1 INTRODUCTION

A significant number of marine accidents and

hazardous incidents occur every year due to the so-

called human factor. According to the Annual

Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents for 2022

published by EMSA [1] (European Maritime Safety

Agency), 2637 marine disasters and dangerous events

were reported last year. The analysis of 2014-2021

shows that more than half (55%) of the recorded

accidents occurred in the area of internal waters, with

the domination of port areas, where 39.2% of

incidents took place. The explanation for this can be

among others: high density of different types of

vessels in a relatively small area, limited

maneuverability due to submergence, haste and

fatigue of the crews.

Similar data are available on Electronic Quality

Shipping Information System Equasis [3] and internal

documentation collected by IGP&I International

Group of P&I Clubs [4]. The above causes account for

the highest percentage of all cases investigated by this

commission. As presented in the Table 1, collisions are

the major cause of marine accidents. From 2014 to

2021, no clear trend was stated. The number of

collisions remained varied, depending on the

considered time interval. The explanation for that can

be the variety of causes of collisions. They are

accidents that may happen alike on the open seas and

in the gulfs, due to equipment failure or crew

inattention, etc. Despite the introduction of more and

more new safety regulations, the number of accidents

has not decreased noticeably.

Risk Assessment While Maneuvering a Loaded Bulk

Car

rier in Close Proximity to a Vessel Performing

Underwater Work

G. Rutkowski & A. Bożek

Gdynia Maritime University, Gdynia, Poland

ABSTRACT: This article focuses on issues related to risk assessment when maneuvering a loaded bulk carrier in

close proximity to a vessel performing underwater work at the time. It is based on a detailed analysis of an

incident that took place in the Gulf of Gdansk. The write-up explains real turns of events, conditions and factors

that contributed to the incident, but also its consequences are explained. Some other aspects of this article

focuses on, are the processes of examination of the direct causes of the incident and identification not

compliance with regulations, requirements, or procedures that help

to find out the human, technical, and

organizational errors. The authors of this text indicate the safety guards that have failed, give the reasons for

their fail

ure and, where it was possible, point out the safety guards that should or must be established

. The

article does not take into account theoretical models for the described accidents, but only practical aspects,

human errors and applicable local and international laws and regulations. Particular attention was devoted to

the analysis of human errors made by officers maneuvering the surface vessel in the close vicinity of divers

performing underwater works.

http://www.transnav.eu

the

International Journal

n Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 17

Number 1

March 2023

DOI: 10.12716/1001.17.01.

According to Polish State Commission for

Maritime Accidents Investigation (SCMAI) [2], among

63 investigated cases of maritime incidents, 18

resulted from a lack of caution in maneuvering, and

13 were caused by the lack of proper alertness and

attention of the crew. The SCMAI is an independent

organization, which carries out safety investigations

based on research of vessel accidents that took place

in Polish waters. This institution is obliged to inspect

each and every ‘severe’ or ‘very severe’ marine

accident. Marine accident should be considered as an

occurrence or several consecutive occurrences linked

directly to the ship's operations, resulting in:

− any loss of life,

− major serious injury to a person loss of a person

onboard the ship,

− draught, loss of the ship in another way,

− damage to the ship seriously affecting its structure,

− maneuverability or operability so that an in-depth

repair is required,

− ship's grounding, or any ship's hull contact with

the sea bottom,

− an impact of the ship into a subsea obstacle,

− laying-up or collision of the vessel,

− fire, explosion,

− an impact into a building,

− facility of installation,

− cargo dislocation,

− damages due to unfavorable weather conditions,

− damages by ice,

− crack of the hull or suspected damage to the hull,

− damage by the ship to a port's infrastructure, or to

facilities providing access to ports, harbors,

installations or offshore structures causing a

serious risk to safety of the ships, other ships or

persons,

− damage to the natural environment or posing a

risk thereof.

Table 2 includes numbers of marine accidents

reported in Polish internal waters or territorial sea in

the period from 2016 to 2021. Those data are based on

Statistical Yearbook of Maritime Economy (Edition

2020 and 2022) [2, 16].

Table 2. Number of marine accidents reported in Polish

internal waters or territorial sea in period 2016-2021.

________________________________________________

Specification 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

________________________________________________

Number of notifications 90 114 110 144 109 142

Investigations not started, 61 83 44 71 59 79

investigations renounced

or another reason

Investigations started 29 31 66 73 50 63

of which

Investigations completed 16 21 53 49 37 54

of which resulted from 15 19 53 49 37 54

renounced investigations

________________________________________________

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Maritime Economy (Edition 2020

and 2022). Data collected by the State Maritime Accident

Investigation Commission (SCMAI) based on [2] and [16].

The aim of the authors of this article is to present

in details the risk assessment when maneuvering a

large ship in close proximity to a small diving boat

performing underwater operations. Similar incidents

are observed quite often around the world, including

Poland. The further part of the study, focuses on a

particular accident that took place in the Gulf of

Gdansk at the end of January 2023. One of the authors

– Grzegorz Rutkowski was appointed by the P&I Club

in London as the main investigator of this incident.

This article does not consider theoretical models of the

described accident, but only practical aspects, human

errors and applicable local and international

regulations. The article shows step-by-step, the real

turn of events, analyzes the legitimacy of the ship

commanders’ decisions and points out all causes of

this accident and its possible variants. Particular

attention was devoted to the analysis of human errors

made by officers maneuvering the surface vessel in

the close vicinity of divers performing underwater

works. Moreover, it mentions every non-compliance

with regulations, requirements and procedures.

2 METHODOLOGY

The authors analyzed the internal data collected by

Polish State Commission on Maritime Accident

Investigation [2], Electronic Quality Shipping

Information System Equasis [3], IGP&I International

Group of P&I Clubs [4] and Maritime Office in

Gdynia [5]. They scrutinized the scientific literature

(e.g. [9-17]) and online-based data related to

homogenous marine accidents from the Polish

Maritime Administration [5-7] and national and

European statistical offices [1,2,4].

It is crucial to mention that not all hazardous

situations with the participation of the vessels are

reported. Minor marine incidents are usually

concealed to avoid legal, administrative and financial

consequences. Those reported ones, are not always

dedicated to a detailed analysis of the effects and

causes of the events. To give an example, Polish

Maritime Chamber adjudicates cases on marine

accidents only at the request of the parties concerned

or a maritime administration. For this reason, "marine

accidents and incidents" or even less "severe

accidents", including those with the participation of

underwater diver intervention, are not necessarily

disclosed or they are less frequently presented.

However, they represent a remarkable group in the

events recorded by the SCMAI.

Another important piece of information about

SCMAI is the fact that it is not engaged in maritime

incidents related exclusively to vessels of the Naval

Forces, Border Guard or Police, unpowered or small-

scale wooden vessels; ships for exclusive state service

or used by the state for non-commercial purposes, 15

meters long fishing boats, leisure yachts–except for

very serious accidents; or accidents at offshore drilling

units. In accordance with Art. 40(1). There are two

main principles of SCMAI - the reports of this

organization cannot constitute evidence in criminal

proceedings and they do not establish fault or

responsibility for causing the accident. The only goal

of reports of SCMAI is to examine background of a

certain accident to prevent and avoid similar cases in

the future.

Table 1. Causes of marine accidents according to the analysis of the European Maritime Safety Agency EMSA.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Collision 548 483 548 497 494 556 354 435 3915

Loss of control - drive power supply 321 315 394 447 500 597 562 546 3682

Contact 303 332 276 346 323 336 319 335 2570

Damage/loss of equipment 237 318 314 286 313 317 326 300 2411

Grounding - hull unsealing 223 221 191 191 191 183 168 189 1557

Fire/ explosion 125 139 104 109 108 111 111 129 936

Utility of control- change of direction 64 74 72 79 66 88 91 122 656

Grounding- others 72 62 60 72 73 55 52 48 494

Flooding/flooding and submersion 72 74 47 63 45 49 52 46 448

Loss of control - loss of tightness 63 50 55 45 56 42 55 57 423

Loss of control - electrical power supply 60 41 39 44 51 53 41 56 385

Listing/capsizing 17 18 8 18 20 19 8 7 115

Hull damage 7 16 22 5 6 2 3 9 70

Loss of control- others 1 1 11 3 6 0 1 0 23

Others 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Total 2113 2144 2142 2206 2253 2409 2143 2279 17689

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Source: EMSA [1] Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents 2022. Access date: 06.03.2023

According to EMSA (based on [16]), 19418 vessel

accidents were reported in Europe from the year 2014

to year 2019. Despite this, the investigation was

provided only in 833 cases. The data collected by the

EMSA, the same as those from SCMAI, have their

methodological limitations - their publication contains

statistics on maritime incidents which involve ships

whose flag state is an EU Member country, incidents

that take place in the territorial or internal waters of

EU member states, and finally, events that are related

to the substantial interests of those nations.

In addition, to obtain detailed information about

the Gulf of Gdansk and to get a practical view of the

issues of maneuvering a vessel with a large number of

units operating in this relatively small area, the

authors interviewed the staff of the VTS Gulf of

Gdansk Station, located at the Harbor Master's Office

in Gdynia. The meeting was organized by the Student

Special Interest Group of Underwater Research

SeaQuest, in the VTS Station facility. It was possible

thanks to hospitality of the authorities of this

institution. Owing to this, the authors were able to

improve their understanding of numerous aspects of

maneuvering from the practical side and confront

their point of view with the opinions of the experts.

This article does not reveal the real names of the

ships and people engaged in the accident due to the

protection of personal data. For the reason mentioned

above, the vessel not complying with traffic

regulations will be called SHIP 1, the boat performing

underwater work will be named DIVER 2, and the

third vessel involved in the event will be given the

name SHIP 3.

The SHIP 1 is a typical Capsize bulk carrier with

the following parameters: 88,397 gross tons, length

over all (LAO) 288 m, width (B) 45 m, air draft (H) 56

m, draft (T) 15 m. The DIVER 2 is a small boat with

length over all (LAO) 15 m, width (B) 4 m, air draft

(H) 7 m, draft (T) 0,7 m. The SHIP 3 is a standard

tanker characterized by the following dimensions:

57,144 gross tons, length over all (LAO) 282 m, width

(B) 42 m, air draft (H) 58 m, draft (T) 15 m. The author

- Grzegorz Rutkowski, acting on the request of

Morska Agencja Gdynia, as Gard (North America)

Inc. P & I Club Underwriters Correspondent,

participated in the investigation process related to the

dangerous actions taken by the SHIP 1 observed at

Gdansk Anchorage No. 4 on January 28th, 2023 in

close proximity to DIVER 2 diving boat and fully

loaded SHIP 3 restricted in her ability to maneuver,

due to broken anchor chain on port anchor.

3 THE COURSE OF THE INCIDENT

SHIP 1 arrived in the Gulf of Gdansk on January 28th,

2023 on the early morning at about 07:10 LT. This

vessel was loaded with 130,600 metric tons of

Australian Thermal Coal in her to be discharged in

the ports of Gdansk [6] and Gdynia [7]. Fifteen

minutes after arrival, SHIP 1 called Gdansk Port

Control on CH-14 VHF and was informed by Harbor

Master that her berth (Ore Pier in Gdansk North Port)

had been occupied by another vessel and she was

requested to proceed to SE part of anchorage No.4. To

be more detailed, the SHIP 1 received clear

instructions from the VTS Gulf of Gdansk Duty

Officer to drop anchor in the South-Western part of

anchorage No. 4 and not to come closer than required

minimum distance of 6 cables (≈ 1100 m) to a DIVER 2

diving boat which at that time, was performing

underwater operations near SHIP 3. The Master of

SHIP 1 confirmed several times that he would follow

those VTS commands. However, he ignored the order

which resulted in exposing the divers working

underwater to great danger. At 09:00 LT SHIP 1

passed in between two other vessels maintaining 6

cables (≈ 1100 m) distance. A few minutes later, the

vessel decided to drop the anchors in the North part

of Anchorage No.4. which was equal to breaking the

order of Gdansk Port Control.

In such circumstances, the Duty Officer of Gdansk

Port Control called SHIP 1 to ask about her present

actions. The Vessel reported, that the anchor was just

dropped and the anchoring operation would be

complete in about 10 minutes. The Port Control

responded and informed the SHIP 1 that she was

already less than 5 cables from SHIP 3 and

dangerously close to DIVER 2 diving boat. SHIP 1 was

instructed by Harbor Master to heave up the anchor

and shift the vessel to the South or to the East of

Anchorage area No. 4. SHIP 1 was to drop the anchor

in the South-Western part of anchorage No. 4 and not

come closer than the requested minimum of 6 cables

(≈ 1100 m) to a DIVER 2 diving boat performing

underwater work in close proximity to SHIP 3. SHIP3

was fully loaded at a draft of approximately 15 meters

and therefore she had restricted ability to maneuver

within anchorage No. 4 with available water of 17 m

to 19 m depths.

DIVER 2 diving boat was performing underwater

operations at that time. Two divers were searching

underwater for the broken anchor chain of SHIP 3 and

because of that, the DIVER 2 diving boat had also

restricted maneuverability. SHIP 1 and SHIP 3 under

keel clearance (UKC) oscillated from a minimum of 2

m to a maximum of 4 m considering good weather

conditions.

At 09:15 LT SHIP 1 started heaving up anchor in

order to move to SW part of Anchorage No. 4. SHIP 1

then moved from the initial anchorage position and at

11:12 LT dropped the anchor in SW part of Anchorage

No. 4. Just after heaving up the anchor in the primary

anchoring position, the Master of the SHIP 1 continue

maneuvering the vessel the way that she was only 3

cables (≈ 550 m) away from the boat DIVER 2

providing direct services to divers. According to

Harbor Master’s opinion, this action created a serious

threat to persons working underwater.

Figures 1 to 4 show the data obtained from the

system SWIZB (Navigation Safety Information

Exchange System) of VTS Gulf of Gdansk. The

analysis of those data shows that SHIP 1 approached

the DIVER 2 diving boat at a distance closer than the

minimum required (see Fig. 2), generating a high risk

for divers performing underwater operations. It is

important to remember, that these distances are

measured from the point where the antenna is

attached on SHIP 1 and DIVER 2. Taking into account

the length, width and draft of SHIP 1 (LOA=288 m;

B=45 m, T=15 m) and also the size of DIVER 2 diving

boat (LOA=15 m, B=4 m), it can be noticed that the

real distance the vessels passed each other was even

less than 3 cables (on Fig. 2 it is 0,24 Nm which gives

only about 450 meters minus ship’s real contour).

Figure 1. SHIP 1 dangerous activity observed at Gdansk

Anchorage No. 4. Source: VTS Gdansk [5].

Figure 2. Distance between SHIP 1 and DIVER 2 diving boat

= 0,24 NM = 449 m. Source: VTS Gdansk [5].

Figure 3. Distance between SHIP 1 and SHIP 3 = 0,35 NM =

647 m. Source: VTS Gdansk [5].

Figure 4. Distance between SHIP 1 and SHIP 3 = 0,31 NM =

577 m. Source: VTS Gdansk [5].

Due to the facts and irregularities described above,

the Gdansk Harbor Master decided to talk to the

master of SHIP 1 in order to obtain his explanations

about what had happened and to start the process of

the possible an administrative penalty on him, for not

complying with maritime law rules in Polish

territorial waters.

In Journal of Laws 2022.457 (Maritime Areas of the

Republic of Poland and Maritime Administration) in

Article 56 (Deeds subject to a financial penalty) [17]

there is a statement that: ‘Anyone who stops or

anchors a ship outside the place intended for this

purpose or drives a ship outside the fairways or does

not maintain the course indicated by the competent

authority, does not comply with the orders set out in

Art. 52, etc. shall be subject to a financial penalty up to

the amount not exceeding twenty times the average

monthly remuneration in the national economy for

the preceding year, announced by the President of the

Central Statistical Office.’ In case presented in this

article, the administrative penalty could be

approximately EUR 25,000.

After clarifying all disputes, the Harbor Master

presented his accusation to the Master of SHIP 1

regarding his improper and unsafe activity recorded

at Anchorage No. 4 of January 28, 2023. The objections

raised by the Harbor Master concerned two main

points:

The first one was concerned with the method of

approaching anchorage No. 4 by SHIP 1, as the vessel

was ignoring the instructions received from the Duty

Officer of the VTS Gulf of Gdansk. It resulted

dropping the anchor in the Northern part of

Anchorage No 4 in the close vicinity (about 5 cables ≈

900 m) 0,5 Nm from other vessels, including a DIVER

2 diving boat performing at that time underwater

operations. Earlier, the SHIP 1 had received clear

instructions from the VTS Gulf of Gdansk Duty

Officer to drop anchor in the south-western part of

anchorage No. 4 and not to come closer than a

minimum required distance of 6 cables (0,6 Nm ≈ 1100

m) to a DIVER 2. SHIP 1 confirmed several times that

she would follow this VTS orders, but in fact, the

Master of SHIP 1 ignored this order and dropped the

anchor in a different place, exposing the divers

working underwater to serious danger. Master of the

SHIP 1 did not post any objections to the place where

he had been ordered to proceed for anchoring. The

master of the SHIP 1 was unable to reasonably explain

his maneuvers at the Anchorage without informing

VTS. However, he showed great remorse and

humility and also apologized for his reprehensible

behavior, which could have endangered other vessels

in the vicinity, especially DIVER 2 diving boat and its

divers.

The second point was related to the issue of

dangerous maneuvers performed by SHIP 1 when she

was heaving up the anchor and later was moving

forward to the North-West, passing very close to the

DIVER 2 diving boat with two divers working

underwater. According to the data received from VTS

Gulf of Gdansk, that time the SHIP 1 approached the

diving boat DIVER 2 at a distance of about 2,4 cables

(0,24 Nm ≈ 449 m). They did not follow the instruction

received from the VTS duty officer which was to keep

a minimum 6 cables distance (≈1100 m). The Port

Control officers had the impression that the

management of SHIP 1 did not understand the given

instructions or did not intend to follow them,

breaking the regulations of the maritime

administration.

In this case, the Master SHIP 1 was also unable to

reasonably explain his maneuvers at the Anchorage

neglecting VTS guidelines and good sea practice. He

again apologized for his behavior and promised that

in the future he would be more careful and always

follow the orders of the VTS operators.

The Harbor Master accepted the apology. The

matter was only ended with a verbal warning, as the

diving company (the owner of DIVER 2 boat) and the

Master of SHIP 3 have not lodged any official claim;

nobody was injured and nothing got damaged.

Taking into consideration the lack of any damage

reported and the full cooperation of the Master of

SHIP 1 in objective clarification of the incident that

occurred, the Gdansk Harbor Master’s Office has

decided not to initiate administrative proceedings in

the subject matter.

4 RECOMMENDATION

To avoid the situation described in this article, the

crew should always be familiar with voyage plan,

port pilotage, VTS systems, navigational charts and

publications, navigational warnings and all other

information regarding ship's route system, next port

of call, available anchorages, local rules and

regulations as well any other information needed for

safe navigation. In this case, the ship's crew did not

obtain in advance information that their position in

the harbor was occupied by another vessel. The

possibility of such an eventuality when planning

ship’s voyage should be taken into account.

A well-prepared passage plan is particularly

important for ships as large as SHIP 1 and SHIP 3.

Such vessel is constrained by their size and draft

which limits their maneuverability. The risk of

difficult situations increases when vessels are in a

relatively small area with a lot of navigational

hazards. Another important issue are good

communication and risk assessment.

On the one hand, the ship's captain, did the right

thing when he did not follow blindly the order given

by the VTS Gulf of Gdansk Duty Officer. The captain

was aware of the depth in the area which was not

sufficient for dropping the anchor. On the other hand,

he made several crucial mistakes that led to the

described accident.

The first mistake the master made was confirmed

the order, but did not perform it. VTS service would

have certainly taken every notice into account if the

master had reported them. Had the anchorage not

been suitable for this bulk carrier, the operators would

have indicated another, safe place to drop anchor. If

the captain’s concerns had been wrong, his doubts

would have been allayed. However, by

acknowledging the order without any complaints, the

VTS watch remained unaware of his problems and the

master was left alone with his doubts.

Irresponsible act of the captain was the fact that he

carried out maneuvers on his own, without following

previously formulated orders. Proved to be another

irresponsible behavior there is always a lot of traffic in

the Gulf of Gdansk area which causes navigation to be

more difficult. In such conditions, the VTS staff plays

a significant role in monitoring ships’ actions and

coordinating their operations in order to prevent

hazardous situation. The wide knowledge and

experience of the operators of this service supported

by high- tech equipment ensure undisturbed and safe

vessel traffic.

Even though, when a ship begins to act on its own

and does not comply with COLREGS and given

orders, it creates a serious threat to other vessels. One

of serious dangers is the occurrence of the so-called

chain reaction, i.e., when maneuvering vessel does not

follow orders, causes unpredictable actions of other

vessels to avoid collision. This type of situation is a

challenge for VTS Duty Officers. The SHIP 1, by its

actions, posed a hazard to the working divers and

vessels engaged in those operations. It could have led

to even more serious consequences. To give an

example, the incident could have ended up

dramatically if the weather conditions had got worse.

It would have resulted in difficulties in maneuvering

and/or conducting surveillance. For this reason, the

distance between the SHIP1, DIVER 2 boat and SHIP 3

at critical moment could have decreased and reached

less than 3 cables. Such a turn of events would have

resulted in a collision between the vessels and injury

to the divers.

Another aspect in which The Master of SHIP 1

failed was the fact that he did not take into account

his limited knowledge of the Gulf of Gdansk area, so

he judged the situation wrongly.

Fortunately, in the mentioned case there were no

casualties among humans and none of the vessels was

damaged. The incident did not result in any pollution

to the environment either. Similar events should be

analyzed in order to increase the safety of navigation

and provide protection to marine environment.

5 FINAL CONCLUSION

The main reason for the accident was human error.

This incident could have been avoided if only the

guidelines received from the Duty Officer of the VTS

Gulf of Gdansk service had been followed by Master

of SHIP 1 and proper visual observation had been

carried out at the same time. Proper look-out must be

maintained, especially during passage in traffic

separation schemes.

During this incident, several rules from COLREGs

were broken, including:

Rule 5 (Look-out): Every vessel shall at all times

maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as

by all available means appropriate in the prevailing

circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal

of the situation and of the risk of collision.

Rule 8 (Action to avoid collision): Any action to

avoid collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules

of this Part and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit,

be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the

observance of good seamanship. In this case, it was

extremely important to conduct proper look-out and proper

radio communication with Duty Officer of VTS Gulf of

Gdansk in order to confirm that our intentions are in line

with the guidelines of the VTS service operator.

The first point concerned by the Harbor Master

was the method of approaching anchorage. The

master ignored the instructions received from the

Duty Officer of the VTS Gulf of Gdansk and, as a

result, dropped the anchor in the close vicinity (about

5 cables) of other vessels, including a DIVER 2 diving

boat, which performed underwater operations at that

time. Before, the vessel received instructions from the

Duty Officer VTS Gulf of Gdansk to drop anchor in

different position and not to come closer than a

minimum required distance of 6 cables to a diving

boat performing underwater work, the vessel

confirmed several times that she would comply with

this VTS order. In fact, the Master ignored this

command and dropped the anchor in a different

place, exposing the divers working underwater to

great danger.

The second point, raised by the Harbor Master was

the issue of dangerous maneuvers performed when

the vessel was heaving up the anchor and then,

proceeding forward, passing very close to the diving

boat with divers underwater. According to the data

from VTS Gulf of Gdansk, the ship approached the

diving boat at a distance of about 2,5 cables (≈450 m),

and according to the instructions received from the

VTS Duty Officer, it was supposed to keep a

minimum 6 cables distance (≈ 1100 m).

In both cases the Master of SHIP 1 did not notify

the Duty Officer of the Harbor Master's Office about

any doubts related to the place where he was ordered

to drop anchor and anchored elsewhere without the

officer's consent. At the time of anchoring, the SHIP 1

was closer to the unit conducting underwater

operations than recommended by the port officer

(minimum distance 6 cables). In addition, after

heaving up the anchor, SHIP 1 set a North-West

course, as a result of which the vessel passed only 2,5

cables from the DIVER 2 boat, all this happened in

spite of having information about underwater

operations conducted by both the DIVER 2 boat and

SHIP 3.

In both cases, the Master SHIP 1 was unable to

reasonably explain his maneuvers at the anchorage

contrary to VTS guidelines and good sea practice. He

apologized for his behavior and promised that in the

future he would be more careful and always follow

the instructions of the VTS operators.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Student Special Interest Group of Underwater Research

“SeaQuest” would like to thank the reviewers for their kind

evaluations, substantive comments and the time devoted to

evaluating our work. “SeaQuest” is currently participating

in research project No. SKN/SP/535575/2022 called MUDS

Base – the Mobile Underwater Diving Support Base which

was submitted as part of a scientific competition organized

by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education as a new

initiative: ‘Student Circles Create Innovations’. Members of

“SeaQuest” hope that their new project will gain extra

financial support in this initiative, which will enable them to

continue their research work on their new mobile diving

base project with flexible diving bell called Batychron. As a

result of the planned research work in 2023, “SeaQuest”

would like to create a mobile MUDS Base device, which will

be widely used in hydrotechnics for underwater transport

and securing exploratory and tourist dives while

maintaining the safety of human life.

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