415
1 INTRODUCTION
Thefirstfireprotectionrequirementsforinternational
shippingwere in1914SOLASConvention,issuedin
response to the sinking of the Titanic in 1912. It
contained basic fire safety requirements, later
integrated into the 1929 and the 1948 SOLAS
Conventions, including lessons learned by accidents
(e.g.MorroCastle
passenger shipfire,whichcaused
134 casualties in 1934) and advances in maritime
technologyduringWorldWarII.Agreateremphasis
on fire safety aboard ships, demonstrated by the
development of three new parts (D, E and F) in
ChapterIIofthe1948SOLASConvention,exclusively
dedicatedtofire
safetyappliedtobothpassengerand
cargo ships. It established three methods of
construction for passenger ships and basic fire
protection requirements for cargo ships, later
integrated by the 1960 SOLAS Convention, which
exportedtocargoshipsanumberofpassengership’s
firesafetyrequirements.Despitethedevelopedsafety
requirements, the
fire is still a relevant factor
generating accidents causing fatalities and material
dam‐ages,asdemonstratedbydatacollectedinTable
1, including almost 50% of fires onboard container
ships.AccordingtoEMSA,firesandexplosionsarein
thetopfivecausesofaccidentsanderroneoushuman
actions during shipboard
operations are responsible
formorethan70.1%ofthetotalnumberoffiresand
more 76% of those on cargo ships [1] [2] [3].
Moreover,intermsoftrafficandtransportcapacity:
About70%ofinternationalfreighttrafficisbyship
(about60,000billionoftons‐miles)andthatabout
9,000billionoftons‐milesiscontainertraffic;
Theaveragecontainershiptodayinoperationhas
adisplacementofabout270,000tandapayloadof
about150,000t(5300TEU).
Fire Management on Container Ships: New Strategies
and Technologies
S.Ricci,B.S.S.K.Ravikumar&L.Rizzetto
SapienzaUniversityofRome,Rome,Italy
ABSTRACT: Design and construction of container ships follow consolidated requirements, with standard
considerationoffiremanagement.Indeed,cargofirescanhaveimportantconsequenceoncrewmembersand
cargoes,aswellasimpactingcoastalzoneandmarineenvironment.Innovativestrategiesincludepreventionof
events and mitigation of
consequences. Digital solutions, providing with situational pictures onboard and
aroundthevesselarefundamentalfornewfiremanagementsolutions,seamlessandintegratedintothevessel
ITinfrastructure,accordingtoIMOregulationsandtherecentEMSACARGOSAFEReport.Theassessmentof
these solutions requires theoretical evaluation, validation activities in simulated environment
and
demonstrationactivitiesinrealenvironments,withusecasestoprovefeasibilityandbenefits.Thispaper,after
areviewoftraditionalpreventingandmitigatingsolutionsagainstfireandananalysisofcontainershipsfires,
proposesapplicableinnovativetechnologiesandoperationalmeasures,emergingproblemsfortheirpotential
implementationandrequirementsforvirtual
andrealtestsdesign.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 17
Number 2
June 2023
DOI:10.12716/1001.17.02.19
416
Table1.Firesonboardcommercialshipscausingfatalities
andmaterialdamages:period2015‐2020
________________________________________________
Year TextFiresonboardall Firesonboard
commercialships containerships
________________________________________________
2015 117
2016 127
2017 72
2018 42
2019 40
2020 21
________________________________________________
Therefore, the relevance of the potential
consequencesonfiresonboardthistypologyofships
is self‐explaining, as well as the potential benefits
achievable by effective technological solutions for
preventionfiresandmitigationoftheireffects.
All these concepts received reinforcement and
validationbytheveryrecent(March2023)issueof
the
CARGOSAFE Report, commissioned by European
MaritimeSafetyAgency(EMSA)[4],withthegoalto
identifycost‐effectivemeasuresforreducingthe risk
of cargo fires on new‐builds and existing
containerships, which will represent a milestone for
thefutureresearchactivitiesinthisfield.
2 FIRETYPOLOGIESANDCAUSES
There are many possible typologies and sources of
shipboardfires.Theinvestigationsarenormallyable
to identify with sufficient level of details the causes
generatingthefiresandtoconsolidateprogressivelya
knowledge on them. The classification of fires
includes:
Accidental: in which the proven cause does not
involve any
deliberate human act to ignite or
spreadthefire;
Natural:eventssuchaslightning,wind,etc.,which
donotinvolveanydirecthumanintervention;
Incendiary:deliberatelysetundercircumstancesin
which the individuals know that the fire should
notbeset;
Undetermined:whentheproofofthe
causeisstill
missing.
Approximately 60‐70% of fires share a common
scenario,based on theoutflowofcombustibleliquid
andcontactwithahotsurface,developsrapidlyand
reachtemperaturesof700–1000°C[5].Accordingtoa
moresystematicanalysis,thesourceofignitioncanbe
at or very near the
point of origin of the fire.
Nevertheless, such evidence may be missing due to
heavydamagesordestructionbythefireitself[6].An
effective source of ignition requires sufficient
temperature, energy and contact time with the first
fuel ignited to raise it to its ignition temperature.
Therefore, the ignition
process involves generation,
transmission and heating and the investigations
focusesontheidentificationofheat‐producingdevice,
substancesorcircumstancesthatcouldhaveresulted
inignition.Exampleareshipsandcargoesmaterials,
electrical items (e.g. circuits, equipment and fuses,
lightbulbs,fixtures),enginerooms(e.g.oiltransfers),
welding and burning, charging
batteries,
housekeeping, friction (e.g. during grinding),
refrigeration (e.g. in compressors), smoking,
flammableandliquidsandgases(e.g.CNGandLPG),
open flames and sparks,as wellaslow temperature
ignition(e.g.withwood)andlightning.
These elements reflect themselves into the ship
designphase,wherethehazardsevaluationbasedon
theIMOGuidelines[7],whichderivefromthe basic
principles of IMO Convention SOLAS [8] and
MARPOL[9].
Inparticular,theSOLASConventionatChapterII‐
2 deals with fire protection, fire detection and fire
extinction, where the focus is on applicable
requirements depending on ship type and, more
interestingly for
our purposes, it fixed fire safety
objectivesandfunctionalrequirements.
The established fire safety objectives are
specificallythefollowing:
1. Preventtheoccurrenceoffireandexplosion;
2. Reducetherisktolifecausedbyfire;
3. Reduce the risk of damage caused by fire to the
ship,itscargo
andtheenvironment;
4. Contain,controlandsuppressfireandexplosionin
thecompartmentoforigin;
5. Provide adequate and readily accessible means of
escapeforpassengersandcrew.
Meanwhile the functional requirements for the
constructionoftheshipare:
1. Division of the ship into main vertical and
horizontal zones
by thermal and structural
boundaries;
2. Separation of accommodation spaces from the
remainder of the ship by thermal and structural
boundaries;
3. Restricteduseofcombustiblematerials;
4. Detectionofanyfireinthezoneoforigin;
5. Containmentandextinctionofanyfireinthespace
oforigin;
6.
Protection of means of escape andaccess forfire‐
fighting;
7. Readyavailabilityoffire‐extinguishingappliances;
8. Minimizationofpossibilityofignitionofflammable
cargovapours.
In this context, the Guidelines on alternative
design and arrangements for fire safety outline the
methodologyfortheengineeringanalysisrequiredby
SOLAS regulation
II‐2/17 Alter‐native design and
arrangementsapplyingtospecificfiresafetysystems,
designs or arrangements requiring approval of
technically justified deviations from the prescriptive
requirementsofSOLASchapterII‐2.
Additionalrecommendationsforthepreventionof
firesarepartoftheInternationalConventionforSafe
Containers (CSC) [10] and
for the mitigation of fire
consequences are part of the Emergency Response
Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods
(EMSGuide)[11].
In general, the following conditions and features
areaffectingthedesignrequirements:
1. Pre‐fire situation (ship, compartment, fuel load,
environmentalconditions);
2. Ignitionsources(temperature,energy,time,areaof
contactwithpotentialfuels);
3. Initial fuels (solid, liquid, gas, vapour or spray
state,density,heatreleasepower);
4. Secondaryfuels(proximitytoinitialfuels,amount
anddistribution);
5. Extension potential (beyond compartment,
structure,areas);
417
6. Targetlocations(itemsorareasassociatedwiththe
performanceparameters);
7. Critical factors (ventilation, environment,
operational,timeofday):
8. Relevantstatisticaldata(pastfirehistory,frequency
andseverityrates).
A systematic risk analysis for each hazard can
allow at providing with quantitative comparative
elements,suchasin[12].
3 STANDARDFIRESAFETYMEASURESON
CARGOSHIPS
A basic strategy, valid in all firefighting situations,
involves four distinct aspects: locating, informing,
containingandfinallyextinguishingafire[13].
The location is mainly by detection devices in
various ships’ compartments,such as exemplifiedin
[14],orsimplybydetectionof
odoursorsmokebythe
crew.Insomeareas,thefiregenerationprobabilityis
higher; therefore, regular checks and visits should
concentrateonthem.
After the fire detection, the information must
circulatequickly.Itisessentialthepreciseinformation
of the bridge about location and extent of the fire.
Moreover,the
findercanalsofightthedetectedfire,if
in the initial phase, and attract attention using any
potentially useful action, such as Shouting fire,
banging on bulkheads, setting off nearby alarms
equipment,etc..
Well‐locatedfireresistingbulkheadsanddecksare
normally able to contain the spread of the fire
and
firefightingpersonnelmustcheckthesecureofthese
barrierswhilstfightingthefire.Ventilationshouldbe
possibly off, as well as exhaust fans. Fast and
completeisolationofflammablematerialsisalsoakey
measure to take. A fire is three‐dimensional and its
containment should be six‐dimensional. Meanwhile
the fighting strategy will vary according to the
locationofthefire.
Theaccommodationareasconstructionisnormally
almost exclusively by Class A material to face by
water or soda‐acid type extinguishers after having
isolatedtheelectricalcircuits.Ventilationandexhaust
fans can stop and fire can close. Moreover,
a water
spray would help achieving the maximum cooling
effect.
ThemachineryspacesfiresinvolvemainlyClassB
materialrequiringtheuseoffoamtypeextinguishers.
Only for the smallest fires, hand extinguishers are
suitable.Thealarmandthebridgeinformationshould
bequick.Isolationofoiltanksandkeepingcool
them
willbeaprimarymeasure.
Incargospaces,withsmokedetectionandcarbon
dioxide flooding system the procedure requires to
ensuretheclosurebeforefloodingofairentryandexit
points by fire dampers. A fire could alsogenerate a
high probability of explosion, as well as an
independent
explosion could generate a fire. The
rapiduse of foam and any coolingprocedure of the
nearbyareasisstronglyrecommendable.
A fire outbreak requires ignition, presence of
combustible material and abundance of oxygen,
availableinlargequantitiesalmosteverywhere.Any
source of air, natural or by ventilation should be
possibly
off.
The systems used for cargo ships have
independently powered pumps, used for general
service and ballast water management too, which
supply engine room hydrants and the deck through
theanisolatingvalve,alwaysaccessiblefromoutside
the machinery space to prevent loss of water from
pipesintheengine
room.Aseawatersupplysystem
to fire hydrantsfitsto every ship. Severalpumps in
theengineroomsupplythesystem,withnumberand
capacitydictatedbylegislationandtechnicalrules..
Finally gaseous‐based systems, working with
stored or locally produced gases (e.g. CO2, inert
gases, halon, etc.) displaces the
oxygen in the
concernedspacesandthusextinguishthefires.
4 FIRESONCARGOSHIPS:ASYSTEMATIC
ANALYSIS
Despite the proven effectiveness of many measures
for preventing the fire events and mitigating their
effects,importantfiresarestillareality,alsoinrecent
years, as highlight‐ed in Table 1.
Therefore, a
systematicanalysisofthemostrelevantfiresoncargo
ships carried out with reference to the period 2008‐
2022, helped to identify areas of potential
improvements,bothinpreventionandmitigation.
A worldwide systematic ad homogeneous
approach to fires onboard cargo ships is not yet a
reality, despite the
efforts of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the European
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), both actively
working in this direction. Therefore, the research
work referred in this paper is not result of a full
systematic analysis, though identifies some good
practices, suchas those made availableby the Japan
Transport
SafetyBoard,MarineAccidentandIncident
Reports [15], and Transport Malta, Marine Safety
InvestigationUnit[16].
Table 2 summarizes the analysed fires and
explosions,having[15][16]asmain,butnotexclusive,
sources.The systematic analysis of the events, the
identification of causes, the estimation of
consequences and the highlighted recommendations
pave
thewaytolearnlessonsandtoidentifysystems
able to act in the direction of risks prevention and
mitigation.
5 NEWSTRATEGIESANDTECHNOLOGIESFOR
FIREFIGHTING
Basing on the systematic analysis of literature
concerning fire accidents onboard cargo ships, the
study identified some promising technologies to
integrateintostrategies
forearlydetectionoffiresand
mitigationoftheireffects.
418
Table2.Selectionoffiresandexplosionsoncargoships
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Year ShipLocationDescriptionConsequences
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
2008 PyxisPacificOcean Firefromcarsdecks1death
(Ro‐Ro)(Japan)
2008 UndAdriyatik AtlanticOcean Fireandexplosionfromcontainerholds 1deathand4seriouslyinjured
(Ro‐Ro)(Portugal)
2012 MSCFlaminiaAtlanticOcean Fireandexplosionfromcontainerholds 1deathand4seriouslyinjured
(Container)(Portugal)
2013 TaiganWakkanayport Firefromcrewcabins6deathsand3seriouslyinjured
(Tanker)(Japan)
2016 EiwaMaru3 WakayamaBay Explosionandfirefromtanksduring 1deathand2seriouslyinjured
(Tanker)(Japan)cleaning
2017 ManhattanBridge Felixstoweport Auxiliaryboilerexplosionandfire
1seriouslyinjured
(Container)(UK)
2017 TaiYuanHakataport FirefrommetalsTotallossofshipandcargoes
(Solidbulkcarrier) (Japan)
2020 MVCroatia SouthChineseSea ExplosionMinordamagestocargoes
(Container)(Malaysia)
2022 FelicityAce AtlanticOcean FirefromcargoholdsMajordamagestoship
andcargoes
(Ro‐Ro)(Portugal)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
The first identifiedsolution for earlydetection of
fires onboard ships is the fiber optic linear heat
detection, an optic‐mechanical linear heat detection
system[17].Forasingledetectionsystem,consisting
ofanopticalfiberandadetectorunit,thecablemay
bemanykmlong.Thedetectoremitsa
lightpulseinto
theopticalfiber and detectsreflectedlight returning
through the cable, whose intensity, wavelength and
time between emission and reflection provides
information about the temperature along the cable
and monitor continuously temperature distribution
along the entire cable and to follow temperature
variations duringfire. Themostcommon
techniques
for distributed temperature sensing are Raman
scattering, Brillouin scattering and Fiber Bragg
Gratings (FBG).BothRamanandBrillouinscattering
use the temperature dependence of light scattering
due to molecular vibrations within the glass core of
the optical fiber. FBG are modifications of the fiber
(grating), which enable reflection of a
temperature
dependingspecificwavelengthfromthegratingitself.
The gratings (temperature sensing points) can space
alongthecableaccordingtothedetectionneeds.Fiber
opticheatdetectionhasawiderangeofapplications,
including tunnels, conveyer belts, pipelines,
wildlands, aircrafts and hazardous or Electro‐
MagneticInterference(EMI) inintenseenvironments
(Figure1).
Figure1.Typicalfiberopticsignalsandcable
Thesecondidentifiedsolution,promisingforearly
detection of fire onboardcargo ships, is the thermal
video camera detection, which employs camera and
post‐processing software. The camera can provide
visual or thermalimages. The detectionofflamesor
smoke is achievable by analysing the images by
motion, shape, colours, transparency,
flicker and
energyorboundarydisorderinformationinthevideo
or a combination by different spectral analysis [18]
and interpreting algorithms [19]. Flame video
detectioniseasierandmorematureintermsofused
technology than smoke detection, which is more
appropriate for the detection of slow growing and
smouldering
fires. Fire detection algorithms may
integratethe softwarenormallyemployedfor CCTV
systems(Figure2).
Figure2.TypicalviewfromathermalCCTVcamera
The third identified solution, promising for
mitigation of effects of fires onboard cargo ships, is
the use of unmanned aircrafts (drones), formally
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). They are flying
robots, remotely controlled or flying autonomously
using soft‐ware‐controlled flight plans in its
embedded systems integrated with onboard sensors
and a
Global Positioning System (GPS). The major
reasons to use a drone are that it can reach heights
thatahumancannotreach,candirectproperlywhere
thetargetisandsolvetheproblem,cansavetimeand
be easily handled, can be much more cost efficient
thanusingafirefighting
helicopter.
Forthespecificfirefightinguse,itshouldbeableto
carryheavyweights.Atpresent,themultirotordrone
typologySKYFlooksgoodtocarryheavyloads,such
asfireextinguishersorretardants.Itcancarryuptoa
180kgofpayloadandflyforupto8hours.The
SKYF
usesthepowerandenduranceofgasolineenginesfor
liftandtheinstanttorqueofelectricmotorsforcontrol
andstabilization,resultingina heavy‐lift,affordable
multirotor(Figure3)[20].