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1 INTRODUCTION

Recent incidents in the Norwegian Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ) have shown the need for a

governmental involvement in building necessary

maritime preparedness for oil spill cases. The

Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) is the

governmental unit responsible for the prevention of

oil spills. One of its tools to prevent ship groundings

is the national Norwegian Emergency Towing Service

(NETS). A description of NETS was given at the

previous TransNav conference in 2019 [1]. In the early

days of NETS, the operational part was shared

between commercial tug companies and the

Norwegian Coast Guard (NCG). A major change in

the organization of the operation took place from

January 1.st 2020, when NCG was given the

operational responsibility for NETS.

2 ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONAL PART OF

NETS – PREVIOUS AND NEW

Based on shipping accidents in Norwegian waters in

the 1990s, the government launched a study to map

groundings and drifting vessel incidents. Possible

means of reducing the number of such cases were

investigated. One measure was the establishment of a

national emergency towing service to prevent drifting

vessels from grounding in coastal waters. From the

start in 2003, three vessels (two commercially

contracted and a Coast Guard vessel) formed the

Norwegian Emergency Towing Service (NETS). Until

2019, commercial vessels have been contracted for 5

years periods in the NETS. Some of these vessels have

been offshore vessels with high bollard pull

capability.

Changes in and Recent Experiences from Norwegian

Emergency Towing Service (NETS)

T.E. Berg & Ø. Selvik

SINTEF Ocean, Trondheim, Norway

ABSTRACT: The Norwegian Emergency Towing Services (NETS) is managed by the Norwegian Coastal

Administration (NCA). In the early days of the NETS, the operational part was sheared between commercial tug

companies and the Norwegian Coast Guard (NCG). A major change in the organization of the operation took

place from January 1st 2020, when NCG was given the operational responsibility for NETS. This change is

briefly described and the vessels in today's NETS are presented. Statistics for drifting vessels in Norwegian

waters are presented before some selected recent maritime emergency incidents are highlighted. Actions by the

NETS vessels and other NCG vessels will be highlighted. Handling of "FV Nortguider" after the grounding in

Hinlopen (Svalbard) and the wreck removal work is one of the cases. The other two are drifting ship

represented by the cruise vessel "Viking Sky" and the cargo vessel "Eemslift Hendrika". The final part of this

paper discusses ways to ensure knowledge and operational experience sharing for personnel on vessels

performing emergency towing tasks.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 15

Number 1

March 2021

DOI: 10.12716/1001.15.01.21

204

Utilizing NETS experiences, the government

decided that commercial companies contracted for

NETS duties should be replaced by vessels from the

Norwegian Coast Guard (NCG). This change in the

organization of the operational part took place from

January 1st 2020, when the NCG become the

organization operating all vessels in NETS. The

reasons behind this reorganization were partly to

improve the operational efficiency of governmental

vessels and to increase the governmental emergency

towing service along the Norwegian coastline. At

present, six of the NCG vessels are part of NETS.

These vessels can be ordered to prepare for

emergency towing activities if some of the vessel

traffic centres (VTC) observe a drifting vessel. They

could also be requested to take part in other types of

rescue missions if requested by governmental or

commercial stakeholders. NETS is governed by NOR

VTC (located in Vardø, close to the Russian border).

This VTC is responsible for surveillance of the outer

sailing zones along the Norwegian Coast, where

vessels with the highest environmental pollution

potential are sailing. The other VTCs (Horten, Brevik,

Kvitsøy and Fedje) monitors ship tracks in their

respective coastal areas, see figure 1 for location of

Norwegian VTC. In emergency situations where there

is a need for the NETS, NOR VTC will alert NCG

which will allocate vessel(s) for this specific mission.

Figure 1. Location of Norwegian Vessel Traffic Centres

(Courtesy Norwegian Coastal Administration)

The agreement between NCA and NGC includes a

risk-based approach to positioning and mobilizing

governmental emergency towing units. Together with

SINTEF Ocean, the governmental bodies have

developed an analytic tool, based on simulations with

variation of parameters such as wind speed and

direction. The tool includes a continuous evaluation

of the risk scenario for specific ship categories with

high environmental pollution potential. It makes it

possible to run day-to-day analysis of the risk level

along the coastline. Outcomes are used to develop a

map for risk levels related to possible incidents, see

figure 2. The colour code used goes from low risk

(green) to high risk (red). Risk zones size are primarily

computed based on forecasted onshore wind (speed

and direction). This map is used by NOR VTC to

recommend locations for vessels in NETS on a daily

basis. Two of the cases discussed in section 5,

happened in the western red zone.

Figure 2. Risk level map for Norwegian coastal areas

(Courtesy Norwegian Coastal Administration)

3 VESSELS IN NORWEGIAN EMERGENCY

TOWING SERVICES

At present there are six vessels in NETS. Four of the

vessels are ordinary Norwegian Coast Guard vessels,

while two last two are hired offshore vessels. NCA

requires at least a Bollard Pull of 100 tons for vessels

in NETS. Table 1 lists the bollard pull of the vessels

operated by NCG. The last two vessels in Table 1 are

anchor handling tugs, on a five-years lease contract

with Boa Offshore. They will be manned by Coast

Guard personnel after a transition period of a couple

of years. Part of the personnel will be transferred from

existing Coast Guard vessels. Based on positive

operational experience, the contract for the Boa

Offshore vessels may be renewed for another five-

years period. Figure 3 presents the different types of

vessels allocated for NETS operations by NCG.

Table 1. Vessels in NETS per 2021.01.01

_______________________________________________

Vessel name Vessel type Bollard

pull (tonnes)

_______________________________________________

KV Sortland Coast Guard vessel- 100

Barentshav class

KV Barentshav Coast Guard vessel- 110

Barentshav class

KV Bergen Coast Guard vessel- 110

Barentshav class

KV Harstad Coast Guard vessel 100

KV Jarl Offshore vessel 267

(Anchor handling tug)

ICE 1C

KV Bison Offshore vessel 275

(Anchor handling tug)

_______________________________________________

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Figure 3. Vessel types in the NETS (upper left KV Harstad,

upper right Barents class vessel and lower left new anchor

handling tug) – (Photos Norwegian Coast Guard)

4 DRIFTING VESSELS IN NORWEGIAN WATERS

2018 - 2020

NOR VTS collects information on different types of

incidents and accidents within the Norwegian coastal

waters. In a previous paper [1], data on drifting

vessels for the period 2011 – 2018 was presented.

Figure 4 presents new data compiled by the Analytic

Group of NCA. The number of drifting vessels was

smaller in 2019 than 2018 and 2020. But some of the

2019 cases involved major SAR operations to rescue

crew (fishing vessel "Northguider" in Hinlopen,

northern part of the Svalbard archipelago) and

passengers (Cruise vessel "Viking Sky", at

Hustadvika) [2].

From figure 4 it should be noted that there has

been a large increase in drifting objects. Part of this

increase comes from loss of containers from container

vessels.

Figure 4 Incidents in Norwegian waters 2018 – 2020. (Based

upon data from NCA)

5 PRESENTATION OF SOME SELECTED

INCIDENTS AND TASKS FOR NETS VESSELS

5.1 Fishing vessel "Northguider" – Hinlopen, Svalbard

December 2018

The vessel was fishing north of Svalbard, when in

Arctic utter darkness it ran aground in the Hinlopen

Strait (see figure 5), grounding at Kinnvika in

Nordaustlandet, which is a national park. The vessel

was flooding and had a heavy list. The Joint Rescue

Coordination Centre in Bodø received an emergency

call from the master of "FV Northguider". The SAR

resources of the Governor of Svalbard were mobilised

and two helicopters took off from Longyearbyen. Just

two hours after the emergency call, the first ten crew

members were rescued and returned to

Longyearbyen. One hour later the second helicopter

rescued the remaining four crew members. The

airborne capacity of the helicopters was fully used in

this operation (airborne time remaining at the end of

the operation was less than 10 minutes).

Figure 5. Accident site for "FV Northguider"

"Northguider" had approximately 300,000 liters of

fuel on board. Due to the risk of oil pollution in the

national park, the NCA in collaboration with the

shipowner (represented by a master and two chief

engineers) and the emergency preparedness and

response company Ardent, immediately started to

plan an operation to empty the tanks to prevent a

potential oil spill. The main challenges for this

operation were: darkness; low temperature; drifting

ice; current; and unknown and poorly charted shallow

waters. It was impossible to bring the NCG vessel "KV

Svalbard" along-side, thus the operation used

dedicated tanks installed on RIBs that shuttled

between "KV Svalbard" and "FV Northguider". After

completing the oil transfer operation, NCA stated that

the wreck posed little danger of significant acute

environmental pollution.

But because it was in a protected area, the Svalbard

Environmental Protection Act mandated the ship’s

owner to remove the vessel. Smit Salvage was

awarded the removal contract, and initiated work to

run the operation during the 2019 summer season.

Due to local ice and weather conditions, the operation

was aborted. Some snapshots showing the faith of the

vessel are collected in figure 6.

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The operation was restarted in late July 2020, being

successfully completed in September 2020. Two

barges, their tugs, anchor handling vessels, and

vessels able to keep small ice fragments away from the

work area were mobilized for the wreck removal. The

wreck was cut into fifty small pieces which were lifted

onto the barges and towed back to mainland Norway,

see figure 7 During the salvage operation, the former

Norwegian research ship "Lance" participated as a

base for NCA personnel overseeing the operation.

This wreck operation was challenging as it took place

at 80° north in an area far from normal logistics

support services.

Figure 6. Different phases prior to the final "FV

Northguider" wreck removal – grounded vessel – initial

icing - inspection of wreck (Photo: NCA) work in Hinlopen

2020 (Photos: NCA, NCG – KV Svalbard and Governor of

Svalbard)

Figure 7. Salvage of "Northguider" – preparing for

dismantling and towing of wreck parts (Photo: Governor of

Svalbard, NCA)

5.2 "Viking Sky" incident at Hustadvika – March 2019

The cruise vessel "Viking Sky" was steaming

southbound from a Northern Norway cruise late

March 2019. Passing the Hustadvika area (figure 8) in

stormy weather (wind speeds of 22 – 25 m/s and

waves at up to 15 m), the vessel experienced an engine

shutdown. The situation quickly got serious due to

the uncontrolled motions of the vessel and a drifting

motion that would lead to a grounding. The metocean

forecasts mean that other traffic in the area was

already, to a large degree, cancelled. Such was the

case for the coastal express vessels operated by the

Hurtigruten company.

At approximately at 2 pm on 23rd March 2019, the

vessel sent a mayday call after a blackout on the

engines. JRCC SN immediately saw the need for SAR

helicopters and tugs. They contacted NOR VTS for

information on locations for suitable tugs for

supporting the cruise vessel. The vessel started to drift

towards the coastline and into waters with shoals and

reefs. The large superstructure on cruise ships

resulted in a drifting speed up to 9 knots for "Viking

Sky". To prevent grounding, the vessel dropped two

anchors. Initially they just dragged along the sea

bottom and reduced the drifting speed somewhat. At

3.40 pm the ship crew was able to restart one of the

four engines. This, together with the drag of the

anchors, stopped the vessel's drifting motion and

prevented a possible grounding, see figure 9. At that

time, the primary goal of the JRCC and NCA was to

tow the vessel out from the coastline. Due to the

weather conditions and position of the vessel, it was

evaluated that the risk related to prepare for an

emergency towing operation was too high under the

prevailing weather conditions. The NCG vessel "KV

Njord" arrived early at the incident site and was

appointed "On-Scene Commander" at 5 pm. Contacts

with other vessels in the area and the pilots on board

"Viking Sky" were their main responsibility, as

initially there were no plans for emergency towing or

the evacuation of the vessel. Shortly afterwards, four

offshore vessels and a tug arrived at the incident site,

followed later by the NETS tug "Boa Heimdal", which

arrived and was told to stand by until it was safe to

fasten emergency towing lines.

Figure 8 The Hustadvika area – an exposed sailing area

between the Norwegian cities Kristiansund and Molde.

Source: Kystinfo (kystverket.no)

Figure 9. Cruise vessel "Viking Sky" - drifting case at

Hustadvika, March 2019 (Photo: Torgeir Are Sortehaug)

The ship then kept position approximately 100 m

from the coastline and only a few meters from a reef.

Vessel motions were significant due to the high

waves. Excessive combined heave, pitch and roll

motions resulted in injuries to passengers. The waves

entered the lower open deck and water started to flow

into the ship, with some passengers, especially older

people, suffering fear. In collaboration with the

"Viking Sky" master, the JRCC Southern Norway

decided to start an evacuation procedure (the total

number of passengers and crew was 1363).

Governmental SAR helicopters were scrambled and

one commercial SAR helicopter (with operation base

207

in Kristiansund) started evacuation of passengers.

Due to the weather conditions and sea floor geometry,

evacuation to other vessels was deemed to be too

risky. In total, the helicopters lifted 466 passengers

during the rescue operation.

During the evening, the ship crew were able to

restart two additional engines. Only one engine was

used for propulsion as the crew feared new engine

blackouts. At 9 pm the crew reported problems with

lifting the anchors. Finally, they were able to lift one

of them. The master then ordered the crew to cut the

other. These actions made it possible for the vessel to

start heading into open waters. The harsh weather

continued through the night. In the morning, the wind

gusts were reduced from 25 m/s to 15 m/s. Three of

the engines were then operating and the vessel moved

slowly forward heading to open water. In

collaboration with the pilot, the captain decided to

take the vessel into port in Molde as soon as towing

vessels were connected. Two tugs, one forward and

one aft were connected at 8 am the following day.

While rescuing "Viking Sky" passengers, JRCC

Southern Norway received another mayday call from

a small cargo vessel, the "Hagland Captain", also

sailing in the Hustadvika area. This vessel had

another engine blackout. The ship dropped both

anchors, which dragged for some time before they

took hold some 50 m from an underwater reef. It was

decided to evacuate the vessel, due to lack of control

and a significant list. The crew were instructed to

jump into the sea and were picked up by one of the

SAR helicopters taking part in the "Viking Sky"

operation. The NETS vessel "Boa Heimdal" was

released from duties related to the "Viking Sky"

operations and given orders to observe the

development. As the ship crew was evacuated, it was

not possible to establish an emergency towing

connection under the actual weather conditions. As

the weather condition improved, a commercial tug

was awarded a contract for towing "Hagland Captain"

to port, see figure 10.

Figure 10. "Boa Balder" towing "Hagland Captain" to port.

(Photo: NCG)

5.3 "Eemslift Hendrika" drifting case, April 2021

The vessel was on route from Bremerhafen to

Kolvereid in Mid Norway. In rough weather "Eemslift

Hendrika" had a shift of cargo, followed by an engine

blackout in the North Sea west of Stadt on the

Norwegian west coast on April 5th. As a result, the

vessel started drifting, and reach a significant list

under large ship motions. It was decided to evacuate

the ship, see figure 11. First, eight of the crew

members were rescued using a Norwegian SAR

helicopter. Four crew members stayed on board to try

to stabilize the rolling motion and to prepare for the

connection of emergency towing lines before they

rescued by the helicopter. All crew members had to

jump overboard to be picked up. The drifting path

was followed closely by NOR VTS using their

prediction tool for drifting of ships. From AIS signals

NOR VTS could follow the actual drift motions. The

NETS vessel "KV Sortland" was on-scene to observe

and forward information to NCA. At 6 pm the

following day, the vessel was unmanned and drifting

40 – 50 nautical miles west of Ålesund. Figure 12 is a

map showing the actual drift track and predictions of

future drift path. Weather conditions remained harsh,

with waves of up to 15-18 m being observed, wind of

18 – 20 m/s coming from the north, which made it

impossible to get specialists onboard the drifting

vessel. It was observed that part of the deck cargo, a

24 m aquaculture service vessel, was lost to the sea.

One of the deck cranes was also damaged.

Figure 11. "Eemslift Hendrika" – early stage of drifting west

of Stadt (Photo: CHC Helikopterservice/ JRCC Southern

Norway).

Figure 12. Observed and predicted drifting path for

"Eemslift Hendrika" (Courtesy NCA)

The Dutch shipowner hired two commercial tugs

to start an emergency towing operation. At 1 pm on

April 7th it was decided to postpone this operation to

the next day. The weather was still too rough for a

safe transfer of Smitt Salvage specialists to the drifting

vessel. At this time, it was assumed that the operation

could start the next morning as the weather would

improve. However, later that day it was observed that

the drifting part changed leading to possible

grounding in about 8 hours. Then NCA called for a

governmental activity involving mobilizing oil spill

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protection resources in the area and prepared for a

NETS operation. A SAR helicopter was allocated to

attempt to bring Smit Salvage specialists to the

drifting vessel. This operation was successful, and the

salvage crew prepared equipment for emergency

towing, both at bow and stern. Two commercial tugs

("Normann Drot" and "BB Ocean") were able to

connect, and the emergency towing started, see figure

13.

Figure 13. Preparing for emergency towing of "Eemslift

Hendrika" (Photo: Norwegian Coast Guard – "KV Bergen")

6 KNOWLEDGE SHARING FROM EMERGENCY

TOWING OPERATIONS

Until 2018 NCA arranged an annual two-day

workshop on emergency towing. The objectives for

these workshops were mainly to present recent

emergency towing operations from Norwegian

waters. These workshops were open for all parties

involved in emergency towing. For some of these

workshops, experts from international towing

companies (such as Smitt Salvage) and Nordic coast

guards presented recent emergency towing

operations. Due to the "Helge Ingstad" incident, the

2019 workshop was cancelled. As NCA was working

on the reorganization of NETS in 2020, it was decided

to cancel that year's workshop as well. However,

NCA run mandatory courses for senior officers on all

vessels in NETS on a regular basis. SINTEF Ocean

researchers gave presentations in these courses.

In 2018 SINTEF Ocean, in collaboration with

Norwegian University of Science and Technology,

Kongsberg Maritime Advisory and Training, Port of

Trondheim and Norconsult, develop an open forum

for advanced shiphandling. As a result of the

cancellation of NCA'a workshop, the forum arranged

shorter workshops on topics related to ocean and

emergency towing. In November 2019 the topic was

towing operations in coastal waters and ports and in

November 2020 (2 hours web- based meeting) on the

topic ocean and emergency towing.

7 MODIFICATION OF TRAINING SYSTEM

Transfer of the operational part of NETS from NCA to

NCG required a change in the previous training

program for officers and crew on the six NCG vessels

allocated for the NETS. A revised training plan was

developed based on the previous training system

presented at TRANSNAV 2019 [1]:

− The content in the phase 1 course (two days) was

adapted to specific needs for NCG personnel with

respect to the background of NETS. New examples

of recent emergency towing operations were

added. The topic "Selection of emergency towing

gear to be used for various ship types/sizes,

condition of drifting vessel, present and forecasted

weather conditions were strengthened". Finally,

improvements of NCG systems for sharing of

knowledge and experience from completed

emergency towing operations were discussed.

− The onboard practical training course was

modified to include a more thorough review of the

ship's own towing gear, connecting emergency

towing lines to drifting vessels (manned or

unmanned). The selection of future training

scenarios was discussed in the debriefing part of

the course.

Further, it has been discussed if the previous

simulator-based training course for emergency towing

should revised and adapted to the Coast Guard

vessels. The cost/benefit of such work was found to be

too low and available resources should be used on the

practical onboard course.

8 FUTURE NORWEGIAN ACTIVITIES RELATED

TO EMERGENCY AND OCEAN TOWING

Based on investigation reports prepared by the

Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection, it is stated

that there is a need for a complete list of Norwegian

towing vessel resources and their characteristics. This

list could be used when NCA calls for a governmental

maritime emergency operation.

Operational experience from the "Eemslift

Hendrika" case shows that there still is a need to

improve tools for prediction of ship's drift and

training of operators using such tools for different

types of vessels and in an ongoing salvage operation.

The way of sharing national experience from

emergency towing operations is presently under

discussion. Forum for advanced shiphandling will

arrange an annual two-hour web-based workshop. At

the same time, the need for the two-day physical

workshop will be investigated by NCA, NCG and

SINTEF Ocean this spring. Based on industrial

feedback, a decision will be made if such a workshop

should be arranged late 2021.

REFERENCES

1. Berg, T.E. et al.: Norwegian Emergency Towing Service

– Past – Present and Future. TransNav, the International

Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea

Transportation. 14, 1, 83–88 (2020).

https://doi.org/10.12716/1001.14.01.09.

2. Norwegian Directorate for Civil Preparedness:

Evaluation of the “Viking Sky” incident". DSB report,

Stavanger (2020).