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1 INTRODUCTION

From a logistical viewpoint, Afghanistan is a

disadvantaged state due to its land-locked location.

Although the significance of secure logistics and

infrastructure has already been recognised in the post-

conflict reconstruction and stabilisation of

Afghanistan, its sustaining factors are less concrete

given the confusion from the withdrawal of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United

States military forces as well as the lack of

transparency of political situation in Afghanistan. Yet

this is also a critical juncture at which further support

of Afghanistan could prevent a humanitarian crisis.

Consequently, it is far more important than ever that

sustaining factors for restabilising Afghanistan are

examined from legal, logistical and technical

perspectives.

Given the logistical disadvantages facing land-

locked states, international legal instruments such as

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

guarantee transit and access rights to ports, seas and

destination countries through neighbouring states’

territories. However, the flaws of relying on foreign

ports for these rights are that neighbouring states

have quasi-full control of Afghanistan's domestic and

international supply chain due to the control of their

shared borders. In order for Afghanistan to retain a

secure supply chain, the maintenance of multiple

Restabilising Afghanistan through a Comprehensive

Logistics Framework for the Access to Ports

M. Okochi

, F. Nawabi

, S. Hemmi

& T. Takemoto

Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology, Tokyo, Japan

Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT: This paper aims to examine numerous sustaining factors in the restabilisation of Afghanistan, from

legal, logistical and technical perspectives. The significance of logistics and infrastructure for state

reconstruction and stability has been recognised by military and engineering practices. However, previous

research on Afghanistan has focused on specific areas such as geopolitics, regional studies, bilateral cooperation

and international aid. In contrast, this paper examines specialised issues within logistics and infrastructure, i.e.,

transit rights, access to ports, investors’ codes of conduct and the modus operandi of military and engineering

engaged in the construction, operation and protection of infrastructure, which have not yet been fully discussed

in the previous research. Furthermore, the importance of logistics of multiple shipping routes will be examined

through comparative analysis. Considering a prolonged restabilisation process in land-locked Afghanistan,

rights of transit and port access are imperative to achieve safe logistics in energy, water, food and medical

supplies. In conclusion, an integrated, comprehensive model agreement for multilateral cooperation would

enable international aid to be funnelled via a single scheme. Thus, this paper concludes that the long-term

stability and development of Afghanistan will be guaranteed through a comprehensive framework agreement

for logistics, which materialises rights of transit and port access.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 16

Number 3

September 2022

DOI: 10.12716/1001.16.03.03

430

alternative routes is necessary to protect its logistical

independence, stability and development.

However, previous research on Afghanistan has

focused on specialised areas such as geopolitics,

regional studies, bilateral cooperation and

international aid. In contrast, this paper analyses the

importance and pros and cons of current and

potential logistics schemes through a comparative

analysis of multiple shipping routes. Furthermore, the

authors focus on the importance of logistics in the

reconstruction and restabilisation of Afghanistan by

ensuring the rights of transit and port access,

especially to Chabahar Port in Iran.

In order to inquire into the worthiness of logistics

in state reconstruction and the supporting elements in

establishing logistics within the unstable region, this

paper will examine current legal instruments and

future multilateral cooperation in financial and

technical support that may lay the foundation for safe

and secure logistics in Afghanistan. Consequently,

this paper clarifies that the long-term stability and

development of Afghanistan will be guaranteed

through a comprehensive multilateral framework

agreement for logistics, which materialises rights of

transit and port access.

2 KEY ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICS AND

INFRASTRUCTURE IN LAND-LOCKED STATES

2.1 Legal Frameworks for Land-Locked States’ Access

Rights to Ports and Maritime Transport

A notion of land-locked state is defined as a state that

has no sea-coast.[1] This is a strict definition since it

may exclude states that have no de facto access due to

geographical features such as short or steep coastlines

or access only to a closed sea. According to this strict

definition, Afghanistan is a genuine land-locked state

surrounded by a number of mountainous borders that

are natural strongholds high above sea level. As a

result, Afghanistan has no access to international

maritime transport that may enhance international

trade, stability and development. The only navigable

river port in Afghanistan is Hairatan, on the south

bank of the Amu Darya river, facing Termez,

Uzbekistan, on the north bank. [2]

Instead of the coastline for an exit to maritime

shipping, Afghanistan has six neighbouring states:

Iran, with a border spanning 582 miles/936 km,

Pakistan (1,640 miles/2,640 km), China (57 miles/91

km), Tajikistan (843 miles/1,357 km), Uzbekistan (89

miles/144 km) and Turkmenistan (500 miles/804 km),

as shown in Fig. 1, with Russia to the north, separated

by the Central Asian states. These adjacent states of a

land-locked state have the potential either to

detriment and forestall outright the supply chain or

stimulate a distribution system of this disadvantaged

state.

The geographical conditions are disadvantageous

not only to Afghanistan but also to various actors

supporting Afghanistan, such as the World Food

Program (WFP), the United Nations High

Commissioner Representative (UNHCR), NATO and

US military, because of difficulties in supply chain

management for essential material.

Figure 1 Afghanistan and Neighbouring States Source:

NATO [3]

Faced with these difficulties, international legal

frameworks for rights of transit and port access are

provided so that seaborne aid and trade are able to

supply essential materials to land-locked states. For

example, legal theories entrust states with

materialising transit rights through agreement. [4]

While the solidity of the legal basis and capacity of

maritime transport are imperative to stabilising

Afghanistan, they have not been scrutinised in

previous research. Therefore, this paper compares

bilateral and multilateral logistical schemes to each

other.

Having considered the disadvantages of land-

locked states, multilateral agreements such as

UNCLOS, ECT and GATT guarantee freedom of

transit by providing the transit rights of land-locked

states in principle.

These multilateral instruments, which include

originally regional agreements, that materialise the

access rights to maritime transport for land-locked

states are as follows.

First, part X of UNCLOS relates to the “right of

access of land-locked states to and from the sea and

freedom of transit.” Article 125, paragraph 1 stipulates

land-locked states have the right of access to and from

the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights

provided for in UNCLOS, including freedom of the

high seas. Subsequent articles vest rights of access to

and from the sea and freedom of transit in land-

locked states so that they shall enjoy freedom of

transit through the territory of transit states.

However, the purposes of UNCLOS essentially set

limits on the contents of the right of access for land-

locked states to and from the sea and freedom of

transit. The terms and modalities for exercising

freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-

locked state and transit states concerned through

bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements (Article 125,

paragraph 2).

Transit states have the right to take all

necessary measures to

ensure that their legitimate

interests are not infringed upon

(Article 125, paragraph

3). Furthermore, Afghanistan has still

not yet ratified

UNCLOS.

431

Another prime example of a multilateral

convention that relates to transit rights is ECT, which

Afghanistan has ratified. The transit provision of ECT,

Article 7 embodies the right of transit, requiring

contracting parties to take necessary measures to

facilitate the transit of energy materials and products

consistent with the principle of freedom of transit

enshrined in GATT. On the one hand, one limitation

of ECT is it focuses solely on energy materials and

products, compared to UNCLOS, which covers

general access to the sea. On the other hand, ECT

includes specific obligations with respect to energy

transit via fixed infrastructure such as pipelines and

electricity grids. [5] In light of the necessity of transit

and infrastructure, the Energy Charter Protocol on

Transit was drafted to implement the transit provision

of ECT by ensuring the transit and construction of

infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Protocol has not been

agreed upon.

Finally, Article 5 of GATT provides freedom of

transit by prohibiting restrictions or impediment that

transit states would impose on the traffic in transit.

Article 5, paragraph 2 stipulates that “there shall be

freedom of transit through the territory of each

contracting party, via the routes most convenient for

international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the

territory of other contracting parties” as a legal

foundation of freedom of transit. This freedom of

transit is applied to goods, vessels and other means of

transport and traffic in transit shall not be subject to

restrictions. [6]

Thus, multilateral legal frameworks are functional

to structuring the transit rights of land-locked states.

However, in order to materialise these transit rights, it

is critical to regulate precise conditions for the transit

of territory of adjacent states. From this viewpoint,

one advantage bilateral agreements hold over

multilaterals, including tri- and quadrilaterals, is

practicality. At the same time, every adjacent state has

individual stakes in Afghanistan, i.e., exploitation of

natural resources, prevention of extremism, or

stabilisation of Afghanistan. Consequently, the

contents of bilateral cooperation vary from state to

state.

2.2 Inseparability of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and

Security Concerns

In addition to the disadvantages of being a land-

locked state, another problem with logistical

capabilities in Afghanistan, as one of the most

seriously stricken states by wars and insurgencies, is

the lack of fundamental energy, transport and

telecommunication infrastructures and their security.

Therefore, the post-conflict reconstruction of

Afghanistan and security concerns have been

considered inseparable by a regional study in Herat

province long since the beginning of the

reconstruction effort. [7]

Also, in practice, the UN Security Council (UNSC)

Resolution 1383 (December 6, 2001) called for state

reconstruction through assistance of independence

and cooperation to put an end to the use of

Afghanistan as a base for terrorism. [8] At the same

time, the UNSC Resolution 1386, paragraph 1

(December 29, 2001) mandated the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the

Afghan government in ensuring the maintenance of

security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. [9] These

resolutions aimed to secure, stabilise, reconstruct and

develop Afghanistan through the ‘Clear, Hold and

Build’ strategy or the ‘Shape, Secure, Develop (SSD)’

framework. [10] As NATO has stressed that logistics

contribute to reconstruction and counter-insurgency

(COIN), the UK military has shown progress in

stabilising Helmand province by constructing

infrastructure and cooperating with the local

community. [11]

Simultaneously, insurgents, too, comprehend that

logistics play a key role in reconstruction and security.

The tactic of cutting off enemy logistics has been

effective since the time of the Soviet War in

Afghanistan (1979-89). [12] The significant number of

civilian casualties in five of the top ten most unstable

provinces (2017 to 2020), attest to the insurgents'

interest in these strategic locations (Fig. 2). Also, in

2021, the insurgents’ first priority was to disrupt the

flow of military convoys and essential goods before

and after the withdrawal of NATO and US military

forces.

Figure 2 Civilian Casualties in MajorAfghan Provinces

Source: Annual Report of UNAMA [13]

In order to establish serviceable logistics for the

reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan,

fundamental infrastructure (e.g., airports, highways,

thoroughfares, feeder roads, railways, gas pipelines,

telecommunication networks, storage facilities and

hinterland) in areas within and surrounding

Afghanistan are key elements. For instance, energy

distribution systems are one example of a large-scale

supply chain with high commercial value. They are

long-term (at least 30 to 50 years) megaprojects which

require numerous phases of infrastructure

construction, from concession to exploration,

exploitation, production, storage, onloading,

transport, unloading, reloading and finally domestic

distribution, as well as foreign export. In order for this

supply chain to function effectively, all possible choke

points must be removed throughout its entirety. As

such, logistics heavily depend on legal foundations to

guarantee transit rights, either bilateral or multilateral

schemes, financial support to build and operate

infrastructure, military support to prevent seizure by

insurgents by thwarting attacks and technical support

to prevent accidents by adhering to Safety

Management Systems (SMSs), especially on the

unstable terrain of the area.

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3 BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SCHEMES

FOR LOGISTICS

Individual relationships between Afghanistan and its

neighbouring states are closely examined in previous

literature in the context of regional, political and

economic cooperation for the purpose of state

reconstruction. For example, Barnett Rubin, who has

the most reputable achievements in Afghanistan

studies, analyses cooperation and relationships

among the players in conflict in the region. [14] Also,

Bojan Savić, in one of his latest studies, focuses on

Iran and Herat province in Western Afghanistan. [15]

In contrast to past literature, this paper compares

possible shipping routes and transit schemes from a

logistical viewpoint as follows; having considered

eliminating obstacles within these routes and

guaranteeing transit rights for port access, multilateral

cooperation becomes more fruitful than bilateral

cooperation and provides exits to maritime shipping.

3.1 Iran Route: Railway and Chabahar Port

Iran has one of the largest influences on Afghanistan’s

logistics due to the similarities between the two states,

namely linguistics and the belief in Shī’ah among the

Hazaras. [16]

In light of this proximity, Iran has pursued its own

interests with Afghanistan, especially a 225 km

railway connection across the northeastern border

through the towns of Khaf in Iran and Herat in

Afghanistan. This route through the western region of

Afghanistan has the potential to grant Iran access to

Uzbekistan, and vice versa, by connecting Herat to

Mazar-i-Sharif by rail, as shown in Fig. 3.

While the 75 km Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairatan line is

operated to provide trade between Afghanistan and

Uzbekistan, Iranian authorities intend to extend a 730

km rail line between Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. [17]

Financial support will be one issue. Support from

interested states such as Uzbekistan and Russia, who

need access to an exit to maritime shipping routes

through Iranian ports, will be a key element to help

materialise this long extension. [18]

Figure 3 Khaf-Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif Railway Plan Source:

Adapted from Afghanistan Railway Authority [19]

Iran’s contribution to the construction of the

railway from Khaf to Herat enabled Afghanistan to

import construction material from Iran and export

agricultural products through Iran to India. As a

result, the flow of products through Iran to India

resulted in foreign direct investment (FDI) from India.

Given the importance of access to Iran for

Afghanistan’s stability, the US gave India “the

Afghanistan reconstruction” exception in accordance

with Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse, US

Code Chapter 95 - Iran Freedom and

Counterproliferation (IFCA) of 2012. Thus, India’s FDI

in Chabahar Port was exempted from economic

sanctions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

(JCPOA). [20]

Chabahar Port is located on the southeastern coast

of Iran, facing the Bay of Oman, as shown in Fig. 4.

Figure 4 Chabahar Port. Source: Adapted from Ports and

Maritime Organzation of Iran [21]

Chabahar Port is considered a strategic location

from an economic viewpoint for enhancing trade

between India and Central Asian countries, such as

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, via Iran and

Afghanistan. Simultaneously, from the viewpoint of

regional stability and global security, this port has the

potential to improve Afghanistan's political stability

through the construction of logistic infrastructure,

supply of essential materials and participation of

Afghanistan in the international community.

Thus, Iran may have the potential to make steady

progress in constructing railway and establishing

logistics by connecting all the way from Chabahar

Port to Hairatan, on the border with Uzbekistan, via

Khaf, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

India also has critical interests in terms of Iranian

port development in the light of Pakistan’s strength in

the strategic port of Karachi, and soon Gwadar, to

support international logistics into Afghanistan and

Central Asia. India believes that an Iranian route

could be a solution to bypassing the Pakistan route

and not allowing Pakistan to control the supply chain

between India, Afghanistan and Central Asia. [22]

Indian and Iranian authorities agreed to a bilateral

contract in 2016 to grant India rights to develop and

operate two terminals and five berths with cargo

handling capacities in Chabahar Port for ten years.

433

The port is a focus in the context of the stabilisation of

Afghanistan by enhancing international trade through

maritime transport with India. [23] Through

implementation of this bilateral contract, India’s

investment and equipment increased the cargo-

handling capacity of Chabahar Port, as shown in Fig.

5. Since 2016, India has invested half a billion US

dollars in the development of the port. Consequently,

India has had a key role in the investment in and

development of Chabahar Port since the early phases

of the port’s construction in the 2000s, despite US

economic sanctions on Iran in response to their

nuclear program.

India’s investment has resulted in an increase of

trade with Afghanistan. India sent 110,000 tons of

wheat and 2,000 tons of pulses to Afghanistan in 2017,

and in 2019 they received 700 tons of agricultural and

mineral products from Afghanistan through

Chabahar Port, thus adhering to the pact between

themselves and, later, Afghanistan.

Figure 5. Loading and Discharge at Chabahar Port Source:

Ports and Maritime Organization of Iran [24]

On the other hand, Iran has also concluded an

agreement for 25 years of cooperation with China in

2021 in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI). The agreement throws some doubt on the

potential of India’s investment in Iran.

3.2 Russia Route: The International North-South

Transport Corridor (INSTC)

Russia has historically paid close attention to its

transport line of communication. [25] In 1964, the

construction of the 2.6 km Salang Tunnel was

completed by the Soviet military and technical

support personnel. [26] The Salang Tunnel is the only

means of connecting Afghanistan to Tajikistan under

the Hindu Kush mountains. Thus, this tunnel and the

Salang Highway contribute to linking Kabul through

Mazar-i-Sharif to the former Soviet Union,

complemented by a road-rail bridge across the Amu

Darya and a railway to Hairatan. However, the

approach to the Salang Tunnel is often blocked by

heavy snow in winter.

Russia has worked to solidify the line of

communication and its legal status. [27] For example,

Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated that

economic cooperation necessitates the existence of a

developed logistics network, the sort of which is

lacking in Afghanistan, referring to the International

North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting

Moscow and Saint Petersburg with the Caspian Sea

and the Persian Gulf as shown in Fig. 6. [28]

Figure 6 INSTC. Source: Adapted from Islamic Republic

News Agency [29]

INSTC, led by Russia and India, is the 7,200 km

multimodal trade and transit network corridor

consisting of sea, rail and road. INSTC may reduce the

shipping time and cost between India, Iran and Russia

through the Caspian Sea region so that Russia and

India can trade directly on land instead of via the Suez

Canal and Atlantic Sea route. Trade between Russia

and India has been carried out via the ocean route;

freight was loaded at Jawaharlal Nehru Port on the

west coast of India, moved along the Suez Canal and

again unloaded and reloaded at Saint Petersburg Port

in Russia. The total transport time was typically 40–60

days, compared to INSTC’s 25–30 days. Russia

considers Chabahar Port to be within its framework.

In 2014 and 2017, the INSTC underwent a dry run to

prove its feasibility and to identify its efficiency and

potential choke points.

In addition, ice often makes the Baltic Sea difficult

to navigate in winter, and therefore, shipping by road

is safer and more efficient than maritime

transportation in this case. Moreover, as container

vessels grew in size, they became unable to berth in

many ports. As a result, these vessels had to be

diverted to hub ports, where their cargo was reloaded

onto smaller vessels for delivery to the destination

port. This became a costly and time-consuming

process. In comparison, multimodal transport, such as

INSTC, does not appear as inefficient as it once did.

On the other hand, when Russia sees that

multilateral transit schemes are less beneficial to the

country’s line of communication, it discards the

framework, ECT likewise. Given that the terrain

always overwhelms technology in Afghanistan, the

rational decision for Russia is to choose the defensive

containment of extremism by cordon sanitaire instead

of seeking to exert control of this natural stronghold.

While Afghanistan has the potential to become a

branch route, it is not yet involved in INSTC. It is not

clear whether this multimodal trade and transit

network would be beneficial to Afghanistan in light of

the current economic sanctions against Russia.

434

3.3 China Route: the Wakhan Corridor

Third, the Afghan-China border (the Wakhan

Corridor) is of limited significance, particularly to

China, as it is narrow and barren terrain in the

province of Badakhshan, in the northeast part of

Afghanistan. Therefore, China has focused more on

mining further inside Afghanistan (namely, copper

mining at Mes Aynak, Logar province) rather than

developing cross-border infrastructure. Furthermore,

the licensee Metallurgical Corporation of China has

had to pause mining operations and cooperate with

the relevant authorities in order to preserve the

remains of an ancient city discovered under the site,

which further delayed the project, as well as a

planned railway construction from the site to Gwadar

Port in Pakistan. Thus, the previous Afghan-China

cooperation was characterised by on-the-spot

involvement, rather than absorption into the BRI.

Instead, Chabahar Port, one of the ports currently

on the frontier of the BRI, enables China to access the

Gulf of Oman through Central Asia. Therefore, it

remains doubtful whether the mountainous terrain of

Afghanistan will merit the time and effort necessary

for China to develop its inland infrastructure,

especially when compared to the easy access to other

ports in surrounding countries like Pakistan.

In sharp contrast to Afghan-Iran-India

cooperation, the Afghan-Pakistan border issue is far

more complicated. Article 3 of the Afghanistan-

Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) provides

that “there shall be freedom of transit through the

territory of each contracting party, via the pre-settled

routes most convenient for international transit, for

traffic in transit to or from the territory of the other

contracting party.” [30]

This legal foundation of freedom of transit is far

more important than ever due to disorder and famine

in Afghanistan since the fall of the Afghan

government and takeover by the Taliban in August

2021. The supply of food and medical aid to

Afghanistan has become a matter of urgency. [31]

Although an agreement between Pakistan and India

to ship the supplies to Afghanistan was ultimately

reached, shipping medical supplies and 50,000 metric

tons of wheat took longer than expected.

Thus, the purpose, extent and capability of

bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and its

neighbouring states vary largely according to

contracting state parties. All these fragmented and

bilateral relationships, which have been studied in

earlier literature on a basis of individual cooperation,

become fruitful when multilateral cooperation

guarantees transit rights and provides exits to

maritime shipping routes. INSTC, Chabahar Port, and

BRI, as examined in this paper, are good examples of

the potential of multilateral cooperation, which helps

to cover the inherent weaknesses of purely bilateral

relationships. [32]

4 FOREIGN SUPPORT IN LOGISTICS

INFRASTRUCTURE IN AFGHANISTAN

4.1 Multilateral Frameworks for Foreign Direct

Investment

Afghan infrastructure, whether for energy,

transportation or telecommunications, is innately

vulnerable due to the mountainous topography of the

region. In light of the manifestations of Soviet interest

and offers to be of assistance to Afghanistan, loans

from foreign governments have been essential to

Afghanistan. [33] FDI in cross-border energy transit

infrastructure has been considered an influential

apparatus for stability since the late 1990s. The

concept of a ‘peace pipeline’ that can promote stability

and development was introduced by the vice-

president of the Union Oil Company of California

(UNOCAL), J. Maresca to the US Congress back in

1998. [34] A ‘peace pipeline’ is expected to perform

multiple functions to achieve reconstruction, stability

and development in the host state, by providing the

host government with revenue, transit fees, an energy

supply and trade opportunities. The Asian

Development Bank (ADB) estimates that the

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI)

Pipeline will benefit citizens through improved

energy supply and employment, especially in

communities surrounding the pipeline. [35]

In order to build and operate such infrastructure, a

legal basis guaranteeing the acceptance and protection

of FDI is essential. No megaproject can be carried out

without multi-layered bilateral and multilateral

agreements (e.g., government-to-government, host

government-to-consortium and product-sharing

agreements agreements), which involve a host state,

adjacent states and donor states. One essential

component of successful FDI is the cooperation of

numerous parties such as producing, states, transit,

importing, and donor states, militaries, international

organisations, the petroleum industry, contractors

and local communities, which enables cross-border

infrastructure to connect a land-locked state with

foreign ports.

In addition to this basic legal scheme, in

investment and economic cooperation in states that

have Islamic religious, cultural and social structures

based in Islam, it is imperative to understand, respect

and adapt the mode of investment to host states. [36]

Article 9 of the Investment Agreement of the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) of 1981

stipulates the obligations of the investor. They shall be

bound by the laws of the host states and shall refrain

from acts that may disturb public order or morals or

that may be prejudicial to public interests. [37]

4.2 Military and Technical Support in Establishing

Logistics and Infrastructure

In the process of reconstruction and stabilization,

logistics and infrastructure obviously must function

despite regional insecurity. Therefore, military

assistance is often necessary for these to operate.

However, the role of the military in protecting

infrastructure in conflict zones has not yet received

much scrutiny by either the military or academics.

There were several instances where military support

435

was vital to the protection of infrastructure in

Afghanistan. For example, the transportation of

turbines to the Kajaki Dam in Helmand province,

which included the construction of necessary roads,

was conducted by British military personnel. A

Chinese contractor was able to return to the site in

2007 after the British military secured its surrounding

roads and areas. The next year, at the Bucharest

Summit Declaration, NATO mentioned its capacity to

protect critical energy infrastructure in the context of

Europe’s energy security, although the specifics of the

issue remain unclear. [38] In 2009, NATO’s secretary

general admitted to cooperating in the protection of

WFP’s convoys. The WFP, however, publicly denied

this. [39]

Thus, the acceptability of military support and

protection of civilians will be one focus of secured

logistics. Especially, difficulties over the construction

and operation of Kajaki Dam for providing

hydroelectricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces

since 1953 as a part of the Helmand Valley Irrigation

Scheme are long-lasting issues. Although the issues

were often discussed in regional and security studies

with respect to provincial reconstruction projects, it is

imperative to examine how to systematically

incorporate the military into the reconstruction

process. [40]

The other form of support, i.e., technical expertise,

is also essential in order to adhere to SMSs and enable

gas, electricity and water distribution systems to

operate safely and securely. Engineers' engagement in

the development of local infrastructure at an early

stage of post-conflict reconstruction has been shown

to have an inseparable positive effect on the military

situation as well.

Thus, even in the case of Afghanistan, not only

military forces but contractors also had a vital role in

building and operating infrastructure (e.g., dams,

power stations and distribution systems). In addition,

considering that the eventual transfer of control from

foreign contractors to the local population is

inevitable, it is essential to harmonise distribution

systems created during the post-conflict

reconstruction period with the existing local industry

and social structure. Kenji Nagata of the Japan

International Cooperation Agency (JICA) stresses the

significance of water resources and irrigation in

Afghanistan for state rebuilding. [42] Throughout the

project, transport of materials (especially gravel) and

construction of roads and bridges must be conducted

parallel to the actual process of irrigation. Thus,

logistics capacity has a decisive meaning in state

reconstruction and stabilisation.

At the same time, coordination between numerous

state reconstruction activities is a sensitive task. The

US COIN strategy aimed to provide “security and

stability” and prevent the global export of extremism.

[41] In accordance with the strategy, the efforts and

activities for the security and stability of Afghanistan

cover the spread of those shown in Fig. 7.

Figure 7 Activities for the Stabilisation of Afghanistan,

Okochi

Moving on, there needs to be a structured method

by which military, technical and financial support of

logistics and infrastructure takes place, and is

integrated into the reconstruction process. This paper

suggests that a comprehensive logistics framework

should be established to coordinate these activities.

4.3 Potential of a Single Comprehensive Framework for

Port Access to Restabilise Afghanistan

To harmonise the legal, logistical and technical

support and effect the post-conflict reconstruction and

restabilisation of Afghanistan, a single,

comprehensive and multilateral model agreement

providing an integrated legal basis for the various

types of support from diverse actors is imperative.

First, a comprehensive template should stipulate

contentious issues. These include transit and access

rights to neighbouring states (either of personnel or

products), conditions of investment (especially human

rights conditions), rules of engagement for military

and/or private companies, and codes of conduct for

engineers engaged in building and operating

infrastructure.

In the model framework agreement, a dispute

settlement clause is a core issue. The social structures

of Afghanistan are interwoven both horizontally and

vertically with a complicated hierarchy. The people

are characteristically bound together by blood, tribe

and territorial relationships. Anotable feature of the

Afghan people is the respect they hold for their

‘elders’. These can be advisers to local government, or

civic or religious leaders who have authority in the

local community. At the same time, the economic and

agricultural labour structure divides farmers into

landed farmers and landless peasants. Within this

structure, while powerful nomads are absentee

landlords, poor nomads temporarily help farmers

with reaping at harvest time. Every single village can

be characterised by a combination of these

inextricable links.

All these diverse social and economic factors are

tied up in Islam. The entire religious community

(‘ummah’) is bound together by devout beliefs. Islam

is simultaneously a religion and the most superior

code of conduct in the social, political and economic

436

structures in Afghanistan. Construction of

infrastructure and establishment of logistics cannot be

carried out without going deep into and adapting to

this multilayered social structure, especially in terms

of the dispute settlement process in rural areas. Every

village has a ‘shura’ - a small parliament or council

consisting of elders, religious leaders (‘mullah’) and

secular leaders – as its own body for the settlement of

disputes.

A comprehensive and structured framework

agreement finds a minimum international standard so

that it can be a versatile and adjustable apparatus

which satisfies the social structure of each individual

village or shura. The model agreement will have a

combination of mandatory clauses as a minimum

standard for the settlement of disputes and optional

clauses to allow for adjustments to suit local

communities’ needs. For example, the Caspian Oil

Pipeline Agreement and its sub-agreements (which

are part of a framework agreement detailing the

agreement on substantive issues) between host

governments and international consortiums are

flexible tools which keep cross-border infrastructure

functioning. [43]

Another important point to consider is that the

multilateral framework must take into consideration

the miscellaneous interests of each participating state.

As more and more donor states participate, their

individual interests will be balanced against the

others’ and hinder outsized influence by any one

state.

In the light of the entanglement of doubt for the

‘sphere of influence’ of the great powers, Afghanistan

can be stabilised by introducing a fair and balanced

spread of interests from foreign states, such as access

to the ports of Chabahar, Gwadar and Karachi,

railway connections with Iran and Uzbekistan, plus

highways and tunnels towards Central Asia. The

model framework agreement for logistics and

infrastructure will become a platform for these

interests, from which Afghanistan can benefit as an

equal and independent counterpart of foreign states,

regardless of whether they are allies or adversaries.

Finally, the existence of a single integrated,

comprehensive logistics framework will make it easier

to control and maintain the pressure of economic

sanctions, without blocking the flow of necessary

humanitarian aid.

Indeed, after due consideration of the situation

with respect to human rights, rights to education,

gender equality, a general election and due process of

criminal justice in a post-conflict state, the

international community must apply necessary

economic sanctions to ensure human security and

pressure the newly emerging government to improve

its way of governing its people.

Simultaneously, humanitarian crises caused by

conflicts require a supply of essential material,

opportunities for meaningful employment and the

improvement of its conditions, which might be

impeded by economic sanctions. The practical

question is whether to send supplies while enforcing

economic sanctions.

A comprehensive framework founded upon basic

legal agreement and technical support will be able to

focus on the improvement of people’s lives by

advancing infrastructure for logistics, energy,

communications and medical institutions, and

enhancing agricultural production, international trade

and education, which had been neglected during the

conflict and of which the emerging government has

little experience.

In this phase, the logistics of a supply-push should

be chosen in the light of the insufficient ability of the

new government. Then, as demand arises,

distribution systems should be transformed by giving

priority to health, education, energy,

telecommunication, finances, technology or possible

ongoing security.

Through these phases of floating post-conflict

reconstruction, a model agreement provides another

flow of humanitarian aid parallel to the line closed by

economic sanctions.

5 CONCLUSION

Logistics and infrastructure are an essential

component of post-conflict reconstruction and

security, and thus contribute to the restabilisation of

Afghanistan. Previous efforts to build infrastructure

through legal instruments, bilateral agreements,

foreign investment, military force and technical

expertise were partially coordinated, while their legal

bases remained separate; the content of bilateral

cooperation was agreed upon by state parties,

investment was regulated by international

organisations, military support was based on UN

resolutions and technical support was based on

contracts. All options share the need for transit and

access rights to neighbouring states and their ports. In

reality, however, those rights depend on the states’

intentions and are less than guaranteed. Arguably

bilateral cooperation and foreign investment have its

drawbacks. Its aims are fragmented according to each

state and are easily influenced by the investors' or

donor states’ policies. Regarding military and

technical support, rules of engagement and codes of

conduct for the safe operation of infrastructure have

not been honed yet to a high standard. [44] Concrete

methods to integrate these fragmented efforts, as

suggested in this paper, were not established.

In order to activate the maximum logistical

capacity, an integrated and comprehensive

framework agreement on logistics and infrastructure

will be formed by considering necessary clauses and

removing all obstacles in the supply chain. This

framework should be inclusively applied to both the

host government and international actors in order to

secure logistics and infrastructure in conflict zones.

Especially in times of humanitarian crises, issues such

as transit rights for aid workers, including essential

goods (food, medical supplies, etc.) should be

prioritised. Even in a prolonged reconstruction

process, the construction and operation of

infrastructure would be guaranteed through the

framework. Given the multitude of international

actors with vested interests in the reconstruction and

restabilisation of Afghanistan, and to ensure the

437

protection of the Afghan people and their

communities, a principled but simultaneously

versatile and adjustable approach to logistics and

international support through a structured agreement

is required as the foundation for the development of

Afghanistan. Consequently, this paper concludes that

an internationally coherent response to post-conflict

reconstruction will be achieved through a single

comprehensive model agreement which guarantees

the rights of transit and port access. Such a logistics

scheme enables various actors, especially shipping

and energy industries, as well as foreign

governments, military and international

organisations, to contribute to the stabilization of war-

stricken land-locked states.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors’ deep appreciation goes to professor Guillaume

Dye, Centre interdisciplinaire d'étude des religions et de la

laïcité, l'Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, for his

support in this research. Additional thanks to David Oakley

for his proofreading and editing work on this paper.

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438

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