287
1 INTRODUCTION
Maritimetransportationisvitalinconnectingnations,
facilitating global trade, and transporting a wide
rangeofcommoditiesandproductsacrosstheworldʹs
oceans,seas,rivers,andothernavigablewaterways.It
is a crucial component of international trade and
global transportation networks. It offers several
advantages, including the
ability to transport large
quantities of goods over long distances, access to
remote regions and landlocked countries through
navigable waterways, lower energy consumption
compared to other modes of transportation, and
reduced carbon footprint per ton‐kilometre.
Merchandiseistransportedthroughthewatersusing
variousmethodsandvesselsspecificallydesignedfor
maritime transportation, such as container carriers,
tankers, roll‐on/‐roll‐off (ro‐ro) and specialized
vessels,andbulkcarriers[30].Thislasttypeofvessel
is of particular importance due to its ability to
efficiently transport commodities such as coal, iron
ore, grain, cement, and other raw materials or
commoditiesthat
arenotcontainerized[4].Theyplay
apivotalroleinmaritimetransportationbyefficiently
and cost‐effectively transporting large quantities of
bulk cargo, supporting global trade, and facilitating
economic development and industrial growth
worldwide[4].
The current SOLAS Convention has been
expandedwithanumberofamendmentsthathavea
huge impact on navigation safety [39, 40]. The
introduction of any amendment is supported by
research.
Maritime transportation carries inherent risks.
These risks include adverse weather conditions,
accidents, piracy, environmental concerns, crew
safety, technological challenges, and the remote
Impact of Bulk Carrier Disasters on the Amendments
To the SOLAS Convention
W.Hermann
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
ABSTRACT:Maritimetransportationfacilitatesglobaltradebytransportingawiderangeofcommoditiesand
products across the worldʹs waterways. There are many types of vessels that carry merchandise across the
water.Amongthemarebulkcarriers,whichtransportunpackedoruncontenerizedgoods,likeore,sand,
grain,
etc.Likeotherwatervessels,bulkcarriersandtheircrewsfacemanyoccupationalhazards.Tominimizethese
hazards andimprove the safety of the work environment, organizations such as the International Maritime
Organizationdevelopedandmaintainsregulations,suchastheInternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLife
at Sea
(SOLAS). Despite these regulations, accidents happen, and new occupational challenges arise, which
result in revisions and amendments of the rules and requirements. This review focuses on the bulk carrier
accidentsthatledtosignificantchangesintheSOLASconventiontoimprovemaritimetransportationsafety.
Anexampleofanaccidentandreport
areprovided.Typesofaccidentsandnumericaltrendsofshipsandlives
lostacrossthelastfifteenyearsarealsosummarized,demonstratingdecreasingtrends.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 18
Number 2
June 2024
DOI:10.12716/1001.18.02.03
288
natureofsomeroutes[24].Despitetheserisks,safety
measures,regulations,andinternationalorganizations
strive to mitigate dangers and improve standards,
ensuring the safety and security of maritime
operations[10,31].
Theaimofthepublicationistoshowtheimpactof
thedisastersofseveraldescribedbulkcarrierson
the
amendments introduced to the SOLAS Convention
[38].
Bulk carriers and their crews, in particular, are
exposed to elevated dangers as the cargo they carry
can be the source of accidents [7, 28]. Causes range
from human error to inadequate equipment on the
ship[7].Thesafetyproblemsofbulk
carriersinterms
of construction, equipment, and operation are a
topical issue in the marine environment [5]. Each
accidentshouldresultinathoroughinvestigationand
analysis, and some have led to important
amendments to the SOLAS to improve the safety of
crewsandcargoandhelppreventreoccurrence.
The review
focuses on maritime accidents
involving bulk carriers that have led to changes in
regulations to improve the safety of ship crews and
cargo.Dataonaccidentsatseahasbeenreviewedand
summarised, and examples of accidents leading to
amendments are provided. It is impossible to
eliminate occupational risk in
maritime
transportation. However, by analysing the causes of
maritimedisasters,itispossibletomitigatethem.
2 SOLAS
The SOLAS convention establishes minimum safety
standards for the construction, equipment, and
operation of ships, as well as procedures and
guidelines for maritime safety. It covers various
aspects,including ship design,fireprotection,
safety
equipment, navigation, communications, and
emergencyresponse[3].
The first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914,
followingthesinkingoftheRMSTitanicin1912,and
it came into force on July 1, 1915 [3]. Since then,
SOLAS has undergone multiple amendments and
updates to address emerging safety issues,
technological advancements, and changing
internationalregulations.
The most recent version of SOLAS is known as
SOLAS 1974, as amended, which consolidated the
amendmentsmadetotheoriginalconvention.SOLAS
1974, along with its subsequent amendments, is the
currentframeworkformaritimesafetyandiswidely
accepted and implemented by the majority
of
maritimenationsworldwide[3].
Chapters II‐1,VI,XII,andXI‐2addressthesafety
requirements and considerations applicable to bulk
carriers. Of importance is Chapter XII: Additional
Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers. This chapter
focuses explicitly on additional safety measures for
bulk carriers. It includes regulations related to
the
design, construction, and operation of bulk carriers,
such as structural requirements, stability
considerations, cargo ventilation, and requirements
forloadingandunloadingequipment[32].
Chapter XII and regulations within the SOLAS
conventiondescribeindetailtherequirementsforthe
constructionandequipmentofbulkcarriers.Theship
shallbeprovidedwith
awatertightcollisionbulkhead
up to the freeboard deck, and pipelines passing
through the bulkhead shall be equipped with
appropriate valves controlled from a position above
thefreeboarddeck.Theconstructionofthebulkhead
shouldalsomeettherequirements.Thevesselshould
haveadoublebottomconstructedoverthespace
from
theforepeakbulkheadtotheaftpeakbulkhead.Bulk
carriers should also be protected against fire.
Evacuation routes should be identified, properly
marked, and provided with the necessary rescue
equipmenttoimproverescueoperations.
Allrecommendationsforthedesignofbulkcarrier
equipmentintroducedbytheSOLASConventionaim
to
maximise the safety of human life, the
environment, and the protection of cargo. These are
dictated by years of experience and lessons learned
from maritime disasters. Technical experts examine
everysubsequentaccidentwithsevereconsequences.
They analyse its circumstances and causes and
prepare amendments to the SOLAS Convention to
prevent
similaraccidentsinthefuture.
3 ACCIDENTSATSEA
The increase in the number of victims of maritime
disasters and the number of disappearances of bulk
carriers drew international attention to this type of
vessel. According to the International Association of
DryCargoShipowners(Intercargo),avoluntarynon‐
profit association representing
the interests of dry
cargo vessel owners, the number one cause of bulk
carrierfailuresisthevesselʹsgrounding.Researchon
the causes and investigations into the sinking and
disappearance of bulk carriers have already been
carriedoutbymanyglobalinstitutions.Theresultsof
this activity indicate that
the loss of watertight
integrity of the sides in the cargo compartments
caused55%to75%ofknownfailuresofbulkcarriers.
Mainly old vessels and ships carrying ore or other
heavyloadssank[42].Thelossofintegrityofthesides
wascausedbythecorrosionofthestructureoccurring
predominantlyinthe lowerparts of theholddue to
damagetotheframes,beamknees,andsheets.Asthe
vesselages,thefatigueofthematerialfromwhichit
was built increases, corrosion progresses, and
structuralwearoccurs,affectingtheweakeningofthe
hull.
Intercargo, using the data from
the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), also states that the
number one cause of lost life at sea involving bulk
carriers is the liquefaction or shifting of the cargo.
Althoughthedataindicatesthattheaveragenumber
of lives lost during a rolling 10‐year period has
decreased (Table 2) [14] even
a single life lost is a
tragedy, which must be reported and investigated,
lessons must be learned, and preventive measures
instated.
The concept of a marine casualty can be
interpreted as any damage to the vessel or its
equipmentoranyothereventthatresultsintheloss
289
ofseaworthinessofthevesselormerelyareductionin
itsseaworthinessatanytime.
Thedefinitionofmarinecasualtiescontainedinthe
Maritime Chambers Act of 1 December 1961 [11]
coversbothaccidentsaffectingavesselandaccidents
involvingonly personsonboard orinitsimmediate
vicinityif
theyhaveexperiencedspecificeffects[11].
Based on reports from Intercargo and IMO, the
averagenumberofvesselslosthasadownwardtrend
between 1994 and 2017 [5]. Even more recent data,
between 2005 and 2023, shows reduced ships lost
(Tablet 1) [1, 15–21]. These improvements can be
attributed to
many factors, from younger ships
through the better‐trained crew to enhancements
afforded by the amendments to SOLAS. The latter
comes from thorough investigations and lessons
learnedaftereachaccident.
Table1.Summaryofseacasualtiesbetweentheyears2005
and2023.
________________________________________________
Year 2005‐2008‐2009‐2011‐2012‐2022 2023 Total
2015 2017 2018 2020 2021(ships
lostper
year)
________________________________________________
2005 6 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 6
2006 7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 7
2007 9 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 9
2008 5 5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 5
2009 9 10 10 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 10
2010 6 6 6 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 6
2011 11 11 11 11 ‐ ‐ ‐ 11
2012 3 3 3 3 3 ‐ ‐ 3
2013 7 7 7 6 6 6*‐7
2014 2 2 2 2 2 2*
2* 2
2015 6 4 4 5 5 5* 5* 5
2016 ‐ 3 3 3 3 3* 3* 3
2017 ‐ 2 2 2 2 2* 2* 2
2018 ‐ ‐ 0 0 1 1* 1* 1
2019‐‐‐1 1 1* 1* 1
2020‐‐‐1 2 2* 2* 2
2021‐‐‐‐2 2* 2*
2
2022‐‐‐‐‐2 2* 2
2023‐‐‐‐‐‐0 0
________________________________________________
Total 71 53 48 34 27 26 20 84
(10‐year
period)
________________________________________________
*‐10‐yearreportsnotavailable–numbersfromthe
precedingreportarecarriedover.
Marine casualties result from objective reasons,
such as the growing number of ships and the
intensifyingcompetitionintheshippingmarkets.The
ruthless pursuit of profit becomes one of the most
critical factors threatening the safety of human life
and health. A characteristic feature of modern
shippingistheintensificationof
theuseofshipsand
the extension of their life, which significantly
increasestheriskofmarinecasualties[23].
Marine casualties in maritime transportation can
occur due to various causes and circumstances.
Humanerrorisoneofthemostfrequentcauses.Itcan
encompass various factors, such as navigational
mistakes,
miscommunication among crew members,
inadequate training, or fatigue due to long working
hours. Fatigue can impair judgment and decision‐
making abilities, leading to errors in navigation,
collisionincidents,orotheraccidents.
Ships and their crews transporting merchandise
throughopenwaters,likeseasandoceans,oftenface
adverseweatherconditions,posingsignificant
risksto
vessels, crews, and cargo. Storms, hurricanes, heavy
seas, and high winds can impact vessel stability,
visibility, and manoeuvrability [35–37]. These
conditions may cause vessels to lose control, collide
withothervesselsorobjects,orbeatahigherriskof
capsizingorgrounding[35].Inadditiontothe
rapidly
changing weather conditions, ships face many
environmentalfactors,suchasfog,poorvisibility,ice,
orstrongcurrents,whichcanalsoincreasetherisksof
maritimecasualties.
Table2.Asummaryofbulkvesseldisastersthatinvolved
thelossoflife.
________________________________________________
Incident Vesselʹs Built LossLikely Reported
Year nameofRoot Cause
lifeCause
________________________________________________
2005 Aurelia 1980 6 Unknown Structural
2005 BrightSun 1985 1 CollisionFlooding
2005 EveriseGlory 1979 1 Unknown Collision
2006 AlexandrosT 1989 26 Unknown Flooding
2006 GiantStep 1985 10 Machinery Grounding
failure
2006 OceanSeraya 2001 1 Weather Grounding
2007 Mezzanine 1975 26 Weather Unknown
2007 Orchid
Sun 1985 13 Weather Flooding
2008 DaJi1997 12 Weather Flooding
2008 Jinshan 1976 2 Structural Flooding
2009 TeHsing 1977 16 Unknown Fire/
Explosion
2009 ChangYing 1976 22 Unknown Unknown
2009 BlackRose 1977 1 Cargo Cargo
shift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2010 Jian
FuStar 1983 13 Cargo Cargo
shift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2010 Nasco 2009 22 Cargo Cargo
Diamondshift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2010 HongWei 2001 10 Cargo Cargo
shift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2011 JuiHsing 1974 10 Unknown Grounding
2011 BrightRuby
1987 7 MachineryUnknown
failure
2011 Vinalines 2005 22 Cargo Cargo
Queenshift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2013 HaritaBauxite 1983 15 Cargo Cargo
shift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2015 BulkJupiter* 2006 18 Cargo Cargo
shift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2015 AlanManis
2007 1 Cargo Cargo
shift/ shift/
liquefaction liquefaction
2017 StellarDaisy* 1993 22 Catastrophic Flooding
structural
failure
2017 EmeraldStar 2010 10 Unknown Capsized
2019 NurAllya* 2002 25 Unknown Sank
2022 CuracaoPearl 1984 1 # #
________________________________________________
*‐bulkcarrierdisastersthatpromptedchangestotheSOLAS
convention.
#‐theincidentinvolvedalossoflifeduringtheregularoperation
ofthevessel.
Given the constant exposure to the harsh
environment and external and internal conditions
bulkcarriersface,equipmentfailuresoccurfrequently
and can have severe consequences. Malfunctions in
propulsion systems, steering mechanisms,
communicationequipment,ornavigationinstruments
cancompromisethevesselʹsabilitytooperatesafely.
290
Structural failures, such as hull cracks, corrosion, or
inadequate maintenance, can compromise a vesselʹs
stability and seaworthiness, as can cargo shifting
duringroughweather or improper loadingpractices
[7].Thesefactorscanleadtolossofcontrol,collisions,
capsizing, or other types of incidents that put the
crew,cargo,
andvesselatrisk.
Collisionscanoccurbetweenvesselsorwithother
objects such as rocks, reefs, or navigational hazards
andareoftentheresultofhumanerror,misjudgement
ofdistances,failuretoadhereto navigationrules,or
technicalmalfunctions.Contactincidents,ontheother
hand, such as striking submerged
objects or
grounding, can result from navigational errors or
inaccuratecharts[7,34].Althoughgroundingscould
be a separate marine accident type, it is a form of
contact incident. It happens when a vessel
unintentionally runs aground on the seabed.
Groundings can occur due to navigational errors,
inaccurate charts, misjudgement of
water depths, or
underwater hazards [34]. Groundings can cause
damage to the vesselʹs hull, potential breaches, or
evencapsizingifnotappropriatelyhandled.
Thesemarinecasualtiescanbedividedintothose
threateningthesafetyofthevesselanditsoccupants
andthosenotthreateningthesafetyoftheship
andits
occupants.Thefirstoneistheresultofaneventthat
causes the loss or limitationof the vesselʹs abilityto
movewithinaspecifiedtime.Asa result,thevesselʹs
and its occupantsʹ safety is endangered. The second
case,ontheotherhand,istheresult
ofaneventthat
causes the loss or limitationof the vesselʹs ability to
move within a specified time and does not cause a
threattothesafetyofthevesselanditsoccupants.
Maritime authorities and regulatory bodies
conduct thorough investigations and analyses of
marinecasualtiestodetermine
thespecificcausesand
circumstances surrounding each incident. The
findings contribute to improving safety measures,
implementing stricter regulations, enhancing crew
trainingprograms,andfosteringasaferenvironment
formaritimeoperations.
A vessel is an unusual place of work where the
crewmembereverydayfacesnewrequirements.The
introduction of modern
technology on vessels is
intended to increase the safety of the crew
(passengers) and cargo. Both external and internal
factorsshouldbereducedtoimprovesafety.External
factorsincludethetypeofsailingwaterbody(sizeof
the water body, navigation markings, vessel traffic
density, systems supporting traffic, i.e., delineation
systems,VTS–VesselTrafficService–etc.),aswellas
the impact on the vessel and its crew of the marine
elementandtheforcesofnature,whichinmanycases
constitute force majeure events [22]. In turn, the
internal factors that directly impact the vesselʹs
behaviour are the
humans, their skills, and their
psychophysical state. Geometrical parameters of the
vessel and its manoeuvring properties. Technical
equipmentanddegreeofautomationoftheship[12,
27].Allthefactorsmentionedaffectnavigationsafety
toagreaterorlesserextent.
One of the most critical factors affecting safe
navigation is,
of course, the human. The European
MarineSafetyAgency,intheir“AnnualOverviewof
Marine Casualties and Incidents 2022” report, states
that in the cargo ship category, human action
accounted for 61.8% of all accidents in the period
between 2014 and 2021 [6]. By far, this is the most
significantcontributing
factor.Othercategorieslisted
in the report account for fewer percentages of
accidents. System and equipment failure accounted
for 20.5 % in the same period. Other agents and
vessels caused 10.3% of all accidents, hazardous
materials 6.3%, and unknown causes accounted for
1.3%. Danger can be avoided by the proper
and
efficientresponseofthecrew in emergenciesrelated
to their psychophysical condition, knowledge of
regulations,andtheso‐calledgoodmaritimepractice.
Thankstothenavigatorʹsuseofequipmentlocatedon
thebridgeandinformationprovidedbylandcentres,
such as weather forecasts, navigation hazards, etc.,
they can avoid
or mitigate the impact of dangerous
externalfactors,increasingtherisktotheship.
The fallibility of the vessel can be significantly
reduced in the design phase, but this is associated
with an increase in the costs of its design and
construction.Theyarethemainreasonforthelack
of
actions related to shaping the reliability of the ship
andthusreducingitsfallibility.Theseareduetothe
need to conduct research explaining the causes of
damageduringshipvoyagesandestablishactionsto
increasesafety.
Statistics on marine casualties of the merchant
shipping fleet show that the number
of accidents is
increasing. Among navigational accidents, collisions
anddamagearestillthemostprevalent,whilefailures
ofthemainenginedominatetechnicalaccidents.Most
ofthecausesofnavigationalaccidentslieoutsidethe
ship,anddefectsintheoperationandconstructionof
equipmentcausemosttechnicalaccidents.
In addition
to amendments made to SOLAS, the
International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code
(IMSBCCode)wasapprovedbytheMaritimeSafety
Committee(MSC)duringits85thsessionin2008and
took effect on January 1, 2011. The IMSBC Code
replaced the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk
Cargoes (BC Code), initially
introduced as a non‐
bindingcodein1965,andhassincebeenperiodically
updated[13].
ImplementingthemandatoryIMSBCCodeaimsto
facilitatethesafehandlingandtransportationofsolid
bulk cargo. It achieves this by providing essential
informationaboutthehazardsassociatedwithspecific
types of freight and offering
guidelines on the
appropriateprocedurestofollowduringshipment.
Navigational hazards often lead to maritime
disasters.Thenumberandconsequencesofmaritime
disasters cause changes in international regulations,
especially the SOLAS Convention. Accidents are
takensoseriously because theyposea threat to life,
pollute the environment and lead to financial
losses
fortheshipownerandtheinsurancecompany.Much
largershipsarenowbeingandposeasignificantrisk,
especially in heavily trafficked areas. The most
commoneffectsofdisasters,theeffectsofwitchcanbe
noticed for many years, are environment pollution.
Accidents can be prevented, in particular
by taking
into account the causes in the operation of the
provisionsoftheSOLASConvention[42].
291
Notable bulk carrier disasters are those of m/v
Derbyshire(1980),m/vBulkJupiter(2015),m/vStellar
Daisy (2017), and m/v Nur Allya (2019). Incidents
involving these vessels led to significant changes in
theSOLAS.
3.1 Bulkcarrierdisaster–m/vDerbyshire(1980)
Thesinkingofthebulkcarrierm/vDerbyshire
in1980
remainsoneofthemosttragicmaritime disasters in
Britishhistory.Thevessel,ownedbytheBritish‐India
Steam Navigation Company and operated by the
BibbyLine,wasanorecarrierbuiltin1976.Ithada
lengthof269metersandagrosstonnageof91,655.On
itsfatefulvoyage,them/vDerbyshiredepartedfrom
Sept‐Îles,Canada,carryingacargoofironorebound
for Kawasaki, Japan. However, it encountered
Typhoon Orchid, a powerful tropical cyclone, in the
South China Sea. Thetyphoon, with winds reaching
up to 190 kilometers per hour (120 miles per hour)
and
massive waves, proved overwhelming for the
bulkcarrier.Despitebeingalargeandmodernvessel,
the m/v Derbyshire could not withstand extreme
weather conditions. On September 9, 1980, the ship
abruptlydisappearedfromradarandwaslostwithall
44crewmembersonboard,withnodistresssignalsor
communication received
[13, 25]. All attempts to
establish contact with the vessel failed. In the
aftermath of the disaster, extensive investigations
wereconductedtodeterminethecauseofthesinking.
Varioustheorieswereproposed,includingstructural
failure, cargo shifting, and problems with hatch
covers.However,the exact circumstancesthatled to
the sinking
of the m/v Derbyshire remainuncertain.
Thesinkingofthem/vDerbyshire,oneofthelargest
ships ever lost at sea, profoundly impacted the
maritime industry and international shipping
regulations. It highlighted the vulnerability of bulk
carriers to severe weather conditions and raised
concerns about their structural integrity and safety
measures[8].
Theofficialreportontheincidentwasreleasedin
1998.ItpromptedMaritimeSafetyCommittee(MSC)
to launch a new review of bulk carrier safety using
FormalSafetyAssessment(FSA)studiestodetermine
what additional regulatory changes might be
required. Significant amendments to the SOLAS
convention were made, including
introducing new
regulationsspecifictobulkcarriers,suchasimproved
structural standards, stability requirements, and
enhancedinspectionprocedures.Atits76thsessionin
December2002,theMSCenactedrevisionstoSOLAS
ChapterXIIandthe1988LoadLinesProtocol,aswell
as a number of suggestions to improve bulk carrier
safety. The MSC published a new language for
SOLAS chapter XII in December 2004, integrating
updates to several standards and new criteria for
double‐sided skin bulk carriers. These modifications
wentintoeffectonJuly1,2006[14].
3.2 Bulkcarrierdisaster–m/vBulkJupiter(2015)
Thebulkcarrierm/v
BulkJupitermetatragicfatein
2015.OnJanuary2,2015,theBahamas‐flaggedvessel
encountered a disastrous incident in the waters off
Vietnam while transporting bauxite, a type of cargo
prone to liquefaction, from Malaysia to China. The
ship encountered severe weather conditions causing
significantdifficultiesduringits
voyage.Itisbelieved
that the load on board shifted, leading to instability
and dynamic separation of the cargo, ultimately
causingthevesseltocapsize.
The incident resulted in the loss of 18 crew
members,with only one individualfoundalive. The
remainingcrewmembersweredeclaredmissingand
presumedlost
atsea.Therapidcapsizingofm/vBulk
Jupiter raised concerns about the safety risks of
transporting certain bulk cargoes, particularly those
pronetoliquefaction.
Following the sinking of m/v Bulk Jupiter,
investigations were carried out to understand the
causes and circumstances surrounding the incident.
This tragic event highlighted the
need for improved
regulations, cargo handling practices, and safety
measurestopreventsimilaraccidentsinvolvingbulk
carriers. Efforts within the maritime industry were
deployedtoraiseawarenessabouttherisksassociated
with transporting bulk cargoes prone to liquefaction
and the importance of proper cargo testing,
certification, and stowage procedures to ensure
the
safetyofseafarersandvessels.
The incident and the lesson learned also led to
amendmentstotheInternationalMaritimeSolidBulk
Cargoes Code (IMSBC 05‐19), which entered into
forceon1January2021.TheCodechangesthefocus
and is directed at vessels carrying cargo similar in
physico‐
chemical attributes to that of bauxite fines,
m/vBulkJupiter’sload.“AccordingtotheCode,‘This
cargo may suffer instability due to moisture content
resulting in dynamic separation and formation of a
liquid slurry (water and fine solids) above the solid
material, leading to a free surface effect which may
significantly
affect the ship’s stability. This cargo is
not liable to undergo dynamic separation when the
cargo is shipped below its TML [transportable
moisture limit]’ (Res MSC.462(101), adopted on 13
June2019)[9,14,15,26,29,41].
3.3 Bulkcarrierdisaster‐m/vStellarDaisy(2017)
The sinking of the bulk
carrier m/v Stellar Daisy in
2017 remains a significant and tragic event in
maritimehistory.TheSouthKoreanvessel,ownedby
Polaris Shipping, was transporting iron ore from
Brazil to China when it encountered a catastrophic
incident.
On March 31, 2017, while in the South Atlantic
Ocean, m/v Stellar Daisy suddenly
sank, plunging
into the depths of the sea. The shipʹs distress signal
wasreceived,andasearchandrescueoperationwere
launched. However, only two crew members were
foundaliveamongthedebris,whiletheremaining22
crewmembersweredeclaredmissingandpresumed
lostatsea[2].
The
sinking of m/v Stellar Daisy sparked
immediate investigationsand raised questions about
thecircumstancesthatledtothevesselʹsdemise.One
prevailing theory suggested that the ship may have
suffered a catastrophic structural failure due to a
structural breakdown in the No. 2 portside water
ballast tank. This triggered progressive
structural
292
failure along the cargo length and produced a total
lossofbuoyancy.Theexactcause,however,remained
uncertain,asnoeyewitnessescouldprovideadetailed
accountoftheeventsleadingtothesinking[2].
Theincidentgarneredsignificantattentionwithin
themaritimeindustryandreviveddiscussionsabout
thesafetyof
bulkcarriers.Concernswereraisedabout
thestructuralintegrityofagingvesselsandtheneed
for more stringent inspections and maintenance
standards.
TheInternationalMaritimeOrganisation(IMO)is
anticipatedto evaluate additionalbulk carrier safety
measures under SOLAS Chapter XII and the 2011
International Code on the Enhanced Programme of
Inspections during Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil
Tankers(2011ESPCode).Thesestepsareintendedto
identify potential shortcomings in safety regulations
and reduce the possibility of comparable maritime
tragediesinvolvingbulkandorevessels.
3.4 Bulkcarrierdisaster‐m/vNurAllya(2019)
The bulk carrierm/v Nur Allya was
transporting
nickeloreandhad25crewmemberson board from
Weda Island (North Maluku) to Morosi (Southeast
Sulawesi), Indonesia. The 189‐meter (620‐foot) bulk
carrierʹscrewlastcommunicatedwiththeowner,PT
GuritaLintasSamudra,
on August 20, 2019, while near Bulu Island in
Maluku. Soon after,
the vessel went missing. Local
authorities located the vessel 843 meters below the
surface in the eastern ‘spice island’ of Maluku in
Octoberof2019.
The official report is yet to be released. The
investigation results will most likely stimulate
discussions related to bulk carriers, potentially
prompting the introduction of new
amendments to
theSOLAS[33].
Table3.Liveslostin10‐yearperiodsbetween2005and
2023.*‐10‐yearreportsnotavailable–numbersfromthe
precedingreportarecarriedover.
________________________________________________
Year 2005‐2008‐2009‐2010‐2011‐2012‐2022 2023 Total
2015 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021(ships
lost
peryear)
________________________________________________
2005 88
2006 3737
2007 3939
2008 14 1414
2009 39 39 3939
2010 45 45 45 4545
2011 39 39 39 39 3939
2012 0 0 0 0 0 00
2013 15 15 15 15 15 15 15*15
2014 0 0
0 0 0 0 0* 0* 0
2015 19 18 18 18 18 18 18* 18* 19
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0* 0* 0
2017 32 32 32 32 32 32* 32* 32
20180 0 0 0 0* 0* 0
201925 25 27 27* 27* 27
20200 0 0* 0* 0
20210 0* 0* 0
20221 1* 1
20230 0
________________________________________________
Total(10‐yearperiod) 255 202 188 174 129 929378
315
Other bulk carrier disasters that should be
mentioned are those with significant loss of life. As
mentioned earlier, 84 bulk carrier incidents were
reported between 2005 and 2023 Table 2 provides a
summary of bulk vessel disasters that involved the
lossoflife[1,15–21].Othertrendsthatcanbenoted
are that incidents often involve older vessels, and
cargoshiftand/orliquefactionare the most frequent
causeofbulkcarrieraccidents.
4 SUMMARY
Whenconcludingthedisasterofthebulkcarrierm/v
Debryshire, it was concluded that the accident was
causedby designerrorsthatledtoa sudden loss
of
buoyancy.Theroofsoftheventingsystemturnedout
to be faulty, they broke off under the pressure of
water,revealingholesinthefloodeddeck.Duetothe
rapidlossofbuoyancy,theshipsuddenlysanktothe
bottom.
Followingthem/vBulkJupiterdisaster,operators
were advised to
always check theshipper’s cargo
declaration and moisture content certificate, paying
attention to the cargo description, handling in
accordance with the IMSBC Code and the stated
moisturecontent.
Afterthelossofthebulkcarrierm/vStellarDaisy
structuraldamagewasfoundonexactlyelevenships.
An investigation conducted in
the Marshall Islands
concludedthatthecontributingfactorsincludedlarge
port and starboard wing tanks which increased the
riskofstructuralfailureandlossofbuoyancy.
The problem of the bulk carrier m/v Nur Allya
may have been caused by the movement of cargo
causedbythephenomenonofliquefaction,witch
may
evencausetheshiptoloseitsstability.
The amendments to the SOLAS Convention
considerseveralconditionsthat result from analyses
of maritime disasters. Bulk carriers should be
equipped with high‐quality alarms and systems to
monitor water levels in the hold, ballast, and dry
spaces. This is very
important because good
equipment usually proves reliable in emergencies.
Without proper access, the structural condition of a
vessel can deteriorate imperceptibly, resulting in
major failures. Therefore, each internal space of the
cargoareashouldbeprovidedwithadequatemeans
of access, thus allowing comprehensive inspections
throughoutthevesselʹslife.
It
maybeessentialtostrengthenthesupervisionof
classinspectionsofrepairs,whichwouldminimiseor
eliminate the practice of in‐house repairs and
significantlyimprovethesafetyofshipping.
Since the adoption of the SOLAS Convention,
various amendments have been made. The new
SOLAS regulations aim to improve maritime
safety.
Recommendations are given for individual vessel
types. This makes it possible to provide the most
detailed, well‐defined solutions to operate particular
vesseltypes,suchasbulkcarriers,safely.
Unfortunately,thepathtoimprovedvesseldesign
hasbeenstrewnwithmanytragicexperiences.Based
293
on accident analysis, conclusions are drawn to
improve specific design elements. The large bulk
carrier fleet is particularly vulnerable to the risks of
failure and sinking. Lack of shipowner control of
corrosion progress and maintenance performed can
contributetothedeteriorationofthehull.
Initially,many dynamic loads on the
hull during
seavoyagesofshipsareknown.However,largeand
uneven loads may occur on bulk carriers when, for
example,onlyeverysecondholdisfilledwithheavy
cargo, when the ship undergoes prolonged ballast
admissions,andwhenthereisashortrockingperiod
at a high metacentric height.
The most significant
stressesonthehullstructureoccurinsevereweather
conditions,likestormsonlargevessels,eventhough
theirwaveworkmayappearlighterthanthatofsmall
vessels.
When analysing marine casualties and their
causes, it is clear that the most common cause is
human errors. Unfortunately, they
cannot be
eliminated because they relate to and depend on
humans.Nevertheless,weshouldstrivetoamendthe
necessaryregulationstominimizetheseerrorsandthe
often‐tragicconsequences.
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