International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 2
Number 3
September 2008
311
Total Losses of Fishing Vessels Due to the
Insufficient Stability
P. Krata
Gdynia Maritime University, Gdynia, Poland
ABSTRACT: The paper presents the statistic data analysis of total losses of the fishing vessels. The emphasis
is put on the total losses caused by the insufficient stability of considered ships. The research is focused on the
fishing vessels, which are relatively small ones in marine industry, so they are most affected by the wind and
rough sea. The correlation between type of the vessel, its size, the shape of its hull and the capsizing statistic
is presented. The regularities noticed in course of statistic analysis allows to formulate the suggestions
regarding the influence of some hydrodynamic phenomena on the safety of fishing vessels and the number on
their total losses at the sea.
1 INTRODUCTION
Fishing vessels, especially small fishing vessels, are
the largest class of marine professional vessels. This
group of ships has been built and operated for ages
but it still generates the great danger for the crew,
ships and environment. The huge number of
accidents and serious disasters occur in spite of
the development of naval architecture, weather
forecasting, means of communication, etc. The total
losses of ships and losses of human lives are sad
facts, therefore any investigation of the accidents’
reasons and any attempt to improve present situation
are worthy to be undertaken.
2 STATISTICS OF FISHING VESSELS’ TOTAL
LOSSES AND LOSSES OF HUMAN
The total losses statistics presented in this paper are
based on data collected by last three decades of
twentieth century. Hundreds of marine accidents
where fishing vessels were involved were taken into
consideration. The main source of the accidents
information are The Casualty Returns of Lloyd’s
Register of Shipping and The Lloyd’s Weekly
Casualty Reports. All considered ships were over
500 gross registered tonnage and they were divided
into groups up to different criteria (Achutegui,
Mendiola & Azofra 2000).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
percent [%] of total losses
fire and explosion
stranding and grounding
foundering
flooding
collision
struck
capsizing
missing
others
casual reason
Fig. 1. Distribution of the reason of fishing vessel total losses
(source - own study based on data published in (Achutegui,
Mendiola & Azofra 2000))
The distribution of the reason of analyzed fishing
vessels’ total losses is shown graphical in figure 1.
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The loss of stability involving capsizing of the ship
is one of the rarely noticed reason of the total losses.
Its rate is only 4% of all casual causes. Although the
rate of capsized vessels is much higher in the group
of smaller ships, not considered in presented
statistics.
Regardless the danger to the ship, the fishing
vessels operations affect the safety of crew working
on board. Commercial fishing industry is one of
the most dangerous and deadly. Fishers in the United
States in 2000 were ranked as the second in deaths
per thousand workers, right behind timber cutters.
In recent studies performed by Roberts of the
University of Oxford in 2002 fishers had the most
dangerous job in Great Britain (Womack 2002).
The statistic data confirms such judgment.
The insufficient stability of ships is one of the most
important reason of deaths on board of fishing
vessels. The distribution of causes for loss of human
life during fishing vessels’ total losses is shown
in figure 2.
0 10 20 30 40 50
percent [%] of deaths
fire and explosion
stranding and grounding
foundering
flooding
collision
struck
capsizing
Fig. 2. Distribution of the causes for deaths during fishing
vessel total losses (source - own study based on data published
in (Achutegui, Mendiola & Azofra 2000))
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
deaths per one ship's loss
fire and explosion
stranding and grounding
foundering
flooding
collision
struck
capsizing
average
casual reason
Fig. 3. Distribution of the causes for deaths per one fishing
vessel total loss (source - own study based on data published in
(Achutegui, Mendiola & Azofra 2000))
Capsizing is the second often reason of the loss of
human life, although it causes only 4% of all total
losses of fishing vessels. The rate of deaths during
capsizing reaches almost 20%. The rate of death per
one ship’s loss is even worse. It is 7,07 loss of
human being per one fishing vessel lost, when the
average rate is 1,40 only. The distribution of the
causes for deaths per one fishing vessel total loss is
shown in figure 3.
The comparison of the average rate of deaths and
the characteristic high rate noticed for capsizing,
shows the level of threat during the capsizing and
generally the condition of insufficient stability. The
rate of deaths per one capsizing disaster, which is
over five time higher than average one, justify
further consideration of this relative rare
phenomenon.
3 ANALYSIS OF CAPSIZING STATISTIC
As the ship’s capsizing is the type of disaster which
cause lots of deaths, the detailed analysis in
particular groups of fishing vessels were made. All
cases of capsizing reported in official data were
divided into typical sets by three criteria: the type of
fishing vessel, the gross register tonnage and the age.
The distribution of capsizing rate by the type of
the vessels is shown in figure 4. The symbols used in
the graph are following: MST - motor stern trawlers,
MT - motor trawlers, MFV - motor fishing vessels,
MSTFF - motor stern trawlers fish factory, StT -
steam trawlers. The names of vessels types
correspond with the division used for statistic data
collecting (Achutegui, Mendiola & Azofra 2000).
The predominating group of capsized fishing
vessels represents motor stern trawlers and the
second one motor trawlers. Those both types of
ships suffered over 71% of all capsizing. It is
characteristic for both of them, that the freeboard is
relatively small. Additionally the stern trawlers have
low and almost open stern, what is necessary for the
type of fishing operations. The coexistence of such
shape of the trawlers hull and the high rate of
capsizing should be underlined.
0
10
20
30
40
50
percent [%] of capsized
fishing vessel
MST MT MFV MSTFF StT others
type of capsized fishing vessel
Fig. 4. Distribution of capsizing rate by the type of lost vessel
(source - own study based on data published in (Achutegui,
Mendiola & Azofra 2000))
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
percent [%] of
capsized fishing
vessel
500-750 751-1000 1001-
1250
1251-
1500
1501-
2500
>2500
GRT of capsized fishing vessel
Fig. 5. Distribution of capsizing rate by GRT of lost vessel
(source - own study based on data published in (Achutegui,
Mendiola & Azofra 2000))
The next step was taking into consideration
the size of the capsized fishing vessels. Six sizes
up to the gross register tonnage were established.
The distribution of capsizing rate by the GRT of
fishing vessels is shown in figure 5. There is the
strong relationship between the size of considered
vessels and the rate of its capsizing. Over 57 % of
capsized ships were under 750 GRT. The vessels
of size smaller than 500 GRT were not taken into
consideration.
The last factor taken into consideration was
the age of the capsized fishing vessels. Six age
categories were established: ships from 0 to 5 years
old - “new”, 6 to 10 years old - “relatively new”,
from 11 to 15 years old - “middle age”, 16 to 20
years old - “relatively old”, 21 - 25 years old were
considered as “old” and over 25 years old - “very
old”. The distribution of capsizing rate by the age of
fishing vessel is shown in figure 6.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
percent [%] of capsized
fishing vessel
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25
age of capsized fishing vessel
Fig. 6. Distribution of capsizing rate by the age of lost vessel
(source - own study based on data published in (Achutegui,
Mendiola & Azofra 2000))
The highest rate of capsizing was noticed for
middle age ships (almost 36% of all capsized fishing
vessels). The second most inflicted to capsizing
group of vessels are relatively old ones. The figure 6.
shows, that there is no rule - the older the worse.
4 CAPSIZING AS THE EFFECT
OF INSUFFICIENT STABILITY
Number The capsizing is the fatal phenomenon
caused by the insufficient stability of the ship in
actual operating conditions. For fishing vessels 24 m
or longer, the main mean for determining the intact
stability is evaluating the characteristics of hull’s
static righting arm curve (Womack 2002). The
principal stability criteria are contained in the IMO
1993 Torremolinos Protocol (IMO 1993). There are
various versions of the protocol, adopted by different
countries, but the major modifications to the IMO
version are the addition of a minimum range of
positive stability, typically 60° or more (Womack
2002).
The criteria adopted by IMO represent the simple
static attitude towards complicated nonlinear
dynamic behavior of the vessel. The weather
criterion, which is the attempt of dynamic stability
calculation, is based on the static righting arm as
well. The vessels shall be able to withstand the effect
of severe wind and rolling in associated sea
conditions in which the vessel will operate (IMO
1993). But no dynamic evaluation of the rolling
and wind guests take place in course of stability
calculation. Additionally, when the stability of
fishing vessel is to be evaluated, some important
circumstances are omitted. First of all the influence
of fishing gear’s towing should be taken into
consideration. The arrangement of additional forces
affecting the trawler is shown in figure 7.
Fig. 7. The towing load affecting ship’s stability (source
(Womack 2002))
The stability of the vessel towing the fishing gear
is reduced by some effects. The first is the rise of the
center of gravity, due to fishing gear load placed
virtually on the top of cable reels. The other reason
for the stability decay is the lower freeboard,
especially in the stern of the trawler. That may be the
reason of the loss of relatively small ships, which
capsize the most often (see statistic in figure 5). The
next factor affecting ships’ stability is the shift of
load as the vessel heel. The negative effects of
towing the fishing gear are shown in figure 8.
314
Fig. 8. Negative effects of towing of fishing gear (source
(Womack 2002))
Another effect resulting the danger to fishing
vessels may be the water trapped on deck and its
dynamic influence (Jankowski & Laskowski 2006).
Such situation is most likely during the towing of
fishing gear by the small trawler. There is an
accumulation of free board lowering (see figure 7)
and the characteristic construction of stern trawlers
having almost open stern for fishing operations. The
water trapped on the deck may also come into the
processing spaces, what considerably effects the
ships stability and results deeper rolling on the seas.
The example of such situation may be the capsizing
of fishing vessel Arctic Rose. The disaster was
described in details (Lieutenant 2002).
The fishing vessel Arctic Rose had been
disappeared in the Bering Sea on April 2, 2001,
killing all fifteen men onboard. The U. S. Coast
Guard convened a Formal Marine Board of
Investigation to determine what had happened to the
vessel and why it had happened. According to the
analysis, the most likely reason the Arctic Rose sank
had been progressive flooding from the aft weather
deck to the processing space and the flooding then
progressed to the galley, fish hold, and engine room
through non-watertight doors and hatches
(Lieutenant 2002). The effect of loss of buoyancy of
the superstructure on the static righting arm curve is
shown in figure9. With the superstructure
nonbuoyant, the angle of maximum righting arm is
at the angle of deck edge immersion. With the
superstructure buoyant, the angle of maximum
righting arm is increased to the angle at which the
top of the superstructure is immersed. However, if
the superstructure cannot physically be kept
watertight due to openings without closures and
operational considerations, the buoyancy is lost
(Lieutenant 2002).
Fig. 9. Arctic Rose righting arm curve RA: openings closed -
upper curve and openings remaining open - lower curve (source
(Lieutenant 2002))
Additionally, water on deck often leads to
progressive flooding into spaces inside the fishing
vessel in which watertight doors and hatches have
been left open, which is precisely the most likely
scenario of the loss of the Arctic Rose (Lieutenant
2002). The sophisticated analysis of dynamic
behavior of Arctic Rose containing the water inside
its hull was performed. The results of the analysis
are shown in figure 10. The great increase in rolling
amplitude is evident.
Fig. 10. Roll angle time history for Arctic Rose (source
(Lieutenant 2002))
The improper use of passive anti rolling tanks
may have the similar effect to the sloshing of water
trapped on deck. It is described in (Transportation
Safety Board of Canada 2006) when capsizing of
small fishing vessel Ryan’s Commander is analyzed.
Just before the capsizing, the combined effects of
beam seas and increasing gust wind force caused the
vessel to roll slowly to port. The significant weight
of some 1.6 tons of slack water in the anti rolling
tank was not evenly balanced, as it also gravitated to
the port side, and, with the liquids in the other tanks,
contributed to the heeling effect. The accumulation
315
of shipped water on the port side of the main deck
continued until eventually it overcame the vessel’s
ability to right itself (Transportation Safety Board of
Canada 2006).
5 CONCLUSIONS
The capsizing is not often occurring phenomenon at
the sea, although it cause considerable number of
fatalities. The statistic analysis of total losses of
fishing vessels and the crew’s deaths suggest several
main factors related with the capsizing rate.
The first feature influencing the capsizing rate is
the size of the vessel. Generally the smaller is the
vessel, the bigger is the risk of capsizing. This is due
o the scalability in vessel stability. It depends on the
square-cubed rule; i.e. the heeling forces, which
depend on water and wind impact areas, go up with
the square of the dimensions, but the righting
moment which depends on the displacement, goes
up with the cube of the dimensions (Womack 2002).
The vessel twice as large as another one has roughly
eight times the righting energy as the smaller vessel
if both have the same righting arm curve. Yet for the
larger vessel the wind impact forces have only
increased four times over the smaller vessel
(Womack 2002).
The next circumstance exposing fishing vessels to
the risk of capsizing is omitting in stability
calculations the load of fishing gear being towed by
the trawlers. The towing load results in lowering of
freeboard and rising in the height of center of
gravity.
Another factor is the influence of the water
trapped on the deck of the vessel. This event is most
likely on the small fishing vessel with low or open
stern. The dynamic behavior of the shipped water,
affects the ship’s intact stability and it also may be
the cause of flooding of the hull. The free surface
effect appearing inside the fish hold, restricts the
righting ability of the vessel considerably. The
sloshing water may be able to lead to ship’s
capsizing, as presented in examples of Arctic Rose
and Ryan’s Commander.
The improvement of present situation could be
significant modification of formal stability criteria
applied for fishing vessels, especially for small
fishing vessels. The first point should be getting rid
of the same stability standards for the vessel of any
size. There should be worked out the restrictions
regarding the freeboard and obligatory advices for
skippers with regard to dynamic behavior of the
vessel on heavy seas and with water trapped on deck.
The steady rise in the level of skipper’s education is
the point to be taken into consideration as well.
REFERENCES
Correa F.J., Achutegui J.J., Mendiola S., Azofra M., Main
causes of the total losses of fishing vessels, 2
nd
International
Congress on Maritime Technological Innovations and
Research, Cadiz 2000.
Jankowski J. Laskowski A., Capsizing of small vessel due
to waves and water trapped on deck, Proceedings of the
9th International Conference on Stability of Ships and
Ocean Vehicles, Rio de Janeiro 2006.
Lieutenant G.A., Research opportunities identified during
the casualty analysis of the fishing vessel Arctic Rose,
Proceedings of the 6th International Ship Stability
Workshop, Washington 2002.
Marine Investigation Report M04N0086 Capsizing and Lost of
Life, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Canada 2006.
Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of
Fishing Vessels, 1977, being the Protocol of 1993 together
with the Regulations Annexed to the Convention as
modified by the Annex to the Protocol, IMO 1993,
www.oceanlaw.net/texts/torremolinos.htm .
Womack J., Small commercial fishing vessel stability analysis,
Where are we now? Where are we going?, Proceedings of
the 6th International Ship Stability Workshop, Washington
2002.