1 INTRODUCTION

The global trade development caused, that within the last 20 years, on the oceans, began to appear more and more tankers, and other vessels that carry a bewildering variety of goods (starting from weapons up to food supplies). The world today transports almost 90% of its all freight by sea. On average, it is estimated that at any time of a day travels more than 10 million containers around the world. One of the biggest dangers that faces the contemporary world of shipping is piracy. The phenomenon concentrates, first and foremost, on waters bordering areas affected by lack of political authority or severe instability, bad economic situation and various problems of social nature. On the other hand another important factor, which significantly affects the appearance of the potential risk of the piracy, is the geographical location especially presence of gulfs, straits or archipelagos, which make piracy possible and very profitable business.

A perfect example of a state meeting all the above factors governing incurrence and the development of piracy is Somalia. This country for many years has been the place of many various armed conflicts, from small tribal clashes, by a series of conflicts with neighbouring countries, until the great civil war, which has been affecting the country since 1991. As a result, there has been a catastrophic destruction of infrastructure, agriculture and domestic industry. Through all these years, Somalia was struck many times by droughts and natural disasters, which have led to a lack of food and as a result of that to unimaginable famine. This difficult situation caused the break-up of the state structures in the flame of the war. Somali authorities asked for assistance the international community, which expressed its approval on several occasions by a number of the resolution. Finally peacekeepers were established in Somalia, with a goal to stabilized the tense situation in the country. All of these missions failed to help the situation and the only advantage of them was to show how difficult are the realities in this part of the world.

The absence of alternative sources to acquire the means to live stimulates the Somali population to take up piracy business and related activities. In that reality piracy seems the only possibility of survival. In order to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery it has been decided to regulate legally, what piracy and armed assault is and then what the difference between these two offences is. The list of offences has
been introduced for this purpose as well as criminal sanctions for committed acts. There were also introduced the principles of extradition, legal ways of accusing presumed criminals and how to pass the international cooperation. In addition, the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the European Parliament in connection with the deteriorating of political situation and increase in attacks in Somalia, have decided to post the relevant resolutions containing provisions concerning improvement of safety and inform about the current situation in this area.

The problem of modern piracy, particularly in the area of the Horn of Africa, through political implications is extremely difficult, and therefore, precise and comprehensive solution is not easy to work out. It is related to the long-term process of decision-making in order to prevent criminal acts in this area. Requires the cooperation of both local and international centres, which must overcome a number of cultural, political, economic barriers and social conditions. It is also very important to act instantly and try to keep maritime transport as safe as possible. For these reasons some measures have been undertaken immediately.

2 ORGANISATION OF MARITIME TRANSPORT IN A SECURE AND SET CORRIDOR IN THE GULF OF ADEN

During the early months of 2008, security in the Gulf of Aden was almost solely provided by the Combined Maritime Forces ("CMF") Combined Task Force 150 ("CTF-150"). At various times CTF-150 has comprised vessels of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Pakistan and other nations. But piracy has not been its main target—which is general maritime security as part of the War on Terror—and CTF-150 is thinly spread over not just the Gulf of Aden but also the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and a large part of the Indian Ocean; a total of 2½ million square miles. To cover this vast area CTF-150 usually has about 14 ships, including supply vessels.1

During 2008 the number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden dramatically increased, especially along the coast of Yemen. In August 2008, as a result of pressure from the International Maritime Organization and other bodies, CTF-150 established a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden (Figure 1.), with the intention of channeling merchant vessels through a corridor that would in theory afford greater safety, because defensive measures would be more effective when concentrated in a smaller area. Thanks to the coalition patrols of warships and aircrafts, the safety of all vessels travelling in the basin was ensured. Easier control, monitoring, and the possibility of faster response, scored big chances of international forces in the fight against widespread piracy and everything seemed to coming back to normal. But all these measures, although ensuring the safe passage of some merchant ships, and preventing some boardings, could not avert a further large number of hijackings and an even greater number of unsuccessful attacks. The situation began to worsen and pirates started to attack more often and farther than ever after hijacking of MV *Sirius Star* - an oil tanker – in November 2008. It was clear that the MSPA did not achieve the expected results, and the passage of the vessel inside the corridor involved increasing risk. There were not enough warships patrolling MSPA, and it was quite a widespread area.

In connection with the escalation of action in the Gulf of pirate, at the beginning of 2009, International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) was established (Figure 2.), and boats were advised to travel in convoys.

The creation of a new corridor was to group ships, in order to give them additional protection not only from the army, but also from each vessel included in the group. Mutual observation of vessels, was giving additional protection, so important during the transition. The greater number of units pa-

---


trolling the corridor, was to discourage Somali pirates to attack ships.

IRTC has to secure safe passage through the Bay. The zone is plotted by the centre of the Gulf Aden and ships move one rate for the entire length of the corridor. In addition, the risk of attack has been limited by the separation of the corridor into two parts, for traffic on the East, and for traffic on the West, by separating the two tracks of two mile safety zone. Entry in the corridor is strictly controlled, entering the boundary corridor for specific times, depending on the speed of the vessel. Delimitation of the corridors for the movement to the East and West, as well as narrowing them, and the assigning of the vessels according to their speed possibilities to the time of entry into the zone, greatly helped forces of military coalition in this area to make the area safer to pass.

Since the introduction in 2009 of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor for all ships passing thorough the Gulf of Aden, cruise-goers can feel much more secure against the threat of Somali piracy. Potential cruise passengers should also be reassured about such matters as travel insurance, changes to the cruise excursion schedule and the unobtrusive nature of the protection offered.

To make sure that situation is properly handled in January 2009 was created the CMF’s Combined Task Force 151 (“CTF-151”), commanded by US Navy Rear Admiral Terence McKnight, with a specific mandate to counter piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, thereby releasing CTF-150 to carry out its original task of anti-drug, anti-smuggling, and other general maritime security operations.

3 OPERATION ATALANTA

Although CTF-151 helps efficiently to keep the Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden secure, it is not the only military mission in the area. Since 8 December 2008 the European Union (EU) has been conducting a military operation to help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. This military operation, named EU NAVFOR Somalia-operation ATALANTA, was launched in support of Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846 which were adopted in 2008 by the United Nations Security Council. Its aim is to contribute to:

- the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia;
- the protection of vulnerable vessels sailing in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

This operation - the European Union's first ever naval operation - is being conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Operation ATALANTA's mission is to:

- provide protection for vessels chartered by the WFP;
- provide protection for merchant vessels;
- employ the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present.

The EU Operational Headquarters is located at Northwood, United Kingdom. The Political and Security Committee exercises the political control and strategic direction of the EU military operation, under the responsibility of the Council.

The operation was initially scheduled for a period of twelve months. During that period more than twenty vessels and aircraft took part in EU NAVFOR. At present it has been extended by the Council of the European Union until December 2010, and again for another two years, until December 2012.

4 Knott J., op. cit.

The EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta consists of units from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Contributions from third countries such as Norway, are participating as well. Malta, Portugal and United Kingdom are also participating. There is also a close cooperation with Russian, Indian, Japanese and Chinese vessels.

The composition of EU NAVFOR changes constantly due to the frequent rotation of units and varies according to the Monsoon seasons in the Indian Ocean. However, it typically comprises 5 - 10 Surface Combatants (Frigates/Destroyers), 1 Auxiliary and 3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Units are drawn from the contributing nations. The Force Head Quarters vessel rotates on a four monthly basis.

The operation can arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in the areas where it is present and it can seize the vessels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels caught following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as well as the goods on board. The suspects can be prosecuted either by an EU Member State or under the EU-Kenya agreement, which gives the Kenyan authorities the right to prosecute. A website is used in coordinating both merchant shipping and military activity. This approach has been welcomed by the merchant shipping industry. Merchant vessels that follow EU NAVFOR recommendations run a much smaller risk of being attacked and/or captured.

Since the start of the operation the number of attacks by pirates has greatly diminished. This is linked to the dissuasive presence of the vessels of the EU NAVFOR ATALANTA force and to the self-protection measures which have been put in place for merchant shipping at the recommendation of the European naval force.

Operation EU NAVFOR is part of the global action conducted by the EU in the Horn of Africa to deal with the Somali crisis, which has political, security and humanitarian aspects.

The EU supports the Djibouti process for peace and reconciliation in Somalia, facilitated by the UN. As the effectiveness of protection measures employed within the Gulf of Aden has increased, pirates have started to operate in previously unused areas to avoid interdiction by EU NAVFOR and other counter-piracy forces. Through the 2009 inter-monsoon periods it became evident that pirate action groups were operating at ever greater range to avoid detection. In light of these changes, EU NAVFOR has increased its area of operations to maintain pressure on the pirates and to continue to constrain their freedom of action. In doing so, EU NAVFOR endeavours to ensure that legitimate maritime traffic within the region continues to receive the best protection possible. This procedural change allows EU NAVFOR units to operate more effectively further east in the Indian Ocean, giving them a greater ability to disrupt and deter pirates in this vast area.

It is very difficult to evaluate the operation which has still been in progress. The basic idea behind this strategy is to deter pirates by making it harder to hijack ships. The strategy is mainly an offshore focussed strategy, with little emphasis on onshore measures to prevent piracy, however, in practice it seems to be combined with an onshore, centralized state-building strategy. It is very difficult however to build a stable central government as its power range is limited to several city quarters in the capital city Mogadishu. Without employing local institutions, authorities fighting piracy might be a very difficult, expensive and long process, and nobody can guarantee its success.

The containment approach dominates the approaches to Somali piracy today; major funds are being used on it in order to contain piracy. The European Union for example uses "The European Union’s Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia” and pledged €212 million for development assistance from 2008-2013, while the EU’s joint naval endeavour, Operation ATALANTA, planned to spend an estimated $450 million in one year only. The result so far can be described as satisfactory but far from very good as we still can hear about attempts of attacks or successful attacks in the area.

4 DIRECT MEASURES TO PROTECT SHIPS FROM PIRACY

In the situation of the still growing acts of piracy, of the coasts of Somalia mainly in Gulf Aden, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has decided to issue a series of recommendations on good practices in the field of the fight against piracy. Ship-owners and masters of vessels in the area are recommended to sign their ships on the website of the Centre of maritime safety on the Horn of Africa-MSC (HOA) before the vessel enters the Gulf Aden. It gives the possibility of continuous monitoring by EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA, and obtaining all nec-

---

7 Ibidem.
ecessary information about the situation in the Gulf of Aden. Unfortunately as IMO delivers every third time which gives the possibility to international forces to escort the vessels. They should avoid entering territorial water of Yemen as they are not protected by international forces. Apart from that the ships should transit the waters at night as the number of attacks is much lower at that time.

At the time of planning the transition through the high risk area, the company together with the captain of the ship must make the relative risk assessment, taking into account all the most up-to-date information from the area of the threat. This assessment will allow to estimate the likelihood of attack by pirates, and take additional outside regulation measures in favour of the fight against piracy. Owners are obliged to register their ships on the website of the MSC (HOA) – www.mschoa.eu, since it is the source of many necessary and most up-to-date information needed when planning a journey in waters of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. The captain is obliged to ensure that all procedures associated with the passage of a vessel by a vulnerable area were made. He must make sure that the company reported to MARLO – Maritime Communications Office and UKMTO Dubai - the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations intention of entry of the vessel in international Transit Corridor – the IRTC, five days before the planned entry. If such notification has not been sent, the captain is required to complete this obligation. The captain must accurately inform the crew of the planned passage and anti-piracy protection measures. The captain decides also if the AIS (Automatic identification System) should be turned on or not. A very important element in secure against pirate attack is blocking access to the ship. In the first instance you should protect and control access to the bridge of the captain, the bridge, the engine room, and all cabins inside the vessel.

It is recommended that there is a special dedicated room onboard - a citadel ‘a hardened’ secure space in the ship, which fulfils the role of the assembly at the time when the risk of attack has been rated. It is designed to block and delay access to the control of the ship by pirates. Although in 2010 military forces have freed three vessels by conducting ‘opposed boardings’ while the crew was safely sealed in citadels. Despite this, shipping operators are warned that they should not treat a citadel as a panacea and that a proper risk analysis is essential. Requirements for the placing of the citadel and how to use it are the newsgroups, for this reason, masters of vessels, on a regular basis should verify this information via the MSC (HOA).

Another a very popular way of thwarting a pirates attack is the use of water and fire hoses and hose to clean the deck. It is recommended that they are distributed over the whole length of the deck ready for use, and the pump, supplying water to the hydrants should be in on, while passing through high risk areas. High pressure water stream addressed in the attackers, effectively can refute the attack.

Additional protection for the ship may be applicable Razor Ship. This is a system of cables wired along the side of the ship and low placed to enter at the stern. This is one of the essential elements of the passive defence before the attack, which can be used while passing the sea, at the time of berthing at anchor and in port. The system has many advantages, thanks to which it is so popular on ships, and they are:

- low cost;
- strong psychological barrier to overcome, not ease to overcame for the attackers;
- easy assembly and dismantling (such a security system is only recommended in risk areas);
- high efficiency and the possibility of prolonged use; practical packaging allows the quick and safe positioning of the crew to wire the whole length of the ship, and facilitates storage in marine conditions;
- system of passive protection (approaching at your own risk);
- easy to link individual lengths of wire (in the case of securing large surface);
- a good tool for protection against pirates, together with the LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device -

---

10 Trapla M., op. cit., 78-79.

an acoustic sound waves device which produces, long range acoustic wave energy of 151dB, for comparison, the threshold of pain for a man is about 120dB, it is applied in immediate distress), it is one of the more effective systems to fight\(^{12}\).

Another very helpful device in defence against piracy are Counter Piracy Net. This is a substantial change in the field of passive defence. Plastic containers with the network should be on the perimeter of the entire vessel, in the proper distances. In the event of danger, the security shall be released and to discharge the net on the surface of the water or just below it, by pulling along the freeboard and stern up to 50 metres. In addition, the networks are equipped with a orange buoys, to act as a deterrent and visually warning of danger.

BEA Systems is another way to direct the fight against piracy. BEA Systems has pursued its expertise from the scope of the defence, safety at sea and airspace sector to develop a technology that enables the detection of small units and identify actions of pirates in a radius of 25 km, such distance is sufficient for this that the crew can prepare themselves to take appropriate action, in order to avoid an attack.

BAE System includes such devices as:

- high frequency radar to detect small boats in a radius of 25 km;
- wide area surveillance system, the system makes it easy to detect traffic unit and has alarms levels of risk;
- passive radar identification system (PRISM), intended to provide early warning against unidentified ships;
- equipped with better lighting, giving the ability to detect and deter intruders who are in the vicinity of the ship during the night\(^{13}\).

Another effective weapon in the fight is an ion cannon. It supposed to send ion beam with such force that any electronic systems, responsible for work of the weapon systems or propulsion and steering were unable to use. Before the struck boat comes back to normal, the vessel that became the target of an attack gets the time to escape\(^{14}\).

As we can see there are many different, passive possibilities to protect the ship from pirate attacks. All of them are probably quite efficient but they must be put in practice otherwise they are just useless gadgets. This is directly connected with money spend on equipment of modern ships, which should be able to have such devices installed if necessary.

The money spent on passive protection, training programmes and other things connected with better security is a well spent money, which may save the crew. It should be noticed that the situation in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin has become very difficult in such a short time that many of ship-owners, captains and crew members do not want to accept as true that passing in the described area is dangerous in spite of the presence of international forces from CTF 151 and EU NAVFOR.

5 ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN OUTSIDE PIRACY ZONE

IMO specifies how the crew should behave while passing through the area of the Gulf Aden and how should the vessel be carried out. Primarily, the master should avoid areas in which the crew is exposed to the risk. Presence on the external parts of the deck should be limited to the minimum from dusk to dawn, however, be aware of the continuous performance of watch keeping.

Vessels should be addressed through the Centre of maritime safety and the licence of the Horn of Africa-MSC (HOA) to the corridor liner - the IRTC, at appropriate times, depending on the speed of the vessel. The captain should be in constant contact with the above mentioned centre and keep track of the information provided by the institution on the website.

If the route of the ship is not passing through the IRTC, this unit should move with full engine, not slower than 18 knots. Transition by the Bay as far as possible should be carried out after dark.

It is important that both vessels entering and outgoing from the IRTC do not switch off navigation lights, while they limit lights on-board. Additional lighting of a ship using a remotely operated head-lamps is consistent with the law, but they may not be jeopardized in any way the security of the maritime traffic.

During the voyage, special attention should be given to small boats, which are frequently used to attack by Somali pirates. Their photographs and description should be on board the vessel. When the crew enter into suspicion about the approach of this type of craft to the vessel, the risk assessment should be made immediately and a report of this event should be sent to UKMTO Dubai and IMB PRC using the after the attack report. The pirates boat should be immediately informed that they had been noticed using lamps, alarms, and the corresponding movements of the crew. If possible use of all available non-lethal types of weapons, assess their advantages and usefulness in a given situation, and the exposure of the ship concerned.

\(^{12}\) Trapla M., op. cit., 85-86.

\(^{13}\) Ibidem, 87-89.

\(^{14}\) Source: Ion cannon
It should be mentioned that pirates develop very quickly and adjust their actions to changing conditions which can be seen for instance in stretching the area of attacks. This forces International Maritime Bureau (IMB), military forces, shipping associations and insurers to take suitable actions by producing the third version of Best Management Practices (BMP3).

Released in June 2010, the new, pocket-sized BMP3 contains everything that ship-owners, operators and masters need to know about deterring attacks. EU NAVFOR commented the BMP3 to be a very helpful tool to avoid attacks especially because in multicultural nature of crews and the fact that standards can vary, it is important to have one common way of action in case of pirates attacks. The booklet is distributed free of charge to ships.

It contains additional advice on ship-protection measures aimed at counteracting the latest pirate tactics. It also includes a copy form of the UKMTO form for vessel position reporting.

As mentioned above reflecting the increasing range of pirate attacks, the high-risk area defined in BMP3 has been expanded beyond the Gulf of Aden to the area bounded by Suez in the north, south to latitude 10° and east to longitude 78°. The area between 47°E and 49°E remains the most dangerous for pirates attacks especially during the daylight.

All the precautions have not entirely prevented vessels being attacked in or near the transit corridor. It should be barred in minds that the planning, constant alertness is crucial for the safety of any ship travelling at the described waters.

If pirates were able to get on board it is very important that any action taken by both the master and the crew of the vessel were directed to:

- ensure the safety of all persons on board;
- maintain control over the vessel;
- leaving the ship by attackers.

In case of both, the risk of attack, and in the case of invading pirates on board a vessel, this fact should be immediately reported to UKMTO Dubai, and if possible to the ship-owner. This should be done before the introduction of the attackers on the bridge. It is very important that the whole crew is together (excluding personnel on the bridge) and remained in the same location on the ship. They should show no resistance and do not behave in a daring way. If there is a citadel, it should be equipped with necessary measures and use them in the event of intrusion attempts of the pirates. In addition, the crew should keep away from any illuminators, manholes, and does not try to stop the pirates from boarding the ship. Be aware of the emergency communications available from inside the citadel and as soon as possible connect with the relevant.

It is extremely important to remember these rules, because they may save crews’ lives in a critical situation. It would be very helpful to bear in mind such points:

- ship operators should register at www.mschoa.org and submit a vessel movement registration-form;
- sent a UKMTO vessel position reporting form (included in BMP3);
- report transit details regularly;
- define the ship’s AIS policy;
- keep emergency contact numbers near;
- read BMP3 implement protection measures and test anti-piracy procedures before the high-risk area;
- maintain crew vigilance and awareness, avoid complacency;
- drill crews in what to expect and how to react;
- always use the IRTC and Gulf of Aden group transit;
- if using a citadel, ensure that all crew members are safely inside;
- if under attack keep the ship moving.

6 CONCLUSION

No matter what temporary precautions we are going to take and how alert we stay in dangerous waters, it is important to remember that fighting piracy must take place not only offshore only, leaving escaping pirates to shelter and ride off the storm to try another day. To fight them we must use many methods and try to engage local institutions. It is true that in Somalia there is lack of powerful central government, but local institutions function pretty well and they should be used in this struggle. So far, focus on a centralized solution has limited the international fleets’ access to information from onshore sources. It has also limited the international fleets’ ability to cooperate with entities that de-facto hold power close to the pirate bases. There is no single solution to Somali piracy, and none of the described approaches is entirely successful nor without merit. On the other hand we have to be aware that European-founded operations to combat Somalia-based piracy could be hit by major public spending cuts. Many countries in Europe have serious problems with constructing their budgets and extra money spent on piracy might be a difficult overweigh impossible to bare for next year or years to come. It can also be

---

15 Worwood D., op. cit., 22.
17 Cuts and counter-piracy, Safety at Sea,13, November 2010, vol. 44 no 501.
heard that shipping must stop relaying on a limited military presence and deal with the problem through proper crew training and vessel design. It is of course a solution but there are also voices saying (especially BMP3) that the use of special armed guards on board the ships is not the best solution.

Total elimination of piracy through the constant control of the Gulf of Aden by using the ships involved in the ATALANTA operation and others is rather unlikely but its limitation should contribute to resolve these issues and gain stability. However, this cannot be the only step done by the ‘West’ in order to ensure safety in this part of the world. We have to offer Somali pirates some alternatives, work opportunities otherwise ex-pirates are likely to slip back into a life of maritime crime.

REFERENCES

Davis N., Take responsibility for stopping piracy, Lloyd’s List, October 2010, No. 60.273.
EU naval operation against piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA),
EU NAVFOR, Press release,
International Recommended Transit Corridor
Ion cannon,
Knott J., Somalia, The Gulf of Aden, And Piracy,
Maritime Security Patrol Area 2008,
European Union Naval Force Somalia - Operation Atalanta

18 Davis N., Take responsibility for stopping piracy, Lloyd’s List, 6, October 2010, No. 60. 273.