151
1 INTRODUCTION
EU,asanorganization,isbasedontheadoptionofa
common path by its Member States, which, with a
view to common development, defines a general
frameworkforactioninthefieldsofpolitics,economy
and society. However, in this context the Member
Stateshavethe
opportunitytoactbypromotingtheir
interestsandrespectingtheirobligationstowardsthe
other Members and the EU itself. Also in the Greek
maritimerealitytherearegroups,whichmoveonthe
International and European stage presenting their
positionsandsupportingtheirinterests,whileatthe
same time they contribute to
the drawing up of the
internationalandcommonEuropeanmaritimepolicy
with the means they have at their disposal. At the
same time, the EU is able to legislate and enact
provisions emphasizing the acceptance and
promotion of common goals by its Member States
withaviewtoadaptingEuropean
tonationallaw.In
thisdirection,itreservestherighttointerveneatthe
national level as soon as a Member State does not
follow the EU’s directions. Cooperation at all levels
contributestothepromotionofthenationalinterests
of the Member States.[1] In this context, maritime
groups are also
active in Greece, which exert an
External Maritime Policy of the EU: A Unilateral
Initiative of Greece in the IMO
D.Grekos
UniversityofPiraeus,Piraeus,Greece
ABSTRACT:Externalmaritimepolicyisthecommonseatransportprinciplesofactionwhicharesupportedby
theEUintheinternationalmaritimeorganizationsandespeciallyintheIMO.Seatransportisthebackboneof
EU’s trade and anessential pillar of cross border support of global
supply chains.Sotheexternal maritime
policy is required to comply with a set of international legislation. IMO is the United Nations specialized
producerofmaritimelawandagreements.EUcannotparticipateintheIMOsessionsduetoitslegalstatusasa
supranationalpoliticalandeconomicunion.Butit
maintainsanobserverposition.Thissituationdoesnotserve
itsexternalmaritimepolicy.EU’sMemberStatesarealsoindependentMembersoftheIMOandsomeofthem
defineitsdecisions.Recently,EUhasbeenengagedinanefforttojointlyrepresentitsMemberStatesinthe
IMOthroughtheabsoluteprimacy
ofEU lawovernationallaw.ThismeansthatEU wishes allitsMember
StatestoexpressthecommonEUpositionsintheIMO.ItisaboutanindirectmuzzleofMemberStatesbythe
EUintheIMO’sdecisionmakingcommittees.Thispracticehasbeenwellunderstoodbysome
EU’smaritime
Member Statesand createsanongoingconfrontation. Leader of that confrontationis Greece as a traditional
maritimestate.GreeceintendstochallengetheEUintroducinganinitiativeofunilateralrepresentationofits
positions in the IMO. To this scope, it exchanges views with other EU’s Member States in order
to form a
coalition.ThisarticleportraystheinstitutionalcontroversyinEU’sexternalmaritimepolicybytheunilateral
initiativeofGreeceintheIMOandpointsoutthattheEU’sdecisionsonmaritimepolicyareperhapsa stakefor
itsfuture.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 18
Number 1
March 2024
DOI:10.12716/1001.18.01.15
152
influence on the formulation of European maritime
policy, supporting Greek interests in a network of
giveandtakerelationshipswithintheEU.
This paper attempts to approach these
interdependencerelationshipsbytheunilateralGreek
initiativeintheIMOandtheanalysiswithintheEU
institutions. This initiative is based
in a group of
MemberStateswithintheEUanditsmainobjectiveis
the presentation of maritime positions in the IMO
withouttheEU’sapproval.Thus,theworkisdivided
into two parts, the theoretical part, where the
functioning of EU institutions and bodies as well as
theaction of
Greek maritime interest are developed,
and the practice part, where the EU’s external
maritime policy contradicts the Greek interests and
leadstothecreationofaunilateralinitiativeofGreece
intheIMOforthedefenseofGreekmaritimefleet.By
thisresearchusefulconclusionsaredrawnaboutgive
and
take maritime relationships within the EU that
perhapsriskitsfuture.
2 EU’SEXTERNALMARITIMEPOLICY
The EUʹs External Maritime Policy is an essential
componentofitsbroaderIntegratedMaritimePolicy
(IMP) framework. The European Union has
recognized the interconnected nature of seabased
activities and the need for a
holistic approach to
maritime affairs. As part of its efforts, the EU has
developed an Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) that
encompasses various searelated policies and
activities. The External Maritime Policy of the EU
plays a crucial role within this framework, focusing
on the EUʹs engagement with external partners
and
the global maritime community. The legal basis for
the EUʹs External Maritime Policy lies in several
articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). These articles provide the
foundation for the EUʹs legislative competence in
maritime policy. Additionally, Regulation (EU) No.
508/2014 serves as
the legal framework for
implementing the IMP and its external dimension.
ThedevelopmentoftheEUʹsExternalMaritimePolicy
was triggered by the realization that fragmented
sectoral policies hindered effective decisionmaking
and coordination. In response, the European
CommissionlaunchedtheIntegratedMaritimePolicy
for the European Union in
2007, which called for a
morecoherentpolicyapproach.Subsequentprogress
reports have outlined the achievements of the EUʹs
IMP and maritime sectoral policies, leading to the
establishmentofanintermediateprogramtosupport
thefurtherdevelopmentoftheIMP[2].
The EU has achieved, mainly in the last years,
a
highlevel of integrationbetweentheMember States
while their external relations are still largely a state
matter, with the 27 countries wishing to maintain
theirownnationalpolicies.However,withtheEUto
hold more weight as, sui generis, the strongest
economicunionofstatestodate,there
areoccasional
attemptsatinternationalrepresentationofalltheMS,
especially in terms of trade, with the simultaneous
expansionof thecompetences ofthe EU in this area
andthroughamendmentstothefoundingTreaties.
As is known, 75% of the EUʹs foreign trade and
31% of its internal
trade is served by sea [3] and
therefore maritime transport largely supports the
economicdevelopmentoftheEUMemberStatesand
especially the maritime ones. The liberalization of
maritime transport services at national level
(cabotage),thepromotionofcompetitivenessandthe
strengthening of employment are some of the areas
that
laidthemainfoundationsofacommonmaritime
transport policy, which was developed centrally by
the European Commission [4] over of the years and
especiallyduringthe80s.The“WhitePaperRoadmap
to a Single European Transport Area‐Towards a
competitive and resource efficient transport system”
movesalongthesamewavelength
[5].Recently,there
hasbeenanincreasedtendencywithintheUnionfora
joint and coordinated representation of the Member
Statesininternationalorganizationsandinparticular
on maritime issues in the International Maritime
Organization (IMO),inwhich the EUparticipatesas
anobserver.
This practice has, as its ultimate
goal, the full
membershipoftheEUintheIMOandthereforethe
legal substitution of its Member States, for which,
however,anamendmentofthefoundingTreatyofthe
IMOwillberequired.Accordingtoarticle34§1ofthe
TreatyfortheEuropeanUnion(TEU),MemberStates
shall coordinate their
action in international
organizations. They shall uphold the Unionʹs
positions in such forums. In this direction, the
positions of Greece and the other Member States of
the EU will not be independently supported in the
IMObutwillbeexpressedcentrallybytheEUinthe
logicofunified
representation,onmaritimeissues.It
shouldbenotedthat,attheEUlevelandspecifically
at the meeting of the Maritime Transport Group
(12/2004),itwasdecidedthatacommitteeofMember
Statesexpertswouldbesetuponlyforthelongterm
planning of maritime issues within the IMO
framework,
while international maritime issues
wouldbediscussedintheCouncilofMinisterswhere
therelevantdecisionswillbetaken.
As it indirectlyfollows from the aforementioned,
inthefieldoftheEUʹsmaritimepolicy,theviewsof
the Member States on shipping issues often do not
coincide with that
of theEU. The issue is extremely
serious for Greek Shipping, which is firmly
maintained in the first positions of the international
maritimeforces(Figure1),aphenomenondue,among
other things, to the successful international
representation of the Greek maritime sector in the
IMO and other fora, resulting in the
excellent
adaptability of Greek shipping to international
developments.Theissueisseriouslymonitoredbythe
Greecewiththeaimoftakinganimportantinitiative
inthefieldofmaritimepolicyplanning.Thisinitiative
includes the cooperation of Cyprus and Malta. In
particular,inviewofthepolicieslaunchedbythe
EU
institutions that are likely to oppose the interests of
Greece regarding the regulation on the recycling of
ships and the legislation on the monitoring and
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions from ships
withinthebordersoftheEU.[6]
153
Figure1. Greece is the first among 10 countries with the
largestfleets>1000GT.Source:RMT,2022.[7]
Therefore, Greece initiates cooperation with
CyprusandMaltainordertolaythefoundationsfor
thefurtherexpansionofdiscussionandcoordination
ingeneralbetweenthethreecountriesinthemaritime
sector within the EU. The main issues that affect
shippingpolicyandneedtobecloselymonitoredare:
EU
ʹsIntegratedMaritimePolicy(IMP).
ThepresidencyofMemberStatesintheCouncilof
the EU and the priorities in matters of maritime
policy.
EUMaritimeLegislation.
The procedural framework for formulating
positions of the EU within the committees of the
InternationalMaritimeOrganization.
Further examination
of subjects related to
maritimepolicyandwithotherEUMemberStates
whohavesimilarviewsandpositions.
Undertheseconditions,anattemptisbeingmade
to lay the creation of a unilateral maritime
cooperationwithintheEU,sinceGreece,Cyprusand
Malta have as a starting point several common
positions
regarding their maritime policy and their
representation in international organizations. The
managed maritime interests and challenges of these
maritime States inside and outside the EU have a
common component and therefore there is room for
cordial cooperation between them since they
representthethreelargestfleetsoftheEU.Obviously,
theenlargementofthatcooperationisdesirablewith
the permanent or occasional presence of other EU’s
Member States. The juncture of said cooperation is
consideredfavourable,sincetheEUissaidtoseekthe
formulation of common positions on behalf of all
Member States, at the level of IMO committees,
which,
however, may not adequately serve the
interests of each individual Member State in the
InternationalMaritimeOrganization.
3 COUNCILOFTHEBALTICSEASTATESAND
THEIRREPRESENTATIONIN
INTERNATIONALMARITIME
ORGANIZATIONS
The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was
establishedin1992asanintergovernmentalforumfor
regional cooperation
in the Baltic Sea region [1].
Comprising ten Member States and the European
Union, the CBSS focuses on fostering regional
identity, enhancing security, and developing
sustainability.TheCBSS’smaritimepolicyisdefined
by the Expert Group on Sustainable Maritime
Economy (EGSME) in which a representative of the
EU Commission participates. It
focuses on regions
growth of maritime economy and marine
environmental protection. In its decisions dominates
the balance of socioeconomic and environmental
aspects. In that way, its Member States can avoid
conflict of interests and obstacles of cooperation.
National experts are responsible for maritime policy
of the CBSS. [8] So they
promote their common
maritimeinterestsintheEUandtheIMO.
The CBSS actively engages with various
international maritime organizations to address
common challenges and promote cooperation. The
CBSSmaintainsclosetieswiththeIMOinthefieldsof
maritime safety, security, and environmental
protection.ThroughitsengagementwiththeIMO,
the
CBSScontributestothedevelopmentofinternational
maritime regulations and initiatives that impact the
Baltic Sea region. Also, CBSS participates in
HELCOM. The Helsinki Commission is an
intergovernmentalorganizationfocusedonprotecting
the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. The CBSS
collaborateswithHELCOMtoaddressenvironmental
challenges, develop
sustainable practices, and
promotecooperationamongBalticSeacountries.The
CBSSinteractswithEMSA(EuropeanMaritimeSafety
Agency), an EU agency that works to ensure a high
levelofmaritimesafety,security,andenvironmental
protection. Through this collaboration, the CBSS
contributes to efforts aimed at enhancing maritime
safetyandsecurityin
theBalticSearegion.
TheCBSSʹs engagement in internationalmaritime
organizationshasresultedinsignificantcontributions
in various areas, including: 1. Maritime Safety and
Security:TheCBSSactivelyparticipatesininitiatives
relatedtomaritimesafety,suchaspromotingeffective
search and rescue cooperation, enhancing maritime
situational awareness, and addressing
maritime
accidentsandincidents.2.EnvironmentalProtection:
The CBSS plays a crucial role in addressing
environmental challenges in the Baltic Sea region.
Through collaboration with organizations like
HELCOM, the CBSS works to reduce pollution,
protect biodiversity, and promote sustainable
maritimepractices.3.MaritimeSpatialPlanning:The
CBSS contributes to the development
of maritime
spatial planning frameworks and strategies. By
promotingcoordinatedandsustainableuseofmarine
resources,theCBSSsupports thepreservationof the
Baltic Seaʹs ecological balance and facilitates
responsiblemaritimeactivities.
While the CBSSʹs engagement in international
maritime organizations has yielded positive
outcomes, several challenges persist. These
include
ensuring effective coordination among Member
States, addressing divergent national interests, and
securing adequate resources for implementing
maritime initiatives. To overcome these challenges,
theCBSSshouldcontinuetostrengthenpartnerships,
enhance information exchange, and prioritize
capacitybuilding efforts. Looking ahead, the CBSS
has the potential to further promote cooperation,
contributeto
regionalstability,andaddressemerging
maritimeissuesintheBalticSearegion.
The Council of the Baltic Sea States plays a
significant role in representing the interests of
Member States in international maritime
154
organizations. Through its engagement with
organizationssuchastheIMO,HELCOM,andEMSA,
theCBSSactivelycontributestopromotingmaritime
safety, environmental protection, and sustainable
development in the BalticSea region. By addressing
challenges,enhancingcooperation,andleveragingits
regional expertise, the CBSS can continue to make
valuable contributions
to international maritime
affairsandensureasecureandprosperousfuturefor
theBalticSearegion.
ThestructureandoperationoftheCBSSshouldbe
an example for the Greek initiative to support
commonmaritimeinterestswithotherEU’sMember
States in international organizations. In this regard,
the creation of such
an organization with the
participation of the powerful maritime states of the
EUcouldinfluenceorevenoverturnallEUdecisions
thatwouldbecontrarytotherepresentativeinterests.
The equal participation of the EU in the proposed
organization would give the impetus for the truly
jointrepresentationofGreek
maritimeinterestsinthe
IMO.
4 LEGALBASEFORTHEUNILATERALGREEK
INITIATIVEINTHEIMO
The unilateral initiative of Greece with the
participationCyprus andMalta highlight the formal
andessentialissueoftheimpossibilityofformulating
a commonly accepted external maritime policy on
behalfoftheEUandthe
furtherproblematicsupport
in the IMO. This issue touches on serious economic
aspectsforGreekshipping.However,inordertobea
responsibletreatmentandabeneficialsolutiontothe
specificproblems,itisfurther required:a)theEUto
assess whether the existing EU institutional
framework and the objective
conditions are ripe to
form a commonly accepted composition of the
maritime interests of the Member States so as to
enforce a joint representation in the IMO, b)
Regarding any political aspirations of the EU in the
IMO, the given legal status of the maritime
organization must be taken into account,
which
obviouslycannotbemodifiedandthustheEUmust
respectitandshowcooperation.
Havingsaidthat,theparticipationoftheEU,asa
party to the IMO, is currently impossible because
according to the IMOʹs FoundingTreaty, (Article 4),
only states can become parties [9]. Also, the
case of
future amendment of the disputed article 4 is
considered a difficult and longterm process.
According to the current regime, the EU maintains
observer status and participates in IMO meetings
undertheAgreementofMutualCooperationbetween
the Commission and the SecretaryGeneral of the
IMO, signed in 1974.
Nevertheless, all 27 EU’s
Member States are also members of the IMO [10].
Thus,theEUasawholehassignificantpowertoplay
aseriousroleintheinternationalmaritimedecision
making process through Member States with
coordinated joint action, as a whole (27) or even by
groups.
It
isnotedthattheobserverstatuswithintheIMO
doesnotallowtheCommissionto:(a)speakonbehalf
of the 27 Member States, (b) use the coordination
mechanismeffectivelyintheareasforwhichtheEU
has the competence, (c) to contribute specifically to
EUpolicyonmaritimesafetyand
(d)toparticipatein
the negotiation of international conventions [11]. So,
sincetheEUhasnonegotiatingrightwithintheIMO
on behalf of theMember States, it assumes, through
theEuropeanCommission,theroleofcoordinatorof
their positions, in order to intervene indirectly,
through the MS, in
the IMOʹs decisionmaking
process. In this direction, the Council plays a
particularlyimportantroleintheEUʹsrelationswith
theIMO.Inmoredetail,afterthesigning(13122007)
of the Reform Treaty orʺTreaty of Lisbonʺ, as it is
more widely known (entry into force
01122009),
mainly the Council, but at the same time in
cooperation with the European Parliament and the
Commission,cannegotiateandconcludeagreements
with third countries and international organizations,
as follows from article 218 of the Treaty on the
FunctioningoftheEU(TFEU).
Inthecontextmentioned
above,theEUtodayitis
a party to a number of IMO maritime conventions,
developinganimportantactivityinthisfieldbothin
the IMO and within the framework of the EU
institutions and bilateral relations with its Member
States.Likewise,theEuropeanCourtofJustice(CJEU)
alsoplaysan
importantroleinthedevelopmentofEU
lawandcan,throughitscaselaw,shapethefieldof
common competence between the EU and Member
States by issuing relevant decisions regarding the
representation and formulation of the positions of
Member States within the IMO, as it did in case C
45/07 (Commission v. Greece), which is analyzed
below. Specifically for the issue of coordination and
harmonizationofthepositionsoftheEU’sMSinthe
IMO,in2005,theCouncilestablishedtheʺProcedural
framework for the adoption of Community or
common positions for IMO related issues and rules
governing their
expression in the IMOʺ SEC (2005)
449.
According to the Framework of Procedures, EU
positionsattheIMOaredividedintothreecategories:
(a) EU positions (exclusive EU issues), (b)
Coordinated Positions (exclusive Member States
issues), (c) Common positions (issues of EU and
MemberStatescompetence).ToprepareEUpositions,
technicaldiscussionscanbeheldinrelevanttechnical
committees, such as the Committee on Safety in
Shipping and Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(COSS)ortheMaritimeSafetyCommittee(MARSEC),
or, as appropriate, in technical meetings of Member
States experts with the Commission. A working
documentshouldbesubmittedtothe
Councilbythe
Commission, including the proposed position of the
EUaswellastheMS.Ifthispositionisapprovedby
the Council, then it binds the Member States to the
IMO. However, it is not always easy for Member
States to follow the decisions from the coordination
process,especiallywhennationalmaritimeissuesare
at stake, let alone those Member States with special
maritimeinterests,suchasGreece,CyprusandMalta.
It is emphasized that there are no drastic measures
thatcanbetakenbytheEUtoaddressthisissueasthe
coordinationprocessisnotlegally
binding[12].
155
The issue of Member States commitment to
supportacommonpositionwiththeEUintheIMO
hasbeenbroughtbytheCommissionbeforetheCourt
ofJusticeoftheEuropeanCommunities(ECJ)intwo
cases, with Greece and Sweden as litigant parties
respectively. Specifically, in the case: Commission
v.
Greece (C45/07), it was ruled that the Hellenic
Republic, submitting to the International Maritime
Organization(IMO)aproposal,(MSC80/5/11),forthe
controlofthecomplianceofshipsandportfacilitiesto
the references of chapter XI2 of the International
ConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea,
(SOLAS),and
the International Code for the Security of Ships and
Port Facilities (ISPS), breached its obligations and in
particular on the basis of Articles 4§3 TEU (former
Article10TEU).Itwasdeemedtohavebreachedthe
dutyofgoodfaithorloyalty,(Article91TFEUformer
71TEU
andArticle101TFEU,formerArticle80TEU).
Also,inthesecondcaseofCommissionv.Sweden
(C246/07), the unilateral Member States proposal to
list a substance in Annex A of the Stockholm
ConventiononPersistentOrganicPollutants,Sweden
was considered to deviate from the coordinated
commonstrategywithinthe
CounciloftheEU.Atthe
same time, taking into account the institutional and
procedural framework of the Convention, such a
proposal was deemed to have consequences for the
European Union. On this the Commission claimed
that,sincetheConventioninquestionisamultilateral
agreement,Swedenisnotallowed
toactindividually,
but only in coordination with the Community. The
above argument should apply to all multilateral
agreements. The ECJ (Court of the European
Communities, now CJEU‐Court of the European
Union) ruled thatthe need fora single international
representation of the Community and its Member
States does not
allow the Member States to act
individually, while this competence remains share
[13].
Underthesecircumstances,itwasdecidedthatthis
actofSwedenconstitutesabreachofthedutyofgood
faithorloyalty,basedonArticles4§3TEU, formerly
Article 10 TEU and 218 TFEU, formerly Article 300
TEU.ThesingleinternationalrepresentationoftheEU
anditsMS,accordingtotheabovephilosophyisnot
anendinitself,itismainlyanexpressionoftheduty
ofgoodfaithorloyaltywhichinparticularandaswill
be analyzed below is provided by article 4§3 of the
TEU [14]. But, before it was decided that Member
StateswouldberepresentedbytheEUonthisbasis,
theobligationsthatwillbeassumedbytheconclusion
of the specific agreement, the effects of the act of
exercisingthesharecompetencebyaMemberStates
and whether this
act can lead to undermining the
exercise of the EU’s competence should perhaps be
further studied. It is pointed out that the duty of
loyaltyalsoappliestotheactsoftheEU’sinstitutions
towardstheMemberStates[15].
Theabovementionedcasesarebasedmainlyona
provisionofprimary
EUlawthatisquitegeneraland
partlyunclear(Article4§3oftheTEU,formerArticle
10oftheTEU,Dutyofloyalty)sorelatedrulingshave
many ambiguitiesinterms of strictness, bindingness
and sanctions. It is interesting to note that the same
decisions indirectly give to the Member
States, that
ʺviolatesʺtheunifiedstance,theargumentofdefense,
legitimization and differentiated tendency, since the
duty of sincere cooperation (or duty of loyalty) acts
both ways and with regard to the EU and its
institutions (Commission etc.). Therefore, if, for
example, it is considered that the institutions of the
EUdelayed,didnotadequatelyrespondtotheduty
oftimelyandcorrectformulationoftheEUʹscommon
maritimeposition,thenbasedontheaboveprinciple
the obligation of harmonized behaviour of the
Member States is lifted, in accordance with the
primaryEUlaw.
5 THEUNILATERALREPRESENTATIONOF
GREEK
MARITIMEINTERESTSINTHEIMO
There has been a trend within the EU of a centrally
controlled and shaped maritime policy which will
then be supported in the IMO by the EU’s Member
States as, on a casebycase basis, policy. Member
Stateswithaspecialeconomicandpolitical
presence
playasignificantroleinthisdevelopmentbutnotthe
maritime ones.This trend even promotesthe official
participationof the EU as a contracting party of the
IMO, so nowthe presence andrepresentation ofthe
MemberStatesislikelytobecompletelyreplacedby
the participationof the
EU in the IMO [16]. In both
cases for the IMO and in particular for its structure
and role as an organization of global scope on
internationalshipping,theautonomouspresenceand
activityof the27 EUʹsMember States is muchmore
preferablethantheirhomogenizedsubstitutionbythe
EU.
Of course, from the EU’s point of view, it is
understandableandlegitimatetoseekacommonand
coordinated presence in the IMO. Obviously, such
presence strengthens the international prestige and
entityoftheEU.However,thekeyquestionarisesas
towhetherthenecessaryobjectiveconditionsandthe
corresponding
institutional background for shaping
and supporting a single EU maritime policy exist at
this stage. It is suggested a policy which will
adequatelycoverthe legitimatemaritimeinterestsof
all Member States. The basic and general answer is
thattheseconditionsdonotseemtobemature,asin
other
EU’s policy areaswhere there are experienced
institutions and tools for their planning and
implementation. To be completelyclear, without the
creation of the EU Register of Shipping or even a
generally accepted convergence on the issue of ship
registration betweenthe EU Member States, there is
nocaseofforming
acommonmaritimepolicyofthe
EUanditsuniformexpressionininternationalbodies
and fora. After all, the adoption of the Community
Registry(Euros)wasa resoundingfailureinthepast;
while on the contrary, a multitude of sui generis
registries was created within the EU such as
international‐
parallel‐offshoreetc.forwhichtheEU
institutionsthemselveshaveraiseddoubtsastotheir
legitimacy.
Furthermore, there are huge variations in the
capacity of the EU merchant fleets, (Figure 2), with
major economic powers having small fleets and
possibly serious and conflicting interests in the
maritime space as coastal states.
This conclusion is
confirmed by the typical treatment of the situation