might have been difficult to
achieve in more stable times. The crisis forces a
rethinking of traditional methods and systems, often
leading to breakthroughs or more effective solutions.
In the case of the port of Klaipeda, the ongoing
geopolitical crisis has compelled it to reconsider its
trade routes, diversify its cargo types, and modernise
its infrastructure. These are strategies that may not
have been pursued as aggressively had the region
remained politically stable. Consequently, the port has
been able to leverage the disruptions caused by the
crisis to make strategic adaptations that will benefit it
in the long run.
It is imperative to acknowledge that geopolitical
considerations are not the sole factors influencing the
region. Indeed, climate change is impacting maritime
transportation in the Baltic Sea in several significant
ways, including the reduction of sea ice cover and the
rise in sea levels. Consequently, coastal infrastructure,
including ports, is confronted with novel challenges.
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