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1 INTRODUCTION
Expanding at 4%, the fastest growth in five years,
global maritime trade gathered momentum in 2017
and raised sentiment in the shipping industry. Total
volumes have reached 10.7 billion tons (Asariotis et
al. 2018), which was transported by sea on different
types of ships (tankers, bulk carriers, container ships,
general cargo ships, etc.). The world commercial fleet
consisted of 94,171 ships on 01.01.2018, with a
combined tonnage of 1.92 billion dead-weight tons
(Asariotis et al. 2018).
With these volumes the importance of maritime
transportation to the world economy cannot be over-
emphasized. The global economic inter-dependency
among the nations relies largely on the successful
operation of the maritime industry. Since the shipping
accidents have a significant negative impact on the
surrounding environments and will heavily influence
the world trade, the safety and security of today’s
modern shipping are of utmost importance. The
safety and security of the ships is ensured by various
onboard and onshore maritime systems working
together simultaneously. These systems include
among others cargo handling and management
systems, Automatic Identification System (AIS),
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), Long
Range Tracking and Identification (LRIT) System,
Electronic Chart Display and Information System
(ECDIS), Global Positioning System (GPS), ship
propulsion and machinery management and power
management system.
Traditionally, attacks on the ships have included
piracy, boarding, theft and destruction. While these
attacks have often been successful and still continue
happening, they are well understood, the risks are
known and appropriate measures can be taken to
mitigate the threats. This includes also the education
Ensuring Cybersecurity in Shipping: Reference to
Estonian
Shipowners
D. Hee
ring
Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia
ABSTRACT: Ships, ports and offshore facilities are increasingly becoming dependent on modern information
and opera-tional technology. Cyber incidents on ships can create disruptions of critical systems that cause
problems for the ship’s safe operation. Therefore, the shipowners must be prepared to cope with rising cyber
threats. In or-der to prevent cyber incidents happening on ships and in the companies, essential steps must be
taken on the management level. This paper introduces results of two surveys on cybersecurity and cyber
awareness carried out in between 2017 2019 among the shipping companies operating in Estonia. Feedback
was received from 12 shipowners out of 19 and the results show that at least 7 organisations had been the
victims to different types of cyberattacks. The results indicate that shipowners are not paying enough of
attention to potential cyber threats and education of their employees. Finally, the paper proposes cyber risk
mitigation means for the shipowners.
http://www.transnav.eu
the
International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 14
Number 2
June 2020
DOI:
10.12716/1001.14.02.01
272
and training of the seafarers. The International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) sets the
standards of competence for seafarers internationally
(IMO 2019a). International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has also developed a series of model courses
which provide suggested syllabi, course timetables
and learning objectives to assist instructors to develop
training programs. They allow for maritime
educational institutions to provide training that meets
the STCW Convention standards.
Today, the cybersecurity in the shipping industry
is a big challenge with a multidisciplinary nature for
the shipping companies. Current cybersecurity
strategies implemented by most of the shipping
companies are not able to counter and deter efficiently
intrusions in the maritime cyber domain. The
maritime industry globally has failed to make the
cybersecurity a priority (Caponi & Belmont 2015).
Increasing number of cybersecurity related
incidents in the maritime sector is a clear sign that the
problem is persistent and serious and requires more
attention and actions from the industry. In June 2017
the world's largest container shipping company, A.P.
Møller-Maersk was one of the companies which was
hit by the malware NotPetya (Greenberg 2018). The
infection with malicious software cost Maersk
between $250 and $300 million. In November 2017 the
London-based provider of shipping services Clarkson
PLC confirmed that it was a subject to a cybersecurity
incident which involved unauthorised access to the
company’s computer systems (Clarckson PLC 2017).
COSCO Shipping Lines announced in July 2018 that
the company was hit by the ransomware attack,
which affected its operations in the Americas
(Johnson 2018a). In September 2018 ports of Barcelona
and San Diego were targeted by ransomware
attackers (Johnson 2018b).
Researchers have successfully developed and
demonstrated cyber attacks against the Integrated
Navigation System (INS) and ECDIS (Lund et al.
2018), and have been able to manipulate with GPS
signals (Bhatti & Humphreys 2017).
Seafarers are exposed to a set of different
challenges when in geographical isolation. These can
be pirate attacks, rough seas and stormy weather or a
very busy traffic routes. With the arrival of new
technologies and solutions assisting to sail safely and
securely through these conditions, continuous
interconnection between the critical maritime
infrastructures and also continuous internet access at
sea, the cyber threats have become one of the new
challenges for the seafarers and cybersecurity
awareness is a new item on the agenda of the
maritime community.
Shipowners have to be prepared to cope with the
rising cyber threats. They have to understand that it is
not only the IT issue; the problems also arise among
other from the ship’s crew behaviour in Internet (chat
forums, social media, downloading illegal software,
cloud-based file storage, e-mails) and from third
parties visiting ships (agents, customs, technicians,
surveyors, port officials, vendors, pilots).
Although there has been an increasing awareness
on maritime cybersecurity in the industry, the results
of several surveys reveal that there is still a room for
improvement from the technological and
organisational point of view.
According to the Jones Walker LLP 2018 Maritime
Cybersecurity Survey (Lee & Wogan 2018) only a
minority (36%) of the 126 respondents from maritime
companies across the United States believed that their
own companies were prepared enough in
cybersecurity and 38% of the respondents reported
that cyber attackers targeted their companies in the
past year.
Fairplay and Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO) are jointly conducting an annual
Maritime Cyber Security Survey in order to examine
how the maritime industry is handling digital
protection. From more than 350 individuals around
the world who participated in the survey in 2018, 22%
admitted of experiencing some kind of a cyber attack
or incident (BIMCO & Fairplay 2018). Top incidents
reported during the survey include: phishing,
infection with malware, spear phishing, theft of
credentials and ransomware.
Another survey undertaken by Futurenautics
Maritime, Crew Connectivity 2018, reveals that 47%
of the seafarers, who responded to the survey, have
sailed on the ship that had become a target of cyber
attack, but 85% of the respondents received no cyber
training at all (Nguyen 2018). Same survey shows also
that 49% of the seafarers confessed that they were
unaware of their employers’ cyber policies, and 41%
thought the responsibility lies with the Master of the
ship.
Although Estonia is considered as a maritime
country, there were no ships with gross tonnage
above 500 under Estonian flag in 2018; last two cargo
ships left the Estonian register in 2014 (Reimer 2014).
Consequently it is complicated to get a full overview
of the companies operating with ships under the flag
of another nation (Hunt et al. 2016). It is believed that
Estonian shipowners own ca 50-60 cargo ships
weighing in excess of 500 tons (Johanson 2016).
In this paper the author presents the results of the
independent survey carried out among the Estonian
shipowners between April 2017 and February 2019.
The results of the surveys indicate that the
cybersecurity hasn’t been the priority for the majority
of the shipowners in Estonia. As the end users are
considered to be the weakest link in cybersecurity,
companies should put more emphasis to the cyber
awareness training of their personnel and crew (Tam
& Jones 2018). You may have the most up-to-date and
expensive equipment, but one careless crew member
can cause extensive damage to the ship and to the
company with just a one click of a mouse.
2 METHODOLOGY
The aim of the research was to find out how much
attention have Estonian shipowners paid to the
increasing cyber threats, whether the organisations
have been the victims of the cyber attacks or incidents
and what steps have they taken in order to reduce the
risks.
273
The surveys were carried out between April 2017
and February 2019. The study sample consisted of 19
Estonian organisations who are known to operate
under Estonian and foreign flags with different types
of ships, including ferries, passenger ships, tugboats,
survey ships, multifunctional ships, general cargo
vessels, icebreakers, offshore support vessels, etc. The
sample list included both business entities and public
organisations. The questionnaires were prepared the
way that allowed organisations to respond to the
survey anonymously and at the same time would also
give a good overview of the present state of the
cybersecurity among the Estonian shipowners.
The questionnaire study was carried out in
Estonian by using the Google Forms platform
(docs.google.com/forms) for the preparation of the
questionnaire. For analysing the results software
Microsoft Excel was used. The organisations were
given an option to receive the questionnaire also in
English or Russian, if needed. An e-mail invitation
was sent to the organisations known to own or
operate with ships. In addition, information
concerning the questionnaire was also sent to the
Estonian Shipowners’ Association.
Several reminders were sent by e-mails during the
surveys and also many phone calls were made to
explain the goal of the surveys and give some
additional clarifications.
2.1 Questionnaire
The first survey, in 2017, consisted of 29 questions of
which 11 were not mandatory to answer and the
second survey consisted of 45 questions of which 7
were not mandatory to answer. This allowed to
respect the respondent’s anonymity and also allowed
the respondent to skip the questions, to which the
shipping company wouldn’t like to answer.
Second survey, which was conducted in February
2019, was amended with the additional questions that
allowed receiving a better overview of the current
state of the cyber awareness training for the personnel
of the organisations and the need for cybersecurity
courses and exercises in the future.
Most of the questions had pre-defined multiple-
choice answers with the option to include the
comment in the text-field under each question. One
sample question is presented below in Table 1.
Table 1. Sample question from the survey.
_______________________________________________
Question Multiple-choice answer
_______________________________________________
What do you perceive is our employees
your organisation’s biggest our IT systems in the office
cyber vulnerability? our IT systems onboard ships
our procedures
third parties (suppliers,
hackers, passengers,
officials, etc.)
our competition
other...
_______________________________________________
Part of the survey questions were aimed to receive
background information about the organisations
(number of total employees, number of employees on
ships, number of the fleet and ship types, etc.),
questions in other sections inquired information
about the cyber risk mitigation activities in the
organisation, occurrences of cyber incidents and also
related consequences, and cybersecurity related
training.
3 RESULTS
In this section the author analyses the main results
from two surveys. The research was aimed at
identifying the current state of the cybersecurity in
shipping industry with reference to Estonian
shipowners. A total of 12 organisations filled in the
questionnaires. 9 organisations participated in the
first survey in April 2017 and 6 organisations in
February 2019 of which 3 were new organisations.
The results were analysed in a qualitative manner
due to the relatively small number of respondents.
The respondents were asked to identify their
organisation at the beginning of the questionnaire, but
it was not mandatory. Some (4) decided not to reveal
their organisation’s name and contacts.
Table 2 shows the position of the respondents in
their organisation.
Table 2. Respondents position in the organization.
_______________________________________________
Respondents position Number
_______________________________________________
Top manager 7 (58.3%)
Manager 3 (25.0%)
Specialist 2 (16.7%)
_______________________________________________
Survey carried out in April 2017 included
organisations with a total fleet of at least 52 ships.
One respondent decided not to reveal the size of their
fleet. Respondents to second survey in February 2019
have a fleet of 51 ships. Table 3 presents the ship
types of the respondents.
Table 3. Types of ships included in two surveys.
_______________________________________________
Ship types Survey 1 Survey 2
_______________________________________________
General cargo x x
Passenger x x
Container x
Ferries x
Ro-ro x x
Ro-pax x
Tugboats x
Multifunctional x x
Icebreaker x
Pilot boat x
Survey x
Accommodation x
Offshore support x
_______________________________________________
The question related to the IMO Resolution
MSC.428(98) and the requirement of addressing the
cyber risks appropriately in the Safety Management
System (SMS) was included in the second survey as
the Resolution MSC.428(98) was adopted by the IMO
Maritime Safety Committee at its 98th session in June
2017. This resolution encourages administrations to
274
ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in
existing Safety Management Systems no later than the
first annual verification of the company's Document
of Compliance after 1 January 2021 (IMO 2019b).
None of the respondents had yet taken any action on
this matter (in February 2019). The organisations have
the plan to implement necessary steps in 2019 (1
organisation) and in 2020 (3 organisations). One
shipping company responded that most probably
they will sell their last ship before 2021 and one
organisation is not planning to make any changes to
their Safety Management System.
Maritime industry in general has approached the
cybersecurity seriously and as a result many
cybersecurity guidelines have been published by
different actors in recent years (Rizvanolli et al. 2018).
Table 4 below gives an overview of the guidelines
that respondents are using.
Table 4. Guidelines and standards used by the respondents.
_______________________________________________
Guidelines Respondents
_______________________________________________
IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk 1
Management (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3)
The Guidelines on Cyber Security onboard 1
Ships (BIMCO)
Cyber security resilience management for ships
and mobile offshore units in operation (DNV GL) 2
Deploying information and communications 1
technology in shipping (Lloyd’s Register)
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 1
Guidelines from the classification society 1
ISKE (three-level IT Baseline Security System 2
developed for Estonian public sector)
Other guidelines or standards 6
Don’t use any guidelines or standards 3
_______________________________________________
The results from the survey indicate that
respondents have taken some measures in their
organisations to reduce the cyber risks. Most popular
actions taken by the organisations are described in the
Table 5.
Table 5. Risk mitigation measures in the organisations.
_______________________________________________
Risk mitigation measure Respondents
_______________________________________________
Virus protection and regular virus scans 12
Using firewalls 11
Software and firmware are updated regularly 10
Regular backups of critical information 10
Privilege user account management has been 10
implemented
Backups are kept in several locations 9
Employees are using separate e-mail addresses for 9
work and personal use
Restrict using removable media (e.g. USB memory 4
sticks)
Employees are regularly reminded about the 7
possible cyber threats
_______________________________________________
Two organisations pointed out in the comments
field that it is sometimes impracticable to restrict the
usage of removable media onboard ships when
visiting the ports. Necessary information is still
shared in many places via USB flash drives (cargo
plans, need for printing documents for port
authorities, updating of ECDIS software or electronic
charts, manuals, etc.) and it is very difficult to control
and verify that the removable media in use is clean
from possible malware and safe to use.
A cybersecurity risk assessment and gap analysis
allows the organisations to identify and prioritise the
cyber risks by understanding the information and
assets they need to protect and the threats they need
to be protected from. Only 3 shipowners out of 12
reported that they have carried out the risk
assessment in their organisation and on the ships.
One respondent confirmed that they are planning to
undertake the assessment in the near future.
The question about the establishment of the
cybersecurity incident response plan in the
organisation received 7 negative answers. Only 5
shipowners had a cybersecurity response plan in
place in the organisation.
According to the Allianz Risk Barometer 2018,
cyber incidents (cyber crime, IT failure, data breaches)
are considered as one of the top five risks in the
shipping industry (Allianz Global Corporate &
Specialty 2018). The results of the survey show that 7
shipowners (58%) have admitted that their
organisations have experienced cyber incidents in the
last few years. The types of the cyber incidents are
presented in Table 6. Two respondents decided not to
share the information about the possible cyber
incidents within their organisations.
Table 6. Main types of the cyber attacks or incidents.
_______________________________________________
Cyber incident Respondents
_______________________________________________
Infection with malware 3
Phishing attack 7
E-mail spoofing 4
Problems with network 1
GPS interference 1
Ransomware 2
_______________________________________________
The organisations who experienced some cyber
incident sustained following damages:
loss or leakage of company data (1);
access to the employees account (1)
measurable financial damages (1);
damages to the IT systems (2);
damages to the organisation’s reputation (2).
Three respondents decided not to share the
information about the damages the cyber incidents
had caused to their organisations.
The author asked the respondents to evaluate the
likelihood of a cyber attack or a cyber incident in their
organisation on a scale of 1 5, 1 being less likely and
5 being very likely. According to the results below
(Figure 1 and Figure 2) the organisations don’t see
that the possibility of a cyber incident on their ships
or in the offices would be high or very high. On the
contrary, compared to the situation in 2017, the
organisations believe in February 2019 that the
likelihood of an incident is less.
275
Figure 1. Respondents (9) evaluating the likelihood of a
cyber incident in their organisation in April 2017.
Figure 2. Respondents (6) evaluating the likelihood of a
cyber incident in their organisation in February 2019.
The question “Has your organisation reported any
cyber attack or incident to the relevant authorities
was included in the second survey, in February 2019.
The feedback to that question revealed that none of
the respondents have reported any cyber incidents to
the relevant authorities, national Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) or to any
dedicated cyber incident platform (e.g. Maritime
Cyber Alliance, www.maritimecyberalliance.com). As
the number of serious cyber attacks and incidents in
the maritime domain is growing, it is of utmost
importance to share the information about the
incidents with other stakeholders and organisations in
the industry. The incidents happen every day.
Unfortunately majority of them are never reported,
thus creating the sense that the cybersecurity is not a
critical part of the organisation’s security.
The author was also interested if the organisations
have any procedures in place for reporting the cyber
incidents onboard ships. 3 organisations confirmed
that such procedure exists and 3 organisations
indicated that they don’t have the procedures for
reporting the office. This question was added to the
2019 survey.
One section of the survey concentrated on the
cyber awareness and cyber hygiene training for the
personnel and ships’ crews. The aim was to get an
overview how much emphasis have the organisations
placed on the education and training.
The question about providing cyber awareness
and cyber hygiene training to the employees received
only 3 confirmative replies. The rest of the
respondents (9) replied that no training on
cybersecurity or cyber hygiene has been provided for
their personnel. At the same time 7 organisations
think that their personnel needs some training on
cybersecurity and 5 organisations still could do
without it.
Additional questions on education and training
were enclosed in the 2019 survey. The results are
shown in the Table 7 below.
Table 7. Results of the questions on cyber awareness and
cyber hygiene training, 2019 survey (6 respondents).
_______________________________________________
Question Yes No
_______________________________________________
Has your organisation conducted any cyber crisis 0 6
management scenarios or exercises for shipboard
personnel?
Has your organisation conducted any cyber crisis 1 5
management scenarios or exercises for the office
personnel?
Has the respondent received any cyber hygiene 1 5
and awareness training?
Would your organisation be interested to carry 4 2
out cyber incident training on ships?
_______________________________________________
The author also asked the respondents in the 2019
survey to choose or propose the biggest
vulnerabilities to their organisations. The results are
presented in the Table 8. Third parties visiting the
ships and their own crews are considered as biggest
vulnerabilities to the organisations.
Table 8. Biggest cyber vulnerabilities to the organisation
perceived by the respondents (6 respondents).
_______________________________________________
Vulnerability Respondents
_______________________________________________
Third parties (suppliers, hackers, passengers, 3
officials, etc.)
Our employees and crews 3
Out IT systems on ships 1
Our procedures 1
_______________________________________________
Several survey questions were related to the
financial aspects. To the question, if the organisation’s
insurance is covering also the cyber risks (e.g.
ransomware, privacy breach, and data loss), only 2
organisations respondent positively, 4 shipowners
replied that their insurance doesn’t cover cyber risks
and 6 respondents decided not to reveal this
information.
The cybersecurity predictions for the coming years
are tough: Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be used by
the cyber criminals to implement and enhance their
cyber attacks, deployment of 5G network
infrastructure will expand the attack surface area,
more poorly secured Internet of Things (IoT) devices
will be targeted and used for harmful purposes,
organisations will be targeted by using more
sophisticated malware, etc. (Thompson & Trilling
2018).
Therefore the author added to the 2019 survey
additional question, which asked the organisations to
indicate, if they have allocated any finances in the
budget of 2019 for cyber risk mitigation. Out of 6
organisations 4 had additional budget dedicated for
the cybersecurity in 2019.
The question “Does your organisation have a
business continuity plan?” had five options for
answering: no, 0-6 months, 6-12 months, 12+ months,
I don’t know. 4 respondents replied that they are not
aware of such continuity plan and 2 respondents
replied that the business continuity plan does not
exist at all.
The result of the BIMCO, Fairplay and ABS
Advanced Solutions cybersecurity survey show that
more than a fifth of the respondents (22%) had been
the victim of a cyber attack. Results of the survey
276
carried out among Estonian shipowners reveal that
the percentage of the victims of a cyber crime in the
shipping industry can be higher, in this case 58% of
respondents. Survey carried out by Jones Walker LLP
among the maritime companies in the United States
reveal that 38% of the respondent organisations were
targeted by the cyber criminals within last year (Lee &
Wogan, 2018).
Regarding the nature of the incidents, then here
we can see the resemblance. Most common cyber
incidents reported by the respondents of all three
surveys involve phishing methods, infections with
malware (Trojans, viruses, worms, etc.), spear
phishing, ransomware and theft of credentials.
All main types of the incidents are related to
inappropriate behaviours of humans with IT systems.
As the human factor is increasingly targeted by the
cyber criminals, more emphasis should be placed on
the training and educating of the end users (office
personnel and crews on ships) (Maennel et al. 2018).
According to the BIMCO, Fairplay and ABS
Advanced Solutions cybersecurity survey results 27%
of respondents reported that they had never received
cyber security training. In case of the survey among
the Estonian shipowners only 25% of the respondent
organisations have provided cyber hygiene or cyber
awareness training for their employees (3 out of 12
respondents). Jones Walker LLP has divided the
companies into three categories: small companies (1-
49 employees), mid-size companies (50-400
employees) and large companies (more than 400
companies). Among the mid-size companies the
cybersecurity training program for employees has
been provided within 55% of the respondent
organisations in the United States. This number is
even lower regarding small companies (11%).
4 PROPOSALS FOR CYBER RISK MITIGATION
In this section the author points out some proposals
for the cyber risk mitigation that shipowners can
employ. As the cybersecurity has a multidisciplinary
nature the approach to the cybersecurity has to be
diverse. As the information technology has become an
important part of the commercial process the first
important step that the organisations have to do is to
acknowledge on the highest level of the management
that the cybersecurity problem exists and no-one is
safe. Only then it is possible to move forward and talk
openly about the problem and take necessary steps
for cyber risk mitigation, including provision of
sufficient financial support for the IT department,
training personnel, etc.
Cyber hygiene training should be provided to all
employees of the organisation. They are the first line
of the defense and can decrease the likelihood of a
successful cyber attack or prevent unwanted cyber
incident. Being the weakest link in the information
technology and not receiving any proper cyber
hygiene training the personnel will keep making
mistakes that can cost the organisation a fortune or
even bring down their operations for good. Also the
cyber awareness training should be considered for the
ships’ crews and basic knowledge about
cybersecurity.
International shipping organisations have in recent
years published several guidelines for the industry in
order to raise the awareness in cybersecurity and to
provide some guidance for the companies how to
reduce the cyber risks and enhance the maritime
safety and security. The list of the guidelines is
available online and includes publications among
others from BIMCO, IMO, DNV GL, Lloyd’s Register
and Bureau Veritas (DNV GL 2016; Lloyd’s Register
2016; BIMCO 2017; IMO 2017).
Setting up the proper support from the shore office
for the crew in case of a cyber incident is an important
measure. This has to taken into account when
developing contingency plans. These plans have to
take into account various case scenarios and include
the actions to be taken in case of disruption of critical
systems.
Regular software and hardware updates are
crucial. It has to be kept in mind, that those versions
of software or hardware that are not supported by the
developers are not receiving any updates either. In
many cases Windows XP and Windows 7 are still in
use on the workstation PC’s for running ECDIS
software (Dyryavyy 2014). Hereby, the use of obsolete
software onboard ships should be carefully evaluated
by the shipowner.
Consequently, the cyber risk assessment has to be
carried out. This includes the mapping of the ship’s
functions and systems, identifying critical IT and
operational technology (OT) equipment, reviewing
the documentation on maintenance and support of IT
and OT systems, etc.
In addition, penetration tests by third-party
experts can be performed in order to identify whether
the actual security level matches the desired level.
The author also proposes to carry out
cybersecurity related drills on the ships to test the
readiness of the crew and the effectiveness of the
established procedures. The possible scenarios could
include loss of GPS signal, malfunction of the sensor
readings for critical operations or infection of ECDIS
with malware via USB port.
Strict rules and policies understandable to all
employees have to be implemented on ships for the
use of IT equipment, removable media, charging of
the mobile devices, generation of passwords, etc.
These rules should not only be applied to the crew but
also to the visitors (agents, vendors, etc.). These rules
would reduce the possible cyber risks happening
onboard significantly.
For the shipowner it is crucial to know that the
software that is being used in the ship’s network is of
legal origin and not warez (pirated software) and that
the end users, the seafarers, are visiting websites that
are safe from malware.
It is important to be aware and informed about the
trends in the industry. Knowing that certain threats
exist in the cyber worlds allows the shipowners to be
better prepared. Therefore it is important to report
about the cyber incidents in the organisation and on
the ships to the national authorities and also inform
the international community. This will create a better
277
awareness of the problem and will also keep the ships
safe.
5 LIMITATIONS
Taking into account that the shipping industry is
often characterised as highly conservative and also
considering the seriousness and sensitivity of the
research topic, one can expect, that the feedback to
cybersecurity related surveys would be reserved and
partial. This can be observed also during the two
surveys described in this paper. To some questions
the respondents decided not to provide direct
answers.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides, what the author believes, the
first detailed study on the state of cybersecurity
specifically aimed at the Estonian shipowners. The
purpose of the study was to get an overview of the
state of cybersecurity among the Estonian shipowners
and to understand the motivations for their actions
related to cybersecurity. Based on the conducted
surveys, the author has found that some of the
Estonian organisations operating with ships have
experienced a cyber attack or an incident to some
extent. Although the shipping organisations in
Estonia have already suffered from the cybersecurity
incidents and have incurred losses in connection with
this, the assessment of the level of probability of
possible future cyber incident in their organisations is
still medium to low.
The shipping industry is undergoing a
fundamental transformation. Digitalisation and
automation of the supply chain has significantly
changed the shipping industry in recent years. With
the arrival of new technological solutions the
shipping is also facing new and unknown threats to
the industry. Undoubtedly the maritime sector is
behind of other transportation sectors in terms of
cybersecurity. This includes the protection measures
for the IT and OT systems and networks,
implementation of the cybersecurity guidelines and
standards in the organisation and also training the
personnel in the offices and crews onboard ships.
While the surveys carried out between 2017 and
2019 might have a positive effect to the increase of the
cyber awareness among the Estonian shipowners, it is
expected to be a continued process by the Estonian
researches in this field that will assist the enterprises
to improve their cybersecurity related activities and
risk mitigation procedures. The author will make any
effort to improve the educational programmes for the
seafarers in Estonia and other personnel involved in
the shipping industry. Also propose proper cyber
mitigation procedures and training requirements for
the shipping companies and for enhancing the
understanding of the maritime cyber space in order to
tackle with the impending cyber threats.
The author also proposes to continue with similar
survey once in a year or in every second year and to
involve the shipping industry also beyond Estonia.
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