International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 3

Number 4

December 2009

373

1 INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that modeling and simulations

(M&S) has no alternative in the modern education

and training (E&T). The port security E&T is not an

exception.

The process of elaborating a conceptual model of

port security simulating complex in Bulgaria coin-

cides with the process of transforming the Harbour

Protection System (HPS). In addition to the concom-

itant problems, this coincidence causes a positive

opportunity – to avoid adjustment of an existing

simulating system to a new HPS realization and to

elaborate a M&S complex simultaneously with the

that is to be modelled.

2 BULGARIAN PORT SECURITY SYSTEM:

When elaborating a variant for optimization of the

Bulgarian HPS, we took into account two types of

considerations.

The first group, named “scientific considera-

tions”, is a direct result of the theoretical analysis of

the security systems as a particular class of organiza-

tions and the application of the “mission approach”

for functional analysis to the Bulgarian MSS per-

formance.

The second group of considerations, named “an

accomplished facts or facts of life”, is a result of

studying the Bulgarian MSS current status.

The summary of so called “scientific considera-

tions” is:

1 The HPS is to possess greater “informational

capacity” than the opposing organizations do.

2 The HPS is to function permanently and to be

able maintain a regime, adequate to the level of

threats. Said in other words, to increase or de-

crease its functional parameters in the context

of scale of the threat.

3 The HPS is to be predominantly “object orient-

ed” than “zonal oriented”.

4 The HPS is to be granted a relatively high level

of autonomy, but the autonomy has to be bal-

anced with reliable control.

5 The HPS is to be able to achieve flexible satis-

faction of the management principles in a dy-

namic environment. Said in other words, the

HPS has to maintain correct balance between

relatively contradictory principles in the context

of the situation.

One more “scientific consideration” should be

mentioned. It comes for comprehension that, during

the passage of a ship to/from the port area, the re-

sponsibility for her protection will be granted to the

Navy. On the other hand, the responsibility for pro-

tection of the cargo during its delivery to/from the

port will be granted to the Ministry of Interior. In

both cases, the responsible institutions will be capa-

ble to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks by choos-

ing more safety roots for passage and/or providing

reliable protection measures in a typical environ-

ment of operating. The problem, which arises, is re-

lated to the fact that the transfer of the responsibility

for cargo protection will be done in place and time

when the cargo is most vulnerable – in the area of

the port.

The following consideration is to be added:

Conceptual Model of Port Security Simulating

Complex (Bulgarian Standpoint)

B. Mednikarov & N. Stoyanov

N.Y. Vaptsarov Naval Academy, Varna, Bulgaria

K. Kalinov

G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College, Sofia, Bulgaria

ABSTRACT: Using modeling and simulations has established itself as the most effective approach of prepar-

ing personnel engaged with crisis management, including the training of port security responsible personnel.

On the background of presenting the overall methodology of transforming Bulgarian Harbour Protection Sys-

tem, the paper formulates a set of requirements for port security related education and training and proposes a

general model of a simulating complex supporting the education and training process.

374

6 The HPS is to compensate the shortcomings of

the existing system, by providing adequate pro-

tection of ships and cargoes in the most vulner-

able area: littoral approaches to the harbour,

port area and adjacent urban area on shore.

On the base of the Bulgarian MSS current status,

the following consideration has been formulated:

The optimization of the HPS is to consider the cur-

rent organization of the system. In other words, the

process of optimization should not involve the idea

of dramatic redefinition of the existing organization

of the HPS or a new subordination of resources. The

optimization has to focus mainly on the opportunity

for improvement of the HPS functioning by

achievement of a synergy effect of shared efforts on

the base of correct co-operation. Practical recom-

mendations are:

7 The HPS is to be in full compliance with the

European, national, and international legisla-

tion.

8 The HPS is to consider existing “status quo” of

the organizations involved (and interested) in

harbour protection. The minimal changes of the

“status quo” are recommended.

9 The optimization of the HPS has to provide

correct solution of the organizational “com-

mand and control dilemma”.

Taking into account that to a great extent the

problems of the Bulgarian MSS current status are re-

sult of a situational approach to problems and the ex-

istence (and establishment) of too many interacting

organizations, one more consideration should be

added:

10 When optimizing the HPS, we should not es-

tablish one more organization, but unite the ex-

isting bodies (or their representatives) in a sys-

tem.

On the base of the defined considerations, we

elaborated a concept for optimization of the existing

HPS. The leading idea of the concept is to achieve a

viable HPS that, on the one hand, possess “informa-

tional superiority” to the possible threats (especially

– the terrorism), and on the other - to satisfy man-

agement principles in accordance of the situation.

Both aspects of the concept are realized by estab-

lishment of network-organized HPS, which in a con-

flict situation is centralized on a level immediately

above the scale of the terrorist threat

The system is organized on the base of the exist-

ing network of Port Security Councils, established

by the Bulgarian government Ordinance No 53/2005

in response to the requirements posed by ISPS

Code.[3]

The Ordinance No 53 [7] establishes three securi-

ty levels of readiness of the HPS. During the first

level of readiness (the lower one) the system is

maintained by the Port Security Councils mentioned

above. When a higher degree of readiness is report-

ed, the Councils are strengthened with additional as-

sets (from the Ministry of the interior and the Navy).

In the context of the situation and in accordance with

a procedure, a senior person in the council is nomi-

nated (a chairman of the council) The nominated

chairman is granted the right to exercise authority

over the forces (assets) placed under command. The

process of delegation of the command authority and

the extent of the delegated authority are settled by a

procedure.

In fact, the process described is the realization of

the idea of centralization of a network organized

HPS on a level immediately above the scale of the

threat.

The technical base of the “new-born” centralized

system is carried by a naval unit.

The area of responsibility of the system includes:

littoral approaches to the harbour, port area and ad-

jacent urban area on shore.

The components of the HPS are in fact joint forc-

es belonging to different institutions and organiza-

tions. As we can see they provide “object oriented”

protection. The “zonal” aspect of the protections re-

mains a responsibility of the state institutions. Every

institution exercises it in its particular area and/or

functional direction of responsibility.

The “command and control dilemma” is settled

by, on the one hand, a procedure for nominating of a

senior person in the Harbour Protection Council, and

on the other - a procedure which regulates the trans-

fer of authority over the HMS (or a part of its com-

ponents) among different bodies.

The results of the negative factors “life-cycle”

analysis serve as a base for formulating the indica-

tors that “switch” the levels of the readiness of the

system and the transfer of the authority over the

whole HPS (or a part of its components).

3 PROBLEMATIC FIELDS OF HARBOUR

PROTECTION SYSTEM EDUCATION AND

TRAINING:

The current harbour safety and security related E&T

process suffers the following practical problems:

− ship officers have little knowledge of the whole

maritime safety and security system, whose func-

tioning has become significantly more important

in the light of the ISM [2] and the ISPS Code.

Very often, the lack of this knowledge leads to

375

demotivation of the main participants in the pro-

cess of maritime transport;

− the training pursuant to the ISPS Code relies on

the acquisition of standard tactical and technical

methods of protection, which provides general

standard basic knowledge and skills. Even though

this is necessary, it contradicts the idea of pro-

activeness and creative problem solving;

− the increased requirements of the STCW Conven-

tion, which already cover all the categories of

maritime transportation system security officers,

now demand a new system of training and a suit-

able learning environment;

− developing and maintaining such an environment

requires significant expenses and the employment

of a very well-prepared team, which is beyond the

affordable for a maritime training institution.

− These problems are hyperbolized by some con-

tradictions in the computer-assisted E&T process:

− developing and maintaining an expensive and

complex environment for computer-assisted E&T

is not affordable for a maritime training institu-

tion;

− the training in the issues of security should not be

closed up only within the framework of the mer-

chant marine;

− the future maritime officer should receive a much

broader range of training in the issues of safety

and security than the minimum required one in

order to be an active organizer and an adaptive

participant in the processes occurring in the

World Ocean;

− the total time for training of the future maritime

officers is reduced, and because of this the neces-

sary balance must be stricken in their fundamen-

tal training in safety and security, and a new level

of knowledge and skills must be achieved by ap-

plying both traditional and new training tech-

niques.

These issues are practically a direct result of the

lack of common methodology for preparing and

conducting computerized training related to the gen-

eral subject area of maritime security and harbour

safety in particular.

4 FORMULATING REQUIREMENTS FOR

PORT SECURITY SIMULATING COMPLEX:

This part of the article describes overall logic under-

lying in the process of harbour responsible personnel

E&T. It reflects two dominant concepts:

1 The E&T process serves the function of system

adaptation (Lynch J. 1937).

2 Despite being a process of setting and maintain-

ing desired behavior; the management process is

based on reactions.

Notwithstanding that both concepts overlap, they

pose some distinguishable requirements. In this con-

text, some additional explanations are necessary.

Assuming that education is a process of adapta-

tion, we have to take under consideration that “adap-

tation takes place on at least three different levels”

(Gell–Mann 1994). On this base, we have defined

three levels of the system adaptiveness: short-term

adaptiveness, long-term adaptiveness, and evolu-

tionary adaptiveness.

The short-term adaptiveness is a process of adap-

tation to the current situation. It is therefore a pro-

cess of direct and situationally-oriented adaptation.

It is performed predominantly by the way of func-

tional adjustment. The process of functional adjust-

ment very often is held by selection of a functional

model (schema) that is relevant to the situation rec-

ognized.

The long term adaptiveness is a process of adap-

tation to relatively predictable future conditions of

the environment. In addition to the functional ad-

justment, it is performed by the elaboration of struc-

tural prerequisites for functional adjustment to pos-

sible future situations. The practical execution of

this process usually includes: making prognoses;

analysis of possible situations; and elaboration of

adequate reactions.

The evolutionary adaptiveness is observed in un-

predictable situations. It is therefore performed by

elaboration of structural prerequisites for the neces-

sary system’s properties for adaptation in cases of

emergency.

It is a good idea to make a parallel between, on

the one hand, the three levels of adaptation, and on

the other – the three levels of management (tactical,

operational and strategic). Going one step further,

we can state to a great extent of certainty that the

E&T process has to provide prerequisites for the

three types of adaptiveness.

Assuming that the harbour protection manage-

ment process is based on reactions, the scopes of dif-

ferent types of management can be summarized as

follows:

1 Strategic management is to achieve better align-

ment of organizational policies in response, in a

long-term time scale, to changes in the external

environment and in the organization itself (the in-

ternal environment).

2 Operational management is the process of design-

ing, executing, and controlling an organization's

operations that convert its resources into desired

end-state, and implement a selected strategy. This

type of management responds in a relatively

short-term time scale to predictable changes in

the external environment.

376

3 Tactical management is the process of quick and

accurate assessment of the situation and elabora-

tion of an appropriate response.

The particularity of the three levels of manage-

ment advocates the necessity of three distinguishable

types of E&T.

Considering on the one hand, the comprehension

that one’s reactions to a particular situation are an

original “cocktail” of previous experience and the

ability to estimate and respond to the particularity of

the situation, and on the other – the parallel between

levels of adaptiveness and levels of management, we

can formulate the focuses of the different levels of

E&T process.

The initial E&T process (tactical) has to establish

behavioural models necessary for quick response to

a familiar situation. In other words, the purpose is to

give the trainee an adequate “memory”. For this rea-

son, the basic level of the port security simulating

complex has to provide models of typical situations

in typical environments.

The next stage of E&T process (operational) is to

make the trainee to “overcome” the framework of

the behavioural models learned, to “recognize” the

specificity of the situation, and to elaborate proper

(which means – specific) response. In order to sup-

port this idea, the port security simulating complex

has to provide models of non-routine situations in

non-routine environments.

The last level of the E&T process (strategic) ex-

plores the idea to give the trainee the ability to make

logical relations in an “unrelated” processes and

events, to recognize the patterns that they have in

common and “cause - effect” relations, and on this

base, to elaborate basic and widely applicable be-

havioural models.

Taking into account that computer-assisted E&T

basically provides simulations which model the con-

ditions of performing system functioning, obviously,

simulators have to be flexible enough in order to be

able to “shift” the accents of the overall E&T pro-

cess.

This understanding of port security E&T process

is the base for formulating the following require-

ments to the overall M&S system:

1 The virtual environment for the HPS’s E&T pro-

cess has to provide both “technical experience”

and “management practice” for the personnel.

The “sub-recommendations” are:

− the simulators have, on the one hand, to be in

full compliance with the equipment, and on the

other – to “reflect” the existing organization of

the HPS;

− both the simulators and the M&S methodology

are to be flexible enough in order to “shift the

emphasis” of the training from “predominantly

technically oriented” to the “predominantly

management-oriented”.

2 The virtual environment for the HPS’s E&T pro-

cess has to model a great variety of possible safe-

ty and security situations.

Any reaction in a particular situation is based on

behavioural models which have “worked” in similar

situations. The lack of real practical experience of

the HPS leads to the idea to provide the HPS with an

“artificial memory”. This means to use an opportuni-

ty to acquire data of situational games in virtual en-

vironment, to analyze the data collected, to derive

indicators for recognition the particular situation,

and to suggest a management decision. The recom-

mendation is:

3 The simulators have to provide an opportunity for

“case management” by modeling specific situa-

tions, acquisition and analyzing data and suggest-

ing particular course of action.

Taking into account, on the one hand, the dynam-

ic nature of the security environment, and on the

other – the abstract charge of the social comprehen-

sion for “safety”, the next recommendations are:

4 The simulators have to provide an opportunity for

upgrading and modernization.

5 The M&S methodology and the supporting base

(databases, software, workstations, etc.) are to be

flexible enough in order to allow their adjustment

to the changeable organization of the HPS.

The necessity of the simulators and M&S meth-

odology flexibility can be developed in one more di-

rection – the idea to use virtual environment for sci-

entific purposes. The possibility to test different

realizations of the HPS’s architecture is to be pro-

vided by specialized software.

The second conclusion suggests that there are dis-

tinctive “accents” of the E&T process.

Preliminary preparation is performed on the basis

of typical scenarios. The E&T process is carried out

in circumstances posed by “an unidentified risk”.

Logically, the recommendation is:

6 The simulators have to support the following ac-

tivities:

− development of typical scenarios;

− development of typical reactions in context of

the typical scenarios;

− examination of the HPS’s functioning in the

environment described by the typical scenarios.

The simulators support the following activities:

training, planning, and research.

The recognition of the negative factor as “a risk”

finalizes the preliminary preparation on the basis of

377

typical scenarios and the focus of the E&T process

shifts to preliminary preparation on the basis of con-

crete scenarios. The recommendation is:

7 The simulators and the M&S methodology have

to be able to select scenarios adequate to the cur-

rent situation and to provide reliable prognosis for

the possible development of the situation.

The last conclusion of the analysis led us to the

idea, that the short-term adaptation process becomes

dominant in relation to any other HPS’s function. In

fact, after the recognition of a negative factor as “a

risk”, the other activity, in practice, stop and “melt”

into the background of the elaboration of a response

to the current situation. Obviously, the paramount

role of the short-term reactions suggests that the

E&T process first has to provide “technical experi-

ence” for the operative personnel and “management

practice” for the low hierarchical level managing

staff, and only after that – to put attention on the

preparation of long-term oriented adaptive reactions.

This motive led us to the idea to try to answer the

question if there is any relation between, on the one

hand, the different accents of the E&T process, and

on the other – the safety and security concepts.

Professor Donna J. Nincicl provides an interest-

ing metaphor explaining the difference between the

safety and the security concepts: “safety is doors

open to allow free access for escape or rescue in a

dangerous or unsafe situation. Security, on the other

hand, is doors closed to prevent access to those who

might wish to do us harm” (Nincicl 2007). Assum-

ing, that “security can be considered protection from

active malicious agents” and “safety, on the other

hand, can be considered protection from accident,

maritime casualties…”, we went one step further

and say that safety is “effect-oriented countering”

concept, which means – short-term oriented. In the

contrary, security is “cause-oriented countering”

concept or – long-term oriented. Logically, the E&T

process has to consider that safety related E&T is the

basic prerequisite for the security related E&T. The

recommendation is:

8 The M&S methodology has to provide correct

balance between the safety and security orienta-

tions of the E&T process.

5 CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR FLEXIBLE

SIMULATOR ARCHITECTURE

The conceptual model of the “simulating complex”

is presented in fig. 1.

The system “input” includes:

− “stakeholders” requirements;

− modelling and simulation theory and practice;

− cases from practice;

− technical equipment description;

− description of the organization.

The “input” serves the following functions: elab-

oration of a simulations methodology and data ac-

quirement.

Figure 1 Flexible architecture for Port Security Simulating

Complex

Taking into account a particular purpose of the

E&T process and related modeling and simulations

methodological procedures, the managing body (sys-

tem) of the E&T process formulates the desired

“output” products. This task is supported by a spe-

cialized for the case software.

Different combinations of the products are “uni-

fied” by the managing system (using the support of

related managing software) in different E&T forms

and/or forms of providing modelling and simulations

support to the decision-making process.

At tactical level the simulating complex has to be

aimed to mono-agency task training – fire brigade,

police, port security staff, navy etc.

In accordance with the operational level of simu-

lations simulation process has to be aimed to the rep-

resentation of wide spectrum of operations. The re-

quirements that the model has to follow are different

than the previous (tactical) level ones. Because of

the nature of operations, an important part of this

level is the possibility to create a simulation of a cri-

sis management system. The main purpose of the

system is to shorten the time needed to make up the

optimum cleanup decision, in order to reduce popu-

lation losses, financial and ecological damage and

other types of direct and indirect damage. In this

378

way the simulation system has to be a powerful tool

for the support of emergency response decision mak-

ing. The system should coordinate and control the

activities of the units involved and provide infor-

mation to all of the participants of decision making

team.

The most common tasks for modelling at the op-

erational level are:

− using electronic charts with possibility to edit,

add and delete objects and information;

− portraying operational plans on the charts;

− route and resource planning;

− monitoring the resource motion;

− assessing response resources;

− comparative analysis of different plans, etc.

The last but not least is the application of M&S at

the strategic level. At this level, the undertaken ac-

tions are similar to operational level, but generally

they are more global and wide ranged:

− displaying strategic plans on the charts;

− resource planning;

− monitoring the resource motion;

− assessing response resources;

− comparative analysis of different plans, etc.

6 CONCLUSION

Even a passing glance on the proposed conceptual

model of the Port Security Simulating Complex in-

spires the sentiment that the system proposed is a

kind of “perpetuum mobile” for the moment.

Being conscious about the “utopian” charge of

the concept proposed and keeping in mind that many

things that were “fiction” in the past are parts of our

life nowadays, we state that the real problem for

elaboration of a similar M&S system is not “tech-

nical”, but it is related to our willingness to solve it.

Its establishment in practice will help us to

achieve the main goal of education and training -

preparation of highly motivated and well educated

and trained port security personnel.

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(http://www.imo.org), 22.05.2008.

[3] International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS

Code), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Lon-

don, 2003.

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[5] Gell – Mann Murray. 1994 The Quark and the Jaguar. Ad-

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294.

[6] Nincic, D. 2007, Maritime Security Education and Train-

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[7] Ordinance No 53/2004on the conditions and manner for

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(http://www.port.bg/bg/documents/nar53.pdf), 22.05.2008.

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