281
1 INTRODUCTION
Maritime accidents have emerged in different ways
and their effects were different. The most common
types of maritime accidents were collision, allision,
contact, capsizing, flooding, foundering, breaking up,
grounding, stranding, breakdown of the ship
underway, and fire or explosion [1],[8]. Some of these
terms are quite simple, for example, grounding and
stranding are probably the most common maritime
incidents. However, most terms are often used
incorrectly. In fact, a ship is aground when she strikes
to the sea floor, while a ship is stranded when the ship
has been staying for a while. Similarly, flooding
means taking on excessive water in one or more of the
spaces of a ship such as the engine room, while
foundering is fundamental taking on water to the
point where the ship becomes unstable and begins to
sink or capsize. Another example that causes
confusion is collision vs allision and these accident
types constitute the two basic variables of this study.
These terms are generally used interchangeably, but
technically, the collision is the crashing of two ships,
while allision is used when a ship crashes to a fixed
object, such as a bridge or dock [19]. In other words,
the allision is defines an accident in which only one of
the objects moves, while the collision defines two
moving objects that collide with each other [4]. All
these accident types have different dynamics by their
nature and they have the potential to be prevented
with different intervention options. Literature review
has shown that maritime accidents occur most
frequently at chokepoints [6]. Maritime chokepoints
classified as primary routes that act as bridges
Evaluation of Tugboat Response Time as an Accident
P
revention Measure in the Strait of Istanbul
G
. Kodak
Istanbul Technical University,
Istanbul, Turkey
ABSTRACT: The Strait of Istanbul, 17 nautical miles long, is one of the main routes of international maritime
trade. Connecting the Black Sea countries with other countries of the world, the Strait is the second busiest
waterway in the world in terms of international ship traffic. In addition to busy sea traffic, limited geographical
conditions also make it difficult to navigational safety. The Strait of Istanbul is the only chokepoint that stands
out with the risk of maritime accidents on the primary routes of world maritime trade. This situation poses a
risk for both the transiting ships and the city of Istanbul, which has a dense population around it. Some of the
accidents that took place in the recent history have caused worldwide concern due to the environmental
pollution they cause. Considering the advantages p
rovided by the developing shipbuilding technology and
today load capacity of the ships, a disaster that will occur in a possible accident today will cause much greater
destruction than in the past. In this direction, it has become a necessity to examine the accident profile in the
strait in order to develop effective accident prevention measures and to strengthen the level of navigational
safety in the region. In this study, maritime accidents that occurred in the Strait of Istanbul over a 16-year period
were discussed in terms of their types and the response time of tugboats to a possible accident was examined.
http://www.transnav.eu
the
International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 16
Number 2
June 2022
DOI: 10.1271
6/1001.16.02.11
282
between major economies and secondary routes that
connect smaller markets. According to this
classification, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Istanbul,
Hormuz, Bab El-Mandeb, Gibraltar, Panama and Suez
channels are the primary chokepoints. Compared to
other primary chokepoints, the Strait of Istanbul is the
only waterway that stands out with its maritime
accident risk. In addition, the Strait of Istanbul is the
world's busiest waterway after the Strait of Malacca,
with an average of 50,000 ships passing annually [23].
The Strait of Istanbul was chosen as the study area,
both because it is the only waterway between the
Black Sea countries and other countries of the world,
and because it constitutes the riskiest area in terms of
navigation on the global maritime transport routes.
The length of the Strait of Istanbul is 17 nautical
miles. The curved geomorphology and the resulting
geometric constraints force passing ships into wide-
angle turns. A ship non stopover passage through the
Strait must change course at least 8 times during this
route [7]. These turns and route changes to be made
during these turns are shown in Figure 1.
Primary Turns
Fil Burnu 13°
Macar Burnu 73°
Koybaşı Burnu 82°
Kanlıca 46°
Aşiyan Burnu 39°
Kandilli Burnu 21°
Deftardar Burnu 36°
Kız Kulesi 51°
Figure 1. Large angular turns in the Strait of Istanbul
The Strait of Istanbul has been the subject of many
scientific studies until today due to the difficult
navigational conditions and the risk of marine
accidents. Effect of ship length as a factor in safe
navigation in the Strait of Istanbul has examined using
by AHP method. Obtained results have shown that
ships over lengths of 151 - 200 m has a risk on
navigational safety [11]. An artificial neural network
model was created to estimate maritime accidents in
the Strait of Istanbul. Study results have indicated that
vessels larger than 58.000 GRT caused accidents when
they did not receive piloting service [16]. In order to
mitigation of risks of the maritime traffic in the Strait
of Istanbul comprehensive scenario analysis has been
made [20].
It has been pointed out that the factors affecting the
safety of navigation in the Strait of Istanbul differ
according to the types of accidents [7]. Collision-type
accidents were investigated and a maritime traffic
modelling based on Automatic Identification System
[3]. It has been highlighted that collision and
grounding type accidents in the Strait of Istanbul are
generally made by general cargo ships and these
accidents tend to increase especially at night [26].
Maritime accidents in the Strait of Istanbul have
spatially analyzed the using the GIS method.
Obtained results have shown that the accidents were
concentrated in the waiting areas [21]. It has been
investigated the reducing the probability for the
collision of ships by changing the passage schedule in
Strait of Istanbul [15]. The Strait of Istanbul has been
evaluated in terms of ship passages, ship
hydrodynamics and blockage effect [5],[25]. Effect of
maritime traffic in the Strait on the number of
accidents was investigated using regression analysis.
The results obtained showed that the number of
passing ships had an explanatory power of 51% on the
accidents. Within the scope of the study, the accident
rate per ship was calculated and the results showed
that 76 out of every 10.000 ships passing through were
involved in the accident. The results of the study also
showed that the measures taken as a result of the
accidents and especially the VTS, which became
operational in 2003, have a reducing effect on the
accidents [12]. Due to one-way planning of traffic with
the Marmaray project that started in 2005, it has been
observed a noticeable reducing effect on maritime
accidents [13]. However, the Vita Spirit accident in
2017 brought forward a well-known vulnerability: in
the case of an engine breakdown and rudder failure
on the ship while passing through these narrow areas,
all the measures taken may remain useless. VTS with
all it’s services remains ineffective. In Vita Spirit case,
there was only 7 minutes between the engine
breakdown and ship crashed into house. Options that
can be initiated in order to prevent such an accident in
these 7 minutes are very limited. At this point, it has
been suggested that if there was a patrol tug near the
ship and pushed ship directing her back in the
channel could be a solution [14]. This solution
highlighted to all related parties to place patrol tugs in
certain areas in the Strait of İstanbul and monitor the
ships passing through very risky areas and take action
in the case of any wrong going. For this reason, the
need to investigate tugboat response time as an
accident prevention measure in narrow channels has
arisen and this has been the motivation of this study.
Reducing the risk of accidents for large commercial
vessels, both in port berthing and take-off maneuvers
and when navigating in restricted waters, requires the
help of specialized vessels that are well aware of the
region-specific features [17], [10], [22], [9]. These
vessels, called escort tugs, are specially designed to
produce the rudder and braking force necessary to
control the escorted vessel [17], [2]. In the literature,
there are various studies on tugboat intervention in
terms of navigational safety. When the factors
affecting collision type accidents are examined, the
importance of the arrival time of the tugboat for
emergency response draws attention [29]. Examining
the tugboat response time in the range of 15/30/45
minutes for emergency response on the Yangtze River
showed that the arrival time of the tugboat was
283
critical due to the limited response time [28]. There is
a size limit in terms of navigational safety for ships
that can maneuver even in the absence of wind,
current and wave in the Strait of Istanbul. Because
under unfavorable navigational conditions, it is not
possible for ships above certain limits to maintain
their position within the traffic lanes [24]. MSRCC
records have shown that 32 near-miss events occurred
between 2001-2016, which were caused by rudder and
engine failures and were prevented by tugboat
intervention before the accident occurred. This
number also means that about 2 accidents per year can
be prevented by tugboats. In this study, the temporal
and spatial profile of accident types in the Strait of
Istanbul was investigated, and the response time of
tugboats to a possible accident was examined. It is
thought that the results obtained will form an
infrastructure for policy makers to develop accident-
specific measures.
2 MATERIALS AND METHOD
The data used in this paper, is gathered by Republic of
Turkey Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure
and it contains maritime casualty records between
2001 and 2016. In order to avoid confusion, maritime
accidents were categorized according to their own
characteristics. In this context, accident types that are
the categories of data set has determined as collision,
allision, contact, grounding, capsizing, drifting, fire,
engine breakdown, listing, person overboard and
other. The incidents outside of the main accident
types such as flooding, foundering, breaking up,
stranding, breakdown of the ship underway, water
ingress are mentioned under the heading "Other".
Maritime traffic in the Strait of Istanbul operates
on 3 VTS sector areas. These are Kadıköy, Kandilli
and Türkeli sector areas, from south to north,
respectively, as shown in Figure 2. The study area has
been filtered within the VTS sectors in the Strait of
Istanbul in order to observe the spatial profile of the
accidents in higher resolution and to identify the
high-risk points.
Figure 2. The area and sectors of Istanbul Vessel Traffic
Services [27]
In the scope of this study, a data set was created by
separating 590 accidents within the VTS sector areas
from all the accidents that occurred between 2001 and
2016, and these accidents were classified according to
both their types and the sector area in which they
occurred. Thus, it has become possible to see the
spatial profile of the accidents and it has been
revealed which accident type is concentrated in which
region. After the creation of the data set, the
classification of the accident types and the spatial
profile of the accidents, the time-dependent variation
of the accident types was investigated. The last part of
the study was devoted to the examination of tugboat
efficiency as accident preventive measure in the Strait
of Istanbul and the tugboat response time was
calculated in line with the geometric constraints of the
region. The process followed within the scope of the
study is shown in the flow chart in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Workflow of the study
3 RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS
The distribution of the accidents that occurred in the
Strait of Istanbul for 16 years according to their types
is given in Figure 4. As can be clearly seen from the
pie chart, the major accident type in the strait is
collision. The second type of accident that occurs
commonly is grounding. Other accidents that except
for the 10 defined accident types, take the 3rd place
among the most common accident types that have
occurred during the 16 years.
Figure 4. Distribution of accidents by types in the Strait of
Istanbul (2001-2016)
284
This was followed by drifting, fire, contact,
allision, capsizing, engine breakdown, person
overboard and listing, respectively. When the
maritime accidents in the Strait are analyzed
according to their types, it is seen that the accidents
that can be prevented by tugboat intervention have an
important place in the total accidents.
Table 1. Annual percentages by types of marine accidents in
the Strait of Istanbul
When the percentage of accidents occurring within
a year is examined separately for each year, the
percentage increase in the annual total of collision and
contact type accidents draws attention. Collision type
accidents accounted for only 30% of total accidents in
2001, while this rate increased to 83% in 2016.
Similarly, while the share of contact type accidents in
total accidents was 0.06% in 2001, this rate reached
16% in 2016. A common feature of these two accident
types, the frequency of which has increased
dramatically, is that both types of accidents are
accident types that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention. At this point, the individual profile of
accident types gains importance. In order to observe
the time-dependent change, time series plots were
created following the 16-year movement of each
accident type. Obtained results are given in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Time-dependent variation of maritime accident
types in the Strait of Istanbul
Figure 5 show the time-dependent change of each
accident type over 16 years. The vertical axis of the
graphs shows the number of accidents in the relevant
accident type, and the horizontal axis shows the years.
The blue line shows the 16-year average for the
relevant accident type. Accordingly, the findings from
Figure 5 mainly pointed out the following results for
each accident type.
The average of collision type accidents is 11. The
number of collision type accidents, which reached
its peak in 2010, followed a steady downward
trend until 2015. The annual number of accidents
over the 16-year period is generally below the
average. Collision type accidents are the types of
accidents that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention when the time factor is used
effectively.
Allision type accidents have shown a zig-zag
behavior over the 16-year period. Accidents
reached their maximum value in 2005. The annual
number of accidents is generally below the 16-year
average. Allision type accidents are among the
types of accidents that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention within the reaction time.
Contact type accidents peaked in 2006 and 2007
and then showed a steady decline until 2010.
Annual accident frequency is generally below the
average. Contact type accidents are among the
types of accidents that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention within the response time.
Grounding type accidents have not shown a steady
increase or decrease over the years. The annual
number of accidents is generally above the
average. Grounding type accidents are among the
types of accidents that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention within the response time.
Drifting and engine breakdown accidents are the
types of accidents that reached their maximum
value in 2010. The annual number of accidents in
both types of accidents is generally below the
average. Both two types of accidents can be
prevented by tugboat intervention within the
response time.
Fire, listing, personal overboard and other types of
accidents have followed a fluctuating profile over a
16-year period. All four types of accidents are not
accident types that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention in terms of navigational safety.
The Strait of Istanbul has its own dynamics in
terms of environmental factors affecting maritime
traffic. Features such as its curving geomorphology
and current system make different areas of the strait
defenseless for different types of accidents. At this
point, the spatial distribution of accident types is
important. Figure 6 shows the distribution of
accidents in the strait by VTS sector areas.
285
Figure 6. Spatial profile of maritime accident types in the
Strait of Istanbul
As can be clearly seen from the pie chart, the
accidents occur overwhelmingly within the
boundaries of Sector Kadıköy. So much so that the
accidents occurring in the Sector Kadıköy region
constitute 65% of the total number of accidents in 16
years. It is followed by Sector Kandilli with 19.6% and
Sector Türkeli with 15.4%, respectively. Another
result given by Figure 6 is that the accidents in the
Strait of Istanbul increase from south to north. In
other words, when the spatial profile of the accidents
in the strait is examined, it is observed that the
accidents increase from south to north.
Table 2. Distribution of accident types by regions in the
Strait of Istanbul
Table 2 shows that collision type accidents in the
Strait of Istanbul are overwhelmingly concentrated in
the Sector Kadıköy region. At this point, it has become
a requirement to develop special measures for
collision type accidents within the boundaries of
Kadıköy sectoral area in order to prevent collision
type accidents. To prevent this situation, tugboats
patrolling the Strait of Istanbul have been suggested
as a solution in the literature [14].
Wide of the Strait of İstanbul in most areas changes
between 0.5 and 1 nautical mile. This geometric
constraint creates a major difficulty in terms of
navigation. Typical ship speed on the ground varies
between 8 to 12 knots, it roughly means that the
response window for the tug intervention could be as
little as 1 minute (half the strait width) and 30 minutes
the most. On the other hand, maximum speed of a
typical tug at low sea conditions is about 14 knots. In
other words, if the tugboat is at a distance of 0.25
nautical miles from the ship, it will take
approximately 2 minutes to reach the ship [7]. In this
direction, considering the geometrical constraints of
the Strait, the response time of the tugboat for a
possible accident was calculated as follows.
Figure 7. Route alternatives for tugboat.
In Figure 7, L represents the straight area channel
length and B represents the channel width.
B1 = B
min = 0.5 nm.
L1 = L
min = 3 nm.
V1 = 8 knots.
B2 = B
max = 1,0 nm.
L2 = L
max = 4 nm.
V2 = 12 knots.
The route alternatives that the ship with a rudder
or engine failure can make from the 0 point (origin) at
the entrance of the straight channel and on the middle
axis are
OA
,
OB
and
OC
.
>
>
OA
,
22
OB OC OA= +
(Pythagorean theorem)
1 1852
1 0,5144 / .
1 3600
Distance
Time
Speed
nautical mile m
knot m s
hour s
=
= ≌≌
,
Table 3. Tugboat response time
_______________________________________________
Alternatives B L V Route t
(nm) (nm) (kn) OA OB OC (minute)
(nm) (nm) (nm)
_______________________________________________
1 0,5 - 8,0 0,25 - - 1,875
2 0,5 - 12,0 0,25 - - 1,250
3 1,0 - 8,0 0,50 - - 3,750
4 1,0 - 12,0 0,50 - - 2,500
5 0,5 3,0 8,0 0,25 3,010 3,0 22,600
6 0,5 4,0 8,0 0,25 4,008 4,0 30,600
7 1,0 3,0 8,0 0,50 3,041 3,0 22,800
8 1,0 4,0 8,0 0,50 4,031 4,0 30,230
9 0,5 3,0 12,0 0,25 3,010 3,0 15,050
10 0,5 4,0 12,0 0,25 4,008 4,0 20,040
11 1,0 3,0 12,0 0,50 3,041 3,0 15,210
12 1,0 4,0 12,0 0,50 4,031 4,0 20,160
13 - 3,0 8,0 - - 3,0 22,500
14 - 3,0 12,0 - - 3,0 15,000
15 - 4,0 8,0 - - 4,0 30,000
16 - 4,0 12,0 - - 4,0 20,000
_______________________________________________
a) Time to hit the channel edges: (Alternative 1-4)
minimum = 1,25 minutes, maximum = 3,75 minutes
(Route (
OA
))
b) Hitting the channel edge for the diagonal route
((
OB
) ): (Alternative 5 -12)
minimum = 15,05 minute, maximum 30,23 minutes
286
c) End of straight channel for straight course ((
OC
) )
in midline:
minimum = 15 minutes, maximum = 30 minutes
(Alternatives 13 - 16)
Within the framework of the above calculations,
the response time for tugboat intervention can be
change between a minimum of 1.25 minutes and a
maximum of 30 minutes. This rate can be expressed as
approximately 1 to 30 minutes.
4 CONCLUSION
As a result of the study, the following conclusions
have been reached.
It has been observed that the main accident types
in the Strait of Istanbul are collision and
grounding, respectively. These accidents were
followed by drifting, fire, contact, allision,
capsizing, engine breakdown, person overboard
and listing respectively.
Main accident groups except by "other" are the
types of accidents that can be prevented by tugboat
intervention within the response time.
When the spatial profile of the accidents is
investigated, it is observed that the accidents are
concentrated in the Sector Kadıköy area.
Maritime accidents in the Strait of Istanbul increase
from north to south.
The temporal profile of the accidents did not show
a stable trend on the basis of accident type, but it
revealed that the measures introduced recently had
an effect on increasing the safety of navigation.
The establishing of VTS and the one-way planning
of the traffic in line with the Marmaray Project led
to a sharp decline, especially in Collision and
contact type accidents, after 2010.
In line with the accident profile obtained, it has
been concluded that tugboats will contribute to the
safety of navigation as an accident preventive
measure. In other words, it has emerged that
tugboats can intervene in accidents before they
occur with the effective use of the time factor. In
this direction, the response time of a tugboat was
calculated considering the geometrical constraints
of the Strait of Istanbul. Obtained results showed
that tugboat response time varied between 1.25
and 30 minutes. In this direction, it is critical for
policy makers to develop measures that will
highlight tugboat intervention.
The results of the study supported the judgment
that especially patrolling tugboats would play an
active role in preventing accidents within the
response time.
In this concept, tugboats using Kort nozzle
propeller, Voith Schneider propeller and
Schoettel propeller are recommended.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work was supported by the Research Fund of Istanbul
Technical University. Project Number: 41217.
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