97
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety is one of the maritime domain’s most widely
discussedtopics.Often,itisinstantlyassociatedwith
technological innovation and the replacement of
traditionalnauticalinstruments.Thisdevelopmentis
supplemented by International Conventions such as
InternationalRegulationsforPreventingCollisionsat
Sea (COLREGS), the Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) and
standards for safe ma
nagement and operation of
ships (ISM Code) which have been adopted by
regulatingbodies.
While improving technology and regulatory
respectivestandardizationeffortsaretreatedaspillars
on which maritime safety rests, the seafaring
personnelisoften considered asthe error‐prone and
safety‐criticalelementwithintheworldofshipping–
with human error being the ma
in cause of many
maritime casualties(Allianz2012, 2013 Hetherington
2006,Strohschneider2010).
Inaway,thiscensoriousviewofthehumanfactor
is limiting the approaches taken towards increasing
safety.Thispaperaimsatchallengingthetraditional
perspective on the human element in the ma
ritime
domain: Acknowledging the potentials while being
awareof itsfallibilities and thus makingthe human
factor the third pillar in the concept of maritime
safety.
2 APROACTIVECONCEPTOFSAFETY
The understanding of safety as advocated by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has
recently undergone a shift from a purely reactive
a
pproachtowardsamoreproactiveconceptofsafety
and security at sea (Carbone 2005, Brenker &
Strohschneider2012).Commemoratingmorethan100
years of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) we should
remindourselvesof thatveryevent which triggered
the whole development: The ma
iden voyage of the
Enhancing Safety through Generic Competencies
S.Möckel,M.Brenker&S.Strohschneider
DepartmentforInterculturalCommunicationandCulturalStudies(IWK),Friedrich‐Schiller‐UniversityJena,Germany
ABSTRACT: Thisarticle provides insights into proactive safety management and mitigation. An analysis of
accident reports reveals categories of supervening causes of accidents which can be directly linked to the
conceptofgenericcompetencies(informationmanagement,communicationandcoordination,problemsolving,
andeffectcontrol).Thesefindingsstronglysuggestaddingthehumanelementasanot
hersafety‐constituting
pillartotheconceptofshipsafetynexttotechnologyandregulation.Wearguethatthehumanelementhas
unique abilities in dealingwith critical andhighly dynamic situations which can contribute to the system’s
recoveryfrom non‐routineor crit
icalsituations. By educating seafarers ingeneric competencies we claimto
enablethepeopleonboardtosuccessfullydealwithcriticalsituations.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 8
Number 1
March 2014
DOI:10.12716/1001.08.01.11
98
Titanicwhichsankaftercollidingwithanicebergand
caused the loss of 1,517 lives. Investigations by
membersoftheUSSenateandtheBritishParliament
revealed tremendous safety flaws: For instance, the
ratio of tonnage and the number of required rescue
boatsdidnottakeintoaccounttheactualnumberof
passengersattha
tpointoftime.Thus,theTitanichad
only20rescueboatswithacapacityforatotalof1,178
personswhereas 2,200personswereonboard(Freyet
al.2010).
AlthoughSOLASwasatremendousimprovement
for safety at sea at that time, it was by all mea
ns a
reactive approach: It considered only those factors
that contributed to the sinking of the Titanic.
Regulations were tailored to prevent similar
accidents. While studying the past thoroughly is
certainly not futile, tailoring recommendations in
order to prevent whathas already happened can be
considered a reactive understanding of safety, one
tha
thasshaped the thinkingofa majorityofsafety‐
related industries until the 1980ies (Reason 1990,
Brenker&Strohschneider2012).
However,inthepasttwodecades,startingaround
1990, the IMO adopted a more proactive approach
towards safety which led to the addition of SOLAS
Chapter IX in 1994 and a revised version of the
Standards of Training, Cert
ification and
Watchkeeping (STCW) in 1995. Following these
developments, effortstowards the development of a
better safety ‐culture have been undertaken in the
wholeshippingindustry:Therecentadoption of the
Manila Amendments to the STCW emphasizes, for
instance, concepts such as “m
arine environmental
awareness”, as key concepts of proactive behavior
which is trained in Crew Resource Management
courses(seealsoBrenker&Strohschneider2012).
Still,onecouldarguethatinsteadofeducatingthe
humanelementinproactivebehaviors,traininginthe
use of checklists, handbooks, and in standardized
operating procedures (SOP) are used to eliminat
e
humans’supposedlynegativeimpact.Thisalsoholds
for mandatory drills and courses for handling
emergency equipment and operating other safety‐
enhancing technical equipment. Even the
implementation of the Manila Amendments in day‐
to‐day operations relies firmly on the use of SOPs;
safetyaudits,forinst
ance,stillfollowchecklists.
3 ACCIDENTSASDEVIATIONSFROMROUTINE
SITUATIONS
Onekeyelement,accordingtotheIMO,inidentifying
safety improvements is the analysis of accidents.
OrganizationssuchastheGermanFederalBureaufor
Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) are
institutionsestablishedtoexaminecausesandfactors
of maritime accidents and derive safety
recommenda
tionforthefuture(BSU2013).
In order to use official accident reports for
scientific purposes, it is important to ponder what
accidentsreports revealandabout whatthey in fact
remainsilent.
These reports refer to events on the tip of the
accident pyra mid (Grech et al. 2008). Based on
accident reports there are hardly any conclusions to
be drawn ab
out actions or factors that actually
prevented accidents. Events which might provide
insightsintothisissueareincidents,nearmissesand
unsafeactswhichoccurmorefrequentlyanddonot
necessarilyresultinaccidents(seeFig.1).Sincethere
is room for improvement in the applicat
ion of
incidentreportsystemsthatareinplacetoday(Berg
2013), there is basically no data accessible which
allowsustolearnaboutthosefactorsandactions.
Coming back to the discussion of accident
investigations, there is certainly a lot to be learned
fromaccidents:Concreteexamplesofthi
ngsthatcan
gowrongandhowpeopleactuallybehavedincritical
situations. However, the official reports represent a
ratherrestrictedaccesstosafetyatsea,sincetheycan
onlyprovideinsightsintofailuresofsafetymeasures.
With their rather reactive and practically orientated
scope, accident invest
igation reports represent
examples of highly non‐routine situations that
sometimes illustrate the limits of existing safety
practices. This makes them a valuable and
comprehensivesourceforsafetyresearch(Goulielmos
etal.2012).
Figure1.AccidentpyramidtakenfromGrechetal. (2008:17)
visualizingthedifferentfrequencieswithwhichunsafeacts,
nearmisses,incidentsandaccidentsoccur
Accident situations distinguish themselves from
routinizedstandardoperationsonboardavesselbya
set of specific characteristics: Accidents which are
categorizedas(very)seriousmaritimecasualtiespose
severe threats to human life, the integrity of the
vessel, as well as to the ecological and economic
environment. Hence, the time shortly before, during
and aft
er the occurrence of an accident can be
regardedashighlynon‐routine.Thesekindofcritical
situations can be described as complex: unsafe,
uncertain,non‐transparent and highlydynamic with
crucial decisions to be taken based on conflicting,
erroneous or even lacking information (Borodzicz
2004,Brenkeretal.2014).
Accident
Incident
NearMisses
UnsafeActs
99
4 CATEGORIESOFACCIDENTCAUSES
Assessing accident reports from the BSU (2013)
publishedbetween2003and2012wefoundevidence
that there might be a need for safety
recommendations beyond the pillars of regulatory
issues(workingproceduresandstandardization)and
technology improvements. Some observations made
by accident investigators show that the human
element involved – through it
s knowledge, skills or
behavior–couldhavemadeadifferenceforthebetter
inthecourseofevents.
Following Bainbridge’s (1983) ideas about “the
ironiesofautomation”inwhichtheauthordiscusses
the unintended consequences of automation (an
expansionratherthaneliminationofoperatorrelated
problems), we present selected casualties whose
causes and aggrav
ating factors suggest that several
proceduresandtechnologies,implementedforsafety
had,atleastinthesecases,aratherdetrimentaleffect.
InTable1wegroupthoseaccidentsaccordingtosix
categories which we will explain in the following
paragraphs.
Unlikely and unexpected events: In invest
igation
reports one repeatedly comes across the phrase that
“eventstook a suddenand unexpected course”. The
crews had no handbook available nor was there an
SOPinplacethatcouldhavehelpedtorestoresafety
in this particular situation. Hazards of seafaring are
legion and legendary (Blackmore 2009). They are
causedbysuddenweatherchanges,phenomenasuch
asfreakwaves,ortheunexpectedmalfunct
ioningof
instruments or machinery. Whenever we think we
haveways andmeans to deal effectively with every
course of events, even the unlikely ones, there are
alwaysexceptionsnoonehaseverthoughtof(Taleb
2004, 2010). SOPs and well‐rehearsed emergency
drills cannot be comprehensive mea
sures to attain
safetyinanyandallsituations–weneedmoreways
todealwithuncertainty.
Non‐compliant behavior: The rationale behind
establishing rules is the firm belief that everyone
adheres to them. Adherence to safety rules is an
arduousta
skandpeoplewhochoosetoneglectthem
infavoroffocusingonotheraspectsoftheirworkare
oftenevenrewarded–aslongasnothinggoeswrong
(Dekker2005).
Safety flaws and ambiguity: In spite of thoroughly
devised and adhered to rules and regulations, there
are safety flaws where the applicat
ion of a rule and
procedures is ambiguous. We discovered a report
where even in the aftermath of an investigation the
correctapplicationofrulesandprocedurescouldnot
be determined. It might not be the rules and
regulations that are obscure, but complex crit
ical
situationsdefinitelyare.
Diffuse state of information: It is a characteristic
featureofemergencysituationsthatthereisadiffuse
state of information. Investigations refer to the
unavailability of critical information as factors
contributingtoanaccidentandthereforeproposethe
integration of displays that would make them
available on existing bridges. Ironically, it is a
commonobservationtha
ttherealreadyisanoverload
ofinformationonbridges,whichholdsespeciallytrue
incriticalsituations(Strohschneideretal.2006).
Inadequate communication: One could also argue
that inadequate communication is the result of the
existenceofrules,well‐trainedSOP and a
utomation.
An increasing availability of data on the bridge in
combination with one‐man watch schedules on
merchant vessels reduces the need for interpersonal
communication, so that this essential skill withers
away (Strohschneider 2010, Dekker et al. 2008).
However, particularly in critical and piloting
situations effective communication between the
bridge tea
m and the assisting pilots would be an
essentialtool(Brenkeretal.2014)whichisbackedup
by several reports listinginadequate communication
asonecauseforanaccident.
Table1. Selected BSU (2013) reports which exemplify six
ironiesofriskmitigationandmanagement
_______________________________________________
No. Category
_______________________________________________
Unlikelyandunexpectedevents
176/05 Installationofawrongshut‐offvalvecausedafire
onacontainership
262/03 Unexpectedruptureofafairleadshackleledto
hospitalizationofthreecrewmembers
637/06 Deathofaseamanandthreeinjuredafterwave
07/10 Unexpectedweatherconditionsledtofoundering
Non‐compliantbehavior
09/06 Collisionasaresultofm
ultiplenon‐compliant
behaviorsconcerningcrossingtheshippingchannel
andrightofway
181/04 Assumingthatbowthrustersareshutoffduring
Divingsessionsadiverwasmortallyinjured
455/05 Omittingcontinuouspositioningresultedin
touchingtheseabottom
Sa
fetyflawsandambiguity
155/04 Inthecourseoftheinvestigationitcouldnotbe
determinedwhobroketherightofway,resulting
inacollision
Diffusestatusofinformation
167/08 Strandingonanunchartedreef
198/02 Differingconvoylistssenttoatankerarecausalfor
acollisionintheSuezCanal
119/05 Contradic
toryinformationfrompilotandacrew
memberonlookoutaboutanobjectintheshipping
channel
156/03 ledtoacollision
Inadequatecommunication
510/09 Communicationproblemsbetweenthepilotand
helmsmanledtocollision
107/08 Communicationproblemsbetweenthecaptainand
thepilotledtoacollision
115/06 Discrepanciesinarrangingthemaneuverledtoa
collision
Technologybri
ngsproceduralchange
166/05 Maloperationoftheautopilotandpoorobservation
oftheautopilot’seffectsledtothedeathofacrew
member
19/03 Restrictedavailabilityoftheradarduetoweather
conditionsledtoacollision.Rec
ommendation
aboutregulartrainingontheusageofnavigational
equipment.
_______________________________________________
Technology brings procedural change: Technology
comesalongwithproceduralchangewhichisthekey
message of Bainbridge’s (1983) observations. Newly
introduced (technical) instruments put different
requirements on the operator ranging from purely
operational skills, to the integration into existing
procedures and, finally, the management of critical
situationswhentechnologyfails.Thei
ntroductionof
ECDIS as a mandatory navigational instrument, for
100
instance, has sparked a debate about the socio‐
technicalerror‐pronenessofthetechnologyandabout
thenavigators’needsforspecialtraining(Tang2009,
Jie & Xian‐Zhou 2008, Allianz 2013). Similar
observations have been made with regard to the
introduction of radar‐technology, which has been
associatedwitha
heightenedwillingnesstotakerisks
inadverseweather conditions(Perrow 1984). Sifting
through accident reports we found examples of
proceduraloperatorerrorscausingaccidents.
Onlyinsomecasesthecategoriesmentionedmay
havebeenthemajoraccidentcauses.Yettheycanbe
definitely regarded as contributing factors to a fatal
course of events. They exemplify that measures
intendedtoraisethesafetylevelmightundercertain
circumstances have unintended, and even
contradictory, side effects. In these cases the human
element is often regarded as a safety critical factor.
Wearguethatthehumanelementhasuniqueabilities
indealingwithcritical
andhighlydynamicsituations
which can contribute to the system’s recovery from
non‐routineorcriticalsituations
5 GENERICCOMPETENCIESFORRESILIENT
SYSTEMS
Technology and regulations, intended to prevent,
mitigate, and manage critical situations, will not be
enough to achieve the best possible levels of safety.
“[T]heveryrules,procedures,
andtechniquesusedto
bring about excellence in emergency situations may
actually contribute to failure in crisis” (Borodzicz
2004:416).A pointof view that has been adopted in
recent years in the aviation domain as a result of
research in high‐risk and high‐reliability
environments:The human elementhas to
be trusted
(and supported) in dealing with critical situations
instead of being eliminated from the control loop
(Dekkeretal.2008).
Reason (1990) distinguishes between people “at
thesharpend”whoarelocatedattheplaceintimeof
the accident (i.e. the crew of seafarers) and those
people“at
thebluntend”whoareindirectlyinvolved
into the happenings as, e.g., industrial engineers,
nauticalarchitects,agents,policymakers,ordesigners
(Celik et al. 2007). In terms of proactive risk
management onboard, the “generic competencies”
could be beneficial in mastering complex critical
situations and allow the seafarer to mitigate or to
manage them successfully. We claim that besides
occupational skills and knowledge there is also the
need for a set of domain‐independent generic
competenciesthat helpseafarers atthe sharpend to
handlecriticalsituations.Thesewillbeelaboratedin
thefollowingparagraphs:
In critical situation seafarers face information
overload
as well as erroneous, contradicting,
incomplete or even lacking information (cf. Tab.1:
diffusestateofinformation).Theseafarerhastolearn
to cope with these circumstances in a quickly
developingsituation of stressand threat.The ability
to develop strategies to handle the information
available and to analyze in order
to make valid
decisionsiscalledInformationManagement(Bergström
etal.2008,Dörner1996,Strohschneider2010).
In routine situations and some particular critical
situations(suchasman‐over‐board,abandon‐ship,or
firedrills) responsibilitiesandfunctionsonboardare
clearly structured. Yet, in a critical situation these
structuresmightneed
tobeadjustedaccordingtothe
given circumstances. Communication and Coordination
(cf. Tab.1: inadequate communication) are
indispensable competencies to articulate causal
coherencesandadapttounfoldingevents(Bergström
etal.2008,Strohschneider2010).
Non‐routine situations are characterized by
uncertainty as well as their dynamic character (cf.
Tab.1: unlikely
and unexpected events, safety flaws
and ambiguity). Therefore, decision‐making has to
take into account all available and relevant
information while still being aware of current
developments. The process of continuously
structuringdecision‐making andthe implementation
of decisions is described by Decision and
Implementation. This competency helps to make
decisionsbasedonwhatisactuallyhappeningandto
developalternativesforaction(Bergströmetal.2008,
Dörner1996,Strohschneider2010).
In rapidly progressing situations it is vital to
perform Effect Control (cf. Tab.1: non‐compliant
behavior,technologybringsproceduralchange).This
is the process of checking whether the
intended
effects of actions are achieved (or not) and whether
the situation develops according to or in contrast to
theexpectations(Bergströmetal.2008,Dörner1996,
Strohschneider2010).
This set of generic competencies supplements
requirements like “situation awareness” or “shared
mental models” that are often referred to in the
human
factors literature as being critical for safe
voyages (Stanton et al 2001, Stout et al. 1999). It is
comparable to Dörner’s (1996) model of decision
making and problem solving competencies which
describes skills that help in transferring knowledge
andanalogiesfromonecontexttoanothertoallowfor
flexibleproblem
solving.
Predefined and well‐rehearsed SOPs, can only
prepareforexpectedcriticalsituationsandmightfail
under (slightly) different conditions, such as similar
but yet different scenarios or in the absence of key
players.Inthesesituations,amoreflexibleapproach
seems promising: “It was found thatin every single
case
of a successfully managed crisis event, the
positiveoutcomecouldbedirectlylinkedtocreative
orflexiblerulebreakingbykeydecisionmakersinthe
response”(Borodzicz2004:418).
6 CONCLUSION
We neither intend to appeal nor to ban emergency
drillsandSOPs.Insteadwepledgetoquestionthem
in
situations when they reach their limits and
complementsafetybyeducatingseafarersontheuse
ofgenericcompetencies.Thereisaplaceandtimefor
each SOP and each regulation– but also for generic
competencies. Seamen should trust their own
knowledgeandskillsindecisionmakingandbeable
to
abandonrulesandroutinesiftheyaredetrimental
tothesafetyofcrew,ship,orenvironment.Weargue
101
that the human element has unique abilities in
dealingwithcriticalanddynamicsituationsandthus
can contribute to the system’s recovery from non‐
routine or critical situations. These abilities do not
come out of nowhere, they have to be trained and
furtherdeveloped.
While the value of non‐technical
skill taught in
courses like Crew Resource Management or
Engineroom Resource Management has beenwidely
accepted(Wuetal.2014),thereremainsthechallenge
ofaneffectiveintegrationofacrew’sresourcesacross
allworkingareas(Brenkeretal.2014):Aspointedout
above, emergency situations demand a coordination
of
all crew members to manage the situation
effectively. Therefore, we make the case for the
training of generic competencies as a set of
competencies that reach beyond occupationally
anchoredskillsandfacilitatethehandlingofnewand
uncertainsituations.Fromthisvantagepoint,generic
competencies are best described as a toolbox
that
could provide seafarers with the necessary tools to
regaincontrolofsituationsthataredifficulttocontrol
iftheyareapproachedbythebook.
7 FURTHERRESEARCHDIRECTIONS
Educatingseamenongenericcompetenciesconfronts
us with many challenges. They range from
educational and didactic questions to challenges
which distinguish
the maritime domain from many
workplaces ashore. Three questions seem to be of
specialimportance:
1 The concept of generic competencies is in
accordance with current maritime training and
qualification approaches (Hill et al. 2014). It
remains open how to best adapt and integrate
various approaches and concepts to match
seafarers’
demands.
2 How can generic competencies be taught in an
effective and sustained way? This is a current
research question in various domains (Bergström
et al. 2009, Heijke et al. 2003 Strohschneider &
Gerdes2004).
3 Whoarethekeyplayerstobeeducated? Bearing
inmindthatcrewsare
affectedbyhighfluctuation
(Carbone2005)andhavetoworkacrosslanguage
barriers (Kahveci et al. 2002, Sampson & Zhao
2003) this becomes a major issue. How can we
assure that crews have collectively acquired
adequategenericcompetenciessothatthelevelof
safetyonboardisactuallyenhanced(Brenkeretal.
2014)?
Wedonotclaimthatwealreadyhaveanswersto
thesequestions.However,wearguethattrustingthe
humanelementatthesharpendandacknowledging
its contribution to successful mastering of critical
situations is a proactive meas ure for safety
management. It depends on the conception of the
human
elementwhetheraflexiblehandlingofcritical
situations in order to return to a routine state is
judged as rule breaking or a paradigm shift
(Borodzicz2004)inmaritimesafety.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The article is a product of the MarNet Project
(03SX322D) which is supported by the German
Federal Ministry of Economics
and Technology
(BMWi).Itisbaseduponacontributionpresentedat
the International Conference on Marine Navigation
andSafetyofSeaTransportationinGdynia,2013.
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