%0 Journal Article
%A Muhammad, Fadel
%A Widarbowo, Dodik
%A Idris, Muhammad
%A Kendek, Meti
%A Filemon, Filemon
%A Haryanto, Dwi
%A Suganjar, Suganjar
%T Formal Safety Assessment of Passenger Embarkation and Debarkation at Anchorage: A Case Study of an Indonesian Pioneer Service Vessel
%J TransNav, the International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
%V 20
%N 3
%P 619-627
%D 2026
%U ./Article_Formal_Safety_Assessment_of_Passenger_Muhammad,79,1690.html
%X Passenger transfer between an anchored pioneer service vessel and local connecting boats combines relative motion, limited infrastructure and fragmented operational authority. This study develops risk-control options and an International Safety Management Code-based operating procedure for such transfers. A qualitative single-case design with an adapted semi-quantitative Formal Safety Assessment was applied to Pioneer Service Vessel R-72 at Sofyanin anchorage, Indonesia. Evidence comprised case observations, Safety Management System documents and role-based expert judgement from a master, a harbour master and a certified ISM Code auditor. Fifteen hazards were identified, while five common scenarios were scored on a 5 × 5 likelihood-severity matrix and summarised by median and range. The initial risks of falling overboard and boat capsizing were Extreme, each with a median score of 20. Collision between boats, passenger crushing or impact, and loss of boat position were High, each with a median score of 12. A layered control package reduced four scenarios to Medium, but capsizing remained High with a residual median of 10 because catastrophic severity and uncertainty in overload control persisted. Eight control groups were formulated and mapped to ISM Code clauses 5-12. The resulting Layered Passenger Transfer Safety System integrates no-go criteria, boat acceptance, fit-for-purpose access, transfer-zone control, personal flotation devices and rescue readiness, competence and vulnerable-passenger arrangements, organisational learning, and formal local coordination. A written procedure alone cannot establish tolerable risk unless capacity, equipment, emergency readiness and stop-work authority are objectively verified. Controlled field trials remain necessary before operational adoption.
%@ 2083-6473
%R 10.12716/1001.20.03.10